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Abstract
In 1990 and 1992, the Academy Award for the Best Motion Picture of the year was won 
by movies belonging to the Western genre: Dances With Wolves, and Unforgiven. Recent 
work on the Western claims that these achievements and the flood of new Westerns dating 
from the late 1980s up to the present signal a renaissance of the genre within the film 
industry, and among critics and the public. The notion of a revival has attached to it the 
idea of a preceding lapse, when a movie genre is “out of fashion”. The lapse experienced 
by the Western beginning in the mid-1970s has a clear parallel in the late 1920s, when the 
trade press announced the demise of the genre. The aim of this thesis is to argue that 
these periods of lull in the popularity of the Western are tied to historical events that 
directly undermined the ideological base of American thought and culture. A principal 
aspect of that ideological base is the American Myth of the Frontier. In the 1930s the 
myth was challenged by the Great Depression, and in the 1960s and 1970s, the Civil 
Rights Movement, Women’s Liberation and Vietnam. In the latter era, an entire 
generation of young men, raised in the ‘Golden era’ of the Western when the frontier myth 
gained its widest currency, were inspired to charge into battle 9,000 miles from America’s 
shores for a victory that was sanctioned by the past. The tragic consequences of that war 
exacerbated the failure of that national narrative of triumph, and as the most dominant 
vehicle of frontier mythology, the Western correspondingly encountered an obstacle to its 
popular reception. This present volume locates expressions of popular culture as 
barometers of the performance of myth. It has, as its subject, an account of the route via 
which the Myth of the Frontier was repaired, by focusing primarily on the gaps prior to the 
myth’s re-emergence. The gaps identified are episodes when myth loses its dehistoricizing 
function, when the frontier becomes a moment in the past that has no relevance for the 
present. An examination of how historical memory is disabled through the movies reveals 
the pervasiveness and continued significance of the frontier myth to America’s self-image.
Prior histories of the Western observe moments of the genre’s resurgence, but 
this thesis adds to the field of criticism in its exploration of the possible reasons underlying 
the restoration of its popularity. This is achieved through an analysis of the various genres 
to which the frontier myth migrates after the ‘A’ Western ceases to be an outlet for its 
discourse. The Gangster film, ‘B’ Western and Vietnam War movie are such surfaces of 
emergence. Part of the originality of this work, for example, is the research on the ‘B’ 
Westerns directed by Joseph Kane and starring Gene Autry. The gaps in the history of the 
Western are thus viewed positively as having the utility for comprehending the relationship 
between the Western genre and the frontier myth. After the introductory chapters which 
discuss the concepts of genre, myth and the Western, this thesis analyses the centrality of 
the historical events that challenged expressions of frontier mythology in the two periods 
identified and the process through which that history is mediated, reconstructed and finally 
replaced.
Preface
Kansas. The late 1880s. A time when lawmen were killers, 
outlaws were heroes and a bad reputation was good as gold. 
It is eleven years since outlaw William Munny (Clint
Eastwood) laid down his gun and retired. But times are
hard. His wife is dead, his young children hungry and his
farm stock dwindling with fever. At this low point he is 
visited by The Schofield Kid who is looking for a partner to 
help him gun down a couple of cowboys and collect a 
bounty.
Who better than celebrated gunfighter William Munny?
1993 Warner Home Video gloss for Unforgiven
The 1990 Academy Award for the Best Motion Picture of the year went to Dances With 
Wolves, with Kevin Costner obtaining the award for Best Director of the same film. The 
movie garnered 12 Oscar nominations, winning seven. Two years later in the 1992 Award 
ceremony, the same two Oscars were to go to Unforgiven, with the award for the
category of ‘Best Director’ going to Clint Eastwood. Unforgiven won a total of four
Oscars. What is both apparent and unusual about the above is that Dances With Wolves 
and Unforgiven are Westerns. Prior to these two movies, other nominated and Oscar 
winning Westerns of note include: Stagecoach, nominated for seven awards in 1939, 
including Best Picture, winning two; The Ox-Bow Incident nominated for Best Picture in 
1943; in 1952 High Noon acquired seven nominations including Best Picture, winning four 
of the awards; Shane nominated for Best Picture in 1953 with four other nominations; in 
1963 How The West was Won got seven nominations including Best Picture, winning three 
awards; John Wayne won the Best Actor Oscar for True Grit in 1969, the film gaining one 
other nomination.1 One observation that can be made from this list is the absence of
Westerns meeting the Oscar standard after the late sixties. The winning of Oscars by 
Westerns again in the nineties is unusual for a variety of reasons, the most significant of 
which being the dwindling popularity experienced by the Western genre after 1972. This 
phenomenon, recorded by Phil Hardy in his Encyclopedia o f The Western, has traditionally 
been aligned with contemporaneous events associated with Vietnam.
The Hollywood Western reached a peak of popularity and preeminence from 1969 
to 1972, with an average release by American producers of 24 Westerns a year. This 
number was drastically reduced from 1977 to 1982, with an average of only 4 releases.2 
The approximate ten-year silence that ensued from the mid-1970’s to the mid-1980’s 
relates closely to the political, social, economic and historical contexts in which the 
Westerns are situated. These contexts significantly influenced the popular reception of the 
genre. Changes and movements wrought by the Great Depression, the Civil Rights 
Agenda, the rise of Feminism, and the Vietnam War initiated an unprecedented 
questioning and de-stabilizing of the assumptions that constitute the ideological base of 
the movie Western. The persecution of ‘Otherness’, a fundamental requisite of the 
Frontier Myth, and the Western’s image of the American Hero as a solitary white male 
became the focus of much condemnation in the light of the revision of America’s history 
as a union of ethnic groups.
In the early 1990s, however, the movie Western showed positive signs of revival, 
marked by the successes of such Westerns as the two Young Guns (1988, 1990), 
Lonesome Dove, Dances with Wolves (1990), The Last o f the Mohicans, Unforgiven 
(1992), Tombstone (1993), Bad Girls, Maverick, The Cowboy Way (1994), and The 
Quick and the Dead (1995). This repair of the Western had previously been attempted 
three times since 1970; the initial efforts at revival, however, failed to generate the 
sustained investment or continuous production in the form that would constitute an active 
movie genre.3 The more substantial achievement of this fourth attempt suggests a
corresponding restitution of frontier mythology in the American imagination; the Western 
is, without question, the dominant surface in which discourses of the myth emerge.
In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner delivered in Chicago an address that was to 
commemorate the four hundredth anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of America. This 
paper, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, would have a great impact 
in academic circles, and is widely acknowledged as a key source in understanding 
America’s frontier myth. Turner’s concerns revolved around the wilderness, with Indians 
existing at the periphery of his notion of progress4 The Turner thesis is essentially one of 
an advance into an uninhabited continent. However, in popular culture, the confrontation 
with the figure of the Indian savage gained precedence: Richard White exemplifies this 
argument in considering the influence of “Buffalo Bill” Cody’s Wild West shows, where 
narratives of Indian conflict and conquest were presented to much broader audiences. 
White’s contention is that the West of the imagination is one more rooted in Buffalo Bill 
than in Turner.5 Such an endeavour is also demonstrated in the work of Richard Slotkin, 
whose seminal volume Regeneration Through Violence argued unequivocally that the 
American character was ineluctably linked to the extermination of a savage Other.
This thesis is greatly indebted to Slotkin’s examination of American history and 
definition of myth. Nonetheless, it departs to some exent from his interpretation of the 
dynamic that exists between myth and popular culture. Slotkin’s perception of the 
Western as a genre of mythic expression assumes a direct translation of the myth into 
cinematic terms.6 He equates the frontier myth and the Western via an emphasis on their 
narrative forms. A more complex ideological framework may be acquired in utilizing 
Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse and Marxist conceptions of base and 
superstructure. In this instance, the Myth of the Frontier appears in surfaces of 
emergence; the superstructure of the myth is constituted by a variety of discourses that 
articulate its central tenets. The Western, for example, is a surface of emergence in which 
the discourse is in a narrative form. The discourse also occurs in surfaces that are less
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based on narrative: Turner’s Thesis, Thomas Jefferson’s writings, the rhetoric of John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and other American presidents and politicians are 
examples of this. Discourses of the myth can also migrate to narrative expressions other 
than the Western. This process can be seen as evidence of a diachronic change in the myth 
when responding to moments of social crisis. The mythic discourse is no longer possible 
through the vehicle of the Western genre when it is in opposition to the provision of 
cultural verisimilitude. Steve Neale’s provocative distinction between verisimilitude and 
reality supplies the theoretical foundation of this argument.
The thesis is divided into three parts, and organized around two major lapses in the 
popular reception of movie Westerns: the “gunfighter gaps”. Part I consists of the 
introductory section and establishes the main concerns of the project: illustrating the 
dominant terms and assumptions of the study as a whole. Chapter 1 discusses the notion 
of genre, chapter 2 the Myth of the Frontier, an essential component of any study of the 
Western, and chapter 3 looks at the Western in the context of the Classical Hollywood 
Cinema. Following the introductory chapters, the book takes up the interaction between 
significant movements in the reception of the Western and the shifting socio-economic 
backgroundsin which they are situated. Part II focuses on the 1930s and analyses the 
centrality of the Depression in the ‘A’ Western’s temporary demise. The three chapters 
discuss the migration of frontier discourse to the Gangster formula and the ‘B ’ Western, 
with particular emphasis on the role of censorship, the documentary motive, and the 
assimilation of the white ethnic. The section ends with a consideration of the ‘B’ 
Westerns made by Republic Studios, directed by Joseph Kane, and starring Gene Autry. 
It attempts to correct the traditional bias towards the ‘A’ budget products of the major 
studios, and suggests the possibility that the ‘B’ movie offers legitimate spaces for 
ideological negotiation.
The last section begins by looking at the social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s 
and the instrumentality of the Vietnam War in this second undermining of the frontier
myth, where the Western virtually disappears from the genre map. The repair of the myth 
is witnessed in stages, from an incomplete enunciation in the first wave of Vietnam War 
movies to Oliver Stone’s trilogy where the narrative of victory emerges intact; mythic and 
cultural verisimilitude co-exist. The cowboy persona of Kevin Costner is explored, along 
with the notion that he fulfills the capacity of a post-revisionist Westerner. Though 
Eastwood is mentioned in this preface his movies tend to transcend generic notions of the 
Western. Paul Smith, in his exhaustive study Clint Eastwood: A Cultural Production, is at 
pains to certify that Unforgiven is endowed with the status of art.7 The predilection that 
this thesis has towards the generic over the artistic is explained in the first chapter. The 
Eastwood Westerns are not discussed primarily because of their detachment from the 
Hollywood Western genre, a quality that can initially be attributed to the direction of 
Sergio Leone. The influence of Leone leads to a representation of the genre that exists 
outside of the moral universe of the traditional Western. The Italian Westerns occupy a 
space that is at one remove away from discourses of frontier mythology: they are, in a 
literal sense, discourses about these discourses. Thus Christopher Frayling’s critical study 
Spaghetti Westerns: Cowboys and Europeans from Karl May to Sergio Leone 
productively examines the relationship between the European Western and the American 
version, while this thesis gives special emphasis to the relationship between the American 
Western and American history and myth. The Westerns I subject to close analyses reflect 
the differing concerns and arguments of each section.
In “The Adventures of the Frontier in the Twentieth Century”, Patricia Nelson 
Limerick cites a “colorful” definition of the closing of the Turnerian frontier: historian 
Paula Petrik reported that when the frontier phase passed, the prostitutes in Helena, 
Montana lost their independence to men who took control of their earnings. Limerick is 
led to the conclusion that “the frontier ends when the pimps come to town.”8 Though on 
a more sombre note, the closing of the movie Western frontier is also susceptible to 
Turnerian dimensions — the gaps identified conform to episodes when myth loses its
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dehistoricizing function, when the frontier becomes a moment in the past. The tools of its 
incapacitation are historical events that challenge and ultimately replace the frontier myth’s 
version of the past, such that the myth forfeits its relevance for the present time. An 
examination of the ideological spaces that inhere before the re-opening of the movie 
Western frontier is thus vital in understanding the persistence of myth, and its ability to 
substitute historical memory with a new past in which it is always germane.
Acknowledgments
The research and writing of this thesis have greatly benefited from the 
advice and suggestions of Peter Stanfield, who not only played a major part 
in providing a flow of material pertaining to ‘B’ Westerns and access to the 
films, but also read and criticized the chapters on the 1930s.
I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Steve Neale, for his support in 
the last six months. I am also grateful to John Kirby and his staff at the 
Psalter Lane Campus Library, who have at all times rendered helpful and 
efficient service.
Prof. John Rogerson contributed to this project with his careful reading 
of the original manuscript. I have profited from his comments and guidance 
in the final stages of this thesis. My deepest gratitude goes to Rosalind 
Rogerson, a remarkable friend who has offered emotional support, 
generosity, kindness and unfailing patience through transitions and 
traumas.
Finally, I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Richard Maltby. 
Richard has engaged with this research on all levels with an intellectual 
rigour and a keen sense of clarity. His enthusiasm for my work in these last 
four years has been a constant source of inspiration and encouragement.
And I thank my parents, for all of the above.
Contents
Abstract i
Preface ii
Acknowledgments viii
Part One. Filming the Mythic West
1. The Western and Hollywood’s Classic Era: 1 
“An Art Form for Connoisseurs”
2. The Western and Frontier Mythology: 32 
Ideology Expressed in a Narrative
3. The Western Formula and Film Narrative: 63 
Playing the Game
Part Two. The Western and Depression America
4. The Depression Era: Progressivism and the 
Discrediting of the West
5. Negotiating the Thirties: Gangster Heroes and 
Masked Discourses of the Frontier
6. The New West Hero: Gene Autry and the 168 
Antimodern Resolution
Part Three. The Western After Vietnam
7. Civil Rights, Feminism and Vietnam: American 197 
Credibility and the Challenge of the Sixties
8. Launching Out of the Quagmire: Early Vietnam 233 
Analogies and the Sci-Fi Movie
9. Recycling Mythologies: Cinematic Regressions and 269 
the Post-Revisionist Western
96
128
ix
Epilogue: Generic Interludes and the Reconstruction o f Myth 306
Appendix 312
Notes 314
Bibliography 345
Select Filmography 354
x
The Western and Hollywood’s Classic Era 
“An Art Form for Connoisseurs”1
Genre space is also mythic space: a pseudo-historical (or pseudo-real) 
setting that is powerfully associated with stories and concerns rooted in a 
culture’s myth/ideological tradition. It is also a setting in which the 
concrete work of contemporary myth-making is done. This is 
particularly true of the Western, whose roots go deeper into the 
American cultural past than those of any other movie genre.2
Richard Slotkin
In Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction, Richard Maltby describes Hollywood as a 
generic cinema.3 Contemporary genre criticism postulates that genres consist not only 
of films, but “also, and equally, of specific systems of expectation and hypothesis which 
spectators bring with them to the cinema, and which interact with films themselves 
during the course of the viewing process”.4 Steve Neale writes of genres as having a 
“process-like nature” evident as an interaction between three levels: “the level of 
expectation, the level of the generic corpus, and the level of the ‘rules’ or norms’ that 
govern both.”5 The activity of the spectator is a notion that is rejected in Dwight 
Macdonald’s denunciation of the mass culture spectator as a “passive consumer” but 
present in the first clause of this definition of genre.6 Acknowledging the link between 
the audience and the genre movie facilitates a comprehension of Slotkin’s claim that
1
generic space can be “powerfully associated with stories and concerns rooted in a 
culture’s myth/ideological tradition”. As the film viewer is an intrinsic part of the 
process by which a genre movie may achieve any degree of popularity, and also how that 
popularity may be sustained, it follows that a prevailing genre can have associations with 
the fundamental beliefs collectively held by audiences.
Richard Dyer’s article on “Entertainment and Utopia” perceives entertainment as 
a temporary answer to the inadequacies of society.7 The table of categories that he 
provides relates to the more superficial and immediate desires of the audience: energy, 
abundance, intensity, transparency and community. Dyer does make the qualification 
that class, race, and sexual caste are omitted in his paradigm as they are “denied validity 
as problems by the dominant (bourgeois, white, male) ideology of society.” These gaps 
in Dyer’s ‘utopian sensibility’ are particularly significant in their relation to the American 
mythological tradition. The ideals of entertainment can only fulfil the wants that 
capitalism itself promises to meet — “entertainment provides alternatives to capitalism 
which will be provided by capitalism.”8 However, when the problems of class, race and 
sexual caste gain a dominance that overpowers the alternatives that capitalism can 
provide, then the alternatives offered become inadequate. The issues of race and sexual 
caste, for example, were highlighted by the Civil Rights and Feminist movements in the 
1960s. It is arguable that after that decade entertainment was forced, at least 
momentarily, to address these issues as constituting the legitimate inadequacies of 
people in society. Thus the utopian solution of “community” cannot meet the social 
tension caused by “fragmentation” when the communal interests offered only avail to 
those who are white, and the solution of “intensity” is overwhelmed by that of 
“dreariness” when activity is reserved only for those who are male. This partially
2
explains the appearance of movie Westerns in the early 1970s that compensate to some 
extent for the increased recognition of these needs by alterations in the genre ~  the 
Vietnam Westerns, for example, are notably more critical of the notion of white 
supremacy than their predecessors. The social aspects of class, race and sexual caste are 
fundamental to American frontier mythology: the Western hero breaking the democratic 
code in being more equal than his fellow Americans, the requisite of a racial Other, and 
the prominence of a central figure who is male. The instability of these three notions 
creates fissures in the myth that signal its irrelevance, and the myth undergoes changes in 
response to the contemporaneous fissures it attempts to mend. As described in the 
opening quote from Slotkin, the genre film as a receptacle for myth functions as “a 
setting in which the concrete work of contemporary myth-making is done.” The generic 
space that has retained its relevance as entertainment would thus appear to have a 
mythic agenda of seeking to seal the gaps of class, sex and race. In doing so the changes 
in myth are registered and negotiated.
Formula, as opposed to genre, is more directly linked to the discrete elements 
associated with the composition of the genre movie. John G. Cawelti’s Adventure, 
Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture begins with the 
study of literary formulas. The literary formula is a useful base from which one may 
ascertain the components of a film formula, though these latter components would 
include certain aspects not available in the former, sound and visual effects being 
obvious examples. Cawelti defines formula as “a structure of narrative or dramatic 
conventions employed in a great number of individual works.”9 Formula is a 
combination of two separate entities: narrative and convention. Patterns of convention 
are usually specific to a particular culture and period, and may be interpreted differently
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outside this specific context.10 The nineteenth-century formulaic relation between 
blondness and sexual purity, for example, would not be pertinent in the twentieth- 
century, which has a different formula for blondes; Richard Dyer’s documentation of 
The Dumb Blonde Stereotype serves to illustrate the ascent of this more recent formula 
using the film personas of Jean Harlow, Alice Faye, Betty Grable and Marilyn Monroe.11 
The second aspect of formula, that of narrative, refers to patterns of plot. Plot patterns, 
distinct from patterns of convention, are not necessarily limited to a specific culture or 
period. They seem to represent story-types whose popularity transcends the boundaries 
of culture and time, almost Jungian in their universal appeal. A popular story-type such 
as the Western employs both components of the formula. The creation of a Western 
entails the usage of conventional images and symbols of cowboys, pioneers, outlaws, 
saloons and frontier towns, along with cultural archetypes or themes such as law and 
order versus outlawry, and nature versus civilization. Formula and genre, however, are 
for Cawelti not two distinct properties as I have made them out to be but two phases of 
an evolutionary process. In his opinion, “a formulaic pattern will be in existence for a 
considerable period of time before it is conceived of by its creators and audience as a 
genre.”12 He exemplifies this observation by looking at the Western, stating that though 
the Western formula was already clearly defined in the nineteenth century, it was not 
until the twentieth century that the Western was consciously conceived of as a distinct 
literary and cinematic genre. Cawelti’s evolutionary linkage of genre and formula 
actually illuminates the basic difference I have discussed. Unlike formula, genre includes 
the activity of the spectator; it is a conception by both “its creators and audience” of the 
“specific systems of expectation and hypothesis which spectators bring with them to the 
cinema, and which interact with films themselves during the course of the viewing
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process”. This conception does not form a necessary part of the formulaic pattern: “a 
formulaic pattern” can be in existence for “a considerable period of time before it is 
conceived of by its creators and audience as a genre”.
A central tenet of Hollywood film production was to standardize formulas whose 
appeal had already been verified by positive audience response ~  as the business of 
movie production developed, experimentation steadily gave way to standardization as a 
matter of fundamental economics, with the goal of reaching as massive an audience as 
possible.13 The move towards standardization was also influenced by the arrival of 
sound: despite the American cinema’s great silent era success, the arrival of sound was 
responsible for an unprecedented peak in narrative and commercial efficiency. 
Hollywood movies became more “American”, suggests Robert Ray, with localized 
accents drawing from the aural resources of the United States: “Cagney’s New Yorkese 
complementing Cooper’s Western laconism, Hepburn’s high-toned Connecticut broad 
a ’s matching Jean Arthur’s Texas Drawl.”14 The universalized mime of the silent era 
was replaced by a new indigenous acting style that encouraged a reformulation of the 
American Cinema around more traditionally American preoccupations. More 
significantly, movies became a site for American mythology: the myths of American 
culture found a setting in the standard narratives that generated audience appeal. 
Cawelti’s definition of literary formulas here consolidates an understanding of the 
mythmaking function Slotkin attributes to genre. The patterns of convention and 
narrative in the Western genre, for example, are determined by the mythology of the 
frontier: the convention of associating the Indian Other with evil and the narrative 
requisite of an extermination of the Other are factors deeply entrenched in the Myth. 
Movies were also produced not in creative or cultural isolation but by a collective
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system which relied upon certain narrative traditions (or conventions) in designing for a 
mass market. The goal of maximizing profit dictated that formulas which have proved 
successful are recycled and systematically delivered to the audience. These formulas 
contain similar elements with variations which differentiate one from the other. The 
formulas themselves are subject to change and adaptation, in accordance with the needs 
raised by the social climate and thus in order to be financially viable. One such formula 
is embodied by the Western genre.
Before focusing specifically on the Western, however, it is necessary to 
investigate the shared social function of genres and the ideological import they possess. 
Two instrumental factors serving as guiding principles in the generic inception are the 
economic motive and the political agenda. It follows that the mass audience viewing the 
movies would have a significant part to play in the shaping of these two motives ~  its 
role being integral in the development of genres that resonate with the myths of 
American culture.
The Economic Motive: Standardization and Innovation during the Studio Era
There is no question that the American film industry was an instance of the 
economic system of capitalism. The producers of film were, and still are, united in the 
single aim of manufacturing films to make a profit. Between 1915 and 1930 the 
Hollywood studios had standardized, and hence economized virtually every aspect of 
film production.15 This mode of production, roughly lasting from 1930 through to 1960 
(Hollywood’s “classic era”) has been characterized as a factory system, with the studios 
operating to mass produce and mass distribute movies. The employment of a mass-
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production system, as the most efficient and economical work arrangement possible, 
facilitates profit maximization. A requisite of mass production is that of standardization. 
In comparing commercial filmmaking with concurrent US business practices, Janet 
Staiger traces the move towards full standardization after the Civil War:
The advantages of standardization — facilitation of economies of production, 
research and design; minimization of engineering problems; reduction of costs 
of patterns, retooling, carrying large stocks, labor retraining, and accounting — 
eventually began to outweigh its disadvantages. . .Prime movers in the trend 
were engineers and efficiency experts who created an institutional discourse 
about standardization in their technical journals, societies, textbooks, and 
handbooks. . .The federal bureau gave the State’s blessing to standardization 
and supplied national rather than state guidelines.16
Hollywood production practices mirrored the capitalist mode of production for the same 
advantages acquired via standardization ~  the movement toward uniformity not only 
allowed for economies of scale but also created a level of excellence that, once 
established, became a goal to be attained.17 Thomas Schatz estimates that as 
approximately 400 to 700 movies were released per year during Hollywood’s classic era, 
the process of filmic conventionalization was being continuously refined with time 
pressures stimulating a return to standard American narratives. The established story 
formulas were the result of a systematic honing of cinematic enunciation into narrative 
conventions with a proven record of appeal. In support of his conclusions Schatz refers 
to the Motion Picture Association of America’s classification of subject matter in 1950, 
where it was indicated that over 60% of all Hollywood productions were either 
Westerns (27%), crime/ detective films (20%), romantic comedies (11%) or musicals 
(4%), and that roughly 90% fell into some pre-established classification (mystery/ spy,
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war, etc.).18 The conventionalization of these narratives has origins that extend to an 
earlier period.
By the mid-twenties all the major studios had close relations with finance capital. 
Though it has not yet been established either that the major finance capital houses 
exerted any direct influence over production policies, or that production policies 
changed significantly because of the involvement of finance capital, it has been argued 
that the commerciality of the American Cinema was intensified when by 1936, 
Hollywood’s major studios came under the financial control of either Morgan or 
Rockerfeller interest, with this concentration encouraging a homogenized product and 
the repetition of a few basic patterns.19 However, finance capital could only exert this 
influence indirectly, as it was mostly involved with the real estate of exhibition. In 1939, 
Lewis Jacob’s The Rise o f the American Film popularised the idea formulated by F.D. 
Klingender and Stuart Legg, that the Morgan and Rockerfeller banking interests had 
virtual control over the major film companies with the introduction of sound. However 
though the Morgan and Rockerfeller banking groups financed the wiring of the nation’s 
theatres and the construction of sound studios in Hollywood to a large extent, their 
“virtual control” over the film companies was illusory. Tino Balio cites Robert Sklar’s 
summary of the revisionist accounts that focus on corporate hegemony: it is not so 
important “who owns the movie companies but who manages them”.20
The economic motive did, however, determine trends of studio production, and 
correspondingly, the trends of cinematic expression. The classical film can be 
subdivided into genres: narrative cinematic expressions that became standard narrative 
traditions through their repeated usage and corresponding audience recognition. Genres 
developed by the Hollywood studio system comprised the vast majority of the most
popular and profitable productions for the length of the studio era, with this trend 
continuing even after its dissolution. This narrative economy and subsequent 
standardization did not result in dull or mediocre products. The desirable aspects of the 
films were repeated and audiences found pleasure in their repetition, an example of 
which are the conflicts that are continuously addressed and resolved. This aspect is 
probably the most basic determining feature of all genres. Schatz describes the 
oppositional narrative strategy of genre films in the following:
establishment (via various narrative and iconographic cues) of the generic 
community with its inherent dramatic conflicts;
animation of these conflicts through the actions and attitudes of the genre’s 
constellation of characters;
intensification of the conflict by means of conventional situations and 
dramatic confrontations until the conflict reaches crisis proportions;
resolution of the crisis in a fashion which eliminates the physical and/or 
ideological threat and thereby celebrates the (temporarily) well-ordered 
community.21
The genre film’s plot thus traces the intensification of some cultural opposition which is 
eventually resolved in a predictable fashion. Through this narrative context, the cultural 
function of genre films are evident: they appear to portray society in a stable and 
invariable ideological position. Although the resolution of conflict is a reason for the 
sustained popularity of genres, that continuing popularity is also an indication of the 
essentially unresolvable and irreconcilable nature of those oppositions. The resolution 
provided by genre films does not solve the basic cultural conflict; the conflict is often 
recast into another context where it no longer presents an immediate problem. A basic 
conflict of the Western, Detective and Gangster genres, for example, is that of 
individualism versus the common good. This conflict dissipates temporarily in the
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Western hero’s fading into the sunset, the detective’s return to his office to await 
another case, and the gangster’s violent death. The individual hero is safe from the 
compromising of his individuality, while at the same time, values of social integration are 
kept intact. The opposing values are both deemed significant ~  neither is morally 
elevated in comparison with the other — and the fundamental (American) ideological 
precepts of conflict, contradiction and ambiguity are celebrated.22 The genre film retains 
its popularity as long as the conflicts it addresses remain pertinent to society. Tino Balio 
provides the rationale that Hollywood should not be condemned for concentrating on 
the production of escapist fare: any proposal actually to solve a social problem would 
not only carry a political liability and fragment the audience, it would also open the 
industry to the charge of manufacturing propaganda.23 The preservation from such a 
charge through the concentration on escapist fare does, however, enable a 
communication of ideology that is more difficult to detect.
The emphasis on standardization did not make for entirely uniform products. 
Innovation, within restricted bounds, was also part of the economic principle. A 
competitive method relied upon to encourage repeated consumption was the promotion 
of difference between products. Neale stresses the financial advantages of an aesthetic 
regime based on regulated difference, where films are aesthetic commodities that 
demand a degree of novelty and difference from one another.24 Maltby lists eighteen 
types of genre as enumerated by one 1942 survey by the Motion Picture Research 
Bureau25:
Comedies: sophisticated comedies 
slapstick comedies 
family life comedies 
musical comedies 
“just” comedies
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War pictures
Mystery, horror pictures
Historical, biographies
Fantasies
Western pictures
Gangster and G-Men pictures
Serious dramas
Love stories, romantic pictures 
Socially significant pictures 
Adventure, action pictures 
Musicals (serious)
Child star pictures 
(Wild) animal pictures
The overlapping nature of this classification suggests that genres are not mutually 
exclusive categories: they possess shared features and are discernible from one another 
in the differing ways those features are combined.26 This product differentiation is also 
closely linked to variations in public taste, with the aim of accommodating the interests 
of the largest possible audience.
Innovation and differentiation also occurred amongst films within the same 
genre. A widely-quoted classification of the Western, for example, may be found in the 
writings of Frank Gruber — he observes seven basic types of Westerns: the railway story, 
the ranch story, the cattle empire story, the revenge story, the cavalry versus the Indians 
story, the outlaw story, and the marshal or ‘law and order’ story. Philip French provides 
a different typology: the ‘Epic Western’, ‘Sur-Westem27’, ‘Adult Western’, ‘Satirical 
Western’, ‘Comedy Western’, ‘Chamber Western’, ‘Liberal Western’, ‘Sociological 
Western’, ‘Realistic Western’, ‘Anti-Western’, ‘Psychological Western’, ‘Allegorical 
Western’, ‘Spaghetti Western’ and ‘Paella Western’.28 As the ‘Anti-Western’ and 
‘Satirical Western’ might suggest, though genre films appear to be bound by systems of 
rules, an individual genre movie could very well transgress those rules when 
differentiating itself from the other films within the same genre. Though recent film
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criticism has tended to elevate the value of works that transgress norms, this 
transgression of the generic norm does not in any way diminish the importance of the 
formula constituting the genre.
Genre and the Constitution of Pleasure
In The Fantastic, Tzvetan Todorov disputes the claim that it is possible to reject the 
notion of literary genres from the point of aesthetics, for “the work of art is unique, 
valuable because of what is original about it that distinguishes it from all other works, 
and not because of whatever in it may resemble them.”29 Critical approaches that treat 
films as isolated texts reject film genres for the same reason. Laura Mulvey’s Visual and 
Other Pleasures attempts to “make way for a total negation of the ease and plenitude of 
the narrative fiction film” with an alternative “thrill that comes from leaving the past 
behind without simply rejecting it, transcending oppressive forms, and daring to break 
with normal pleasurable expectations.”30 However, her notion of pleasure as a 
composite of scopophilia and narcissisim — the first a function of “sexual instincts” and 
the second of “ego libido” — is morally dubious and overemphasizes the sexual. With 
this definition of pleasure the cinematic experience is paramount to an act of sexual 
transgression. Kristin Thompson’s explanation of the Neoformalist method of film 
analysis with “defamiliarization” being the “general neoformalist term for the basic 
purpose of art in our lives” is less Freudian but seems to reach the same conclusion 
about film genres, for she goes on to elaborate that:
Defamiliarization must be present for an object to function for the spectator as
art. . .Automization may nearly wipe out the defamiliarizing capacities of
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ordinary, unoriginal artworks, such as B westerns. Such ordinary works tend 
not to defamiliarize the conventions of their genre of classical Hollywood 
filmmaking.31
She does qualify this statement. Thompson contends that “even an unoriginal genre film 
is, in its subject matter, minimally different from other, similar films. . .it is slightly 
defamiliarizing in its use of nature and history”.
The function of a genre film, however, is not primarily one of defamiliarization, 
or as Mulvey would have it, the “pleasure in using another person as an object of sexual 
stimulation through sight”.32 Any single Western movie must be set against the 
collective ‘universe of Westerns’ in order that its full significance may be appreciated. 
In Men, Women and Chainsaws, Carol Clover observes that genre is a field in which 
there is in some sense no original, no “real or right” texts, but only variants. Therefore, 
“the meaning of the individual example lies outside itself’. Though Clover applies this 
observation mainly to the horror film, it is also equally relevant to the Western. A 
particular Western may have original features, but its status as a member of a genre lies 
in the way it delivers the cliche: what Clover terms “the art of rendition or performance” 
that is “understood as such by a competent audience”.33 Robert Warshow’s comment 
that the Western is an “art form for connoisseurs” echoes this emphasis on the delivery 
or rendition of the cliche, and the understanding of an audience that is competent to 
notice and derive pleasure from minor variations on the same theme. The cliche is 
always present; for example the conflict between civilization and the wilderness in the 
Western. The differing ways that the cliche is delivered are the variations that audiences 
notice, and add to their existing genre baggage.
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James B. Twitchell recommends an “ethnological approach” to generic films, in 
which “the various stories are analyzed as if no one individual telling really mattered. . . 
You search for what is stable and repeated; you neglect what is “artistic” and “original”, 
tracing the migration of images to the audience, and understanding why these images 
have been “crucial enough to pass along.”34 Richard Slotkin sees this “passing along” of 
images being carried out through a set of “mnemonic cues”, images which invite the 
viewer to associate with other images of a similar kind previously acquired from the 
same genre. The images arise from what Robin Wood has called “the personal dreams 
of their makers and the collective dreams of their audiences”, “the fusion made possible 
by the shared structures of a common ideology.”35 These mnemonic cues raise movie- 
images from being mere documents of action, endowing visual narrative with the 
metaphoric resonance achieved in printed literature.36 Unforgiven, for example, depends 
on its heritage of scenes from past Westerns for a sense of nostalgia and an 
understanding of its ironies, in the same way that Milton’s Paradise Lost gains depth 
and resonance from the King James Bible. Quoting a description by Andrew Britton on 
the topic of the horror movie, Clover sees this process of generic association as the 
source of pleasure provided by the genre film:
It became obvious at a very early stage that every spectator knew exactly what 
the film was going to do at every point, even down to the order in which it 
would dispose of its various characters, and the screening was accompanied 
by something in the nature of a running commentary in which each dramatic 
move was excitedly broadcast some minutes before it was actually made. The 
film’s total predictablility did not create boredom or disappointment. On the 
contrary, the predictability was clearly the main source o f pleasure, and the 
only occasion for disappointment would have been a modulation o f the 
formula, not a repetition o f it. Everyone had parted with his or her four
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bucks in the complete confidence that Hell Night was a known quantity, and 
that it would do nothing essentially different from any of its predecessors.
Everyone could guess what would happen, and it did happen.37
My Emphasis
Britton’s conclusion is that the highly ritualised and formulaic characteristic is “the most 
striking feature of the contemporary entertainment film”. Neale’s “Questions of Genre” 
looks into the “generically verisimilitudinous” elements of film, and pits these elements 
against what is considered as cultural verisimilitude to discover how films attract 
audiences. He derives these two broad types of verisimilitude from the writing of 
Tzvetan Todorov, where neither type equates directly to ‘reality’:
If we study the discussions bequeathed us by the past, we realize that a work 
is said to have verisimilitude in relation to two chief kinds of norms. The first 
is what we call rules o f genre: for a work to be said to have verisimilitude, it 
must conform to these rules. In certain periods, a comedy is judged ‘probable’ 
only if, in the last act, the characters are discovered to be near relations. A 
sentimental novel will be probable if its outcome consists in the marriage of 
hero and heroine, if virtue is rewarded and vice punished. Verisimilitude, 
taken in this sense, designates the work’s relation to literary discourse: more 
exactly, to certain of the latter’s subdivisions, which form a genre.
But there exists another verisimilitude, which has been taken even 
more frequently for a relation with reality. Aristotle, however, has already 
perceived that the verisimilar is not a relation between discourse and its 
referent (the relation of truth), but between discourse and what its readers 
believe is true. The relation is here established between the work and a 
scattered discourse that in part belongs to each of the individuals of a society 
but of which none may claim ownership; in other words, to public opinion.
The latter is of course not ‘reality’ but merely a further discourse, independent 
of the work.38
15
Neale reaches the conclusion that it is often the generically verisimilitudinous ingredients 
of a film, those which are often least compatible with regimes of cultural verisimilitude 
that attract audiences to the film in the first place, and that constitute the film’s pleasure. 
The fact that these generic regimes of verisimilitude can transgress and ignore social and 
cultural regimes is important in ascertaining the function of genres as a site of 
ideological negotiation.
In the context of the generic inception, the variations that existed were a 
technological development aimed at fulfilling Hollywood’s central tenet of producing 
efficient entertainment. Audience participation was encouraged and essential in the 
economic exchange with filmmakers at the box-office, and the minimization of audience 
effort (or lack of defamiliarization) was more economically effective precisely because it 
was, at the time, what audiences demanded. The artistic or aesthetic value of the movie 
was not as economically influential as the reaffirmation of individual and collective 
beliefs provided by genre films during the studio era. Maltby puts it succinctly in the 
following:
Hollywood sought to minimize its audience’s effort both because it was 
economically more effective for it to do so, and because that was what it 
presumed its audience wanted. . .The development of Hollywood’s fictional 
conventions were a gradual process, conducted progressively in film after 
film, and took the form of an economic dialogue between filmmakers and 
audience at the box-office. Innovations in form and content were negotiated 
by their financial success or lack of it; a crude mechanism of consultation, but 
a mechanism nevertheless.39
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Though the Supreme Court’s decision on the “Paramount Case” of 1948 had the effect 
of liberating filmmakers from formulaic productions, the movie genres were by that time 
firmly established, and served as norms which retained their importance even if the bulk 
of films that came later sought to defamiliarize the conventions that bound them. Ray 
claims that the movies of Hollywood’s Classic Period, which were mostly generic in 
style, are “the single most important body of films in the history of cinema, the one that 
set the terms by which all movies, made before or after, would be seen”. He uses the 
following statistics to support this claim:
(From 1930-1945) the movies averaged 80 million in weekly attendance, a 
sum representing more than half of the U.S. population of the time. . .the 
movies attracted 83 cents of every U.S. dollar spent on recreation.
. . .By also dominating the international market, the American Cinema insured 
that for the vast majority of the audience, both here and abroad, Hollywood’s 
Classic Period films would establish the definition of the medium itself.40
For Schatz, the defamiliarization of conventions that followed constituted the end of a 
cycle of the generic evolution, when audiences were saturated with the genre’s 
straightforward messages. Schatz’s model of evolutionary development has already 
raised many objections, notably by Alan Williams41 and, at greater length, Tag Gallagher, 
who takes exception to Schatz’s “specious argument” that “‘classic’ Westerns are simple 
and naive”42. The theoretical aspect of Williams’ disapproval is pertinent here:
Note that Schatz locates this shift of opacity within individual genres, such that 
a ‘new’ genre in the 1980s would have to go through a ‘classical’ stage before 
evolving into a self-conscious formalism. It is not the filmmaking system or the
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social context that has changed, but the genres that have evolved. (In my 
opinion, this is clearly wrong.)43
The self-conscious formalism of Westerns in the style of Sam Peckinpah has been seen 
to herald the end of the Western44, however, this saturation needs to be seen in the 
socio-historical context of changing ideological beliefs, with movements such as the rise 
of feminism and the Vietnam War questioning the Western’s ideological foundations. 
Thus a re-instatement of or reversal to the previous ideology in the original social 
context, as this thesis will later elaborate, could also correspondingly alter the cycle with 
a movement towards transparency.
Schatz’s generic progression from straightforward narration to a more self- 
conscious formalism and a final loss of popularity does not undermine the value of the 
initial generic norm.45 Todorov asserts that even in the case of works that transgress 
generic norms, genre remains important:
For there to be a transgression, the norm must be apparent. Moreover, it is 
doubtful that contemporary literature is entirely exempt from generic 
distinctions; it is only that these distinctions no longer correspond to the 
notions bequeathed by the literary theories of the past. . .failing to recognize 
the existence of genres is equivalent to claiming that a literary work does not 
bear any relationship to already existing works. Genres are precisely those 
relay points by which the work assumes a relation with the universe of 
literature.46
The close relationship of genres and social ideology that is overlooked in Schatz’s 
approach to genres, in how deviations from the norm are an economic response to 
shifting ideological beliefs, will be developed in subsequent chapters.
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The Political Agenda : Myth and Conservatism
The commerciality of American cinema dictated a filmmaking that would consistently 
deploy the basic ideologies and myths of American culture for the sake of a regular 
audience.47 Hollywood’s movies had communicated myths and ideologies before the 
1930s, but it was after the thirties that the potential of this mythmaking function was 
more fully realized. The influences fostering an emphasis on a mythological/ ideological 
product can be traced to events taking place during Hollywood’s Classic Period, 
principally the Depression and World War H. Robert Sklar explains how these two 
factors facilitated a re-assertion of fundamental American beliefs:
. . .moviemakers (in the 1930’s) were aware in a more sophisticated way of 
(the cinema’s) mythmaking powers, responsibilities and opportunities. Among 
intellectuals and in centers of political power, the importance of cultural myths 
to social stability was a seriously debated topic. The Depression had shaken 
some of the oldest and strongest American Cultural myths, particularly the 
middle-class homilies about the virtues of deferred gratification and assurance 
that hard work and perseverance would bring success. . . .The widespread 
doubt about traditional American myths threatened to become a dangerous 
political weakness. In politics, industry and the media there were men and 
women. . . who saw the necessity, almost as a patriotic duty, to revitalize and 
refashion a cultural mythology 48
From the outset, that mythology was deliberately traditional and hence politically 
conservative: Hollywood film legitimated dominant institutions and traditional values, 
obliquely responding to challenges against American ideals with either repression or
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displacement. The strategy of repression is discussed by Maltby in “The Production 
Code and the Hays Office.”49 In the article Maltby argues persuasively for the 
importance of the Code as a force for ideological conservatism, where the criticism of 
moral viciousness in the early 1930s is accommodated by “a system of representation 
acceptable both to the industry and to the cultural authorities it deferred.”50 According 
to Maltby this system was enabled by codes of representation that allowed for both 
“innocence” and “sophistication” to be derived from the film text, without violating the 
limits of public acceptability. In “Anatomy of a Proletarian Film: Warner’s Marked 
Woman”, Charles Eckert investigates the American cinema’s tactic of displacement. 
Though the sources of Marked Woman (a topical proletariat-oriented gangster film) are 
in class conflict, the expression of conflict in the film is displaced by conversion into 
conflicts of a surrogate nature: ethical, regional, and life-style.51 The tactic of 
displacement is basic in the American cinema’s conservative response to challenges to 
the status quo. This form of cultural responsiveness lasted until the 1960s, when 
dominant myths and values were questioned and more critical stylistic and thematic 
modes were adopted by the moviemakers.
Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner list the traditional American institutions and 
values legitimized by Hollywood cinema prior to the sixties. These included: 
“individualism (with its emphasis on self-reliance and its distrust of government), 
capitalism (with its values of competition, upward mobility, and the survival of the 
fittest), patriarchy (with its privileging of men and its positioning of women in a 
secondary social role),” and “racism (with its unequal partitioning of social power)”.52 
Ideological legitimization was achieved through Hollywood’s representational 
conventions, formally and thematically. They mention narrative closure, image
20
continuity, character identification, sequential editing, dramatic motivation and shot 
centering as some of the formal conventions employed in presenting an objective view of 
events while actually projecting a subjective point of view.53 The formal conventions of 
genre films provide what seems to be a neutral recording of events in automizing the 
signs of cinematic artificiality. This automization is achieved with repeated viewings of 
films within the same genre. In a musical where a character bursts into a song and dance 
routine on roller skates while being chased by the police (Gene Kelly in It's  Always Fair 
Weather) for example, the audience would not find this surprising or outside of reality; 
the reality constructed by the musical formula encompasses and naturalizes such events. 
This singing is a component of Neale’s generic verisimilitude. The thematic conventions 
of Hollywood films legitimize social values and institutions in linking them to its 
apparent presentation of what is probable in reality. These values and institutions 
become seemingly natural and self-evident attributes of an unchanging world; the status 
quo is preserved and perpetuated. The thematic conventions include heroic male 
adventure, romantic quest, female melodrama, redemptive violence, and racial 
stereotyping.54 Ryan and Kellner’s analysis is, however, too simplistic in its 
endorsement of a model of film reception that renders the spectator a mere victim of 
ideological manipulation. The problem, as discussed in the following section, lies in 
their conception of verisimilitude.
Marxist and Constructivist Theories of Audience Participation
Aligning the Hollywood production mode to that of a factory system does not account 
for more specific individual deviations from the norm, but a broad perspective is initially
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necessary in observing what was common and pervasive during the studio era, and in 
ascertaining the elements constituting a genre. A criterion that the neoformalist 
approach adopts in singling out the most valuable work is that it defamiliarizes the 
conventions established by previous art works, and this underscores the value of the 
norm. It is also through a consideration of the general nature of Hollywood’s 
production system that we might determine its social significance. The factory analogy 
with film as commodity and the importance accrued to the economic motive echoes the 
Marxist view that Hollywood is a slave to the profit system, blindly reproducing the 
dominant ideology of bourgeois capitalism.55 The following is an oft-cited passage in 
support of this notion:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are subject to it.56
Ray posits that the determinedly commercial nature of the American movie business and 
its financial servitude to the powerful eastern banks insured that Hollywood’s 
elaborations of American mythology would proceed according to the Marxist 
ideologically censoring standards above. While I would accept an essentially Marxist 
analysis of the relationship between the ownership of means of production and ideology 
in relation to the Hollywood cinema, I would hesitate in identifying with Marxist- 
influenced analyses that view the audience as necessarily passive, blindly absorbing the 
ideology of the bourgeois film producers.
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A paradigm that places greater emphasis on active audience engagement and 
thus complements this model of communication is David Bordwell’s assumption of a 
Constructivist theory of psychological activity. According to Constructivist theory, 
perceiving and thinking are active, goal-oriented processes: “the organism constructs a 
perceptual judgement on the basis of nonconscious inferences.”57 Inference making is 
dependent upon two sources, conclusions drawn on the basis of perceptual input, and 
sensory data primarily determined by expectation, background knowledge, problem­
solving processes, and other cognitive operations. Perception becomes a process of 
active hypothesis making — these perceptual hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed 
at different stages, with the cycle of perceptual-cognitive activity explaining the ongoing, 
revisionist nature of perception. The spectator comes to the film “already tuned, 
prepared to focus energies towards story construction and to apply sets of schemata 
derived from context and prior experience”58 — in essence, Neale’s “level of 
expectation”. This paradigm envisions a relationship between viewer and film medium 
whereby the former is no longer a victim or dupe of narrational illusion-making, but an 
active participant in that process.
A Constructivist theory of audience participation appears to be at odds with 
Ryan and Kellner’s understanding of genre film reception, which more closely fits the 
Marxist perspective of cinema:
Genres depend on receptive audiences who are willing to grant credibility to 
the conventions of the genre to the extent that those conventions become 
invisible. Once that is accomplished the generic illusion can assume the 
character of verisimilitude. It no longer seems to be constituted through the 
manipulation of coded formulae. A certain occlusion of rhetoric and 
convention, therefore, is crucial to the transmission of ideological beliefs to the 
audience.59
23
The nature of the genre film as an effective tool of ideological manipulation, arising from 
an “occlusion of rhetoric and convention” would imply that the audience exists as mere 
victims of ideology. Much of the conflict lies in the definition of verisimilitude, which 
Neale has (as mentioned previously) not aligned with ‘reality’. In the example quoted 
above, the distinct concepts of generic and cultural verisimilitude have been condensed 
to mean simply cultural verisimilitude, and this narrowed interpretation of verisimilitude 
is then equated with realism. Thus Ryan and Kellner propose a model of communication 
whereby the audience’s enjoyment of what is generically verisimilitudinous becomes 
evidence that they are duped into believing that the “generic illusion” is “verisimilitude/ 
(reality)”. This is obviously a mistake. Referring back to a previous example, this 
would mean that Gene Kelly’s bursting into song, a generically verisimilitudinous 
element found in musicals, would lead to audiences deluding themselves into thinking 
that this is a natural occurrence in reality, and that the bourgeois film producers enforced 
this delusion upon them. It would be difficult to ascertain how the bourgeois film 
producers would benefit from this instance of ideological manipulation.
Though ideological beliefs are transmitted, they are not indifferently produced or 
consumed. To minimize the commercial risk, Hollywood filmmakers could pose issues 
only in terms that did not overtly contravene the bounds set by the prevailing ideology, 
while audiences participated in collectively responding to and isolating formulas it found 
satisfying and entertaining. These formulas were granted credibility, and their 
conventions attained both generic and cultural verisimilitude with the willing cooperation 
of the viewers. The character of generic verisimilitude is also not static but dynamic. In 
fact, the pleasures of what Warshow has called “connoisseurship” is an active
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recognition of variation among generic conventions. The variation that occurs is in this 
instance synchronic, while changes in cultural verisimilitude tend to be more diachronic - 
- this distinction will be made more apparent in the third chapter.
The Constructivist approach to audience involvement would gel with the idea of 
capitalistic procedures influencing the generic inception, for the spectator makes 
inferences from the background data he or she has accumulated from past viewings and 
applies them in forming hypotheses about the new film. Cawelti’s research on generic 
transformations in movies of the 1960s exemplifies this point. The production of 
laughter in the famous campfire scene in Mel Brook’s Blazing Saddles is based on 
background data which stipulates that when cowboys sit around a blazing campfire at 
night, mournful and lyrical cowboy ballads will be performed. However, in Brook’s 
Western, the audience is treated with “an escalating barrage of flatulence.”60 The 
variation in the formula results from an assumption that audiences are familiar enough 
with this particular element of the Western formula to appreciate a greater complexity in 
its treatment ~  in this case the hypothesis would involve the recognition that the 
sequence is a burlesque of the traditional Western campfire scene, and the result is 
laughter. This example has a basically humourous thrust, but as Cawelti has noted, the 
most powerful generic variations of the 1960s and 1970s (such as in Bonnie and Clyde 
[1967], The Wild Bunch [1968], and The Godfather [1972]) tend more toward tragedy 
in their overall structures.61
Innovations in the generic formula were negotiated by their financial 
performance, and audiences formed an integral part of that contract. It might be more 
feasible to move from a theory of Marxist domination as expounded by Ryan and 
Kellner to a Gramscian notion of hegemony. While one strand of Marxism posits the
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dominant culture as perpetrators of ideological mystification in a closed system of ruling 
class manipulation, or false consciousness, the Gramscian model allows for the creation 
of counterhegemonies: hegemonic cultures, depending on the historical context, exist in 
an open system where the capability for resistance flourishes and may lead to the 
creation of counterhegemonic alternatives. According to Gramsci, “the consent given by 
the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group is achieved through legitimation, and caused by the 
prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its 
position and function in the world of production.”62 In examining the relationship 
between Hollywood and the ideology of the consensus, Maltby makes the initial 
proposition that:
. . .while American cinema of the consensus may have established itself as a 
hegemonic and unilateral system of communication, it did so not out of a 
conscious or unconscious desire to impose a dominant ideology on its 
audience, but with the active participation of that audience, which was also 
maintained through its products. If Hollywood governed the perception of 
their audiences, they did so with “the consent of the governed”.63
When dissent does arise -- and this is clearly shown by the performance (or lack of it) at 
the box office — then the problem is often located in the region of cultural verisimilitude. 
For example, it would be difficult to convince the audience that America is a frontier 
where riches can be regenerated in the light of a severely failing economy. This would 
seem highly improbable. However it is important to note that even when the ideology of 
the bourgeois film producers is accepted, it is achieved with the active consent of the 
audience, rather than through a passive absorption.
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Will Wright and the Western’s legitimization of America’s Contemporary Economic
Institutions
The Western is an essentially conservative genre. A major component of the American 
cultural ethos that it legitimized was that of capitalism. In Sixguns and Society, Will 
Wright links the classical and professional plots of the movie Western to two significant 
periods of economic organization: the competitive, market society existing prior to 
World War II and the planned corporate economy that came later. His approach is a 
synthesis of two main currents in the structuralist tradition: Levi-Strauss’s structural 
study of myth, and Vladmir Propp’s analysis of the Russian folktale.64 Christopher 
Frayling notes that this is a “(very) uneasy synthesis”, for the former is a synchronic, 
ahistorical account, while the latter is an implicitly diachronic, historical account.65 
Thus, as suggested by Maltby, “Wright’s structuralist version of myth is based on an 
anthropological analysis expecting to decipher fixed and static narratives, and therefore 
arguably not very well attuned to the nuances of frequent change”. Moreover, the links 
that Wright develops between the Westerns and changes in American society are 
historically inaccurate. However, it is this last inherent weakness -- the historical 
inaccuracies ~  in Wright’s model that furnishes its utility for this thesis.
The emergence of a market economy freed economic relations from the control 
of social goals and values. According to Karl Polanyi, “a market economy is an 
economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the 
production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism.”66 
This self-regulating mechanism was a historically new concept — in previous societies,
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social relationships were governed by political and religious institutions, which 
responded to social values and directed the economy in accordance with those values. 
Conversely, in the market-oriented society, the exchange of land, labour and money is 
now determined by the needs of the autonomous market, so that the market comes to 
regulate the ordinary social relationships of the people.67 With this new economic 
development the individual is no longer primarily a social being whose values were 
derived from social interaction, but an autonomous being motivated by rampant self- 
interest. Under capitalism, the legitimacy of traditional authority is lost and the 
dominance of economic needs supersedes political goals. A conceptual conflict arises 
between the values of bourgeois society and the institution of the market. The 
institutions of capitalism were concerned with profit and production and directly 
opposed the goals of bourgeois ideology which were founded on consensual norms that 
stress freedom, equality, peace, and the theoretical availability of meaningful human 
relationships.68 Wright observes that as the American economy became market oriented, 
classic Westerns promoted capitalism in addressing the dilemma of bourgeois values and 
the values required by a self-regulating market and providing a resolution.
In the classical Western, Will Wright ascertains that the division between social 
experience and the theories of a market economy corresponds to the moral distinction 
between good and bad.69 The opposition of market and society is displaced onto 
another plane, that of a decent social market versus an individual exploitative market. 
The villains represent unbridled market self-interest, the individualistic aspect of the 
opposition. The settlers represent the social aspect. The hero is separate from society 
but in his relationship with the settlers, the individual and group come to constitute the 
morally positive social market. This is achieved in society’s final acceptance of the hero
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when he defeats the villains and saves the society. When the hero is outside of society, 
he, like the villain, is not approved of. However, in his acceptance he does not lose his 
individuality: it is his independence and self-reliance that form an essential part of his 
ability to aid society. The conflict between individualism (market economy) and society 
is resolved in the stressing of individuality and its benefit to society.
The professional Westerns corresponded to the economic period of corporate 
capitalism and legitimate its technocratic-elitist ideology. Corporate capitalism replaced 
the individualistic self-reliant entrepreneur with a group of men each of whom 
contributes information and skills to fulfil the requirements of special planning and 
complex organization. Just as the idea of the autonomous, self-reliant individual was the 
key image in the ideology of the free market, the image of a specialized man who works 
in an elite group that possesses great power and seeks relatively arbitrary, technical, 
goals is central to the ideology of corporate capitalism. The professional Westerns 
corresponded to this change in ideology, as opposed to the single hero of classic 
Westerns: “The professional group can accurately be called an elite body -- a group that 
wields power, is restricted by status and is socially independent and self-contained, yet 
utilizes and depends on social institutions.”70 The technocratic-elitist ideology was not 
without its contradictions:
The dilemma of modem liberal-democratic theory is now apparent: it must 
continue to use the assumptions of possessive individualism, at a time when 
the structure of the market society no longer provides the necessary conditions 
for deducing a valid theory of political obligation from those assumptions.
Liberal theory must continue to use the assumptions of possessive 
individualism because they are factually accurate for our possessive market 
societies.71
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The system of corporate capitalism insisted on the suppression of individuality ~  the 
individual in the corporate capitalist system identifies his goals with those of the 
corporation, he is committed to the technical group even though its activities may not 
agree with his values. The dilemma results from the conceptual need for an autonomous 
individual in this context. As in the classical Westerns, this dilemma was addressed and 
resolved in the process of legitimization found in the professional Westerns.
In the professional plot, the individuality of the hero is denied. Though the 
individual exists, his individuality is redundant for it is no longer needed to protect 
society from the villains. In fact, the individual versus society opposition is eroded as 
society is bereft of values -- the individual has to establish a set of values to distinguish 
himself from society and he does so by joining an elite group which acts according to 
group values (loyalty, respect and friendship). What establishes the hero’s individuality 
and separation from society is his membership in a group and this prevents us from 
defining him as a true individual. It is thus the group that is separated from society. By 
joining the group and accepting the values of technical proficiency, the individual is 
shown to be superior to the dull and weak members of ordinary society.72 His 
individuality is suppressed by his membership to a group, while he is shown to be 
autonomous in his independence from society. Society recognizes each member of the 
group as a specific individual, and each member’s unique contribution is also recognized 
by the group.73
From Will Wright’s analysis, we have witnessed how the function of the classical 
and professional plots of Westerns was to legitimize the contemporary economic 
institution in addressing the dilemmas that arose from the new economic development in
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its variation from the past, and providing a resolution. At this point it is necessary to 
make a slight amendment to Wright’s paradigm; the classic and professional Westerns 
that legitimized the respective market oriented and corporate capitalist economies 
emerged after a significant time-lag, and not simultaneously. In his history of the United 
States, Hugh Brogan notes that the change from a rural to market-oriented society 
began after the Civil War — with the dramatic transformation occurring between 
Appomattox and the First World War.74 Thus the classic Westerns were legitimizing in 
the twentieth century that which had begun in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, 
Frayling, in his thorough critique of the Will Wright model, also points out that the 
change in American society from a market economy to a corporate economy did not 
take place in the forty-year period (1930-1970) with which Wright is concerned. 
Frayling suggests a substitution of changes within Hollywood for the shifting values of 
society that Wright offers.75 Instead of a simple substitution, it might be worthwhile to 
consider that a dynamic exists between the changes within Hollywood and those that 
occur outside of the institution — the significance of the time-lag is thus in its suggestion 
of a period of ideological negotiation before dilemmas could be effectively resolved in 
the films. Taking into account this modification to Wright’s analysis, this thesis will 
extend Wright’s paradigm to elucidate on how a time-lag between periods of a sharp 
drop in popularity of Westerns and a later rise in popularity are also suggestive of 
arbitration. The notion of generic space as a site of ideological negotiation is a 
structuring principle that will be applied in the subsequent chapters. The next chapter 
will discuss the Western genre in relation to the frontier myth: arguably the most 
pervasive and dominant myth arising from America’s cultural past and confronting 
America today.
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The Western and Frontier Mythology 
Ideology Expressed in a Narrative
Myth expresses ideology in a narrative rather than a discursive or 
argumentative structure. Its language is metaphorical and suggestive 
rather than logical and analytical. The movement of a mythic narrative, 
like that of any story, implies a theory of cause-and-effect and therefore a 
theory of history (or even of cosmology); but these ideas are offered in a 
form that disarms critical analysis by its appeal to the structures and 
traditions of story-telling and the cliches of historical memory.1
Richard Slotkin
The Myth of the American Frontier, describing the pull of a vacant continent drawing 
population westward through the passes of the Alleghenies, across the Mississippi 
Valley, over the high plains and mountains of the Far West to the Pacific Coast, was 
given its classic statement by Frederick Jackson Turner, in a paper on “The Significance 
of the Frontier in American History” at the Chicago World’s Colombian Exposition in 
1893.2 Earlier historians had emphasized European influences and colonial origins; 
Turner’s essay was a polemic directed against two dominant schools of historians -- the 
group headed by Hermann Edouard von Holst who interpreted American History in 
terms of the slavery controversy and the group led by Herbert B. Adams of Johns 
Hopkins (Turner’s former teacher) who explained American institutions as the
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outgrowth of English germs planted in the New World. The genesis of the frontier myth 
can be traced back to Benjamin Rush around 1786, and it was grasped at least in part by 
Crevecoeur, before him by Benjamin Franklin, subsequently by Emerson, Lincoln, 
Whitman and a hundred others.3
The Myth of the Frontier may be placed in an intellectual tradition that sought to 
explain Americanism. The significance of that explanation lies in its role in the forging 
of national identity. The ideology expounded in the frontier myth grew to be an integral 
part of national self-consciousness, with symbolism that became intelligible to a wide 
section of the American public. The thrust of contradictions involving “the isolation of a 
vast unexplored continent, the slow growth of social forms, the impact of unremitting 
New England Puritanism obsessed with the cosmic struggle of good and evil, of the 
elect and the damned, the clash of allegiances to Mother Country and New World” is 
clear in the literary heritage of the romantic novel that springs from Fenimore Cooper, 
moving through Hawthorne and Melville, Mark Twain and Henry James, Fitzgerald and 
Faulkner, Hemingway and Mailer.4 However, for Americans raised in the middle 
decades of the twentieth century, the most memorable images of the historical frontier 
are not drawn from the pages of Turner, Francis Parkman, Owen Wister, or even these 
literary successors. The images and ideas that the American public associated with the 
West were drawn from the mythic landscape of the Western movie.
Unlike other genre films, such as the gangster or detective movie, the musical 
and suburban domestic comedy, and the combat film, the characteristic iconography, 
material settings and historical references of the Western movie have pre-cinematic roots 
that gain density, currency and ideological presence through their direct association with 
the Myth of the Frontier.5 Before exploring the extent of this association, it would be
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appropriate to consider first the intellectual tradition underlying the myth and how that 
has shaped the conception of the West from which the Western movie draws its 
referents. The notion of myth must initially be explicated, and its function investigated 
in order to understand its role in the prevailing attraction of the Western genre.
A working definition of myth may be found in Slotkin’s Gunfighter Nation, the 
last of three volumes that follow the historical development of the Myth of the Frontier 
in American literary, popular, and political culture from the colonial period to the 
present:
Myths are stories drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through 
persistent usage the power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of 
dramatizing its moral consciousness -- with all the complexities and 
contradictions that consciousness may contain. Over time, through frequent 
retellings and deployments as a source of interpretive metaphors, the original 
mythic story is increasingly conventionalized and abstracted until it is reduced 
to a deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols. . .myth becomes (in this 
form) a basic constituent of linguistic meaning and of the processes of both 
personal and social “remembering.”6
The decoding of a symbol would evoke an implicit understanding of the entire historical 
scenario that belongs to it: for example, an allusion to “the Frontier” for an American 
would involve the movement westwards and the conquest of the wilderness with its 
Native American inhabitants. Revisionist histories explaining the settling of the West 
later exposed the treachery and exploitation related to the scenario and undermined 
conceptions of heroism attached to the myth. However, this historical invalidation needs 
to be separated from the functional validity of myth — Theodor H. Gaster, a modern 
myth-ritualist and specialist in folklore of the Near East articulates the view that a
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mythic story might “be valid functionally. . .yet be invalid historically, or it might be 
valid historically, yet be futile and inefficacious as a cultic recitation. Again, it might be 
a genuine tradition, yet in itself fictitious, or conversely, it might relate an actual, 
historical fact, yet be a modem product and no genuine traditional composition.”7 The 
events that shaped the genesis of frontier mythology are partially based on historical fact.
The Myth of the Frontier underwent changes in the course of historical 
experience that resulted in the acquisition of a new mythology which blended old 
formulas with contemporary ideas and concerns. A predominant concern of that 
mythology was of an economic nature. This quality of myth — its flexibility — has been 
noted by Th. P. Van Baaren in his work on myth as a relatively unchanging charter for 
belief as opposed to a vehicle for the expression of cultural change. Baaren cites an 
example from Borneo, where among the Dayaks a human sacrifice was required when 
buildings were erected. When the Dutch government prohibited such sacrifices, the 
myth of the foundation sacrifice altered such that the slave in the narrative was 
transformed into a water buffalo. This change enabled the Dayaks to sacrifice a water 
buffalo instead of a human being.8 This plasticity is limited; the need for some form of a 
sacrifice is still present. This limited flexibility is also a feature of the frontier myth and 
will be explicated in subsequent chapters, where various substitutes take the place of the 
Indian. The initial production of a set of cognate features on which a national 
mythology could be built can be witnessed through a chronological observation of the 
distinct phases of frontier expansion, and the shifting rhetoric of America’s politicians. 
A distinction needs to be made at this point between the Myth of the Frontier and 
discourses arising from, or about the myth. Eric Dardel, an ethnographer researching 
the work of Maurice Leenhardt, was led to conclude that “myth projects far beyond the
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domain of narrative and even that of language” because narration, written or oral, “does 
not cover the whole extent of the mythic.”9 The narrative/ literary influences guiding the 
formation of the frontier myth is the subject of Slotkin’s monumental book Regeneration 
Through Violence. His account, as quoted on the back cover, has been hailed by Ray 
Allen Billington of The American Historical Review as definitive. The original 
influences demonstrated by Slotkin are thus not the focus of this chapter. After 
outlining the historical frontiers and events involved in the settling of America, the rest 
of this chapter will devote itself to tracing the features of the Myth as they surface in the 
political discourses of the time.
The first frontier was the transoceanic. It lasted through to the seventeenth 
century and ended with the establishment of colonial settlements along the seaboard. 
The second phase was the increase in population and extension of the rim of settlement 
from the seaboard to the Alleghenies, in the process overcoming French and Indian 
opposition and lasting until 1765. Between 1780 and 1800 Americans opened the trans- 
Allegheny Frontier, and it was succeeded by the Mississippi Valley Frontier which was 
initiated by Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana. The Mexican Frontier was opened in the 
1820s by American settlers in Texas, and the last “internal” Frontier (the area marked off 
by the former Frontiers of the Mississippi and California) lasted from 1854 to the 1880s, 
after which much of the land was settled or in productive use for mining and grazing.10 
Differences separated each phase of frontier development but there remained the 
recurrent phenomenon of sudden leaps forward of the frontier line. This reflected 
dramatic new acquisitions of land or the sudden spread of settlement to undeveloped 
regions. The special psychology of Frontier economics emerged out of the succession of 
speculative booms and cyclical recessions (slow phases of apparent stagnation).
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The psychology of Frontier economics is apparent: the vital dynamic of the 
frontier process prescribes that for the continuance of a good economic performance, 
the frontier must always be extended. This extension of the frontier became a 
fundamental requisite of the myth. W.A. Williams enunciates the logic behind this 
feature when he writes : “given the marketplace-expansionist conception of reality, the 
end of one frontier implied the need for a new frontier.”11 Williams cites the earliest 
explicit statement of the same argument from J.A. Kasson of Iowa:
We are rapidly utilizing the whole of our continental territory. . .We must turn 
our eyes abroad, or they will soon look inward upon discontent.12
As recessions would be directly associated with a stationary frontier, effort would be 
applied to rectify the poor economic performance by new land acquisitions. This land 
would be acquired from the Indians who occupied it.
The Indian Wars of the 1850s and 1860s were instrumental in contributing to 
what Richard Drinnon has called “Indian-hating”, an essential component of the Myth. 
Richard White divides the wars into three categories, those that raged on the Great 
Plains and centred on American attempts to control Indian territory, those that 
attempted to suppress Indian raiding, and the final group of wars with Indians who tried 
to maintain their independence from American interference.13 The first category of wars 
were the most bitterly fought, and spawned the Sand Creek and Washita massacres. It is 
important to note that the violence pervading the history of the American West was not 
solely against the Indians. Conflict in the West also thrived among the WASP 
Americans and those who were different from them in terms of race, ethnicity, class, 
religion and other sectional loyalties, with the most significant battles mobilizing large
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groups of westerners (white, Chinese, Mexican and Indian) against each other. 
However the violence is translated in the myth from social conflict to conflict of a 
personal nature. Richard White provides a convincing explanation for this substitution:
Myth makes all conflict personal and resolves all conflict with violence. . 
Explaining the bloody conflict in the West in terms of personal violence is 
perhaps appealing to Americans because it allows them to escape asking 
uncomfortable questions about social conflict. Despite the bloodletting of the 
Civil War, nineteenth-century Americans took great pride in the ability of their 
political rule of law, not in the rule of force or violence. Western myth, in 
effect, validated the larger belief in a society of social peace. Violence 
existed, the myth said, but the violence was personal, and it largely vanished 
as society imposed law and order. But if, contrary to the myth, the social 
order itself sometimes encouraged violence, then the easy reading of western 
history as the imposition of peace and the rule of law upon a lawless and 
violent land loses its meaning.14
From the historical events of the Indian wars and the hostility between whites and other 
immigrant groups developed a myth in which a lone frontier hero would confront a 
single Indian enemy in a climactic and individual battle.
The myth became a dominant influence in America’s political ideology, though 
the most immediate concerns of the literary, ideological and political spokesmen of the 
“American nation” were not directly given to the frontier. Instead, their most urgent 
concerns were given to the political economy of the Metropolis. However, statesmen 
and settlers alike drew on the mythology of the Frontier as a platform on which future 
Metropolitan centres would be erected.15
Qualities of the frontier myth tend to be revealed in the political discourse of the 
American presidents, as they dealt with the most gripping issues of their time. In
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American political and historiographical debates since the 1890s, two strains of the 
Frontier are identifiable: an “agrarian” Frontier and an “industrial” Frontier. An 
investigation of the exchange of an old, domestic, agrarian frontier for a new frontier of 
world power and industrial development would be useful in ascertaining how the frontier 
myth grew to become a part of nascent national ideology and mythology, and how the 
Myth adapts to contemporary needs.16
The Agrarian Frontier: Hector St. John Crevecoeur and Thomas Jefferson
The mythic conception of the West implanted in the imagination of nineteenth century 
America was that of an agrarian utopia. In addition to charting elements of frontier 
mythology, the significance of a discussion about the agrarian frontier lies also with the 
changing image of the yeoman farmer. The idealized version of the yeoman as described 
by Hector St. John de Crevecoeur was overtaken by the observations of Thomas 
Jefferson, which were deemed closer to actuality. Jefferson’s yeoman exhibits qualities 
that inexorably link him to the American frontier hero.
Henry Nash Smith provides an illuminating study of the rise and decline of the 
conception of the West as an agrarian utopia. He ascertains that the myth of the garden 
was already implicit in the iridescent eighteenth-century vision of continental American 
Empire. Lewis Evans’s prediction of 1775 was that “Wealth and Power. . will naturally 
arise from the Culture of so great an extent of good land, in a happy climate.”17 Other 
visions of the future at this stage tended towards the establishment of an urban 
commercial society. This vision of the future empire in the West is the subject of a
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poem written by Philip Freneau and Hugh Henry Brackenridge for their Princeton 
commencement of 1771:
and a line of kings,
High rais’d in glory, cities, palaces,
Fair domes on each long bay, sea, shore or stream. . .
Hoarse Niagara’s stream now roaring on 
Thro’ woods and rocks and broken mountains tom,
In days remote far from their antient beds,
By some great monarch taught a better course,
Or cleared of cataracts shall flow beneath 
Unnumbr’d boats and merchandize and men. . . ,18
Their vision of the future was reasonably accurate concerning the remote future of the 
Middle West. There was, however, a long period of development to intervene during 
which the West was devoted to agriculture, a fact on the plane of rational and 
imaginative interpretation to emerge as an agrarian social theory. The materials for such 
a theory were present from the 1750s in the writings of Benjamin Franklin. In the late 
1780s, Franklin declared that “the great Business of the Continent. . . is Agriculture. 
For one Artisan, or Merchant, I suppose, we have at least 100 Farmers, by far the 
greatest part Cultivators of their own fertile lands. . .”. He saw the body of the nation 
consisting of “industrious frugal farmers, inhabiting the interior Part of these states. . 
.”.19 The best known expositors of the agrarian philosophy in the generation after 
Franklin were Hector St. John de Crevecoeur and Thomas Jefferson.
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During the 1780s and 1790s, Crevecoeur’s Letters From an American Farmer 
were published and achieved great popularity. He took it for granted that American 
society would expand indefinitely westward:
Many ages [he exclaimed] will not see the shores of our great lakes 
replenished with inland nations, nor the unknown bounds of North America 
entirely peopled. Who can tell how far it extends? Who can tell the millions 
of men whom it will feed and contain? For no European foot has yet traveled 
half the extent of this mighty continent!20
The nature of this society, a majority of farmers (as with Franklin), was also explicit — it 
was a society sustained by the soil:
What would we American farmers be without the distinct possession of that 
soil? It feeds, it clothes. . .it has established all our rights; on it is founded our 
rank, our freedom, our power as citizens, our inhabitants of such a district.21
Generally, society would be divided into three main sections: a fringe of backwoods 
settlements, a central region of comfortable farms, and a region of growing wealth, cities 
and social stratification to the East. Undesirable social conditions would persist in the 
first and last sections, but the middle condition would offer opportunity for human virtue 
and happiness. This literary discourse places further emphasis on the requisite for 
westward expansion ~  to maintain the integrity of the central area and accommodate the 
expansion of the city, then the frontiers must continually be extended. The inhabitants of 
the backwoods settlements are described in the following:
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When dischord, want of unity and friendship, when either drunkenness or 
idleness prevail in such remote districts, contention, inactivity, and 
wretchedness must ensue. There are not the same remedies to these evils as 
in a long-established community. . .
There men appear to be no better than carnivorous animals of a superior rank, 
living on the flesh of wild animals when they can catch them, and when they 
are not able, they subsist on grain. . .
There, remote from the power of example and check of shame, many families 
exhibit the most hideous parts of our society.22
The equation of men at the frontier with bestial qualities and thus a corresponding 
acculturation to the Indian was also to become intrinsic to the Myth. Crevecoeur 
believed that in the simple agricultural communities comprising the bulk of the American 
colonies equality of station, combined with a security that arose from the ownership of 
property and the hope of increasing that property fosters a general sentiment of 
benevolence.23 The middle section is given this positive description:
Here everything would inspire the reflecting traveler with the most 
philanthropic ideas; his imagination, instead of submitting to the painful and 
useless retrospect of revolutions, desolations, and plagues, would, on the 
contrary, widely spring forward to the anticipated fields of cultivation and 
improvement, to the future extent of those generations which are to replenish 
and embellish this boundless continent.24
The realm of the American farmer is a utopian district, freed from the Indian menace 
(the “dreadful enemy”) of the remote backwoods settlements and the corruption of the 
city.25 In Crevecoeur’s paradigm, the significance of the cultivated land outweighs that 
of the frontier, where confrontation with the Indian takes place. This confrontation is, 
however, incipient in the agrarian myth of the frontier.
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The centrality of agriculture in the American economy and its status as a “growth 
sector” in the 1790’s provided the rationale for Jefferson to identify agrarian enterprise 
as the characteristic form that economic growth would take in the republic. The 
Frontier, comprised of newly acquired lands, promises complete felicity, the satisfaction 
of all demands and the reconciliation of all contradictions. Like Crevecoeur, in 
Jefferson’s mythic terminology, the “city” is the symbolic place in which class conflicts 
tend to become irreconcilable, and lead to despotism. The processes of commerce that 
generate urban prosperity produce the very conditions of collapse, in creating separate 
and antagonistic classes of the very rich and the very poor. The dependence of poor 
upon rich, degrading in the best of times, may be converted by hard times into a basis for 
extreme revolutionary behaviour.
Jefferson differed from Crevecoeur in his opposition to the character and the 
ideology of the “yeoman farmer” — a free individual, living on his own land, independent 
of others for the necessaries of life yet depending on his fellow citizens (and society in 
general) for protection, law, and civilized amenities. Jefferson saw that the yeoman in 
actuality did not live up to this ideal: because the yeoman possesses a share of property 
(and therefore of political power) he is a sturdy defender of property as an institution, 
and of the social system that authorizes and sustains property holding. Because he is not 
dependent on the rich for his subsistence, he is politically free; but because he acquiesces 
in the social arrangement, he does not wish to challenge the wealth, standing or 
authority of his “betters”.26 Jefferson’s observations stemmed from his pre-occupation 
with Republicanism and democracy. His fears were voiced by David Ramsay, who put 
his finger on the discrepancy between American governments and the society they were 
supposed to embody; despite the general commitment by the constitution-makers to “the
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propriety of a compound legislature” (the establishment of different houses of legislation 
to introduce the influence of different interests and principles), “the mode of creating 
two branches” in the American social environment proved to be “a matter of difficulty”. 
Since in America “none were entitled to any rights, but such as were common to all,” the 
framers of the constitutions could not “erect different orders of men” at the same time as 
ensuring that “all government be ultimately in the hands of the people, whose right it 
is ”27
This problem regarding the unity of interests was exacerbated in the 1780s when 
property was isolated as a distinct ingredient of the society that must be separately 
embodied in the government. The emphasis now lay on “the different and discordant 
interests existing in all societies”, the various groups and parties — creditors, debtors, 
farmers, manufacturers, merchants, professionals — who would ‘for convenience’ all be 
subsumed under “names, invented long ago, the democratic and aristocratic factions,” or 
better, those who possess “the rights of persons” and those who possess “the rights of 
property.”28 This rigid division between persons and property failed to distribute the 
rights of the people justly and violated the homogeneity of interests on which 
republicanism was based.
Consequently, instead of a national character composed of a community of placid 
yeomen (as celebrated in Crevecoeur’s Letters) the society appeared to be filled with 
inveterate grumblers. Among Americans, “the idea of inferiority, as of pursuing a mean 
employment or occupation. . .mortifies the feelings, and joins the minds of those who 
feel themselves inferior”. The people were “the offspring of envy and disappointed 
ambition” possessed by “a general uneasiness”. “Every man wants to be a judge, a 
justice, a sheriff, a deputy, or something else which will bring him a little money, or what
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is better, a little authority”.29 Conversely, the point of “Andrew the Hebridean”, 
Crevecoeur’s famous fable of the archetypal immigrant boy who finds success in the 
New World30, is that prosperity may be found within the boundaries of civilization, and 
that opportunity may be seized without excessive individualism and with a natural and 
enlightened self-interest observed by all parties.31 Crevecoeur writes:
All I wish to delineate is the progressive steps of a poor man, advancing from 
indigence to ease, from oppression to freedom, from obscurity to contumely to 
some degree of consequence -- not by virtue of any freaks of fortune, but by 
the gradual operation of sobriety, honesty and emigration.32
Andrew’s journey culminates when he is “independent and easy. . .unencumbered with 
debts, services, rents, or any other dues; the successes of a campaign” for “the laurels of 
war, must be purchased at the dearest rate” “makes every cool, reflecting citizen to 
tremble and shudder”. Crevecoeur concludes the tale on an advisory note: “By the 
literal account hereunto annexed, you will easily be made acquainted with the happy 
effects which constantly flow, in this country, from sobriety and industry, when united 
with good land and freedom”.33
Jefferson opposed this notion of the farmer because he saw that the men who 
responded to agrarian expansion were different from Crevecoeur’s Andrew. These men 
included ambitious cotton planters, land speculators and artisan-entrepreneurs who 
aggressively exploited the opportunity of frontier windfall, motivated by self-interest and 
calculated mostly for the short term. They were unlikely to be complaisant with the 
established leaders of society (the representatives of civilization), or to adapt the 
manners and morality of high culture. Thus in territorial expansions they proceeded with
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the dispossession of Indians without waiting for the justification by operations of Indian 
policy, and risked interest-group conflict in their acquisition of financial success.34 
Jefferson’s reaction to this new class became a blueprint for the character of the national 
frontier hero and shifted the focus towards the relations between the border and the 
wilderness. Crevecoeur, on the other hand, emphasised the internal relations that centre 
on the world of the farmer. Jefferson placed greater attention on the population 
inhabiting the borders and drew from the language of race to call them half-breeds, with 
the implication that their character was savage or Indian-like, that they were white men 
who had deserted civilization for Indian ways.35 With this development, the white- 
Indian opposition and the idea of acculturation was strengthened in the myth.
The opposition appeared to express historical conflict in simple and agreeable 
terms, thus whatever the class, religious, or political differences within colonial or 
Revolutionary society, the appearance of the Indian challenge evoked instant 
appreciation of the fundamental common ground.36 Though Jefferson opposed the 
yeoman ideal, the agrarian myth and the ideal of yeoman society continued to flourish 
well into the 1850s. This ideology of the yeoman farmer is evident in the 1851 speech 
made by Representative George W. Julian, an intellectual heir of Thomas Jefferson:
The life of a farmer is peculiarly favorable to virtue; and both individuals and 
communities are generally happy in proportion as they are virtuous. His 
manners are simple, and his nature unsophisticated. If not oppressed by other 
interests, he generally possesses an abundance without the drawback of 
luxury. His life does not impose excessive toil, and yet discourages idleness.
The farmer lives in rustic plenty, remote from the contagion of popular vices, 
and enjoys, in their greatest fruition, the blessings of health and contentment. .
. . The pleasures and virtues of rural life have been the theme of poets and 
philosophers in all ages. The tillage of the soil was the primeval employment
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of man. Of all arts, it is the most useful and necessary. It has justly been 
styled the nursing father of the State; for in civilized countries all are equally 
dependent upon it for the means of subsistence.37
This symbol of the yeoman farmer was later seized by the Republican orators in the 
campaign of 1860 for the Homestead Bill. The results of that bill, conversely, would 
work against the notion of an agrarian utopia.
The Agrarian Frontier provided a rationalization of economic patterns. With 
Jefferson, the ideal of the contented yeoman so celebrated in the agrarian frontier was 
found lacking because of its inability to articulate the more contemporaneous view of the 
farming community, and this image was corrected as the myth adapted to the new 
understanding. A new dimension was also added in the emphasis on a fundamental 
racial conflict that would carry on into Turner’s Frontier Thesis. The notion of an 
agrarian frontier itself would not persist — with the forces of industrialization that 
descended upon the American States, there was a need to adapt the idea of the Frontier 
to incorporate the socio-economic transformations.
The Industrial Frontier: William Gilpin’s “UntransactedDestiny”
Between 1815 and 1870 the United States experienced a time of uninterrupted and swift 
economic expansion. During that period the country grew from an agrarian adjunct of 
the European economic system to a leading industrial and financial world power, 
superseding the industrial nations in railroad mileage and in other key areas of heavy 
industrial production. The solid foundation of the economy was such that even the 
destruction wrought by the Civil War did not alter the economic growth curve of the
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nation as a whole. This cycle of economic expansion coincided with a period of 
dramatic geographical expansion. By conquest and purchase, the American government 
acquired land that was sufficient to double the size of the nation. Successive waves of 
settlers from the flourishing populations of the States as well as from Europe populated 
the undeveloped land. Slotkin concludes that it was perhaps an inevitability for these 
two dramatic expansions to be linked in American historical mythology and that the 
westward movement of population be read as a cause — even as the cause — of 
American economic development.
In the period of agrarian expansion, the economic language of profit-and-loss 
employed by prospective investors, statesmen, and settlers drew on the Myth of the 
Garden (the West as Agrarian utopia) in support of their colonizing enterprises. From 
the initial transoceanic phases of Frontier development to the 1880s, the new territory 
was advertised as a Garden of Eden endowed with wealth and fertility to be settled by 
men forewarned of serpents.38 The restorative and regenerative power of the land was 
emphasized: it contained the ability to redeem the fortunes of those fallen from high 
estate, and provided an arena for moral heroism. However, in the passage of time, the 
Myth of the Garden became an increasingly inaccurate description of a society 
transformed by commerce and industry — signalled by the arrival of new economic and 
technological forces, especially the power of steam working through river boats and 
locomotives. The greatest blow to belief in the Myth arose from the failure of the 
homestead system, itself an incongruity within the period of Industrial revolution.
The dream of an agrarian utopia became ready for realization at the end of the 
Civil War on the basis of the Homestead Act.39 Following the Civil War, the impetus of 
the Westward movement and the implied pledge of the victorious Republican party to
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develop the West were powerful forces urging the onward progress of the Agricultural 
Frontier. The intellectual framework of the Republican homestead programme was the 
National Reform doctrine propounded by George Henry Evans and his followers. 
National Reform influenced Republican theory through leaders such as Greely and 
Galusha A. Grow.40 The contention of this doctrine was that free land in the West 
would attract unemployed or underpaid laborers from industrial cities, thus preventing a 
labor surplus of workmen in factories. Republicans had thus joined with Democrats in 
supporting the measure with two goals in mind: to provide an agricultural “safety valve” 
for surplus or discontented workers, and a Western population base for an enlarged 
domestic market for manufactured goods.41 The greatest appeal of the homestead 
system to the West, however, lay in the belief that it would enact the agrarian utopia of 
hardy and virtuous yeomen which had pervaded the imaginations of writers about the 
West since the time of Crevecoeur.42
The Homestead Act passed the Senate in May 1862. With the predictions 
accompanying the Act, the image of the garden in the West became an article of national 
faith. Horace Greely predicted that the new system would greatly lessen the number of 
paupers and idlers in favor of “working, independent, self-subsisting farmers in the land 
evermore”.43 He was confident that ultimately millions of dwellers in city slums would 
go West to establish homes for their children, erasing the possibility of future serious 
unemployment for the United States 44 In 1867 Greely was still trying to convince the 
unemployed city laborer:
if you strike off into the broad, free West, and make yourself a farm from 
Uncle Sam’s generous domain, you will crowd nobody, starve nobody, and. . . 
neither you nor your children need evermore beg for Something to Do.45
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Thirty years following the passage of the Homestead Act, it became evident that the Act 
wholly failed to live up to its predictions.
Henry Nash Smith calculates that between the passing of the Homestead Act in 
1862 and 1890, only 372,659 entries were perfected:
Vast land grants to railways, failure to repeal the existing laws that played 
into the hands of speculators by allowing purchase of government lands, and 
cynical evasion of the law determined the actual working of the public land 
system. . .At most, two millions of persons comprising the families of actual 
settlers could have benefited from the system, during a period when the 
population of the nation increased by thirty-two millions, and that of the 
Western States within which most of the homesteading took place, by more 
than ten millions.46
Fred Shannon, a historian, also saw that perhaps only a tenth of the new farms settled 
between 1860 and 1900 were acquired under the Act; the rest were bought either 
directly from land or railroad companies (beneficiaries of huge land grants) or from the 
states. With the failure of the Homestead Act, the Myth of the agrarian utopia was 
destroyed. The Homestead Act would, however, prove instrumental in furthering the 
incorporation of Western lands into the Eastern Industrial system.47 The Myth of the 
Frontier persisted in its translation into another form -- that of an Industrial Frontier.
As part of the agrarian programme, the exploitation of western resources by 
individuals or groups of settlers, artisans and entrepreneurs were seen to be responsible 
for the growth of the American economy. However, even during the period of agrarian 
expansion, the growth of the economy owed as much to developments occurring within 
the city: entrepreneurial and technological innovation, industrialization, changes in public
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education and the growth of the workforce, as well as high rates of productivity.48 The 
vision of an industrial Frontier was most elaborately developed by William Gilpin, an 
advisor to government and business on western and railroad matters, and the governor 
of the Colorado territory (appointed in 1861).49
Gilpin’s insistence that the West contained an infinite supply of resources and his 
acknowledgment that the agrarian Frontier was restricted by the outer limits of 
productivity pushed him to locate another resource reservoir: this resource reservoir 
took the form of precious minerals. He asserted that an infinite supply of gold, in 
addition to the energies represented by the enterprise of the railroad, would make the 
industrial system a substitute for the agrarian Frontier, offering to an unlimited 
population of free men the same future promise of infinite opportunity to fulfill their 
rising expectations.50 The crucial requisite of expansion in the myth (and the 
contradictory expression of its democratic nature) was thus retained in this translation. 
In Gilpinian rhetoric, the American race is possessed of a mission to expand the 
boundaries of civilization, and to “regenerate” the moral and political character of 
civilization in that process:
The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent -  
to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean — to animate the many 
hundred millions of people, and to cheer them upward. . . to agitate these 
herculean masses -- to establish a new order in human affairs. . . to 
regenerate superannuated nations — . . .  to stir up the sleep of a hundred 
centuries -- to teach the old nations a new civilization — to confirm the destiny 
of the human race — to carry the career of mankind to its culminating point— 
to cause a stagnant people to be reborn — to perfect science — to emblazon 
history with the conquest of peace — to shed a new and resplendent glory upon 
mankind — to unite the world in one social family — to dissolve the spell of
51
tyranny and exalt charity — to absolve the curse that weighs down humanity, 
and to shed blessings around the world.51
In the above, the mythology of racial struggle incipient in the agrarian Frontier of 
Jefferson is invoked, gaining greater emphasis for the purposes of advancing the 
industrial Frontier. The “untransacted destiny of the American people” is to “subdue” 
the “herculean masses” and “stagnant people” (of Latin America, Europe and Asia), and 
so “shed blessings around the world”. The material means for bringing about this 
shower of blessings was a Pacific railway built along a central route passing through 
Missouri and the Rocky Mountains.52 This railway would bridge the American continent 
and serve as the line of communication between Europe and Asia.
On its surface, the exchange of an agrarian Frontier for an industrial Frontier 
would produce a geographically antithetical society: a society created by great urban 
centres and divided by classes of capitalists and workers. The values of agrarian 
ideology proved, however, to be similar to those of industrial entrepreneurship. The 
fantasy of the yeoman as politically passive and deferential was not borne out in actuality 
-- though the ideal yeoman farmer was envisioned as “contented” in all practical 
contexts, this image was in contradiction with the Jeffersonian yeoman who emerged as 
“an expectant capitalist, a hardworking, ambitious person for whom enterprise was a 
kind of religion, [who] everywhere. . . found conditions that encouraged him to extend 
himself’.53 Farmers found accuracy in Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes o f the Wealth o/1 Nations, first published in 1776. Man was defined primarily in 
terms of his unique and inherent “propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for 
another” in the marketplace.54 Basing his system upon the individual’s self-love rather 
than upon any urge or propensity to realize the ideals of benevolence or freedom, Smith
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saw that “the consideration of his own profit is the sole motive which determines the 
owner of any capital to employ it.”55 Farmers would be limited “by the extent of the 
market”, and thus “the surplus must be sent abroad ”56 Economic expansion rather than 
contentment with what one already has, was the dynamic factor in the proper 
functioning of Smith’s system that American agricultural businessmen were attracted to. 
Expansion was essential. The other common factor which follows and draws from both 
agrarian and industrial Frontiers was the conquering of the natural wilderness. This 
conquest gained a more sinister tone with the industrial Frontier, as an “untransacted 
destiny” the advancing of the frontier was more intimately linked to the necessity and 
historical sanctioning of violence. With the agricultural frontier, the ideology of placid 
yeomen would not advance notions of violence in the extension of property; however, 
the discourse surrounding the Jeffersonian yeoman and the conversion to an industrial 
frontier focusses on the moral justification of violence. This justification was needed as 
the new understanding of Crevecoeur’s yeoman revealed that he was individualistic in 
his pursuits, and that the outcome of these pursuits to “subdue the continent” was the 
initial subjugation of another race -- the Indian.
A corollary of the “untransacted destiny” of Gilpin’s vision is not the integration 
of different races into “one social family.” The Indian title and cultural existence were 
not preserved. They were obstacles to progress, legitimate targets of extermination, and 
their rights were not to be recognized by civilized society. Gilpin wrote, “war has been 
to our progressive nation the fruitful season of generating new offspring”, and applied 
this without differentiation to the native Americans, as well as to Europe and Asia. 
The violence exerted against the Indians exemplifies American interaction with 
“superannuated” races and will be dealt with in the following section. Progress was
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increasingly seen to be dependent on the extermination/ exclusion of a regressive, 
“stagnant” type of humanity and on the aggrandizement of a privileged race or people.
The Myth of the Frontier was thus in process of reformulation as Frontier 
symbolism was adapted to emergent industrialization. The ideological response of 
America’s intellectual spokesmen and its public to the Frontier led to the substitution of 
an agrarian Frontier for an industrial Frontier. The Myth conformed to the concerns of 
the industrial era and survived historical change to continue as a document of American 
national character. The fact of the agrarian and industrial Frontiers, on the other hand, 
retained their mythic appeal as cliches in historical memory.
With the translation of the Frontier from agrarian to industrial the centrality of 
violence to the American character was manifest. The propensity of frontier mythology 
to assimilate new economic developments (the change from an agrarian economic 
system to an industrial one) merely illustrates the superficial reflections of a deeper 
agenda: the moral justification of violence that is the basis of economic progress.
Regeneration through Violence: Slotkin and Turner’s Frontier
The definition of myth given in the first part of this chapter describes the process of 
mythic formulation: “stories drawn from a society’s history” are frequently retold and 
deployed as a source of interpretative metaphors, until the original mythic story 
(associated with the Westward expansion of the American nation) is “conventionalized”, 
“abstracted” and “reduced to a deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols”. The 
frontiers envisaged by Crevecoeur, Jefferson and Gilpin are “stories” that contribute to 
this mythic process, and provide the material sources for the Frontier Thesis that Turner
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would later systematize. The common element in all their visions is the conquest of the 
wilderness, and the drive for expansion that necessitated the crossing of borders. With 
the application of Slotkin’s version of the frontier myth to Turner’s thesis this conquest 
of the wilderness and its subsequent regeneration of American spirit (and achievement of 
national identity) would be more intimately related to violence.
The ideology embodied by the frontier myth is expressed in a narrative that plays 
through a scenario of separation, temporary regression to a more “natural state”, and 
regeneration through violence.57 This journey would be carried out by a frontier hero — 
when history is translated into myth, the complexities of social and historical experiences 
are simplified and compressed into the action of representative individuals or “heroes”.58 
In essence, the journey through the moral landscape of the frontier myth involves the 
crossing of boundaries, the frontier hero must abstract or “separate” himself from his 
metropolitan culture, cross the Indian/White border, into “Indian country”, and 
experience a “regression” to a more primitive and natural condition of life. This notion 
of the wilderness mastering the colonist and being the catalyst of his regression to a 
more primitive state is evident in the following passage from the Turner thesis:
The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The 
wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him European in dress, industries, 
tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and 
puts him in a birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays 
him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in a log cabin of the 
Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long 
he has gone planting Indian com and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the 
war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the 
frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the 
conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian
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clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the 
wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe. . .here is a new product that 
is American.59
In this regression to a more primitive condition of life, the frontier hero is purged of the 
false values of the metropolis (the old Europe) and finds himself a new, purified social 
contract. In this more natural state, the hero undergoes a spiritual or psychological 
struggle where he learns to defeat savagery in two senses: the physical wilderness and 
the wilderness of the human soul. This conquest leads to a purification or regeneration, 
and the means to that regeneration is violence.
The myth of “regeneration through violence” did not only arise out of the 
historical and political circumstances previously discussed; though pervading these later 
circumstances it finds its source in the personal narratives developed during the initial 
experiences of colonial experience, particularly the colonialist’s accounts of the Indian 
Wars. The first of these was the “captivity narrative” which had the Christian theme of 
redemption through suffering, the second the Indian-war story which celebrated the 
conquests of Indian fighters. The captive (usually a white woman) of the first narrative 
symbolizes the values of Christianity and civilization that are put at stake in the 
wilderness war. The state of captivity is likened to a spiritual darkness akin to 
“madness”; though this scenario of historical action emphasizes the weakness of colonial 
power, the captive does vindicate her moral character and the values she symbolizes.60 
The Indian-war story enacts a triumphalist historical scenario in which a white male uses 
his intimate knowledge of Indians and skill in adapting their tactics to overcome the 
enemy. The outcome of this second narrative is a victorious conquest. The integration 
of the formulas and ideological themes of these two narratives produced a single unified
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Myth of the Frontier, in which “the triumph of civilization over savagery is symbolized 
by the hunter/warrior’s rescue of the White woman held captive by savages.”61 This 
Myth of the Frontier may be understood with greater clarity when viewed as a 
diagrammatic construct charting the progress of the Frontier Hero:
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CYCLE OF “REGENERATION 
THROUGH VIOLENCE”
(1) SEPARATION: From 
False Values of Metropolis
METROPOLIS
WILDERNESS
(2) REGRESSION: and
Acculturation
(3) THE VIOLENT 
ACT
(4) RETURN: ^
a) False Values Purged
b) Hero as Mediator of New Values KEY
— ► Heroic Route
Mass Media and Myth
The functions of canvassing the world of events, the spectrum of public concerns, the 
recalling of historical precedents and of translating these into various story-genres (or 
narratives) that constitute a public mythology, has in modern society been provided by 
the mass media.62 The mythologies of the mass media are most clearly seen in the 
productions of its cultural industries; the mythology produced by the mass media is the 
form of cultural production that addresses most directly the concerns of Americans as 
citizens of a nation state of which Hollywood cinema is a prime example.63 In Imagined 
Communities, Benedict Anderson notes the function of the newspaper, and this provides 
a useful parallel to the movie as a form of cultural production. Anderson turns to the 
newspaper as cultural product, noting that the establishment of print-languages laid the 
bases for national consciousness in creating unified fields of exchange and 
communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars:
In a rather special sense, the book was the first modem-style mass-produced 
industrial commodity. . .the newspaper is merely an ‘extreme’ form of the 
book, a book sold on a colossal scale, but of ephemeral popularity. Might we 
say: one-day best-sellers? The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow 
of its printing- curious that one of the earlier mass-produced commodities 
should so prefigure the inbuilt obsolescence of modem durables- nonetheless, 
for this reason, creates this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely 
simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of the newspaper-as-fiction. . .The 
significance of this mass ceremony -- Hegel observed that newspapers serve 
modem man as a substitute for modem prayers — is paradoxical. It is 
performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is 
aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by
59
thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of
whose identity he has not the slightest notion.64
This “extraordinary mass ceremony” that Anderson observes in the consumption of the 
daily newspaper is also a characteristic of movie-watching. Movie viewers congregate 
in the same place, simultaneously consuming a mass-produced commodity: when we 
extend this mass viewing not only to the movies but to videos, the ceremony performed 
by “each communicant” is replicated by even more people “of whose existence he is 
confident”, but of whose identity he may not have “the slightest notion”. When we 
relate Anderson’s observation to the Western, the Myth of the Frontier encapsulated by 
and emanating from this movie genre is the mythology that survives through this mass 
ceremony as long as it addresses the concerns of Americans as citizens of a nation state, 
and the extensive popularity of the Western testifies that the myth has remained pertinent 
in this function.
The Myth of the Frontier has pervaded expressions of American culture in its 
varied forms; some examples are the pamphlet, the dime novel, the nineteenth-century 
historical romance, the stage melodrama, the Wild West show, and the modern 
paperback. Evidence of references to frontier mythology, however, are more observably 
direct in the movie Western, with its associated film narratives, images and 
characterizations. Contemporary transmissions of the myth and modifications to it are 
centrally located in Hollywood’s Westerns, where the American public may experience 
the mythic landscape of the frontier, rather than from the work of Frederick Jackson 
Turner and other writers involved in the genesis of the myth. In this process of 
translation from its literary successors onto a new film medium, the myth acquired 
different nuances as its images and ideas were adapted to suit the needs, preferences,
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and ultimately the commercial requirements of the filmmakers. In his introduction to 
Gunfighter Nation Slotkin writes:
Within the structured marketplace of myths, the continuity and persistence of 
particular genres may be seen as keys to identifying a culture’s deepest and 
most persistent concerns. Likewise, major breaks in the development of 
important genres may signal the presence of a significant crisis of cultural 
values within the structured marketplace of myths, the continuity and 
persistence of particular and organization. The development o f new genres, 
or the substantial modification o f existing ones, can be read as a signal o f 
active ideological concern in which both the producers and consumers of 
mass media participate — producers as exploitative promulgators and 
“proprietors” o f their mythic formulations, consumers as respondents 
capable o f dismissing a given mythic formulation or o f affiliating with it.65
My Emphasis
The history of the Western (film or literary) genre as a form of mass popular culture is 
thus directly related to the development of a popular ideology of American nationality 
and to the creation of nationwide networks of production and distribution. Between the 
Civil War and the Great War, new technologies were utilized to meet the demands of an 
expanding and increasingly polyglot culture with varied and complex needs and tastes; 
the nature of cultural production became fully industrialized by the 1920s and grew to be 
the clearest expression of the American national identity. Mechanization made possible 
the mass production of culture in the form of consumable objects. Alan Tractenberg 
writes:
The same process which fragmented labor into minute mechanical tasks, 
which brought into cities new masses of people experiencing wage labor for
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the first time, thus destroyed old forms of labor and community, old cultures 
of work and shared pleasures. . .As old cultures dissolved, a new culture of 
mechanically produced goods and values arose in their place; the same process 
which produced insecurities at the same time pandered new images of security 
in home and consumption, in goods inscribed with culture.66
The mythologies of the popular culture industry are intimately linked to the expressions 
of American identity through these goods (for example, movies) which are “inscribed 
with culture”.67
The emphasis that this thesis places on the Western movie may be justified by the 
centrality of moving pictures in modem culture and the pervasive influence of moving 
picture images on the language of literature and politics, a centrality witnessed by Roger 
Schank in Dynamic Memory™ The aim of the following chapters is to investigate the 
significance of movie Westerns as a site for negotiating adaptations to the frontier myth, 
and the transmission of its ideology. The immediate chapter following focuses on the 
formula of the Western, and the expression of the frontier myth in film narrative.
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The Western Formula and Film Narrative 
Playing the Game
. . .the world of a formula can be described as an archetypal story pattern 
embodied in the images, symbols, themes, and myths of a particular culture. 
As shaped by the imperatives of the experience of escape, these formulaic 
worlds are constructions that can be described as moral fantasies constituting an 
imaginary world in which the audience can encounter a maximum of excitement 
without being confronted with an overpowering sense of the insecurity and 
danger that accompany such forms of excitement in reality. Much of the artistry 
of formulaic literature involves the creator’s ability to plunge us into a 
believable kind of excitement while, at the same time, confirming our confidence 
that in the formulaic world things always work out the way we want them to.1
John G. Cawelti
In chapter one, formula, an entity distinct from but a part of genre, was defined as the 
synthesis of a particular set of cultural conventions with a more universal narrative or 
archetype. These various conventions are temporal, specific to certain cultures and 
subject to change, while archetypes appeal to many cultures at different time periods. 
Patterns of convention may thus be seen to belong to the surface structure of formula, 
while the story form or archetype is a part of its deep structure. The second chapter 
discusses myth in much the same fashion, as composed of a surface structure (the 
historical cliches of agrarianism and industrialism) and the deeper structure of 
regeneration through violence. The relationship between formula and myth is
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problematic, for they seem almost interchangeable. There exists a link at the level of 
their deep structures: the narrative or archetype played out by the formula relates to the 
deep structure of myth. At this level the myth underlies the historical discourse that 
makes it explicit (at different time periods) and persists after the events have become 
cliches.
Both surface structures of myth and formula are temporal, where changes in 
convention relate to the historical transfigurations of the mythic veneer. Changes in the 
formula can be charted synchronically and diachronically, to use terms introduced in F. 
de Saussure’s posthumous Corns de linguistique generate (1916). For Saussure the 
‘synchronic’ is a study of form or content independent of historical setting, authorship or 
literaiy origins, while a ‘diachronic’ study considers sources and redactions2; a 
‘diachronic’ study of the Western formula would thus take the frontier myth into 
account. Schatz’s model of generic evolution leans towards the former. In this sense 
conventions are diachronic, subject to the meanings assigned to them at different time 
periods, while archetypes are synchronic, being ahistorical and mostly inert. Synchronic 
variations in the formula are independent of the historical context and do not arise from 
developments in the myth. Diachronic permutations in the formula’s representation of 
the myth accommodate cultural change, and appear to signal that the myth undergoes 
change as well. However the diachronic changes in formula do not always extend 
beyond the surface structure of the myth. The pro-Indian perspective in Dances with 
Wolves (1990) for example, has been hailed by Jane Tompkins as the “one movie” that 
“represents Native Americans in a serious, sympathetic way”.3 It would be convenient 
to situate this alteration in the Western formula’s conventional representation of the 
Indian as savage in a post-Civil Rights Movement context, and to suggest an
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accompanying revision of the core element of white supremacy in the Myth of the 
Frontier. The attempts at faithful representations of race associated with the cultural 
awareness of America in the 1980s up to the present do relate to diachronic changes in 
formula that are a response to challenges raised against the Frontier Myth. These 
changes modify the surface of the myth, altering the vessels of its discourse. However, 
at the level of its deep structure, the myth remains static. The following diagram 
illustrates these structural components of the frontier myth in relation to the Western:
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STRUCTURE AND VARIATION OF 
FRONTIER MYTH AND WESTERN
SURFACE
SYNCHRONIC * *
DEEP
A: Synchronic variation of Western formula
e.g. novels, films, television dramas and comic books.
B: Diachronic changes as response to historical change affecting 
surface level of myth, i.e. conventions and symbols 
e.g. Indian representation in Dances With Wolves responding 
to events o f 1960s and 1970s.
C: Diachronic changes as response to historical change affecting 
deep level of myth, i.e. narrative and archetype 
e.g. migration of frontier discourse from Western to Gangster 
formula responding to events of 1920s and 1930s.
This quality of inertia is facilitated by the diachronic changes in formula which fulfil two 
functions -- firstly the cultural contexts that undermine the myth are accommodated 
while, secondly, ideological negotiations that aim to re-secure the status quo 
simultaneously take place. At certain times cultural changes may subvert the myth to 
such an extent that these functions cannot be performed within the same formula. The 
reasons for this are a severe loss of faith in the myth and the active role of the spectator 
in rejecting genres that explicitly manifest the myth’s core elements. In the instance of 
the early part of the Great Depression, for example, the Western formula was 
substantially abandoned, and the discourse of the frontier myth emerged in another 
formula — the Gangster film. This implicit communication of the discourse of frontier 
mythology in other formulas than the Western as a route to re-securing ideological 
validity is mirrored in the 1970s, when the Vietnam War led to a questioning that 
undermined the very foundations of the frontier myth. The frontier discourse that 
emerges in the 1930s, however, does signal a temporary revision to the myth at its deep 
structure, an argument that will be developed in the following chapters. The 
instrumentality of genres is evident in the processes of ideological negotiation that seek 
to restore credibility to the frontier myth in the 1930s and the 1970s.
This third chapter discusses the relationship between myth and formula and 
considers the various components of the Western formula by demonstrating the 
ideological import they possess. The latter consideration will have an emphasis on 
charting synchronic and diachronic variations in the formula’s representation of myth.
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The Frontier Mvth and the Western Formula
Cawelti contests the argument that the concept of formula he is developing in The Six- 
Gun Mystique is merely a variation on the idea of myth.4 In Adventure, Mystery, and 
Romance, from which the opening quotation is derived, Cawelti goes a step further. 
He argues that distinguishing formula has two “great advantages” over the notion of 
myth: firstly, formula requires a more encompassing concentration on the whole story 
while myth grants attention to “any given element that is arbitrarily selected”. Thus,
A myth can be almost anything -- a particular type of character, one among 
many ideas, a certain kind of action — but a formula is essentially a set of 
generalizations about the way in which all the elements of a story have been 
put together. . .This feature of the concept leads us to its second advantage: to 
connect a mythical pattern with the rest of human behaviour requires tenuous 
and debatable assumptions, while the relation between formulas and other 
aspects of life can be explored more directly and empirically as a question of 
why certain groups of people enjoy certain stories.5
Cawelti’s defence of a formula approach over a myth approach to the study of literature 
is persuasive, but it does not necessarily hold in relation to the subject of this thesis. 
Myths can be almost anything, in the same way that formulas can be composed by many 
different elements, but as its name suggests, the American Myth of the Frontier is 
specific to a particular nation of people -- it is a specific cultural myth, as distinct from 
other myths as the Western formula is distinct from the detective formula. The 
American Frontier Myth is also one of the modes via which American society expresses 
its complex of feelings, values and ideas; myth has the power of symbolizing the 
ideology of a society. It is this cultural expression of ideology that ultimately shapes the
68
Western formula. The Western formula is thus a literary and cultural expression of the 
frontier myth. The connection between myth and “the rest of human behaviour” may 
require “tenuous and debatable assumptions”, but the direct link between the frontier 
myth and the Western formula cannot be denied. The basic distinction then, is not so 
much that formula allows for a more holistic assessment of literary products, but that 
they are discrete with different functions in society.
The social function of myth lies in its power of explaining problems that arise in 
the course of historical experience (and justifying the actions employed in overcoming 
these problems) through its ability to influence our perception of contemporary reality: 
new phenomena are interpreted according to their resemblance to a remembered 
happening. Myths are the symbolic models against which the states and processes of the 
material world are tested.6 In the course of experience, these models are either 
confirmed or subjected to revision. With the frontier myth, indications of the balance of 
change and continuity are reflected in developments within the Western genre. The 
Western formula embodies the ideology of the frontier myth and is its external 
manifestation: changes in the myth’s credibility are reflected, and are made tangible 
through the outward performance of the formula, which can be equated to the popularity 
of the genre.
Since film genre is a contemporary vehicle through which myth is expressed and 
in which myth resides, and formula is the means via which the basic qualities of a specific 
genre are categorised and observed, it follows that changes in belief in the myth would 
lead to changes in the popularity of the formula and genre. As it is “tenuous” to link 
human behaviour directly with myth, it would instead be logical to relate the Western 
formula which can be “explored more directly and empirically” with patterns of human
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behaviour to the American frontier myth. The dual cultural functions of formula that are 
escape and entertainment help explain this role of formula as the public indicator of 
myth.
Escape and Entertainment: The Rules of the Game
The quality of escape provided for by formula is derived from its essential characteristic 
of standardization. As discussed in the first chapter, the tendency towards 
standardization is implicit in the economy of Hollywood filmmaking, but there exists 
another important motive: the pleasure derived from the formulaic work is intrinsically 
tied to its intensification of a familiar experience through which the formula creates its 
own world and with which the audience becomes familiar by repetition. The imaginary 
world (the world of formula) is experienced without continual comparisons with actual 
experience: an alternative world is constructed into which the audience may temporarily 
retreat. This perspective consolidates Neale’s notions of generic and cultural 
verisimilitude and their non-equation with actuality. The alternative world “reflects the 
construction of an ideal world without the disorder, the ambiguity, the uncertainty, and 
the limitations of the world of our experience”.7 Warshow explains this in the following:
. . .the relationship between the conventions which go to make up such a type 
and the real experience of its audience of the real facts of whatever situation it 
pretends to describe is only of secondary importance and does not determine 
its aesthetic force. It is only in the ultimate sense that the type appeals to its 
audience’s experience of reality; much more immediately, it appeals to 
previous experience of the type itself; it creates its own field of reference.8
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The formulaic element is a fundamental characteristic of the genre film: not only does 
the formulaic movie create its own field of reference, these films also work towards the 
representation of universal characters and situations, and are differentiated from movies 
which aspire to create something that is unique. The equation of singularity with 
success (and an aversion to the formulaic) by critics who value defamiliarization 
overlooks the complex rationale underlying the genre film’s provision of pleasure.
The experience of escape arising from the formulaic movie sustains itself over a 
considerable period of time and arrives at a sense of completion and fulfilment within 
itself. This experience fulfils two psychological needs: firstly, the need for intense 
excitement and interest to transcend the boredom and ennui of secure, routine and 
organized lives (arguably led by the great majority of the contemporary American movie 
audience) and a second conflicting impulse to escape from the ultimate insecurities and 
ambiguities: sickness, death, the inability to realize our hopes, and failed relationships. 
In “Naive Consciousness and Culture Change: An Essay in Historical Structuralism”, 
Harry Berger describes the nature of this conflict:
Man has two primal needs. First is a need for order, peace, and security, for 
protection against the terror and confusion of life, for a familiar and 
predictable world, and for a life which is happily more of the same. . . .But the 
second primal impulse is contrary to the first: man positively needs tension, 
jeopardy, novelty, mystery, would be lost without enemies, is sometimes 
happiest when most miserable. Human spontaneity is eaten away by 
sameness: man is the animal most expert at being bored.9
The essence of the experience of escape is that these two needs are temporarily 
synthesized and the tension between them resolved. This accounts for the paradox
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inherent in the Western formula -- it is at once highly ordered and conventional, yet 
centrally incorporated with the symbol of violence. Jane Tompkins’s analysis of the 
centrality of death in the Western illustrates this paradox:
The ritualization of the moment of death that climaxes most Western 
novels and films hovers over the whole story and gives its typical scenes a 
faintly sacramental aura. The narrative’s stylization is a way of controlling its 
violence. It is because the Western depicts life lived at the edge of death that 
the plot, the characters, the setting, the language, the gestures, and even the 
incidental episodes — a bath, a shave, a game of cards — are so predictable.
The repetitive character of the elements produces the same impression of 
novelty within a rigid structure of sameness as the thousand ways a sonneteer 
finds to describe his mistresses’s eyes. . .Half the pleasure of Westerns comes 
from this sense of familiarity, spliced with danger.10
The excitement of violence and death in the Western intensifies the viewer’s basic sense 
of security because the extent of uncertainty is controlled by the familiar (and imaginary 
as opposed to the actual) world of the formulaic structure.
The quality of entertainment as provided by the formulaic movie is more difficult 
to define: such movies are clearly standardized commercial products sold by the 
Hollywood film companies; yet there is more to enjoying these films than escapism and 
the fulfilment of certain basic needs. Being entertained by such a movie elicits active 
participation in a game, a game which requires the observation of a set of rules. The 
rules consist of familiar characters and familiar actions which celebrate familiar values. 
Together these rules constitute a system of conventions which are subject to slight 
variations (“the thousand ways a sonneteer finds to describe his mistresses’s eyes”) such 
that a type of play emerges, with the audience and filmmakers as participants of this
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game. Audiences signal their approval and enjoyment of the game to the filmmakers 
through the film’s box office receipts. This aspect of the formula movie, Neale argues, 
allows for an understanding of genre as a process. Neale supports his argument with a 
passage from Hans Robert Jauss:
. . .the relationship between the individual text and the series of texts formative 
of a genre presents itself as a process of the continual founding and altering of 
horizons. The new text evokes for the reader (or listener) the horizon of 
expectations and ‘rules of the game’ familiar to him from earlier texts, which 
as such can then be varied, extended, corrected, but also transformed, crossed 
out, or simply reproduced.11
Variations take place on two levels. The first kind of variation is discussed in the first 
chapter, where the viewer is like a “connoisseur”, recognizing, appreciating and 
remembering each different nuance made in the individual work. To be interesting, the 
individual genre or formula film has some unique characteristics of its own, but these 
special qualities ultimately follow the rules of the game, in accordance with the system of 
conventions: “Variation is absolutely necessary to keep the type from becoming sterile; 
we do not want to see the same movie over and over again, only the same form”.12 
Variations of this nature are synchronic; the differentiation (within limited bounds) of 
the standardized product makes economic sense in the maintaining of its popularity. 
The creator of a Western, for example, employs typical characters and situations that 
audiences expect — the cowboy hero, the outlaw, the showdown, the poker game, but 
renews these characters and situations by adding new elements or a new perspective that 
will heighten the pleasure of the audience based on the recognition that comes from 
previous encounters with these conventions. Diachronic variations occur when the rules
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of the game undergo revision: due to new social attitudes the formula evolves and 
develops new themes and symbols. The example of Indian representation in Dances 
with Wolves was earlier linked to a new social consciousness which condemned racist 
attitudes and encouraged the modification of that existing symbol (a more detailed 
discussion of this film can be found in chapter nine). Genre films do, however, have the 
tendency to “play it both ways”, criticizing and reinforcing values, beliefs and ideas 
within the same narrative context. This tendency reveals how diachronic mutations of 
formula sustain the persistence of the myth at its deep structure. This process will be 
further explicated and exemplified in the following individual sections on the principal 
components of the Western formula: the cowboy hero, the Indian, the woman, and the 
landscape.
After establishing formula’s two cultural functions, we can now proceed to 
discuss how they situate formula as a public indicator of myth. Because the Western 
formula embodies the ideology of the frontier myth, viewers who are able to escape into 
the formula world of the Western need to identify with that ideology. If the values 
purported by the ideology of the frontier myth are adopted and upheld by viewers of the 
Western, escapism is possible as no violation of the viewer’s moral sensibility occurs. 
However, when the conquest of the frontier can no longer be aligned with the values of 
moral victory and justifiable violence, as was the overall effect of the Vietnam War, the 
world of the formula Western can no longer be a place where one may find the solace of 
comfort and security. The adverse effect of the Vietnam War on the Western is directly 
and empirically recorded in the approximately ten years of silence during which 
Westerns were no longer as profitable to produce. This public abandonment of the 
Western formula indirectly points to (and finds its source in) a loss of faith in the central
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tenets of the frontier myth from which the formula world obtains its values in the 
construction of this particular “moral fantasy”.
The activity of game playing carries with it a more sinister agenda. The positive 
portrayal of the Indian seems to reflect a non-racist attitude towards otherness, but it can 
be argued that the primary message of the myth remains the same: that of American 
exceptionalism. In “playing it both ways”, genre movies have the ability to discredit the 
beliefs that they seem to affirm, making changes to the rules such that the audience is 
placated and yet leaves the cinema with the original sense of pleasure ostensibly 
emanating from the former set of rules. If we once again refer to the image of the Indian 
or Native American, we can relate the amendments needed to be made to that image as 
portrayed in films to the American culture’s changing view of the settling of the West, 
Manifest Destiny, and the treatment of peoples whose cultures were overwhelmed by the 
infringements of civilization. Soldier Blue (1970), a Western based on the massacre by 
the U.S. Army of the Cheyenne at Sand Creek, places the Indian as an innocent victim of 
their white assailants, showing a very different and controversial view of how the West 
was won. In appreciating such a movie, the morality of the American audience is 
placated in the acknowledgement that crimes were committed in extending the white 
frontiers of the west. However, the hero and heroine (Peter Strauss and Candice 
Bergen) of this extremely violent “anti-violence” Western are white; they are seen to 
befriend and even attempt to protect the inhabitants of the Indian village, and they are 
themselves victims of an Indian raid. They live to tell of the atrocities committed by the 
other whites, but their innocence cannot be challenged, and their altruism cannot be 
denied. The massacre is thus tempered by the identification of the audience with these 
two heroic white figures, survivors of mercenary Indians seeking for gold, who
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witnessed the horrific killing of the Indian villagers but are themselves set apart from any 
responsibility. The violence is partially justified in two ways; firstly, revenge against the 
Indians is taken for the hero and heroine, and secondly, by the rite of passage that these 
two white characters undergo in their realization of how brutal other Americans can be 
and conversely how hospitable some Indians are. The generic formula is varied to 
incorporate a controversial perspective of the settling of the West, but manages to 
exploit the qualities (in this example, the quality of American exceptionalism) that made 
the genre popular in the first place. The deep structure of the myth, containing the 
archetype of white heroism, remains intact.
This second cultural function of formula reveals a more complex aspect in its 
relation to myth. Though the formula changes, the ideology of the myth may in fact 
remain the same and even be reinforced. This kind of variation can only be assimilated 
by the formula if the foundations of the myth are not violated. Generic play can only 
begin when the requisite of escapism is satisfied. Thus, in the post-Vietnam War period, 
when the foundations of the Frontier myth were shattered and the Americans emerged 
not as victors but as the defeated, the game is discontinued. The progress of civilization 
justifying the violent acts of the Frontier hero becomes invalidated in the context of the 
Vietnam War, as noted by John Heilman:
The American Mythic landscape is a place fixed between savagery 
and civilization, a middle landscape where the hero sheds the unnecessary 
refinements of the latter without entering into the darkness of the former. 
Ever-receding, this frontier gains its validation as a setting for the mythic hero 
because his killing makes way for the progress of civilization advancing 
behind him. In the memoirs of the Vietnam War, however, the American hero 
has somehow entered a nightmarish wilderness where he is allowed no linear
76
direction nor clear spreading of civilization, where neither his inner restraints 
nor the external ones of his civilization are operating.13
Without the moral validation that accompanies the working out of the mythic paradigm, 
the world of the Western no longer exists as a comfortable space to recede into. The 
violent acts of the hero cannot be justified in the name of progress, and the Western 
formula fails to maintain its popularity; the mythic surface is instead critiqued in the 
Vietnam War films that follow after the Western’s demise.
Edwin S. Porter and The Great Train Robbery (1903")
Before evaluating the various components of the Western formula, one of the first movie 
Westerns to exhibit these components will be discussed, and analysed as contributing to 
the prototype from which the reproduction of a pattern followed. The continued 
reproduction of a successful pattern reifies the pattern into the status of formula, and 
movies that later adopt that pattern into members of a genre. Most accounts of the 
Western hail Edwin S. Porter’s The Great Train Robbery as the progenitor of narrative 
cinema and “the first Western”.14 It is important to use the distinction of formula and 
genre at this point. Though the Edison company had played with Western material for 
several years prior to The Great Train Robbery, contemporary audiences recognized the 
film more as a melodramatic example of the “chase film,” the railway genre,” and the 
“crime film”.15 Maltby locates the emergence of the genre at about 1910, when 
American producers were attracted to its being a distinctly American product that their 
European competitors could not successfully imitate.16 The aspect of audience
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identification is less tied to the Western formula, elements of which can already be 
witnessed in Porter’s film.
The Great Train Robbery became a commercial success on a scale that no 
previous film had previously achieved. The film was of a remarkable standard 
considering that it was made in 1903, being almost a reel in length, relating its story 
visually without the aid of subtitles, with fluid cutting between interior and exterior 
shots, utilizing good visual compositions and editing for dramatic effect in the building 
of its tension. With these achievements, Porter set the precedent for later directors to 
refer to. George N. Fenin and William K. Everson provide a clear synopsis of the film:
The Great Train Robbery opens with a sequence in the interior of a 
railroad telegraph office; a typically static long-shot fashion. However, there 
is an unusual effect: the arrival of the train shown through a window. . .a 
good, if occasionally unsteady, superimposition was the modus operandi.
The bandits bind the telegraph operator; then, a cut to the exterior.
As the train pauses by the railroad’s water tower outside, the bandits board it.
From the New Jersey exterior locale, Porter then cuts to a studio interior set of 
the express car. . .Porter then switches to another exterior, his camera placed 
on the rear of the tender, photographing the train in motion. The villains 
approach, and overpower the drivers. . .The callous treatment of the drivers 
seems to have been a deliberate attempt by Porter to emphasize that he was 
not glamorizing outlaws undeserving of sympathy. This is further emphasized 
when the train stops and an incredible horde of passengers- presumably the 
entire population of Dover- descends. One of them breaks for freedom, and is 
shot in cold blood.
Their loot secured, the bandits escape the train, bring it to a halt some 
distance up to the track and in a long and smoothly executed panning shot, 
retreat into the woods. The crime established, the development now cuts 
abruptly to the forces of law and order. At the telegraph office, the operator’s 
little daughter discovers the plight. The film cuts again, this time to the
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dance hall. . .The final section of the film- the chase, the robbers thinking they 
are safe dividing the spoils, is, of course, a typical western finish.17 .
Porter’s pioneer work is useful for observing early standard Western plots and basic 
elements of technique. It is possible to analyse, at this early stage, how these met the 
requisites of escape and entertainment. The tenet of escape was analysed as the 
fulfilment of two primal needs: the need for order, peace, and security, and the contrary 
need for jeopardy, novelty and mystery. In the formula world, these two impulses are 
united. The Great Train Robbery was noted in its editing for dramatic effect leading to 
an increase of suspense. This suspense is built up in the dance hall scene, where the 
Westerners are shooting at the heels of a tenderfoot to force him to dance, while the 
audience waits in anticipation with the knowledge that the telegraph operator would 
arrive to seek their help momentarily. The whimsical shooting also serves as an 
harbinger of the climactic gun battle that is to come at the end of the film. The build up 
of suspense and the violent killing of the bandits is securely encapsulated by the typical 
Western finish of good triumphing over evil, and peace being restored. Thus the 
audience escapes temporarily into an imaginary world where they are “plunged. . .into a 
believable kind of excitement” (facilitated by Porter’s smooth cutting) while their 
confidence that things will work out the way “they want them to” is confirmed.
The commercial success of the film led the Edison company and its competitors 
to make efforts towards replicating its success, turning out a series of films that imitated 
Porter’s movie: The Great Bank Robbery, The Bold Bank Robbery, The Little Train 
Robbery, The Hold Up o f the Rocky Mountain Express. These movies served to 
enhance the audience’s familiarization with the early rules of the game: that of the 
outlaw threatening members of society, the cowboy taking revenge on the outlaw, and
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the shoot-out. Some of the films inspired by the success of The Great Train Robbery 
were outright plagiarisms: Sigmund Lubin made a film with the same title which 
duplicated the sets and action of Porter’s original exactly, with the only variation of a 
local bank’s calendar.18 These incipient rules would be added to with the making of 
more Westerns. An additional player within the game would be the cowboy hero, an 
early version of which can be witnessed in the films directed by an “extra” in Porter’s 
The Great Train Robbery -- G.M. Anderson.
The Cowboy Hero and the Ideology of Nationalism
G.M. Anderson’s decision to build the image of a cowboy hero in his films came about 
after the failure of his Selig Westerns, which Anderson had co-produced with Colonel 
William Selig on location at Colorado. Anderson had tried to repeat the formula of 
Porter’s The Great Train Robbery, where he was cast in the minor role of a bandit until 
he showed that he could not “ride like a Texas Ranger” as he had assured Porter: he 
could not mount a horse, let alone ride it.19 This attempt to repeat Porter’s formula and 
the acclaim of The Great Train Robbery met with little success, and Anderson turned 
towards improving the formula by creating a central character on which the audience 
could focus their attention.
Anderson’s first film, an adaptation of a Peter B. Kyne story was entitled 
Broncho Billy and the Baby,; with its success Anderson was convinced that he should 
use Broncho Billy as a continuing character in his Westerns. Each story was still treated 
individually, so that it did not matter how many times Billy was married, reformed, or 
killed off. Anderson used the character of Billy in an estimated five hundred short one
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reeler and two reeler Westerns. The cowboy hero soon became the main player of the 
formula, and his actions drove the narrative, communicating its central ideology — 
nationalism.
Philip French lists the qualities of a typical Western hero:
. . .the hero is the embodiment of good. He is upright, clean living, sharp 
shooting, a White Anglo Saxon Protestant who respects the law, the flag, 
women and children; he dresses smartly in white clothes and rides a white 
horse which is his closest companion; he uses bullets and words with equal 
care, is a disinterested upholder of justice and uninterested in personal gain.
He always wins.20
These requisites of being a hero are closely aligned with what has been the distinct 
cultural profile of the American Nation’s dominant group. Charles Wagley and Marvin 
Harris’s description of the discourse by which this dominance is articulated is as follows:
The cultural tradition, the language, and physical types of one of the state’s 
society are proposed as the national language, the national culture, and the 
national physical type. . . .In the United States, the national ideal is English- 
speaking, Protestant, northern European in descent, and light Caucasoid in 
physical appearance.21
This dominance is at odds with the ideology of nationalism, for it creates a hierarchy of 
group identities and dispels the conception of the nation as what Ellis Cashmere has 
termed “a deep, horizontal comradeship”.22 Virginia Wright Wexman sees this 
contradiction at the center of the myth of imagined community to be a particularly 
troublesome one, for the tension between the ideal of a community of equals and the
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drive for domination by groups within the culture has been pronounced.23 The 
contradiction is also apparent with relation to the ideology of the Frontier, for the 
settlement of the West brings into focus confrontations with indigenous racial others 
whose value systems were fundamentally at odds with those of the European settlers, 
and were not easily accommodated into the ideal of comradeship. The previous 
discussions of the agrarian and industrial frontiers expressed this conflict. The movie 
Western communicates the ideology of the frontier and manages to contain and 
neutralise this contradiction: the cowboy hero represents the dominant group, yet 
manages to promulgate the ideal of nationalism in either partially synthesizing the 
cultures of other groups or omitting their existence completely if their culture is so 
different that synthesis is not possible. The minority groups are classified under the all 
encompassing term of “the Other”, and the main representative of this “Otherness” in the 
Western is the Indian.
The Indian: Symbolic Surrogate
From the standpoint of Western film history, two contrasting approaches to the Indian 
co-existed. One held the Indian to be a bloodthirsty, senseless savage while the other 
veered to the opposite extreme by depicting the Indian with dignity as the original 
American. The sympathetic approach to the Indian was short-lived and dominated in the 
first phase of the history of the Western, witnessed in films such as The Cowboy and the 
School-Marm (1910) and The Sacrifice (1912). The former stars James Young Deer 
and Red Wing, playing an Indian father and daughter who help the cowboy protagonist 
save the white female victim from her (non-Indian and Indian-hating) captors. In the
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second an Indian sacrifices his life to save the white heroine of the narrative, 
overwhelmed by the cold after he dispatches her towards safety on his sled. This latter 
approach manipulated the Indian into the role of a red-skinned menace whose only 
justification for existing lay in providing the formula action by taking to the warpath in 
opposition to the white heroes. This was especially so for the bulk of the “B” Westerns: 
in Prairie Thunder (1937) and Fort Osage (1952), for example, their warlike actions 
were deliberately spurred on by white renegades, and in The Law Rides Again (1943) 
because of erroneous grievances against the whites.24 The acceptance of the Indian as a 
convenient mass enemy in Western films ensured that the ideology of American 
nationalism would remain intact, for the Indian failed to emerge as a candidate for that 
“deep, horizontal comradeship” and was instead regarded as a savage, a scourge to rid 
the land of. The myth of the “savage war” is actually a basic ideological convention for 
the extermination of Indians, with the Indian becoming a symbolic surrogate for the 
range of political and social inequality that tarnished the nationalist ideology of a perfect 
republic. The Indian is viewed as an obstacle to the creation of that republic. An 
example of a Western that embraces this perspective and is widely admitted to be the 
most famous and perhaps the most influential is John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939).
In Stagecoach, the enemies of the bearers of civilization are the Apache Indians, 
who periodically arise like a pestilence to attack white men without any specific reason. 
Motivation becomes unnecessary, once the rule equating the Indian with the enemy is 
accepted. These Indians, led by Geronimo, appear suddenly with intense hostility 
against the stagecoach and its passenger load of Western types: Doc Boone, a conniving 
drunkard, Dallas, a prostitute, Hatfield, a shady gambler with the manners of a southern 
gentleman, Lucy, the pregnant wife of a cavalry officer, Henry Gatewood, a pompous
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banker, and Samuel Peacock, a whiskey salesman. The coach is driven by Buck, a man 
with an aversion to Indians, and Curly, a lawman riding “shotgun”. Before long, the 
coach picks up Ringo Kid: John Wayne in a star-making performance. The journey 
through Monument Valley has been likened to a spiritual passage, where the 
dehumanized Apaches symbolize demonic forces that terrorize the characters en route in 
senseless waves of violent hatred, with many Indians killed but none relenting. This 
view of the Indian would persist well into the forties, with more sympathetic 
perspectives adopted towards the sixties, as in Ford’s Cheyenne Autumn (1964). 
Stagecoach, however, centres on the symbolic grouping of civilization and that group’s 
encounter with its persecutors, the Indians.
The dialectical approach to the Indian as devil and noble savage gave way in the 
nineteenth century to a definition of the Indian way of life as an inferior and earlier stage 
in the development of civilization.25 This redefinition of the Indian justified his 
assimilation or extermination -- providing the American nation’s “dominant group” with 
the rationale for the brutal elimination of native American cultures. The portrayal of the 
Indian in Costner’s Dances With Wolves has been perceived as belonging to a more 
recent approach, with films which are radically positive in their treatment of the Indian. 
The formulaic rule of racially discriminating against the Indian Other appears to be 
replaced by the new rule of appreciating his difference. I have identified this as a 
diachronic change. However, the more sympathetic representation of the Indian was 
not, as Jane Tompkins insists, available only in Costner’s movie. There is a widespread 
understanding that Broken Arrow (1950) is a pro-Indian Western. Michael Walker 
provides a detailed analysis of the movie, focusing on its pro-Indian nature in The Movie 
Book o f the Western. The movie was considered so radical in this aspect that the 1950
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movie audiences had to be prepared for the reversal in ideology.26 He also identifies 
Westerns prior to Broken Arrow that were famous for protesting the injustice done to 
Native Americans: Ramona (1936) is about the victimisation of Indians while The 
Vanishing American (1925) and Devil's Doorway (1950) are about the dispossession of 
Navajo Indians and a Soshone chief who fought with the Union Army respectively. 
These changes in the formula’s representation of the frontier myth are synchronic — 
Drum Beat, the next Western that Daves made after the production of Broken Arrow, 
sees the return of the Western’s racism with a vengeance. The ability of the Hollywood 
genre to “play it both ways” is relevant here, for the central tenet of white supremacy is 
not violated in any of these Westerns, nor in Dances With Wolves, as a later discussion 
of the film will elucidate. The brutalization of Otherness is intrinsic in the deep structure 
of the frontier myth, and defies correction. Douglas Pye affirms this in the following:
The history of the Western is littered with movies that attempt to develop 
liberal perspectives on the historical treatment of Native Americans.
However, the racism that is inherent in the traditions of the genre makes 
almost any attempt to produce an anti-racist Western a paradoxical, even 
contradictory enterprise. It is, in effect, impossible to escape the genre’s 
informing White supremacist terms.27
The white supremacy is enacted through violence that is committed against the Indian 
enemy. These acts of violence are motivated by the role of the woman, who is forever 
at the mercy of the lawless element and dependent on the hero for protection. Her 
function as the central figure in the captivity narratives discussed in chapter two is 
pertinent here.
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The Woman: Shifting Reality and Static Prescription
A remark by Budd Boetticher enunciates the role of the woman in Westerns: “what 
counts is what the heroine provokes, or rather, what she represents. She is the one, or 
rather the love or fear she inspires in the hero, or else the concern he feels for her, who 
makes him act the way he does. In herself the woman has not the slightest 
importance.”28 The woman in the Western is, like the Indian, representative of 
“Otherness”. However, her difference is one that can be partially eradicated — she 
becomes a representative of what motivates the hero’s actions. Thus even in the 
captivity myths where the woman is arguably the heroine of the narrative, her position is 
fundamentally a passive one. By resisting the physical threats and spiritual temptations 
of the Indians, she vindicates the power of the values of Christianity and civilization that 
are imperilled in the wilderness war. The worth of the woman lies in these values that 
she symbolizes, and as Budd Boetticher states, “in herself’ she “has not the slightest 
importance”.
The role of the woman then, is to provide the motivation for the heroic action 
undertaken by the cowboy in the Western. Like the Indian, the portrayal of the woman 
undergoes some change over the years, but her function has not altered considerably. 
At this juncture a qualification has to be made with respect to a significant group of ‘B’ 
Westerns in the late 1930s, a point that is taken up in chapter 6. In general, however, 
irrespective of the shifting roles of women in American society, women in Western films 
are subject unrelentingly to the same prescriptions. Jon Tuska demonstrates this 
reification process by contrasting The Return o f Draw Egan (1916) with Heaven’s Gate 
(1981).29 In the first movie, William S. Hart plays “Draw” Egan, an outlaw who goes
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into hiding after rumours are widely circulated that he was killed in a shoot-out. He is 
appointed as Sheriff by the head of the reform committee at Yellow Dog and regards it 
as capital cover for resuming his outlaw activities. However, upon meeting the heroine 
of the movie, Egan decides that he must reform and prove his morality by stamping out 
the evil element at Yellow Dog — the film concludes when Egan is forgiven for his 
transgressions and accepted by the heroine. The point that Tuska makes is that the 
heroine is entirely passive, it is merely her appearance that marks the crisis moment in 
the film when everything changes. The role of the woman in The Return o f Draw Egan 
is to be the hero’s motivation, and this role carries on into Heaven's Gate. The plot of 
Michael Cimino’s film revolves around Jim Averill’s determination to save Ella Watson’s 
life -- the latter a prostitute who is on the “hit list” of a vigilance committee made up of 
rich cattlemen to deal with immigrant rustling.
Though the feminist movement in the 1960’s historically liberated women from 
these passive and stereotypical roles, the roles prescribed to women in Westerns have 
for the most part remained static. The function of women as captives is as integral to 
the frontier myth and Western as it is that the Indians are inferior to the whites. In 
Unforgiven, a Western made in 1992, the women are still prescribed the roles of 
prostitutes, who must seek their revenge through the hero: Clint Eastwood plays the 
part of an infamous gunslinger who goes to their aid in return for the reward offered by 
the women at the brothel. By Slotkin’s account — which has a basis in Jungian 
psychology -- the Western genre’s assignation of the role of motivation to women stems 
from the hunter myths, where the anima is the object of the hunter’s quest. The hunter 
hero seeks union with his “lost half’, his anima: the hidden part of male consciousness 
where feeling subordinates intellect, passive, feminine and essential.30 Even though the
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woman is passive, she is still essential, for it is only through her that the male protagonist 
may achieve personal salvation and acquire heroic status. This function is clear in all 
three Westerns mentioned. In The Return o f Draw Egan, Egan decides to seek moral 
salvation when he meets the heroine of the film, in Heaven's Gate, Averill’s heroic 
exploits are committed for the sake of Ella Watson, as in Unforgiven, where Clint 
Eastwood goes on a journey at a prostitute’s request.
The Woman, Indian, and Cowboy are three of the main characters which fulfil 
central roles in the Western: the woman represents civilization, the Indian savage 
threatens civilization, and the hero is fundamentally committed to the preservation of 
civilization while possessing many qualities and skills of the savage. It is out of the 
multiple variations on the relationships between these groups that the various Western 
plots listed in the first chapter are concocted. This tripartite division of characters 
constitutes a major part of the Western formula — with the Western setting performing 
an equally integral function.
Setting: “the Meeting Point Between Savagery and Civilization”31
The definition of the frontier by Turner as the meeting point of savagery and civilization 
marks a relatively brief stage in the social evolution of the West when outlaws and 
Indians posed a threat to the community’s stability. Yet this brief period of struggle has 
been erected by the Western formula into a timeless epic past in which heroic individual 
defenders of law and order (without the modern social resources of police and courts) 
stand poised against the threat of lawlessness and savagery.32 Cawelti sees several 
factors contributing to this particular fixation of the epic moment. One of these is the
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ideological tendency of Americans to see the Far West as the stronghold of traditional 
values ~  especially the value of nationalism that is associated with the cowboy. The 
importance of these values cannot be overstated, but it must be remembered that the 
Western’s success as a popular form in the twentieth century derives from the great 
potential it manifested for cinematic expression.
In terms of visual articulation, the geographic setting of the Great Plains and 
adjacent areas have proved appropriate as a means of isolating and intensifying the 
drama of the frontier encounter between civilization and savagery. The sharp contrasts 
of light and shadow characteristic of an arid climate, combined with the topographical 
contrasts of plain and mountain, rocky outcrops and flat deserts, bare canyons and 
forested plateaus, visually enhances the contrast between civilized man and the 
wilderness. The research of Patricia Hills on the work of the American Art-Union in the 
1840s and 1850s illustrates how such qualities were readily exploited in the era of 
Westward expansion. The project of the men who ran the American Art-Union was to 
promote and distribute patriotic images with the “Progress of Civilization” as a central 
theme. William Ranney’s oil painting The Scouting Party (1851), for example, was that 
of a party of trappers with their horses on a high bluff overlooking the movements of 
Indians who were betrayed by fires in the prairie below.33 The Western landscape’s 
potential for visual expression is augmented through the medium of film. Tompkins 
observes that the typical Western movie begins with a landscape shot:
Desert, with butte, two riders galloping toward camera.
Stagecoach (1939)
Cattle on a trail, flat country.
Texas (1941)
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Landscape with butte, a wagon trail, cattle.
My Darling Clementine (1946)
Desert with wagon trail, flat country, a few hills.
Red River (1948)
Flat foreground, river, large mesa on the opposite shore,
Rio Grande (1950)
Desert landscape framed by the doorway of house. Song:
“What makes a man to wander, what makes a man to roam, 
what makes a man to wander, and turn his back on home?”
The Searchers (1956)34
The opening shots of all the films above, except for Rio Grande unite the structural 
element of civilization and wilderness, where the cattle, wagon trail and house are 
representatives of the former.
Four topographic features of the Great Plains are especially pertinent in creating 
an effective backdrop for the Western: its openness, aridity and inhospitability to human 
life, extremes of light and climate, and paradoxically, its grandeur and beauty.35 The 
importance of this paradox is in the capacity that it wields as a source of regenerating 
power: the inhospitable but open prairie can be tamed arid inhabited through an 
extension of the boundaries of civilzation. The thematic conflict between savagery and 
civilization generally centres on the visual images of the isolated town, ranch, or fort 
surrounded by the vast open grandeur of prairie or desert that is connected to the rest of 
civilization via railroad, stagecoach, or trail. Stagecoach exploits these visual resources. 
The opening of the film dwells on the visual theme of the restrictive character of town
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life, as a fragile town with rickety false fronts, and dark, crowded interiors. As the 
stagecoach departs on its voyage, this restriction and artificiality is contrasted with the 
epic wilderness ~  Monument Valley’s topography of a large flat desert between steep 
hills embodies a mixture of grandeur and savage hostility. This propensity of the 
Western setting for strong visual contrasts not only aids the dramatization of the 
tripartite division of characters, it dominates the Western pattern of action, and thus the 
Western’s film narrative.
The Western Film Narrative: Enigma and Resolution
Janet Staiger’s chapter on the formulation of the classic Hollywood narrative finds the 
American classical cinema’s narrative based on compositional unity: a chain of cause and 
effect linking separate events, so tightly constructed that no extraneous event could 
enter the film’s plot.36 Causality and motivation with a pattern of linear determination 
and multiple lines of intertwined actions formed the classical narrative model, with 
character psychology functioning to initiate and sustain a unified, developing narrative 
line. The notion of character psychology in the Western film genre manifests itself in a 
cast of fictional characters with certain traits of personality, motivations and desires: 
basically, the woman, Indian and cowboy. The classical narrative is organised around a 
structure of enigma and resolution, whereby a fictional environment begins with a state 
of equilibrium, and suffers a disruption before a new equilibrium is produced at the end 
of the story.37 It is through the agency and authority of the hero that a narrative 
resolution of the conflict is brought about. The Western, in this narrative aspect, is part 
of a generic entity — the classical Hollywood movie.
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Like the Western setting, the focus of the Western narrative is on the Indian 
story or the battle to exterminate Otherness. The Indian War provides the disruption 
that the cowboy hero eliminates to restore equilibrium to the narrative structure. It is 
appropriate to note at this point that the qualities symbolized by the Indian savage can be 
superimposed onto the outlaw, who stands for the same negative values of lawlessness, 
a love for violence, and the rejection of civilization for the freedom of the wilderness. 
Will Wright provides the structure of the classical plot, which I will list here to present 
the basic development of the Western narrative:
1. The hero enters a social group.
2. The hero is unknown to society.
3. The hero is revealed to have exceptional ability.
4. The society recognizes a difference between themselves and the hero; the hero is given a 
special status.
5. The society does not completely accept the hero.
6. There is a conflict of interest between the villains and society.
7. The villains are stronger than society; the society is weak.
8. There is a strong friendship or respect between the hero and a villain.
9. The villains threaten society.
10. The hero avoids involvement in the conflict.
11. The villain endangers a friend of the hero.
12. The hero fights the villains.
13. The hero defeats the villains.
14. The society is safe.
15. The society accepts the hero.
16. The hero loses or gives up his special status.38
According to Wright, this narrative structure of the classical Western is the prototype 
for all Westerns, and the foundation on which variations are built. The ideological
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import of this film narrative is explicit: the Indian or villain presents a problem for the 
hero (who articulates the discourse of the dominant group) and must be overcome so 
that peace may be restored, security ensured, and civilization perpetuated. The success 
of the hero achieves the realization of the American national identity: that of a 
democratic polity, an ever-expanding economy, and a phenomenally dynamic and 
‘progressive’ civilization.39
The Western formula and film narrative as expressions of the American Myth of 
the Frontier, thus served to enunciate the dominant ideology of the American nation. 
This formula, already incipient in The Great Train Robbery, remained popular well into 
the 1930s when it suffered a sudden and sharp drop during the crisis of the Depression. 
The formula of the Western evoked a mythology and ideology linked with the heroic age 
of American expansion, and the dream of limitless growth. In 1932-1935, this vision no 
longer seemed valid, for the historical catastrophe of the Depression revealed the failure 
of the progressive dream embodied in the Western. Westerns were replaced by other 
film genres that spoke directly to the social crisis of the 1930s and entertained the 
possibility of such a catastrophe: these were the crime film and the social drama.40
The following chapter focuses on the temporary demise of the Western in the 
Depression era. The two film genres that were activated by the depression and replaced 
the Western share a common function with the latter as vehicles for a continuously 
developing mythology. To a large extent, both genres absorbed the mythic charge of the 
Western and applied its mythic material to the concerns and imagery of the Depression, 
and the New Deal. However, the myth that surfaced at the level of discourse did not do 
so in its entirety, suggesting that cultural verisimilitude neccessitated a modification 
beyond the level of its surface structure. The communication of frontier mythology in
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the Gangster movie and the ‘B’ Western manifested a period of negotiation before the 
re-emergence of the Western in 1939.
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PART TWO
The Western and Depression America
The Depression Era
Progressivism and the Discrediting of the West
Maybe these gangsters will put up a lot of factories and use all the water in our 
creeks for power and our trees for paper pulp and our kids to run the machines 
for them! Maybe if we pay ’em enough they’ll put up a lot of tall buildings so 
we can’t see the sun for the smoke from chimneys! And all the cowboys left in 
this country’ll get jobs driving trucks.
Cowboy in Gunsmoke (Paramount, 1931)
The collapse of Wall Street in 1929 ended a period of optimistically uncontrolled 
growth, ushering in the Depression and the New Deal.1 The “Jazz Age” was 
characterized by a spectacular increase in consumer spending as the practices of 
conspicuous consumption permeated through the social system to the lower middle 
classes. This economic expansion aided the Coolidge years by a laissez faire approach 
to economic regulation under the Republican administrations of the 1920s. The 
apparent success of the economic system during the 1920s, especially in the consumer 
industries had confirmed the psychology of Frontier dynamics that linked expansion with 
a sound economy.2 This economic expansion provided a replacement for the expansion 
into empty land, abating Turner’s concern for the closing of the frontier.
A component of that psychology was what Francis Jennings has called the 
“crusader ideology”, where the “conquerors of America glorified the devastation they
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wrought in visions of righteousness”.3 This ideology was applied to the domestic 
economy in the decade prior to the Depression. Bruce Barton, a successful journalist 
and a leading figure in the advertising industry, was one of many who imagined himself 
in terms of frontier heroism. In seeking to demonstrate the links between corporate 
business and a liberal Protestant Christianity, Barton appropriated the crusader ideology 
from the context of a wilderness environment to a business environment. This is clear 
in his rhetoric:
Great progress will be made in the world when we rid ourselves of the idea 
that there is a difference between work and religious work. . . .All work is 
worship; all useful service prayer. And whoever works wholeheartedly at any 
worthy calling is a co-worker with the almighty in the great enterprise which 
He has initiated but which He can never finish without the help of men.4
(Barton’s italics)
Barton transformed “business men into ministers of Christ”; the new corporate system of 
the 1920s was “not secular but divine”.5 This conjoining of business with religion made 
it possible to view economic expansion as the equivalent to territorial acquisition. Both 
were activities conducted in the interests of Holy Church.
The American Film Industry benefited tremendously from both trends of 
increased consumer spending and conspicuous consumption — Tino Balio calculates that 
in 1930, motion-picture attendance reached a then all-time peak of 80 million spectators 
a week.6 The assets of the industry between 1926 and 1930 tripled to reach $1 billion.7 
A significant change to the industry was the new sound technology, which led to a 
consolidation of the studio system with audience responses at the time providing the 
economic rationale for the studios' conversion to sound. The immediate increase in
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profits justified the initial outlay of up to $500 million in capital expenditure required by 
the sound conversion.8 However, beginning in 1931, the movie business directly 
suffered from the effects of the Depression and its associated sense of economic 
dislocation. Theatre admissions dropped by more than 12% to 70 million per week in 
1931, with the price of theatre tickets falling by 35% to 20 instead of 30 cents per ticket. 
The conversion to sound now proved to be an economic hurdle, more than doubling the 
original production costs for the silent movies.9 The continued investment demanded by 
the sound revolution led Fox, Paramount and RKO (Radio- Keith- Orpheum: its 
founding in part due to the arrival of sound) into receivership.
The 1930s was also a turning point for the Western — it saw the bifurcation of 
the genre into two sections with differing levels of popularity. The ‘A’ Western suffered 
a sudden and precipitous drop in its production, while the ‘B’ Western flourished and 
reached its peak of popularity, arguably providing the economic motive for the 
resurgence of the ‘A’ Western in the 1940’s.10 ‘A’ movies in general were made on 
budgets averaging $350,000 or more, featuring stars with known box-office appeal, 
while ‘B’ movies filled the bottom half of the double bill — an industry practice that was 
standardized in 1935 where audiences were promised two films for the price of one.11 
Brian Taves’s “practical multilevel taxonomy” for the ‘B’ film is probably the most 
accurate to date; in order of prestige it consists of: (1) major-studio programmers, (2) 
major-studio ‘B’s, (3) smaller-company ‘B’s and (4) the quickies of Poverty Row.12 
The statistics that follow chart the performance of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Westerns in the 
Depression era — they are based on the tables constructed by Ed Buscombe in The BFI 
Companion to the Western. However, his and Slotkin’s (the latter deriving the statistics 
from Buscombe’s tables) definition of what constitutes a ‘B’ film differs from Taves’s
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categories in that both identify movies screened prior to the standardization of the 
double bill as belonging to the ‘B’ category. Their classification appears to be more 
dependent on the criterion of budget and running time; nonetheless the statistics are 
useful as a rough illustration of the decline of the ‘A’ features in relation to the ‘B’s.13
In 1930 ‘A’ Westerns made up 2.6 percent of all films produced by the seven 
major studios, and 21.4 percent of all Westerns. In 1931 these figures dropped to 1.6 
percent and 16.7 percent, with both ‘A’ and ‘B’ Westerns continuing to comprise 16-17 
percent of all Hollywood films produced by the major studios and independents. In 
1932, though the Western share of all Hollywood films rose to 22 percent, ‘A’ Westerns 
actually dropped to 0.6 percent of major studio production and 4.7 percent of all 
Westerns. The depths of unpopularity were reached in 1934, when no ‘A’ Westerns 
were produced. Between 1932 and 1934 Westerns continued to average 17 percent of 
all Hollywood productions, but, again, the ‘A’ Western averaged only 0.3 percent of all 
major studio productions and 2.4 percent of all Westerns.14
These discrepancies may be explained by the rise of the ‘B’ Westerns, which 
were not only marketable but cheap enough for the Poverty Row studios to produce. 
After 1931, the seven major studios became sceptical about the market for feature- 
length Westerns, and their investment of money and resources for this genre were 
directed at lower budget equivalents: of the 1336 Westerns made by all producers 
between 1930 and 1941, only 66, or a mere five percent, could be classified as A- 
features, with 31 of those A-features falling within the years 1939-1941.15 These ‘B’ 
Westerns appealed to a different section of the American public, cultivating an audience 
outside of the metropolitan boundaries defining the patrons of its ‘A’ counterpart. In 
general, the B films targeted not the white middle class, but rural, black and immigrant
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groups.16 The lower budget Westerns were also designed to fill the bottom half of the 
double bill. In 1935-1936 the attempt made by the studios to revive the Western genre 
was assisted by the standardization of the double-bill which increased demand for cheap 
fillers which the ‘B’ Westerns (which had a budget of US$50,000 to US$200,00017) 
were ideally placed to supply.18 The production of Westerns jumped from 59 in 1934 to 
106 in 1935 due to the growth of the double-bill, and, through the decade the annual 
number of films produced by the Hollywood film industry generally increased. 
However, the three ‘A’ Westerns made in 1937 and the four made in 1938 were less 
than the five made in 1931.19
Progressivism and the Turner Thesis
Few would disagree that the crisis of the Depression had a direct influence on the 
decline of the ‘A’ Western. The reasons given for this decline vary, and though they 
ultimately lead to economic considerations, ideological conflicts do come into play. As 
a direct expression of Turner’s progressivism and an embodiment of America’s aspirant 
culture, the Western’s ideological message was at odds with the waning of optimism that 
characterised the Depression years. The mythology of progressivism requires the belief 
in pioneering as a defining national mission (a ‘Manifest Destiny’), and envisions the 
westward settlements as a refuge from tyranny and corruption, a safety valve for 
metropolitan discontents, a land of golden opportunity for enterprising individualists, 
and lastly as an inexhaustible reservoir of natural wealth on which future limitless 
prosperity could be based.20 The frontiering experience espoused in this mythology is 
proclaimed in Turner’s thesis, where it is considered to be a major determinant in the
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shaping of American civilization. The American version of progress was thus 
intrinsically associated with territorial expansion.
Prior to the 1930s, Progressives had utilized the frontier hypothesis to rationalize 
Theodore Roosevelt’s ideas about the New Nationalism. They held a collective belief 
that as the frontier had disappeared a new age was emerging.21 In 1909, Herbert Croly, 
a journalist who greatly influenced Roosevelt’s speeches, attempted to develop an 
ideology for progressive reform on the basis that economic conditions were profoundly 
modified by the passing of the frontier. He prescribed a vast increase in the powers of 
federal government to develop economic and social policies to compensate the 
disappearance of the frontier.22 Though for some historians the Progressive era extends 
back to an earlier date, the Progressive party was launched in 1912, with a platform that 
linked the idea of progress with big business, coupled with a belief in the efficiency of 
business and the desire to emulate its techniques.23 As a leading expounder of the 
businessman’s creed (publishing The Gospel o f Wealth in 1900), Andrew Carnegie held 
that the methods by which he became a self-made millionaire would have similarly 
beneficial results when applied to the fields of humanitarianism and international 
relations: this belief was widely shared.24 The component of territorial expansion as a 
reservoir of wealth translated into an industrial frontier that sought to accommodate the 
disappearance of the wilderness. As explained in chapter two of this thesis, the 
exchange of an agrarian for an industrial frontier following the failure of the Homestead 
Act did not in any way undermine the dynamic of frontier psychology. The new 
resource reservoir in the form of precious minerals would offer the same promise of 
infinite opportunity to an unlimited population of free men to fulfil their aspirations.25 
The Myth of the Frontier as espoused by Turner retained its validity with his Thesis
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embraced by most professional historians in the Progressive era. To some, its validity 
was incontestable -- in 1907 Frederic Logan Paxson stated that “within recent years it 
has become commonplace in American history that the influence of the frontier is the 
one constant to be reckoned with in accounting for the development of American life 
during the first century of independent existence”.26
The decade of the 1920s saw a change of mood as the optimism characterizing 
the earlier years began to wane. World War I gained for the Americans a more 
pronounced sense of their global significance, and the increased pace of industrial and 
technological advance led to the diminishing of the role of agriculture in American life. 
The transition to an industrial frontier, along with its extolling of Turner, had ironically 
been characterized by a deep nostalgia for the agrarian past. These changes shifted the 
emphasis to international and urban dimensions. By the end of the 1920s, not only had 
the frontier theme been minimized, serious fissures were apparent in the consensus on 
the validity of Turner’s Thesis.27 In the wake of the Depression, the progressive myth 
contained in Turner’s doctrines was more rigorously questioned. Five competing 
hypotheses challenged the central impact of the frontier as an explanation for American 
development. These were concerned with economic determinism, psychological 
analysis, spiritual influences, and the impact of immigration and cultural values.28 The 
economic interpretation of history as propounded by Charles A. Beard was persuasive; 
he found it “questionable whether even up to that time [1890] the frontier or the whole 
agricultural West had exercised a more profound influence on American development 
than either the industrialism of the East or the semi-feudal plantation system of the 
South.”29 More damning was the charge that the frontier thesis had fostered the myth of
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Rugged American Individualism, rather than moulding the democratic character of the 
American people and their political institutions. He wrote:
The cold truth is, that individualistic creed of everybody for himself and the 
devil take the hindmost is principally responsible for the distress in which 
Western civilization finds itself. .. .Turner overemphasizes, in my opinion, the 
influence of the frontier economy on the growth of the democratic idea.30
Even Frederick L. Paxon was moved by the Depression to retract his previous claims 
championing Turner and endorse instead the theory of class conflict, declaring that the 
frontier of 1935 was the social boundary between those who have and those who want. 
John C. Almack, an education professor at Stanford University voiced a summary of the 
general criticisms directed against Turner:
For thirty years American historical thought has been dominated by the
frontier shibboleth. . .The frontier theory appears to be nothing more than a 
diluted type of Marxian determinism; its foundation an unmistakable 
materialism, conceiving men as the slaves of forces over which they have little 
influence or control. . .All people have had frontiers. . .While the frontier has 
been an important factor in American life, it has not been an important agency 
of progress. . .The advances which have been made were made in spite of, not 
because of, the environment.31
Almack made this observation in 1925. When the Depression undermined any belief in a 
frontier of unlimited opportunity or an infinite resource base, it further stimulated the 
criticisms of Turner’s thesis that had begun in the previous decade. The difference with 
this post-crash critique of Turner was that at the same time as professional historians
were rejecting his explanation of American progress, movie audiences appeared to be
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rejecting the Westerns that were essentially visual counterparts of Turner’s thesis. This 
was registered by the poor reception of the genre at the box-office.
Though the legitimacy of Turner’s thesis was questioned, it did not mean that 
•expressions of Frontier mythology declined correspondingly. Michel Foucault’s 
‘Repressive Hypothesis’ is relevant here for understanding the relationship between 
frontier discourse and American history. In his first volume of The History o f Sexuality, 
Foucault makes the initial observation that the 17th century marked the beginning of an 
age of the repression of sexuality, to the extent of extinguishing the words that rendered 
it too visibly present.32 He proceeds to qualify this observation in providing evidence for 
how in the last three centuries there has been a veritable discursive explosion, with the 
codification of a whole rhetoric of allusion and metaphor. There was a steady 
proliferation of discourses concerned with sex and a discursive ferment that gathered 
momentum from the 18th century onwards, with:
. . .the multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of the exercise 
of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more 
and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it 
spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and 
endlessly accumulated detail.33
The subversion of Turner’s progressivism and the accompanying demise of the ‘A’ 
Western in the Depression era is analogous to a repression of sexuality in the sense that 
the frontier discourses they contain are too visibly present. The incitement to articulate 
frontier discourse is also as forceful because the frontier myth (with notions of rugged 
individualism and a hatred of Otherness) is arguably as crucial to American self- 
definition as sexuality was to the Victorian of Foucault’s imagination.
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Thus discourses of a mythology ineluctably linked with the heroic age of 
American expansionism and the dream of limitless growth might seem inappropriate 
after the historical failure of progressivism, but they continued to thrive in less explicit 
forms: crime films set in a recent urban past, and cheaper ‘B’ productions which 
addressed the changes wrought by urbanization. The crime films (discussed later in 
chapter 5) took over the mythographic function of the Western, and also dealt more 
explicitly with Depression era problems of prohibition and organized crime. The ‘B’ 
Westerns (discussed in chapter 6) subdued the rhetoric of frontier expansion with music. 
The achievements of these two Depression genres provided a discursive framework of 
masked repetition that sustained the central tenets of frontier mythology until 1939, 
when it emerged once again in less hidden versions. In economic terms, this generic 
shift to differing versions of the same frontier mythology and the appeal to other 
audiences (associated with the cheaper ‘B’ productions) were two parts of Hollywood’s 
strategy to recoup the losses in profits that it suffered in the Depression years.
The fact of the ‘A’ Western’s eclipse is significant. The following section of this 
chapter investigates, within the context of American social and cultural history, the 
possible reasons linked to its demise. This eclipse has been attributed in general to the 
deepening Depression that reduced theatre audiences, and to three other more specific 
reasons: the failures of two big-budget Westerns at the beginning of the 1930s; an 
explicit rejection of the progressive interpretation of Turner’s Frontier Thesis in 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal; and the attraction of other genres.34 A 
consideration of these various factors will lead the discussion into the ideological project 
contained in the classic Gangster films and, in a later chapter, the cultural instrumentality 
of Gene Autry’s Singing Westerns. The masked repetition of frontier discourse
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manifests the attempt at preserving the utility of the frontier myth as it confronts the 
failure of the progressive dream.
I) Costly Disasters : The B iz Trail and Cimarron (1930)
With regard to the decline of ‘A’ Westerns during the 1930s, Ed Buscombe offers a 
plausible determinant in the box-office returns of the Westerns which were made at the 
start of the decade. By 1920 the average expenditure on a feature had risen to 
US$60,000, with Paramount productions reaching in excess of US$150,000.35 Fox’s 
Big Trail (1930) followed in the tradition of James Cruze’s The Covered Wagon (1923) 
which signalled an increase in the number of longer and more expensive Westerns. 
Slotkin has termed Westerns from 1923-1931 “epic Westerns” due to their scale and 
sophistication.36 Cruze’s film was ten reels long when originally released, and at 
US$782,000 (about US$8 million in 1988) it was the most expensive Western to date. 
Its income from rentals totaled US$3.5 million.37 The Covered Wagon thus superseded 
its historical precedents in scope and scale: after the success of Cecil B. Demille’s 
feature-length Western The Squaw Man (1914) which exceeded US$37,000 and was six 
reels in length, William S. Hart made feature-length pictures, and three years later with 
John Ford’s first five-reel Western, Straight Shooting (1917), feature-length pictures 
were common.38 The significance of The Covered Wagon was that it led directly to a 
marked increase (from 1923) onwards in the number of Westerns with bigger budgets, 
as most were over six reels in length. The Iron Horse (1924), a Ford ‘Prestige Western’ 
and Fox’s first epic Western, had a phenomenal budget that catered for 5,000 extras 
needing 100 cooks to feed them, and had a running time in excess of 2 hours, overtaking
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the 108 minutes of The Covered Wagon. North o f 36 (1924), The Pony Express, The 
Vanishing American (1925), and Redskin (1928), commanded similar epic status, along 
with Tumbleweeds (1925) which cost US$302,000.
Seven years after The Covered Wagon, The Big Trail had a budget of US$2 
million, more than double the amount of the former film.39 The cost of production was 
linked with the intention to launch John Wayne as a star, and the fact that the film was 
one of the first to be made in Grandeur, a 55mm wide-screen colour process so 
impressive that the premiere audience cheered and gave the film a standing ovation at its 
conclusion. The film was, however, a disaster at the box-office, perhaps because most 
viewers would only see the film in standard 35mm black-and-white screen, taking away 
its impact. There are also sections of the film where the background noise overpowers 
the dialogue of the actors and actresses — Variety’s 1930 review of the Western labels it 
a “noisy Covered Wagon”.40 This occurs at various points in The Big Trail, but most 
critically at the beginning, where the sound of moving wagons and horses marrs the 
scene where Wayne makes his entrance. Wayne was subsequently condemned to 
Poverty Row and CB’ Westerns for the rest of the decade. Radio Picture’s (later RKO) 
Cimarron was slightly less ambitious, costing the studio an unprecedented 
US$1,433,000 to produce (it was filmed in black and white), but despite winning an 
Academy Award for Best Picture it lost US$565,000.41 Its poor box-office performance 
could be attributed to its overtly classic Tumerian frontier-as-safety-valve perspective; a 
feature that the film shares with The Big Trail.
The Big Trail's opening is a dedication to “the men and women who planted 
civilization in the wilderness and courage in the blood of their children”, establishing the 
setting of a gathering of these people “from the North, the South and the East” as “they
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assemble at the bank of the Mississippi for the conquest of the West”. The mise-en- 
scene of the establishing shot consists of a cluster of wagons, and the camera moves in 
to focus on one pioneer family, with Zeke (played by Tully Marshall), the father, as the 
leader of the Missourians. On his way to the “pow wow” with the leaders of the other 
states, Zeke meets Breck Coleman (played by John Wayne), who tells him about a 
stretch of land North of Oregon ~  “Indian country” — uninhabited by white men except 
for a few trappers. Coleman then denies Zeke’s request for him to lead them to the 
valley, as he is on the trail of “a pair of scum”. All the dialogue up to and including this 
scene is muffled by the background noise of the movement of wagons and horses, and 
dogs barking. The next sequence is of more pioneers who have travelled via boat, and 
the other key protagonists make their entrance: Thorpe (Coleman’s antagonist and 
rival), Ruth Cameron (Coleman’s love interest) and Gussie (El Brendel providing the 
comic relief). As the plot unwinds Coleman discovers that his personal trail will take 
him in the same direction as the group of pioneers heading for the valley, and Zeke 
employs him as a trail scout. Overcoming rivers, cliffs, an Indian attack and a snow 
storm, the “prairie schooners” roll West and finally reach their destination. Thorpe is 
killed and Coleman is united with Ruth Cameron.
The portrayal of Indians is surprisingly liberal, a quality that is also reflected in 
Cimarron. Wayne’s persona is of a frontier hero who comes from the plains and the 
mountains, and lives with the Indians. In the scene where the men are discussing Old 
Ben’s untimely demise and blaming the Indians, there is a dissolve to the place and time 
of the murder, with Wayne (and an Indian companion) discerning the work of “renegade 
whites”. The culprits are later discovered to be a belligerent “grizzly” Flack, and his 
accomplice Lopez (Charles Stevens playing a Mexican). The audience is encouraged to
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perceive these men as the locus of hostility and treachery, while the Indians are regarded 
as valuable allies. When Wayne is questioned by some children about whether he had 
ever killed an Indian, what follows is a lesson in tolerance such that his later persona in 
The Searchers appears to be an exercise in off-casting:
The injuns are my friends, they taught me all I know about the woods, they 
taught me how to follow a trail by watching the leaves, how to cut your mark on 
a tree so you won’t get lost in a forest, they taught me how to burrow deep in 
the snow so you won’t freeze to death in the storms, and they taught me how to 
make a fire without even a flint. . .
Wayne displays his Indian expertise and affiliation in different parts of the film, at one 
point in the trail preventing an Indian attack by recognizing the Cheyennes, riding his 
horse in a zigzag fashion as an Indian signal to confer with them, at another using a 
Commanche yell, and in being the only white man that the Indians know by name. The 
Indians in the film are also played by Native Americans, communicating to the pioneers 
via hand gestures, and only expressing hostility towards the end of the film where a 
battle proclaims the film’s immense production values. The supremacy of the whites 
over the Indians is, however, maintained when Zeke claims that “Injuns have never yet 
prevented our breed of men from travelling into the setting sun”.
The depiction of women is less progressive, with mother-in-law jokes as the sole 
source of humour, and a female protagonist who is utterly dependent upon the hero. 
Women are portrayed as fickle, unpredictable, and irrational -- Ruth Cameron is forced 
to change her inappropriate attire at Wayne’s suggestion, and in acting impulsively 
nearly gets him wrongfully hanged. Her apology later is self-denigrating and emphasizes
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yet again her inferior status: “Sorry I was so stupid, I should have known better.” 
Cimarron's representation of women is more liberal.
Wesley Ruggles’s film opens with a clear declaration of its theme, the founding 
of Oklahoma:
A Nation rising to greatness through the work of men and women. . .new 
country opening. . .raw land blossoming. . .crude towns growing into cities. . 
territories becoming rich states. . .
In 1889, President Harrison opened the vast Indian Oklahoma Lands for 
White settlement. . .2,000,000 acres free for the taking, poor and rich pouring 
in, swarming the border, waiting for the starting gun, at noon, April 22nd. . .
The film’s hero is Yancey Cravat (played by Richard Dix), a typical frontier hero who 
initially settles in Oklahoma but finds himself still stricken by “wanderlust”. After 
refusing the appointment of governor, he leaves his wife and children for “newer fields”. 
She takes over the running of their paper though retaining his name as editor. Many 
years later an incident of heroism occurs in the Osage reservation, where a “drifter” 
cushions a torpedo with his chest, sacrificing his life for a group of oil miners. Yancey 
dies in his wife’s arms.
Though Cimarron is an explicit representation of the settling of America, with 
the generation of wealth intrinsically tied to the extension of a territorial frontier, it is 
surprisingly pro-Indian for its time. This latter factor might also have contributed to its 
lack of popularity: Yancey educates his wife that the derogatory terms “dirty” and 
“filthy” should not be attached to Indians but to crooked politicians who double deal to 
rob Indians of their land (and oil); he is also approving of his son Cimarron’s marriage to 
their hired Indian girl, the children of this mixed marriage later feature, and the subject to
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commemorate the Oklahoma Wigwam’s (the paper that Yancey is the editor of) 
anniversary is the acquisition of Indian citizenship. Sabra Cravat (played by Irene 
Dunne), Yancey’s wife, becomes a member of Congress, and her involvement in politics 
is also lauded in the film. She is praised for what she has done “alone” (i.e. without the 
help of a man) and the role of women in politics is seen as a “natural step”. The film’s 
ending is mirrored exactly in Anthony Mann’s conclusion of the film (1960), with the 
statue of Yancey Cravat in a posture that shows him aiding the progress of the Indian: 
he is depicted holding the hand of an Indian and helping him forward.
Mann’s version of Yancey’s frontier adventures and pro-Indian attitudes 30 
years later vary only slightly from Wesley Ruggles’s film; if anything, it centres less on 
Indian issues and the status of women. Mann’s Cimarron omits the topic of Indian 
citizenship and has Sabra Cravat echoing the words of Pegler’s widow: “It isn’t worth it, 
I am a woman, where is my man. . Unlike Ruggles’s Sabra she takes no pride in her 
achievements and consigns the admiration placed upon her onto her husband. Thus on 
the one hand, the rise in wealth via a ffontiering experience of the Cravat family, and on 
the other, the pro-Indian (and attendant castigation of those who are anti-Indian) and 
pro-woman perspectives in Ruggles’s Cimarron could account for the lack of appeal 
that it had for audiences of the Western in 1931. This rationale (excluding the pro­
woman representation) also holds for The Big Trail. Variety's moderately scathing 
critique of the film suggests that the frontier adventure is no longer a meaningful or 
popular theme — “the players mean nothing, nor does the story. It’s just the moving 
camera, going ahead at 10 miles a day as the caption mentions, with Oregon 2,000 miles 
away and the film getting there in 125 minutes”.42
I l l
The failure of these two ‘A’ Westerns to make a profit at the box-office and 
justify the studios’ vast investment of capital and labour logically resulted in the 
withdrawing of that investment. It would appear that the frontier’s allure as an 
explanation of American progress was fast fading, and that this presented an obstacle to 
the popular reception of the Western. The continued lack of a market for the feature 
Western until its return in 1939 may be comprehended in the context of the dominant 
political ideology of the Depression era. From Foucault’s work on psychopathology, a 
particular discursive formation, we can derive terms that relate to the discourse of 
frontier mythology. These obstacles to the emergence of frontier discourse in the ‘A’ 
Western, such as the performance of the ‘A’ Western at the box-office and the political 
context discussed below, act as “authorities of delimitation”. For Foucault, a major 
authority of delimitation was the medical profession, an institutional body that possessed 
a certain knowledge and authority recognized by public opinion, law and government. 
Another aspect of the discursive formation is, in Foucault’s terms, the “grid of 
specification”. He links this to the different kinds of madness that were specified and 
related to one another in psychiatric discourse. The discursive formation makes its 
appearance in “surfaces of emergence”. In Foucault’s analysis these were the family, 
immediate social group, and the religious community.43 For the discursive formation of 
frontier mythology, the novels of American writers such as James Fenimore Cooper, the 
rhetoric of American politicians, and the various Hollywood film genres, are surfaces of 
emergence. The grids of specification can be tied to factors that channel the migration 
of frontier discourse from one outlet to another. The factors influencing the grid of 
specification listed in this chapter, for example, help explain the migration of frontier 
discourse from the ‘A’ Western to the Gangster film.
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II) The Frontier and Roosevelt’s New Deal
Turner’s Frontier Thesis was part of the ideology of the New Deal administration; 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other members of his “Brains Trust” used his theory 
of frontier closure to describe the new condition of the American Economy. However, 
they rejected the progressive gloss on Turner that looked to new frontiers of imperial 
conquest or unlimited industrial growth to replace the lost Frontier.
The 1930’s incited a more severe critique of this version of progress, a critique 
that was apparent in the political agendas of the time. As F. D. Roosevelt declared in a 
1932 address,
Our last frontier has long since been reached. . . . There is no safety valve in 
the form of a western Prairie. . . . Our task is not the discovery or exploitation 
of natural resources. . . .  It is the less dramatic business of administering 
resources and plants already in hand. . . of distributing wealth and products 
equitably.44
The prevailing ideology thus contradicted the mythology of progressivism. The task that 
lay at hand was not to rely on the frontier as a safety valve to escape from metropolitan 
discontents, but to attain a more satisfactory distribution of wealth such that those 
metropolitan discontents are eradicated. The crisis of the Depression years proved that 
the bonanza economy fostered by the existence of the Frontier was no longer a prospect 
but an accomplished fact, and that this agrarian-based economy was now slackening. 
Professor Alvin Hansen of Harvard University echoed these sentiments when he wrote 
that “the opening of new territory and the growth of population were together
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responsible for a very large fraction -- possibly somewhere near one-half of new capital 
formation in the nineteenth century. . .these outlets for new investments are rapidly 
being closed. . .This movement ended in the Great Depression.”45 Hansen was the 
leading Keynesian in the United States, and represented the mainstream of economic 
thought in the late 1930s and 1940s. He based his reasoning on the assumption that the 
American system was, after the ending of the frontier, now encapsuled in closed space.
Conversely, the Western was a medium that communicated this version of a still 
open system of progress. Moreover, as it dealt more with America’s agrarian past and 
often incorporated ambivalent attitudes to industrialization, it proved unsuitable as a 
representation of America’s urban technological present. The continuing migration of 
Americans to cities in the 1930s led to an urban interpretation of the national experience, 
with an emphasis on the role of the immigrant ~  explaining in part the rising popularity 
of Gangster films. The Western, on the other hand, expressed a more traditional attitude 
to the West that involved the American commitment to agrarianism. Henry Nash Smith 
has traced this attitude to a specific phase in American history:
With each surge of westward development a new community came into being.
These communities devoted themselves not to marching onward but to 
cultivating the earth. They plowed the virgin land and put in crops, and the 
great interior of the valley was transformed into a garden: for the imagination, 
the Garden of the World. The image of this vast and constantly growing 
agricultural society in the interior of the continent became one of the dominant 
symbols of nineteenth century American society. . . that defined the promise of 
American life. The master symbol of the garden embraced a cluster of 
metaphors expressing fecundity, growth, increase and blissful labor in the 
earth, all centering about the heroic figure of the idealized frontier farmer with 
that supreme agrarian weapon, the sacred plow.46
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Unlike the Gangster film with its explicit focus on the metropolis, feature Westerns 
seldom contained expressions of industrialization. The Iron Horse (1924) was probably 
the only Western to do so in a significant manner before the 1930s. Union Pacific 
(1939), Bend o f the River (1952), The Far Country (1955) and Guns in the Afternoon 
(1962) are other examples. The emphasis on the metropolis coupled with the decreasing 
relevance of the Old West explain the utility of the Gangster figure. However, the 
substitution of the Gangster for the Westerner also needs to take into account factors 
other than the appropriateness of setting. The factors that contributed to this generic 
shift, and relating to Foucault’s grid of specification, are considered in the following 
section.
Hit The Attraction of the Gangster
The first phase of gangster movies, conventionally known as the “classic” gangster 
cycle, lasted for a brief duration: the result of one production season 1930-1931. There 
is evidence in the trade press of the period that by 1931 these films were already seen as 
substitutes for the Western. In an article entitled “Gangster Film Wave?”, Variety 
reports that the films are “hotter fare than ‘Westerns’”:
Gangster films are now in the spot where the westerns were in the early days 
of the pictures. Probability that they will be made in series, as in the former 
western heyday, is not so far remote, according to producers. . .One 
producer’s viewpoint as to the probable substitution of racketeer films for the 
Westerns, especially in the second and third class houses, is that the so-called 
tough and rough stuff on which the horse operas were based is so tame when
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stacked against the current banditry that it makes the wicked west and the 
frontier days seem Sunday schoolish.47
The next chapter will engage with the Gangster films primarily at the level of movie 
content, dealing substantially with the gangster protagonist as urban cowboy and ethnic 
scapegoat. At this point however, it is of some significance to notice that the producer 
mentioned in the excerpt locates the attraction of the Gangster film to “the current 
banditry” of his present. His explanation can partially be attributed to the documentary 
motive that becomes important in the 1930s, a factor that will be elaborated in the rest 
of this chapter together with the other conditions influencing the economic base of the 
movie industry in that decade. In attempting to explain the hegemonic trends leading to 
this substitution of the cowboy and the subsequent abrupt end of the gangster movies’ 
classic phase Foucault’s discursive paradigm will be uitilized. Chapter 5 will address 
one of the primary surfaces of emergence of the frontier myth, while the following will 
elaborate on the grids of specification (the historical context). This last aspect of 
Foucault’s paradigm is here constituted by three factors — ethnic exclusion, the 
Protestant business ethic, and the appeal of documentary.
A) Ethnic Exclusion in the 1920s
The Progressives were noted for their anti-immigrant sentiments in the earlier sections of 
this chapter, and W.W.I witnessed an increase in the general suspicion of the foreign 
born, or ‘hyphenated American’. This group of the population were assumed to have a 
divided loyalty. The cultural panic that ensued in the postwar period fuelled stronger 
assertions of American superiority and anxiety over foreign infiltration, of which the
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1919 Red Scare is an obvious example. The pervasive unease in American society 
towards European immigrants was codified in a series of acts: the Immigration Act of 
1917; the Quota Act of 1921, and the National Origins Act of 1924 (also known as the 
Johnson-Reed Act). The Johnson-Reed Act, in particular, recalled the ethnic divisions 
of the 1890 Census by observing its quotas restricting migration,48 and its general effect 
was to build discrimination against suspect nationalities into the system.49 These ‘new 
immigrants’ or ‘white ethnics’ presented some cause for concern to the rest of native- 
born American society, due firstly to their being foreign and secondly because they came 
to symbolize urbanization and social change. The rationale for the massive immigration 
from Eastern and central Europe was escalating urbanization. Despite immigration laws, 
technological changes increased the demand for unskilled laborers that forced key 
industries to absorb these laborers in vast quantities irrespective of their backgrounds.50 
However, organized labour in America feared that the continued importation of cheap 
labour from overseas would adversely affect the maintenance of their wage-levels.51 The 
overall result was the creation of a large population of urban industrial workers whose 
existence as hyphenated Americans posed a threat to the ‘native-born’. The fear of 
these new immigrants is evident in the political discourse of Senator Albert Johnson, a 
sponsor of the 1924 Act:
It is no wonder, therefore, that the myth of the melting pot has been 
discredited. It is no wonder that Americans everywhere are insisting that their 
land no longer shall offer free and unrestricted asylum to the rest of the world.
. . .The United States is our land. If it was not the land of our fathers, at least 
it may be, and it should be, the land of our children. We intend to maintain it
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Senator Johnson justified his prejudices with the rationale that ‘the foreign-born flood’ 
was a threat to American institutions and liberties, and to the happiness of individual 
Americans.
The natural assimilation and Americanization of the white ethnic was also 
circumvented by moves to preserve this ethnicity. In her study of industrial workers in 
Chicago (1919-1939) Lizbeth Cohen observes that cultural allegiance in twenties 
America was a contested terrain. Public policy in the 1920s was influenced by a desire 
not only to limit additional immigration drastically, but also to assimilate immigrants into 
a pre-existing American norm, while ethnic leaders in Chicago were motivated by a 
desire to keep their members tied to national communities.53 They made deliberate 
efforts to prevent ethnic Chicagoans from succumbing to the pull of mainstream 
America, with their greatest energy directed into ensuring the survival of basic 
institutions — the expanding of their communities’ welfare programs, the stabilizing of 
their mutual benefit societies, providing ethnic alternatives to thriving mainstream 
institutions such as banks, and consolidating their church parishes. These efforts were 
not negligible: by 1928, the Italo-American National Union alone had incorporated more 
than twenty-seven smaller mutual aid societies in Chicago.54 In totality, these four basic 
institutions consolidated local and European loyalties into larger, national ethnic 
communities. Jewish welfare agencies, Italian fraternal associations, Bohemian banks 
and Polish parishes serviced a more national ethnic community within America.55
The prominence of the ethnic-based infrastructure highlighted the dominance of 
ethnicity and consequently retained new immigrants in a separate category from the 
native American, defining them as “Other”. The emergence of national ethnic 
communities in the late 1920’s served to heighten this Otherness further and made it
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more obvious. The resultant ethnic division was, however, a barrier to the quest for a 
coherent national identity that the American state and political formations strove for 
throughout the 1930’s. The cause of this division did not solely lie with the ethnic 
leadership; the ideological message embodied by the National Origins Act clearly 
advocated the supremacy of native bom WASPs, or what Graham Barnfield has called 
‘Nordic Stock’. However, the forging of a national identity that included the immigrant 
industrial worker did not occur immediately. Participants in the nativist social 
movements of the 1920s were in the 1930s still insisting upon the ethnic divisions 
entrenched in immigration law, and questioning whether those of non- ‘Nordic’ stock 
were able and prepared to conduct themselves as decent Americans.56 These sentiments 
were voiced in the sphere of popular culture, where the utility of ethnic divisions was 
still not yet exhausted, and where there were fears of an increasingly Jewish ownership 
of the motion picture industry.57 The Jewish movie moguls were themselves aware of 
the threat their ethnicity posed and seemed eager to pledge their allegiance to the values 
of Middle America — Louis B. Mayer did this by producing movies which trumpeted the 
values of family, loyalty, virtue, tradition and patriotism.58 Once they had acquired 
prominence in Hollywood, the moguls shunted off the religious and social traditions of 
their inheritance. They were reluctant to promote the cause of Jewish actors and 
actresses, and re-married non-Jewish women.59 However, the impact of their attempts 
paled in comparison with the masses of urban immigrants that arrived and settled in 
America.
The white ethnic served as a useful target on which the blame for the Depression 
and the alleged excesses of the 1920s could be displaced. In scapegoating the white 
ethnic, blame could be shifted away from the corrupt business activities of policemen
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and politicians, and more firmly onto the bootleggers and gangsters with whom they 
shared a covert alliance. The ineffectuality of the law can be surmised in looking at the 
case of New York city, where out of 6,902 cases involving breaches of the Volstead 
Act, 6,074 were dismissed for ‘insufficient evidence’ and 400 not even tried.60 The 
actual purveyors of corruption in the Jazz Age were not unknown to all sectors of the 
public imagination; a liberal weekly expressed its views on Prohibition by demanding the 
nationalization of alcohol on the grounds that the government “would not seek. . . to 
dominate local politics for their own ends. It would not bribe local officials to wink at 
law violations, as was the almost universal practice of the saloon, nor would it extend its 
operations into the allied occupations of gambling, drug-selling and prostitution. . .The 
corrupt politicians are working to prevent repeal and prolong the reign of the 
speakeasy”.61 This perception of metropolitan civic corruption was tied to fears for the 
future of Protestantism, an essential component of WASP values, and another factor 
determining the Foucauldian grid of specification.
B) The Protestant Business Ethic
The impact of immigration not only affected the racial character of America, it also 
transformed the nation’s religious composition: membership of the Catholic Church rose 
from 9 million to 18 million between 1807 and 1920.62 By 1928 the political race 
between Herbert Hoover and A1 Smith demonstrated that many Americans were bitterly 
suspicious not only of city politicians, but of Catholics. Born on a farm, Hoover stood 
for “old, predominantly rural, Protestant America”, whilst Smith, born in the city and a 
Catholic, stood for immigrants and Americans of immigrant stock. The fear of
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escalating urbanization was now complemented by religions in competition: Reverend 
Mordecai F. Ham, a Baptist preacher, told his congregation “If you vote for A1 Smith 
you’re voting against Christ and you’ll be damned.”63 Fiery crosses placed by the Ku 
Klux Klan blazed in the fields during Smith’s tour of the South-West. This threat of 
Catholicism was exacerbated by a sense of guilt arising from the business ethic that had 
influenced Protestant Churches in the 1920s — reflecting a failure of Christian doctrines 
to overcome the spreading secularization of American culture.
The compromise of Protestant religious beliefs with the power of capitalism 
manifested itself in the organization and activities of its churches. Evidence of the 
adoption of business values is provided by Maltby in his discussion of The King o f 
Kings, a film that typified aspects of Protestant belief in the 1920s. Religious practices 
were increasingly situated within the dominant business discourse, and a reciprocal 
affinity developed between the doctrines of liberal Protestantism and the ideological 
infrastructure of capitalism.64 Clergymen endorsed business spokesmen and offered 
them their pulpits and periodicals, whilst business spokesmen responded by endorsing 
the application of business ideas to churchwork. Business managers and efficiency 
experts were hired by some of the larger churches, and business administration courses 
were offered to pastors in divinity schools.65 Christianity was increasingly superseded by 
a business ethic that doubled the value of church property between 1916 and 1926 in the 
face of an unremitting decline in religious belief. In 1929 Middletown:
Secular marriages are increasing, divorce is increasing, wives of both workers 
and business men would appear to stress loyalty to the church less than did 
their mothers in training children, church attendance is apparently less regular 
than in 1890, Rotary which boasts that it includes all the leaders of the city 
will admit no ministers, social activities are much less centered in the
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churches. . . In theory, religious beliefs dominate all other activities in 
Middletown; actually, large regions of Middletown’s life appear uncontrolled 
by them.66
The church also began to use the appeal of motion pictures to solve the problem of 
declining attendances. In Rockport, Massachusetts, a church that started using films in 
its services had its evening congregation increase from 12 to 500.67 By 1923, an 
estimated 15,000 church schools and clubs were showing motion pictures as part of their 
activities, and by 1927 27,0000 schools, churches and other institutions were equipped 
with projection machines.68 According to Maltby, this practice of exhibiting films in 
churches was part of a larger institutional project to establish a close relationship 
between the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc. (MPPDA) and 
the liberal Protestant Churches, and it is his contention that the project failed. However, 
by 1929, business and religion merged in the popular imagination; devotion was repaid 
in purely financial terms with the Dean of the University of Chicago Divinity School 
telling a reporter that a businessman could make more money if he prayed about his 
business. President Calvin Coolidge’s observation was that “the man who builds a 
factory builds a temple”, for “the man who works there, worships there.”69
With the Crash of 1929, the liberal Protestant Churches were pushed to reassess 
their adaptation of business ethics in the 1920s, and their relationship with the MPPDA 
in particular came under attack: blame was diverted from the secularization of 
Protestantism and its corresponding assimilation of business techniques and 
infrastructures to a critique of the motion picture industry. Of the three gangster films 
of the classic cycle, two (.Little Caesar and Scarface) are about Italian gangsters; while 
Public Enemy's Tom Powers has an Irish father. This not only established a convention
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that derives from the notoriety of A1 Capone in the Prohibition period, but is also 
significant in its association with Protestantism’s “Other”-- Catholicism. The Italian 
protagonists who are scapegoated for the excessive capitalism of 1920s America can 
thus be seen as a strategic move by Hollywood to appease and regain the support of 
liberal Protestant opinion. These attempts at placation ultimately ended in failure and, 
ironically, when Hollywood was forced to seek elsewhere for support, they turned to the 
Roman Catholic Church.70
Q  The Appeal of Documentary
The documentary motive of the 1930’s provides a further explanation for the 
substitution of the Gangster Film for the Western. In his investigation of the 
documentary approach in thirties America, William Stott provides this definition: 
“Documentary is the presentation or representation of actual fact in a way that makes it 
credible and vivid to people at the time.”71 The subject of documentary is generally the 
experience of a group of individuals of low economic and social standing in the society; 
lower than the audience for whom the documentary is made. Stott observes that the 
primary expression of the thirties was based not on myth or fiction, but on actuality, and 
that documentary was the vehicle that suited this requirement. A significant reason for 
explaining why the documentary approach was characteristic in the 1930’s was the 
Great Depression: during the Depression, the American public was shielded from 
knowing the basic facts of their economic plight. The Hoover government, the business 
community and most of the media minimized the truth of the failing economy in their 
attempts to restore confidence. Hoover, for example, “corrected” the results of the
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1930 Census by cutting the figure of 3,187,947 unemployed in the U.S. to 1,900,000.72 
As the Depression progressed, it became evident that the government, business, and the 
press (those who claimed knowledge of the present situation) were arranging evidence 
towards their own ends and prejudicing their estimates. This growth of scepticism 
compelled a need for the presentation of actual facts, and documentary satisfied this 
need. Paula Rabinowitz’s contention that in the 1930s a “slippage” occurred between 
the spheres of documentary and the fiction of what she terms “Hollywood’s dream 
machine” is pertinent here.73 Though she only gives brief mention of the Gangster films 
in her argument, she does discuss how Gold Diggers o f 1933 was affected by the 
documentary impulse: evoking images of the Depression familiar to middle-class 
listeners of Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats and to urban working and poor people whose 
lives formed these images. Her analysis strengthens the notion of commingling between 
documentary and Hollywood movies in the early 1930s.
The popularity of the Gangster film can thus be linked with its proximity to the 
documentary genre. A figure constructed out of the daily headlines, the exploits of the 
gangster protagonist appeared to “represent actual fact”. In the 1920s, organized crime 
was a public spectacle; the big gangster funerals beginning with Big Jim Colosimo in 
May 1920 became media events, whilst tabloids thrived on the melodrama provided by 
police raids and gangland wars.74 The Gangster films, particularly Little Caesar, utilized 
a quasi-documentary form. Conversely, the adventures of the Cowboy on the frontier 
belonged to an era embedded in the distant past, and were associated more with myth 
than actuality. The Western and its iconography of gunslingers, horses and stagecoaches 
were inappropriate to an era which shifted its emphasis to the city. For 1930’s 
audiences with a documentary bias, the gangster as a figure from their immediate past,
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together with the iconography of machine guns and limousines, held greater relevance. 
The argument that the Gangster films were popular merely because they were culturally 
more verisimilar than the Western cannot alone explain the genre’s popularity in the 
1920s. The documentary motive, in tandem with the requisite of cultural verisimilitude, 
is important for understanding the attraction of the Gangster. Thus, like the subject of 
documentary, The Public Enemy, Little Caesar and Scarface are concerned with tracing 
the careers of “a group of individuals of low economic and social standing in the 
society” -- ethnic succession predicates that the immigrant would automatically occupy 
the bottom rung of the social ladder, and thus as immigrants of Catholic stock, these 
protagonists were on a social standing lower than the WASP audience whose approval 
the films set out to gain. In addition to the use of sound, documentary-type techniques 
were adopted to create greater realism — the representation of working-class Chicago in 
The Public Enemy with its stockyards, beer parlours and the Salvation Army marching 
down the streets corresponds to the assertion made in the beginning of the film that an 
attempt is being made to depict a social environment honestly.75 The documentary and 
sociological approach to the creation of the gangster protagonist and his life-style in the 
films concur with the needs of 1930s American audiences that social documentary in 
particular fulfilled.
These three factors, the appeal of documentary in the thirties, ethnic division, 
and the need to placate the Protestants, explain why 1930-1931 was an appropriate 
moment for the motion picture industry to produce and release Gangster films. The 
effect that these Gangster films had on American audiences, however, proved contrary 
to the ideological project of establishing the cultural solidarity of the WASPs. This is 
perhaps due to the failure of Hollywood to recognize an additional and essential aspect
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of documentary that in this specific context was detrimental in its manipulation of 
audience reception:
The people documentary treats are felt to be more real than those on top of 
society, but that is not all. Social documentary is instrumental, and its people 
tend, like the innocent victims o f propaganda, to be simplified and ennobled 
— sentimentalized, in a word.16
My Emphasis
The ability of documentary to ennoble its subject, and to encourage audiences to 
empathize with the circumstances of its protagonists, was an aspect that worked against 
the aims of the film industry. Social documentary, though a medium that satisfied the 
needs of the American public in the thirties, was also instrumental in undermining the 
establishment, and in adopting the documentary approach in their gangster films, the film 
industry unwittingly contributed to this weakening of establishment values.
The two factors in the discursive grid of specification designating Catholicism 
and the ethnic as “Other” would appear to suggest that the Gangster protagonist was 
meant to function as a scapegoat. This explanation adheres with the generic necessity of 
his death. The attempt to transpose frontier discourse onto an urban setting, discussed 
in the following chapter, consolidates the argument in illustrating that the gangster’s 
death also fulfilled the requisite annihilation of Otherness that is central to the 
mythology. The utilization of documentary techniques, however, aided a translation in 
which the encoded ethnic scapegoat was decoded as a tragic Ajnerican hero. The 
substitution of the Gangster film for the Western proved to be a failed project in 
scapegoating. This failure not only dictated the end of the gangster cycle, but also
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sealed an outlet in which discourses of frontier mythology could emerge. The next 
chapter considers the authorities delimiting the boundaries of frontier discourse that 
emerged in the thirties, focusing on the Gangster film as a surface of emergence.
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Negotiating the Thirties
Gangster Heroes and Masked Discourses of the 
Frontier
During the early thirties the documentary approach was practised by 
those who wished to embarrass the Hoover administration and upset the 
status quo: in particular journalists of the Left and by social workers 
trying to inform the more fortunate classes about the hardship of the poor 
and unemployed. Such documentary. .exposed America’s 
shortcomings: the government mendacity, the brutal wastefulness of a 
capitalistic system. But when the New Deal came to power, it 
institutionalized documentary; it made the weapon that undermined the 
establishment part of the establishment.1
William Stott
When the historical “West” of the frontier lost its mythological resonance in the cultural
crisis of the 1930s, a surface innovation occured in the frontier myth. This was a
migration of frontier discourse from Westerns that depicted the surges of westward 
development to movies that addressed a more recent past. The abandoning of its 
progressive gloss simultaneously manifested a change at the deep structure of the myth - 
- the tenet of expansion was for the moment suppressed, though the other elements of 
which the myth was composed still emerged at the level of discourse. These other 
elements included notions of WASP superiority, a hatred of Otherness, the role of the
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woman as a motivation for the hero’s actions, and the influence of the environment. 
This slight transformation of the myth as a reaction to the events of the early 1930s is an 
example of a diachronic change. However, the myth was not suppressed in its entirety -- 
though the new genres in the early 1930s accommodated the climate of the depression, 
they had narrative and mythic structures that mirrored those of the Western. This 
migration of frontier discourse thus exhibited an attempt to communicate the myth’s 
version of national identity through a different setting. This tactic was only partially 
successful.
Alternative Routes to Discourse: Hollywood’s Double System of Repression
. . . .  Classical Hollywood’s double system of repression: first, its deployment 
of the classic western’s structures as a means of displacing crucial anxieties, 
and second, the further concealment of that strategy itself, achieved by 
displacing those structures into disguises they assumed in other genres.2
Chapter one dealt with the corporate consolidation of the Hollywood studios, and the 
economies of scale that pointed the industry toward the mass production of films, in turn 
facilitating the proliferation and evolution of film genres, by maximizing the advantages 
inherent in the systematic repetition of successful formulas. Studios prospered by 
learning to anticipate shifts in the public’s interest in particular kinds of story, and by 
their industrial capacity to exploit a discovered preference by reproducing the story-type 
promptly and in quantity. In the early 1930s, box office receipts convinced the studios 
that the public’s interest had for the moment shifted from the feature Western onto 
genres that were more relevant to the crisis of the time. Amongst others, the Gangster
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film was the discovered preference that studios exploited and commenced to produce 
speedily and in abundance. The films assimilated the mythic charge of the Western, 
containing its structure and endorsing its values.
The final section of chapter three provides an explication of Classic Hollywood’s 
narrative model, concluding that the paradigm contained a naturalizing effect, such that 
the manufactured medium appears to be spontaneous. The spectator is presented with a 
constantly shifting perspective in a decision-based medium, but is made to feel (through 
the concealment of the pattern of choices that constitute style in an art form) that the 
necessity for choice does not exist. This establishes the first level of Hollywood’s 
system of repression: the denial of the necessity for choice. The explanation of Classic 
Hollywood’s narrative paradigm was then followed by a specific application of that 
paradigm onto the Western, and the mythology of the Frontier.
Robert B. Ray posits that the Western’s importance is derived from the national 
ideology’s eagerness to assert an American exceptionalism as the basis for avoiding 
difficult choices. This exceptionalism turned on notions about the availability of 
uncivilized, open land (firstly the American continent remote from Europe, and later 
West of America’s urbanized Eastern region). The ideology of space transposed itself 
into the promise of endless economic growth, and the mythology of the Frontier with its 
explanation of American progress influenced a large percentage of American policy 
making. The result of an external safety-valve was a postponing of internal reforms, 
such as civil rights and welfare legislation. This ideology encouraged repeated American 
interventions abroad, and was validated each time the intervention proved successful and 
American victory was confirmed, as in the two world wars. The narrative of movie 
Westerns expressed and promoted this ideology of progressivism and American
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exceptionalism, supporting the status quo in the same way that the Classic Hollywood 
procedure denied the need for internal revolution and change.
This conservatism results in a doubling effect when masked discourses of the 
frontier in the depression genres are considered: like the Western, its disguised 
counterparts repeated notions of American exceptionalism, but these modernized 
versions went further in resolving the anxieties perceptible in the frontier mythology’s 
promise of unlimited space and the inevitable encroachment that threatened (and 
accomplished) a diminishing of that space. In addressing an urban present and a West 
that was changing due to industrialization, they dissipated the anxiety that directly 
confronted the myth in the context of the Depression era. Moreover, with the 
discrediting of the mythic West, as explained in the previous chapter, the urban setting 
functioned as a new site for frontier discourse. This argument differs from Ray’s 
deployment of disguise. Ray sees almost every other Hollywood genre as a “disguised” 
Western, not only giving unwarranted precedence to the Western but also collapsing 
notions of discourse, myth and the Western narrative. The frontier myth is an important 
component of American ideology, and its discourse is often most completely articulated 
in the Western, but this does not equate films where frontier discourse surfaces to 
Westerns in disguise. Rather, frontier discourse tends to be less explicit in movies 
existing outside the Western genre, and this most often happens when that discourse 
cannot be articulated within the genre itself.
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The Gangster Formula as Vehicle for the Frontier Myth
The beginnings of a widespread agitation for alcoholic prohibition began as early as 
1880, when the Prohibition party fought a Presidential election for the first time. The 
Progressive era saw a strengthening of anti-alcoholism, with the formation of a new 
class that believed in totally forbidding the manufacture, sale and purchase of alcoholic 
drink. They were also anti-socialist, anti-immigrant and anti-working class. However, 
the conservative instincts of the progressives hindered them from dictating fundamental 
changes to the American system. It would take the patriotic fervour of WWI (brewers 
were commonly of German origin) for prohibitionists to induce Congress to pass a 
Constitutional amendment (the Eighteenth) forbidding the export, import, ‘manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquers’, from then on. The ammendment became 
law on 29 January 1919. Until 1933 when the Volstead Act was changed to permit the 
manufacture of beer and light wine again, the demand for alcohol escalated and put 
$2,000,000,000 into the pockets of bootleggers and gangsters (who worked in close 
cooperation with corrupt politicians and policemen).4 A1 Capone achieved national 
prominence in the 1920s, when gangster activities were an acceptable media spectacle. 
However by March 1930 Capone was named Public Enemy No. 1 by newspapers across 
the country.5
The media attention Capone courted and the urban disorder of the Depression’s 
tumultous first years spawned a new genre: the Gangster film. The beginning of the new 
genre dates at about 1931 due to the success of two movies — Little Caesar (1930) and 
The Public Enemy (1931). The genre’s popularity throughout the 1930s has been 
explained particularly by relation to the early Depression years in which the films were
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produced. For the financially constrained studios the Gangster film’s relatively cheap 
production costs were a bonus: primarily using contemporary dress, minimal sets 
(backroom offices, seedy restaurants and hotel rooms) and exteriors that rarely 
demanded anything more than the standing sets of the backlot. The generic formula of 
the Gangster film has as its central protagonist a hero embodying the values of 
Americanism, but unable to succeed due to the limitations of the city. Most critics agree 
that the genre thus captured the public imagination through its response to and reflection 
of contemporary concerns.
Robert Warshow’s essay “The Gangster as Tragic Hero” (1948) was significant 
in its promotion of such interpretations of the Gangster film. His selection of Little 
Caesar and Scarface arguably influenced a trend of critical writing that combined these 
two films and The Public Enemy as “classical” precedents of the gangster genre. This 
consensual interpretation of the Gangster films has more recently been contested by 
Richard Maltby. Though much of the critical writing on the Gangster film recognizes 
that the movie gangster was a derivative of his media representation, Maltby’s 
contention is that most critical literature on the genre fails to consider the instrumentality 
of the media in concealing “the practical realities of liquor-related crime” where “the 
bootleggers, racketeers and speakeasy operators were ‘technicians’ in a business 
enterprise run by ‘respectable’ brewery owners, law enforcement agencies, politicians 
and public officials.”6 Police raids, gangland wars and big gangster funerals became the 
media events that fuelled the tabloid melodrama, the latter serving as a “convenient and 
entertaining distraction from the realities of 1920s muncipal realpolitik, in which city 
government was an exercise in barely concealed corruption”. Maltby’s gangster is thus 
not Warshow’s tragic hero, but a scapegoat villain, and “an embodiment of guilt to be
133
expiated.”7 Before discarding Warshow’s interpretative framework entirely, his 
perspective on the Gangster film does allow for an important correlation to be made 
between the Western and Gangster formulas: the conflict between the values of the 
individual and the community. This consensual interpretation of the classic Gangster 
films yields an analysis of how Hollywood still manages to reconcile its tragic hero with 
his environment. Maltby’s argument of the gangster as scapegoat lends greater 
complexity to the Hollywood mechanism, revealing the sophistication with which it 
operates in endorsing the status quo.
According to most critics of the Gangster film, including Stephen Louis Karpf8 
and Jack Shadoian9, Little Caesar inaugurated the classical phase of the Gangster Film. 
The genre reached the point of classical development soon after its appearance, with The 
Public Enemy (1931) and Scarface (1932) iconographically and thematically close to the 
first film. The second phase of the Gangster film came about in 1935 with a cycle of 
films similar to William Keighley’s G-Men. Unlike the films of the classical period, these 
movies had F.B.I. agents as their central protagonists in an attempt to appease the 
censors, and to endorse the status quo more firmly. However, the classical Gangster 
films did set the tone and establish the generic rules for the subsequent phases of films to 
follow. This is manifest in the behavior of the G-Men, which was no different from the 
gangsters they supplanted.10 The movies following the Classic Gangster cycle (notably 
Gabriel Over The White House and This Day and Age) exhibit a quality of vigilantism -- 
where the law is taken into the hand of the citizenry -- that is usually associated with the 
Western, but here transplanted into a contemporary urban setting.
The widespread acceptance of the gangster as a career obsessive individual 
whose raison d’etre is “a drive for success” with the “typical” Gangster film presenting a
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“steady upward progress”, culminating always in his death explains why certain 
Gangster movies, though noted for their value, have not been seen as ‘classical’.11 
Maltby has identified the crime movies that were made in the ‘classical period’ but which 
fail to reach ‘classical status’: Doorway to Hell (1930), City Streets (1931), Quick 
Millions (1931) and The Secret Six (1931). In Doorway to Hell, Lew Ayres plays Louis 
Ricamo, a beer baron who gives up his bootleg racket to get married. He resists the 
‘classic’ criterion on two counts ~  sacrificing his ambition, and also in that move 
elevating marriage (and the woman) above his career. He does fulfil one tenet in dying 
at the hands of his former gang. In City Streets Gary Cooper plays “The Kid”, a 
protagonist who initially refuses to work for a beer-running racketeer McCoy, but finally 
succumbs to acquire evidence that might aid the release of Nan Sooley (Sylvia Sidney) 
from prison. When she is released from jail Nan tries to persuade The Kid to leave the 
rackets, and in the process she is framed for McCoy’s death. The finale sees a reunion 
of The Kid and Nan, after he saves her from the gang. The gangster protagonist here is 
not only defined by a lack of ambition, he also manages to survive.12 The importance 
accrued to gangster movies that do fit the Warshow paradigm is significant, perhaps 
only because they embodied the mythic charge central to notions of Americanism. As 
expressions of frontier mythology, these classic gangster movies incorporated that which 
was deemed culturally significant within the domain of the Western. That cultural 
significance was by the same process transferred.
This section of the chapter will thus derive examples from the three archetypal 
films associated with the gangster genre (Little Caesar [1930], The Public Enemy
[1931] and Scarface [1932]), exploring the way in which these films commented on the 
historical background and current public issues related to the Depression. It will aim to
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reveal that below these surface innovations of discourse, an unbroken link persisted 
between the narrative and mythic structures of the Gangster film with those developed in 
the Western. The delivery of this revelation will initially utilize a comparison of the 
Gangster figure with the Cowboy.
I) Cowboy. City Bov: The Gangster as an Urban Westerner
In 1929 the gangster for the first time surpassed the cowboy as a subject for Hollywood 
moviemakers. Though the gangster figure is generally thought to be a contemporary of 
1930s movie audiences, he was actually a part of their immediate past. Maltby writes 
that the Gangster films were:
all overtly retrospective accounts of the excesses of the 1920s as seen from the 
perspective of the worst years of the Depression. In all of them a strong 
element of criticism of their central character is present, couched in a rhetoric 
comparable to that used by press editorials, and their press campaigns 
endorsed that position as the only credible one available for their promotion.13
These figures were, however, far from mere reflections of social actuality; they were 
instead, social and imaginative constructs. The gangster was the product of genre and 
convention, of the creative instincts and commercial calculations of producers, writers, 
performers, and above all, the products of ideology; the products of an ideological 
struggle that sought to countervail a cultural crisis. This new type of gunfighter 
replaced the Western gunslinger, and arguably, had roots that intertwined with the latter. 
Eugene Rosow asserts that to Howard Hawks, the gangster and cowboy heroes are 
basically the same character: a man with a gun.14 The gangster was, however, to
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address the darker aspects of progressive history which had featured in earlier Westerns, 
but would also figure later and with increased frequency in the “outlaw Westerns” of the 
late 1930’s (The Oklahoma Kid, Jesse James [1939]). The next two sections discuss 
the individuality of the gangster, particularly how that individuality threatens the 
ideology of a classless society.
Individualism and the Democratic. Classless Society
Like the Cowboy, the Gangster embodied an internal contradiction between advocating 
the values of community and those of individualism. In the period of rapid 
industrialization that followed the end of the Civil War, American commitment to 
individualism and success (as represented in economic terms by laissez-faire capitalism 
and in political terms by attachment to States’ rights15) was significant in determining 
the quality of the cities that grew at this time. The burgeoning and associated 
uncontrolled capitalism of New York and Chicago attracted large numbers of 
immigrants, with the lack of influence by a central government leading to the surfacing 
of the boss system in city politics and to a tradition of civic corruption. Ironically, the 
threat that the movie gangster faces is one that seeks to rob him of his individuality. 
Law and order, as symbols of the forces of civilization, seek to suppress the criminal 
activities of the gangster.
This contradiction between the community and the self is nullified in the Western 
when the Cowboy neutralizes the existing representations of plurality, and also partially 
by his ability to ride off into the sunset, leaving both community and contradiction 
behind. In the latter example, the contradiction is resolved temporarily, until he rides
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into another town again. The narrative envelope provides the temporal resolution, and 
the lack of a permanent resolution facilitates a future expression of the contradiction 
between community and self, an expression that is arguably an attraction of the genre. 
The gangster figure is a Westerner with no sunset to fade off into. He is denied a place 
in the mythic West, a place beyond the boundaries of legal and social restraints of 
civilization. This mythic West offers a positive, democratic, and moral environment; 
according to Frederick Jackson Turner, the frontier was a guarantor of demographic and 
social mobility that gave American society its democratic and open quality. Nash Smith 
locates the Turner’s affirmation of democracy and doctrine of geographical determinism 
as derivative of the stream of agrarian theory that flows from eighteenth-century 
England and France through Jefferson to the men who elaborated the ideal of a society 
of yeoman farmers. He notes that in nourishing an agrarian philosophy Turner’s model 
offered no intellectual apparatus for taking account of the industrial revolution. 
Turner’s thesis was powerless to confront issues arising from the advance of 
technology.16 This flaw in the utility of Turner’s thesis as an explanation for the 
character of the American nation has its corollary in the perception that democracy is 
not attainable within an urban environment. A child born after the closing of the 
frontier, and into the environment of the city, the gangster is bereft of the mobility that is 
afforded the cowboy. In the city, the gangster is faced with the threat to his individuality 
and freedom.
The majority of Gangster films make some comment about the nature of the city: 
the city is never a neutral but often a virulent environment. The industrial reality not 
only erodes the positive vision of the mythic West, the only outlet for creative 
expression appears to be (at least according to Hollywood) a life of crime. Hollywood
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did not, for example, make films that lauded the meritorious actions of trade union 
leaders: Rowland Browne’s original script for the Doorway to Hell (“A Handful of 
Clouds”) has this to say:
Gangsters are really the invention of capitalists. My first job was breaking a
strike, at twenty bucks a day; and all I had to have was a gun. I was over on
one strike in Pennsylvania and saw that a lot of my countrymen working there
and living like animals; so I decided I was on the wrong side of the fence, and
17became a labor leader and later an underworld power.
My Emphasis
When a life of crime is presented as inevitable, the opposition of individualism to the 
agents of democracy, and the dilemma of mutual existence, is to a large extent more 
convincing. A criminally inclined occupation is logically at odds with the token moral 
agents of civilization. Nonetheless, as in the Western, the Gangster genre contains the 
contradiction such that both values of self and community are upheld ~  dissipating the 
threat to individuality that arises from the closing of the frontier and the threat to 
community with its evils of organized crime and corruption.
At a time when Americans defined themselves by the quality of life afforded to 
them in the city, the general sentiment was one of national disillusionment. The 
prohibition act had promoted an unparalleled level of corruption that was now fuelled by 
the dissatisfaction with a weak economy. The film that commented on the national 
disillusionment was Public Enemy: a gangster movie that in approximately half an hour 
traces the life of a young man (Tom Powers) who begins his career with the theft of a 
pair of roller skates and “six-buck-a-piece” watches, graduates to grand larceny, 
bootlegging, murder, and ends with his bound and trussed body falling through his
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mother’s frontdoor. Ironically, it is via Mike Powers, Tom’s elder brother, that the 
ideals of the pre-Depression years are shown to be inadequate. The character of Mike 
exemplifies the impossibility of presenting a WASP patriarchal hero to contemporary 
audiences in a Depression context. The irony lies in Mike’s personal belief in the values 
of patriotism and altruism; this is apparent in the conversation he has with Tom in their 
bedroom, as he packs in preparation for service in W.W.I:
Tom: Gee, you’re rushing it.
Mike: Well, Tom, when our country needs us.. . she needs us.
Tom: I suppose so. I suppose you think I ought to go too.
Mike then gives Tom some brotherly advice about being the “man of the family” and 
looking after their mother. He sets up a moral code of unselfishness and virtuosity that 
is undermined by Tom. When Mike accuses Tom of the latter’s involvement in “some 
crooked work”, Tom retaliates:
Tom: . . .You ain’t so smart. Books and that whoey don’t hide everything.
Mike: You’re a liar Tom! You’re covering up.
Tom: Covering up? To you? Say. . .You’re only a sneak thief! A nickel
snatcher! Robbin’ the street car company.
The opposing beliefs underlying Tom’s cynicism are confirmed when Mike lashes out 
and catches Tom on the chin, knocking his brother down. Mike’s moral code fails in 
view of his own actions; he fails in his role as the patriarchal hero. The ideal of 
patriotism is critiqued in a later incident, when Mike comes home from the war and
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discovers that his brother has developed into a full-time gangster. He is enraged at 
Tom’s gift of a keg of beer (the movie is based on John Bright’s Beer and Blood):
Mike: You’d think I’d care if it was just beer in the keg? I know what’s in it!
I know what you’ve been doing all this time. . .where you got the clothes and 
those new cars — you’ve been telling Ma that you’ve gone into politics. . .that 
you’re on the city payroll! I know everything! You murderers! It’s not beer 
in that keg! It’s beer and blood. Blood of men!
Tom: You ain’t changed a bit. And say. . .you ain’t so good yourself. You 
killed. . .and you liked it! You didn’t get all those medals for holding hands 
with them Germans.
Tom’s contempt of Mike and his ideal of patriotism is evident in the logic that there is 
no difference between killing for the defence of one’s country and killing to get rid of 
bootlegging gangs that are a threat to one’s profit. The community values espoused by 
Mike are subverted by Tom. The values of individualism held by Tom conflict and 
appear to prevail over the values of community held by Mike.
Tom as the gangster, on the other hand, is glamorized. He is depicted in heroic 
proportions ~  coupled with James Cagney’s charismatic performance as Tom, the 
audience is attracted to Tom’s dynamism, and his self reliance. The dubious morality of 
the gangster is counterpointed by the limitations of society, a society that denies 
individualism and provides only minimal options to the struggling male from an inner 
city, working-class background (in the opening of Public Enemy the six shots prefaced 
by the title “1909” establish the setting as a Chicago working-class neighborhood). 
According to Hollywood, the gangster is partially justified in his chosen career path 
because it is shown to be the only profitable and engaging occupation available. It is 
significant that Tom Powers is not only at odds with the agents of civilization. His fight
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against rival gangs echoes the Classic Westerner’s separation from both community and 
other outlaws. Tom Powers, Rico Bandello and Tony Camonte are advocates for 
America’s aspirant culture in their drive to rise. Rico takes over Sam Vettori’s gang, 
and tells Otero that “Diamond Pete ain’t so tough” ~  after taking over Diamond Pete’s 
territory, he now confides to Otero that even the Big Boy won’t be on top much longer. 
In Scarf ace, Tony tells Gino: “This business is just waitin’ for some guy to come and run 
it right, and I got ideas”, and when Gino reminds him that they are working for Lovo, 
Tony replies: “Lovo! Who’s Lovo?. . Just some guy that’s a little bit smarter than Big 
Louie, that’s all. Hey that guy’s soft. I could see it in his face. He gotta set-up, that’s 
all, and we just gotta wait. Some day I’m gonna run the whole works!”. Like the 
Cowboy who leaves community behind him and is ever in search of new frontiers, the 
City Boy expresses individuality by not conforming to any organization, and by aiming 
high and getting ahead. Both heroes espouse the ideology of America as a land of 
opportunity, and fulfil the American Dream that culminates in the acquisition of wealth: 
the cowboy extends the frontier thereby regenerating the fortunes of those inhabiting 
civilized territory, and it is significant that most movie gangsters begin their upward 
journey from working class backgrounds. In both the Western and Gangster genres this 
fundamental belief in an individual’s progress opposes the ideology of a classless, 
democratic society because being an individual creates inequality by setting one apart on 
a level above others.
Thus, though this validation of the gangster’s individuality is put forward at the 
expense of community values, the gangster movie still manages to endorse a positive 
cultural model, and it does this in two ways. Like Little Caesar and Scarface, the 
release prints of The Public Enemy carried a careful rationalization in its forward that
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the audience would see a national problem explored through film, and not the 
glamorization of gangsters. Tom Powers, as the hero of the movie, did little in support 
of the law, order, or conventional morality. Without a sunset to ride off into or a place 
in civilization, the movie does culminate in his death and appeases the censors. The 
subject of the gangster’s death draws much debate, and the most popular observation is 
that the death of the movie gangster, like the obligatory gunfight that resolves the 
Western’s conflicts, is an essential generic formality. In Underworld USA, Colin 
McArthur contends: “That the gangster must ultimately lie dead in the streets became 
perhaps the most rigid convention to the genre”.18 It is perhaps more appropriate to 
view the gangster’s death as a generic necessity. This generic necessity conformed to 
Hollywood’s implicit code of social order that governed the resolution to virtually all of 
its classic genre films. The conflicting values of self and community are equally lauded: 
Tom’s criminality forms an essential part of his heroism, but it is ultimately not a path to 
power and wealth. Later from his hospital bed, Tom shows signs of remorse and 
reform, before his tragic demise. He dies to re-affirm the laws of society. We witness in 
this narrative strategy the ability of the gangster genre to “play it both ways” — while 
defining heroism through ruthless individualism and ambition, the Classical Hollywood 
procedure complied with a more pro-social message of celebrating social order and a 
sense of community morality.
This resolving of the contradiction between community and self is an echo from 
the Western. Unlike the cowboy the gangster dies, but his death, as will be discussed in 
the following section, simultaneously affirms both the values of individuality and 
community. The fascination with crime and violence has a deep appeal that links both 
genres, with anti-social behaviour being one of the strongest forms of romantic
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individualism. The American ideology of nationalism is founded on the notion of 
individual energy and decisive action, making that energy admirable, but paradoxically, 
having to curtail it in its own interests. In the Western, the rugged individualism which 
built the frontier society conflicts with the restraints on that individualism imposed by the 
newly-established community: the cowboy and farmer are rarely on friendly terms. The 
Cowboy always rides into sunsets farther West because he is ill at ease with the 
civilization he has recently defended, and still defends. This structural component of the 
frontier myth is transposed onto the gangster genre — the gangster’s frustrations with 
urban society stem from a revolt against society’s restrictions. As in the Western, the 
dramatization of this conflict and its temporal resolution is also the means through which 
the audience’s acquiescence to the contemporaneous political system (conservative and 
committed to laissez faire) is encouraged.
Success and the Status Quo
Robert Warshow’s conclusions on the death of the gangster are persuasive:
The gangster is doomed because he is under obligation to succeed, not because 
the means he employs are unlawful. In the deeper layers of the modem 
consciousness, all means are unlawful, every attempt to succeed is an act of 
aggression, leaving one alone and guilty and defenseless among enemies: one 
is punished for success. This is our intolerable dilemma: that failure is a kind 
of death and success is evil and dangerous and -  ultimately -  impossible.
The effect of the Gangster Film is to embody this dilemma in the person of the 
gangster and resolve it by his death. The dilemma is resolved because it is his 
death, not ours. We are safe; for the moment we can acquiesce in our failure, 
we can choose to fail.19
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This passage raises two important points about the gangster’s death: in confronting the
problems and anxieties relating to increased levels of crime and a slackening economy
(and the lack of space outside of civilization to escape from these evils), the gangster
genre showed that the individuality ordinarily expressed by the cowboy in his conquest
of new frontiers can still be asserted. His act of aggression, like that of the cowboy’s is
an attempt to succeed. The death of the gangster, while displacing the anxieties of
corruption, simultaneously acts as the consummate reaffirmation of his own identity: an
identity constituted by a dedication to the American ideals of rugged individualism,
capitalism, and upward mobility. Like the cowboy, the gangster espouses the ideology
of nationalism and the “deep horizontal comradeship” by the suggestion that regardless
of social class, education, or opportunity, the American individual can control his own
destiny. The intensity of the gangster’s commitment to his fate indicates that power and
20individuality are worth more than a long life. The tragedy of the gangster’s death is 
thus from this perspective the working out of a success story.
Secondly, the Gangster Film endorses the status quo in its support of the existing 
capitalistic structure. The gangster is a rebel, and expresses his individuality in his acts 
of rebellion, but only within the confines of the existing order. He does not seek to 
establish a different kind of structure, and there is never the suggestion that a different 
social and political structure might allow for more humane possibilities. Warshow 
comments on the gangster as a tragic figure, but the tragedy of the gangster’s death is 
not traced to its social cause, rather out of the gangster’s character: he appears to make 
the choices that leave him vulnerable to those that covet his position. On the other hand, 
the aggressive acts that he commits to survive within the confines of the capitalistic
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structure are lauded as expressions of individuality and routes to power. Judith Hess 
Wright views the continuing appeal of the Gangster Film (and all genre films) in their 
provision of a refuge from the alternative of questioning the hierarchical social structure:
We may trace the amazing survival and proliferation of genre films to their 
function. They assist in the maintenance of the existing political structure.
The solutions these films give to the conflicts inherent in capitalism require 
obeisance to the ruling class and cause viewers to yearn for not less but 
greater freedom in the face of the insoluble ambiguities surrounding them.
Viewers are encouraged to cease examining themselves and their 
surroundings, and to take refuge in fantasy from their only real alternative — 
to rise up against the injustices perpetrated by the present system upon its 
members.21
Though her analysis of spectatorship is too deterministic here, Wright’s observation of 
genre films with their obeisance to the existing political structure as part of their function 
is pertinent. The central contradiction of individualism and the value of democracy 
inherent in the frontier myth continues in the Gangster film as an “insoluble ambiguity”. 
Though the settings of the two genres obviously differ, both genres address the same 
issues, and the roles of their heroes occupy the same function of displacing crucial 
anxieties. The politics of both genres speak the same ideology: Jack Shadoian in 
Dreams and Dead Ends initially observes that the bias of the thirties is towards the Left, 
but concludes that the gangster genre “offers no alternative to the American way of life. 
America’s political, social, and economic flaws are not hidden, but the system in 
principle, is never seriously argued with.”22
With Maltby’s contribution to the existing critical knowledge on the Gangster 
Film, the extent of Hollywood’s ability to play it both ways is more complete. The
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portrayal of the gangster figure allows for an interpretation that assigns this figure the 
status of a tragic hero. However, as a container of the values of indivualism that are an 
intrinsic part of America’s aspirant culture, the gangster has a flaw other than that of 
hubris. The gangster roles played by Paul Muni (Tony Carmonte), James Cagney (Tom 
Powers) and Edward G. Robinson (Cesare Enrico Bandello) have one thing in common, 
they all stand outside of the boundary that separates those who are White, Anglo-Saxon, 
and Protestant from the rest. Muni and Robinson play Italian gangsters, while Cagney’s 
character is “the public enemy” — a direct reference to A1 Capone (as is Scarface). The 
gangster films viewed from this perspective are thus exercises in the scapegoating of 
ethnic stereotypes. The movie gangster is an insufficiently Americanized figure who 
rises to prominence, and the threat of his success is eradicated in the repressive narrative 
structure of the Gangster Film, a narrative circumscribed by the gangster’s rise and the 
closure of his death. The gangster is doomed not because he is under the obligation to 
succeed, but because his success threatens the authority of the WASP American hero. 
The Secret Six, Beast o f the City, and Gabriel Over the White House — the last movies 
of the gangster cycle -- are more obvious in their elimination of this threat. The WASP 
heroes in these films enact the role of the vigilante, suppressing the aspirant non-WASP 
gangsters.
This argument begs the question of why the WASP hero who is usually at the 
centre of the Hollywood film is absent from the classic Gangster films. The lack of a 
father figure in The Public Enemy has been noted, and this is echoed in Little Caesar 
and Scarface. This absence of a central male patriarch points to the difficulty of 
representing such American heroes during the Depression era. The problem is partly 
one of the depiction of a hero embodying the promise of unlimited space and endless
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economic growth being incongruous in a period when the focus is on the limited 
environment of the city and an adverse economy. Another reason for this difficulty in 
representation could lie in the American public’s loss of faith in authority figures that 
failed them in the beginning of this era; the men that had led America in the wonders of 
business Progressivism were now marred by revelations of conspiracy and fraud. 
According to Murray Kempton:
The year 1931 was not a time when the American business man held his head 
high. All the ancient values he represented seemed to wither around him. The 
early Thirties tried bankers and found them guilty as steadily as the Fifties 
were to try Communists. The image of the American Dream was flawed and 
cracked; its critics had never sounded more persuausive.23
It would be an understatement to say that perhaps the most conspicuous WASP 
patriarch of those years ~  President Herbert Hoover — also fell short of his public’s 
expectations. At the end of 1932 there were 13 million unemployed, and Hoover who 
could not give work to his people, now also refused to give them bread. Those who 
knew him personally did not doubt his compassion; Hoover toiled 18 hours a day, until 
his hands trembled, his voice became hoarse and his eyes were red with exhaustion.24 
However, to the unemployed masses he appeared hard-hearted and inert. The reason for 
this perceived inhumanity of their president stemmed from his desperate attachment to 
the values he deemed befitting of an American leader:
. . .he had always been an ideologist, who believed in what he called American 
individualism: in the social arrangements which made it possible for a poor 
Iowa farm boy to become, first, a millionaire by his own efforts, and then 
President of the United States. The system which had made such an
148
achievement possible must not be tampered with in any circumstances; it must 
be vigorously defended, whether against monopoly capitalists. . .or, now, the 
economically and politically ignorant who wanted the state to take on 
responsibilties which, in the American system, belonged exclusively to the 
individual. . .If the state made itself responsible for seeing that men had work, 
food, shelter -- made the direct pursuit of happiness its business -  then 
everything that made the United States unique and glorious would be betrayed.
The mission of the federal government was to get the productive machine 
operating again without destroying the moral fibre of the citizens.25
These disciplinary measures now appeared contemptible when widespread starvation, 
homelessness, despair and humiliation made it clear that state assisstance was 
imperative.
The impossibility of portraying credible WASP figures in movies is evident in 
their new status as ‘non box office’ elements. Movie audiences during the Hoover 
administration were unsympathetic to films where politicians were depicted as heroes — 
in Washington Masquerade (1932), a reference is made to Hoover as “a man whose 
heart is breaking because some of us are traitors”. This allusion, and other such ‘non 
box office’ qualities of the movie led to the following comment in Variety.
The people — the theater-goers for this discussion — are at the moment pretty 
thoroughly impatient with politicians and a story that undertakes to glorify the 
Washington salon isn’t going to win popular acclaim.26
Reviews in the trade press were equally disapproving of Washington Merry Go-Round
(1932), with the “scene causing the most concern” being the one “where the body of a 
lynched politician is thrown on the Capitol steps” :
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The whole picture is. . .apparently dedicated to the principle that all politicians 
are noble statesmen and their only fault is that they are just a leedle [s/c] 
feeble-minded and let themselves be hoodwinked by sinister master-minded 
crooks bent on sending the country to the dogs for their own fell purposes.27
The problem of representation dissipates in substituting insufficiently Americanized 
ethnic scapegoats who fail to succeed. The key to why Westerns were scarce in the 
1930’s lies in that tragic end of the gangster figure.
The representation of positive heroic male figures is integral in the Western 
genre. In a period when this representation is difficult, the virtues are instead transferred 
to other figures. However, the difficulty of direct representation leads to the 
substitution of protagonists who stand outside the WASP boundary, and who come to a 
tragic end. This central factor separating the cowboy from the cityboy supports the 
theory that when the portrayal of WASP virtues are a problem, they can still be 
indirectly extolled by representing the vices of the Other, those who stand outside the 
WASP boundary. By inverse association, the patriarchs with the values and ideology 
they contain are lauded, and the attempt to portray the WASP hero no longer presents 
itself as an obstacle. As hero, or as scapegoat, the gangster resolves the conflict of his 
individuality and American democracy with his death. In both scenarios the WASP 
virtues are kept intact and extolled.
The argument of the gangster as scapegoat leads to an interesting parallel when 
aligned with the position of the Indian in frontier mythology. The Indian is sacrificed to 
purge the White hero of his own evil, as the fight between the two opponents is seen as 
the external manifestation of a spiritual battle whereby the hero defeats the savagery of 
his own soul. However, to defeat the savagery of the wilderness first, the Frontier Hero
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must be rid of the false values of the metropolis, and he does this by a process of 
acculturating the Indian ways ~  the frontier “strips off the garments of civilization and 
arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. . .he shouts the war cry and takes the 
scalp in orthodox Indian fashion.”28 The gangster as an ethnic Other is scapegoated for 
the excesses of white middle-class America in the 1920s. However, the dominant school 
of thought has for some time regarded the gangster as a hero who comes to a tragic end. 
When both interpretations are considered, the gangster as possessing heroic qualities and 
yet being defeated provides a striking similarity to the Indian, whom the Frontier hero 
imitates to conquer the wilderness, yet kills ultimately for his own excesses. This 
method by which the Other is scapegoated in frontier mythology and the Western is 
perpetuated in the Gangster films. The Indian is scapegoated to expel from the WASP 
frontier hero the residual corruption which originated from the European metropolis. 
The gangster is scapegoated to clear the WASP hero of any liability that has resulted 
from the latter’s involvements with the 1920s. The following section deals with the role 
of the woman and particularly the mother figure in the Gangster film. This figure gains 
prominence in the absence of the male patriarch.
II) The Woman: A Convenient Avenue Towards Death
The Western and Gangster genres have another unifying factor: their portrayal of 
women. In the frontier myth, action is a male prerogative that is denied the female, and 
in both movie genres women are consistently relegated to passive or negative roles. 
Karpf writes of the relationship between the gangster and the women in Gangster films, 
particularly the sister-mother-best friend involvement:
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Normally clever, unafraid, and consistently able to outwit rival gangsters and 
police, his love of the unattainable and/ or his possessiveness prove to be his 
“fatal flaw”. Without believable motivation and often with a noble intent 
foreign to his character, the “fatal flaw” causes the steel-nerved gangster to 
commit an unreasonably foolish act in the next to last reel of the film. This 
act is his death knell.29
In Public Enemy, Tom Power’s complex personality of violence is blamed on too much 
motherly love, and in a completion of the circle, his last “foolish act” lays him bleeding 
on her doorstep. In the frontier myth, the hero exerts his masculinity in saving the 
captive woman from the savage Other. This violent conquest of savagery is attained 
with the woman as its prime motivation. James Cagney as Tom Powers marks the 
emergence of a cultural type whose violent streak is explained via overprotective 
motherhood. The gangster and cowboy heroes share the same motivation for their acts 
of violence: women.
Robert Sklar sees the emergence of what he calls the “roughneck sissy” in 
popular media as a response to wider cultural discourses in the 1920s. In that decade, 
one of the dominant themes of American culture was voiced in the behaviourist 
psychology of John B. Watson, whose most influential publication Psychological Care 
o f Infant and Child (1928) castigated American mothers for over-indulging their 
children. This theme was taken up and expanded by Philip Wylie in Generation o f 
Vipers (1942), and between the two books were the peak years when the urban tough 
guy held sway in American popular entertainment. The gangster as a cultural type was 
fully interwoven with this broader social discourse about overprotective mothers and 
dependent sons.
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The tone of protective and often smothering mother-love permeates many 
Gangster Films, from LeRoy’s Public Enemy to Roger Corman’s Bloody Mama in 1970. 
In the former, Beryl Mercer as Mrs. Powers is overwhelming in her devotion to her son, 
to the point of a contrived sentimentality. This form of excess intensified when mirrored 
in Tom’s relationship with the three other women Tom comes in contact with. All three 
want to mother and domesticate him. The famous and often-quoted scene of Tom 
administering a grapefruit to Kitty’s face does not (as it has been interpreted) register 
Tom’s innate misogyny; rather it is the domestic nature of the breakfast and 
conversation they are having that lead to this particular violent action. The protective 
gestures and verbal comforts of all three women are an echo of Mrs. Powers calling 
Tom “My baby” (Gwen’s seduction of Tom is characterized by her mothering him: she 
calls Tom “My bashful boy”) and not only testify to but perpetuate Tom’s inability to 
assimilate the social value of the family or to arrive at some degree of sexual maturity. 
Instead, his contact with women serves to fuel his frustration at this weakness and as 
each relationship is linked with Tom’s acts of violence, the equation may be extended to 
apply to other acts of violence that are committed. This is manifest in his last 
relationship with a woman in the film. As Jane tucks Tom into bed she uses motherly 
phrases to soothe him in his drunken state (“Be a good boy and sit down/ Just a 
goodnight kiss for a fine boy”). However, the next day when she alludes to their night 
together, Tom slaps her in a fit of fury and rushes out into the streets, in defiance of 
Paddy’s orders. Matt follows him and gets gunned down, and it is this desire for 
revenge that stemmed from Jane’s mothering of Tom (a crucial element of the seduction 
process) that leads Tom to his attack on the rival gang.
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This mother-son obsession is enhanced by the absence of a father-figure; instead
the biological father is replaced by substitute fathers (usually leaders of the gangs or the
syndicate that the gangster is a member of) who would normally have no romantic
31alliances with the gangster’s biological mother. In fact, the social and familial values 
held by the latter would be in opposition to the moral code (or immoral code) adopted 
by the substitute fathers. The lack of a father makes a further statement on the
disintegration of the family, or the abnormality of the family climate that appears in most
\
Gangster films. The syndicate or gang becomes the new family, a family that expresses 
an unfeeling attitude towards its members. Rico kills his “brother” in broad daylight and 
says his gun will “speak its piece” to anyone else in the gang who threatens to cross him.
The Gangster Film as Entertainment in the Depression Era
Whilst using the Depression crisis as the contemporary background with which they 
modernized the referents attached to the mythic story of the frontier, Hollywood kept 
the underlying structure and ideology intact. The Gangster films appeared to address an 
active public issue (the corruption and criminal activity in the early Depression years) but 
had an agenda that sought not to motivate its spectators to action but instead to render 
its audience an escape from their daily turmoil. This desire for escapism was manifest 
not only in the Gangster films, it also showed itself in the media coverage and in the 
discourse of politicians.
The effect of the Depression in lowering the standards of living was very real. 
Economic statistics, such as capacity utilization and capital investment indicated the 
economy’s fundamental stagnation. Starving people waited in lines for food; families
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were evicted from rented apartments, mortgaged homes and farms; families were broken 
up as they wandered from one place to another. However, as people died of starvation 
and illnesses associated with malnutrition, President Hoover reportedly told the country 
that “Nobody is actually starving. The hoboes, for example, are better fed than they 
have ever been.”32 The media followed the government’s cue in its refusal to 
acknowledge the depth of the current problem. The local press of Middletown, for 
example, suppressed unpleasant evidence, placing hopeful statements by local bankers
and industrialists on the front page and relegating shrinkages in plant forces and related
33unhappy news to small spaces on the inside pages or omitting them entirely.
Frank depictions of the Depression were rare in Hollywood films for obvious 
reasons. An explicit acknowledgement that the American society (its family unit) and 
economy were disintegrating would undermine the status quo. However, in 
scapegoating an ethnic stereotype for the dysfunctional economy and extolling the 
values of the WASP patriachs, this status quo was preserved. The Hollywood 
procedure also complied with the politicians’ agenda of promoting escapism. This 
element of escape in the Gangster Film fulfils the two psychological needs discussed in 
the preceding chapter: firstly, the films provide excitement (with its chase scenes, and 
scenes of violence) and interest (with its contemporaneity) which transcend the 
boredom and routine of the audience’s daily lives. The second impulse is satisfied when 
an escape from the insecurities and ambiguities of life is provided: the Gangster films 
expressed a courageous approach to the Depression in the representation of its central 
protagonist. Gangsters projected a self-confident, defiant determination to withstand the 
most adverse circumstances, overcoming the obstacles that confronted them. With a 
national mood characterized by apathy, disorientation, ambiguity, and defeat, the
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gangsters were actively self-reliant in their pursuit of their goals. As movie patrons 
vicariously experienced this courageous approach to the Depression experience, they felt 
“better able to gather up (their) worries and thrash them soundly; to line up (their) cares 
against the wall, to shoot them one by one and glory in it just as (they) saw the hero 
do.”34 A Texan movie patron wrote:
Movies have helped us forget. It is a delight to move up the economic ladder.
But it is trying indeed to descend, so mankind has sought relief from trouble 
and worry. . .Thank God for the movies — they have provided the sanity- 
saving diversion, often the inspiration that mankind can afford and has so 
sorely needed in the most trying days within the recollection of people living 
today.35
The tenet of entertainment follows in the tradition of the Western and all genre films. 
The conventions established by the early and classic Gangster films become the rules of 
the genre that are later transformed or subverted in later films of the same genre.
It is significant that the movies would effectively drive the audience not to 
change the circumstances of their distress, but merely to cope with it. In the 1934 
President’s Report to the Motion Picture Industry, Will Hays expresses the movie 
industry’s viewpoint, asserting that their aim was to provide entertainment that made 
movie patrons forget about the Depression:
No medium has contributed more greatly than the film to the maintenance of 
national morale during a period featured by revolution, riot and political 
turmoil in other countries. It has been the mission of the screen, without 
ignoring the serious social problems of the day, to reflect aspiration, optimism, 
and kindly humor in its entertainment.36
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The dominant Myth of the Frontier has an integral part in the constitution of America’s 
national morale, and in an era beset by political turmoil and a questioning of the myth’s 
ideals, the industry still succeeds in reflecting optimism and aspiration. The tactic of 
displacing the Western’s structures onto the Gangster genre is an example of the 
American cinema’s conservative response to challenges to the status quo, and its 
attempts to dissipate events of cultural crisis.
The Production Code and The End of the Gangster Film
The transference of frontier discourse from the Western to the Gangster genre carried an 
observation that the gangster’s demise was predicated on his incomplete assimilation of 
WASP values. At a time when the frontier myth was being undermined, its WASP hero 
was also difficult to represent; instead, the establishment values contained in the myth 
and its hero were indirectly extolled in the failure of a hyphenated American who aspired 
to usurp that position of cultural authority.
This ideological message was not, however, the same one that audiences of 
gangster films received, and indeed the consensual interpretation of the gangster 
protagonist in subsequent critical writing is of a “heroic, inner-directed individualist, a 
self-made man in the guise of the American Adam who died because his individual 
ambitions were boundless in an environment that was determined to limit him.”37 This 
celebration of the gangster hero was in direct opposition to the intentions of the film 
industry, in the light of the defensive posture it had toward not only religious, but civic 
groups that were anxious about losing their dominance over American culture to foreign
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parties. The threat of ethnicity, coupled with fears of Catholic ascendancy, now 
appeared to be validated by audiences who empathized with the plight of the gangster 
protagonist -- a problem that was expressed in Henry James Forman’s Our Movie Made 
Children.
Forman’s account was part of a project sponsored by the Motion Picture 
Research Council in 1928, with the intention of demonstrating the ill effects of films on 
children and adolescents. Under the direction of Professor W.W. Charters of Ohio State 
University, the studies were prepared by professional social scientists, psychologists, and 
educators from leading American universities.38 Forman’s book was the popularized 
account of these academic studies, and a few extracts suffice in revealing the basic 
premises of how gangster films exceeded their moral boundaries:
We are all of us, it has been said, potential criminals, and the movies, some 
psycho-analysts believe, provide the spectators with opportunities for 
vicarious killing. It follows that the young, being more malleable, are likely to 
be more subject to influences than the adults. In the back of our heads there 
has for some time been a vague notion that in some manner movies have a 
relationship to delinquency and crime.
Through facility of seeing them is created a tolerance of criminal patterns and 
a ready stimulation to those either predisposed to delinquency and crime or to 
those whose environment is too heavily weighted against them. The seed is 
supplied all too lavishly to the fertile ground.
It was found that. . .the “gangster” or “crook” type of picture. . .caused the 
trouble. In a high delinquency area, as Professor Thrasher and Mr. Cressey 
found, it is the gangster picture that points the way to wealth, and thereby the 
way to “high society.” The themes and characters of such pictures are more 
familiar to the people concerned, the atmosphere more natural and kindred to
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their environment and interests. . .They exhale possibility within reach of the 
aspiring among themselves.. ,39
Forman also gathered evidence of these corrupting effects from the Blumer-Hauser 
survey, which observed that high-school boys and girls often expressed sympathy for the 
criminal, and that more than half of truant and behaviour problem boys examined 
indicated that pictures dealing with gangsters stirred in them desires for wanting “to 
make a lot of money easily”. The examples from Blumer and Hauser show children 
being more tolerant of criminality as a result of the movies, leading Forman to the 
conclusion that compared with the “continuous production” of the “gangster” or 
“racket” picture, “the sale of whisky to reservation Indians is a trivial offense.”40
Though Forman’s summary was denounced as inflammatory and unscientific, his 
book gained a wide readership, and had the approval of Professor Charters, who 
endorsed Forman’s manuscript with the statement that he showed “a thorough grasp of 
the facts in the complicated materials presented in the nearly 3,000 pages which 
constitute the report of the 12 studies.”41 The book’s unequivocal linking of 
delinquency and the watching of gangster movies, and its obvious exaggeration of the 
films’ damaging effects contributed to a greater furore over the production of these films 
that would strain the relationship of the motion picture industry and the moral guardians 
of America’s community values; but this did not, however, greatly destabilize the 
position of Will H. Hays and the organization he represented. As President of the 
MPPDA, Hays had prepared a strategy for greater diplomacy with America’s civic, 
religious and educational organizations, in the form of constructing a mythology where 
Hollywood was scapegoated to accommodate any mistakes that the industry made.42 
Attention was deflected from the industry to the producers of films, who had to be
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educated to recognize the demand for better movies -- a demand that audiences would 
be taught to cultivate. The slip-up over the gangster films was thus seen to be a result of 
the MPPDA’s incomplete control over Hollywood’s film producers, but the actual blame 
for the effect of these films lay solely on the latter party. The hostility of these nationally 
federated educational, civic, and religious groups were channelled towards achieving a 
more effective control of film production, and the MPPDA’s answer lay in re-enforcing 
the largely ineffective Production Code that had been officially accepted on March 31, 
1930.43
The threat of Catholicism, the religion that represented the new immigrant, was 
now converted into the linchpin for reforming the movies. Presented with an 
unremittingly hostile Protestant religious press, the Roman Catholic hierarchy was seized 
on as the moral institution that could now buttress the MPPDA’s cultural respectability. 
Joseph Breen, an active lay Catholic, organized the Catholic publicity campaign that 
approved the purposes of the Production Code, without committing any Catholic Party 
to endorsing the Code’s effectiveness.44 Amongst other guidelines, the particular 
applications of the Code stipulated that with regard to crimes against the law:
These shall never be presented in such a way as to throw sympathy with the 
crime as against law and justice or to inspire others with a desire for imitation:
The treatment of crimes against the law must not:
a)Teach methods of crime.
b)Inspire potential criminals with a desire for imitation, 
c )Make criminals seem heroic and justified45
My Emphasis
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If the practical implementation of the Code had been successful when it was adopted in 
1930, then it is arguable that the classic cycle of Gangster films with their tragic but 
heroic protagonists would not have existed. However, the implementation of the Code 
in the early thirties was hampered by an extensive negotiation over interpretation, 
enforcement and procedure, as well as the lack of cooperation between the studios and 
the Studio Relations Committee.46 The popularity and effect of the films raised a protest 
that incited a potential public relations crisis, and in a move to avert the calamity, the 
Association of Motion Picture Producers (AMPP) passed a resolution banning the 
production of further Gangster Films in 1931. The Code itself would only achieve full 
effectiveness with the recruitment of the Legion of Decency, a vehicle through which the 
Episcopal Committee on Motion Pictures (appointed by the American Bishops and 
composed of religious leaders including the Most Rev. John T. McNicholas, O.P., 
Archbisop of Cincinnati, Ohio, who was its chairman, and The Most Rev. John J. 
Cantwell, Archbishop of Los Angeles, California) exerted its influence.47 This would 
take place in July 1934.
In the years after 1934 Hollywood enjoyed its “Golden Age of Order”, a term 
Robert Sklar gives to describe the second half of the thirties for the movie industry. The 
increase in moral conservatism in the early thirties, coupled with fears that threatened 
the status quo, and more importantly the establishment values guarded by America’s 
religious, civic and educational institutions, forced an abrupt termination of the Gangster 
film’s classic cycle. The films were in themselves pro-establishment, in their attempt to 
scapegoat non-WASPs for the excesses of the 1920s, in the same way that the Indian is 
scapegoated in discourses of the frontier. However, just as the ideological message of 
scapegoating the Indian cannot be directly expressed, this masked repetition of frontier
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discourse in the Gangster film could not be unmasked to educate the public as to how, in 
actual fact, the superiority of the WASPs was being advocated. The lengthy process of 
negotiation that followed between the industry and the institutional guardians of 
America’s moral and community values coincided with the increasing prominence of 
ethnicity, and its counterparts — urbanization, Catholicism, and generally, a culture of 
Otherness. The equation of ethnicity with Otherness was a factor influencing the ease 
with which frontier discourse was displaced onto the Gangster genre. When these fears 
were alleviated in the latter half of the thirties, the instruments attacking Hollywood’s 
economic base eased accordingly. At this juncture, it would appear that the authorities 
of delimitation were of the persuasion that the urban setting had ceased in its capacity as 
an outlet for frontier discourse. The re-assertion of the Production Code was an explicit 
manifestation of the negotiation that existed prior to 1934; it was concerned primarily 
with movie content and only symptomatic of the destabilizing occurring at the economic 
level. The institutions responsible for that destabilization were not solely placated by the 
effective implementation of the Code, but also by the events that led to an alleviation of 
the threats to America’s cultural hegemony. Roosevelt’s New Deal was one such event.
Statism in the late thirties
Compelled by the Great Depression, the motion picture industry scapegoated white 
ethnics to strengthen establishment values. Though this attempt backfired, the effect of 
the Crash itself would lead a younger, more Americanized generation of ethnics to look 
beyond their own communities and institutions for support. The basic services of 
welfare, security and employment that they had relied on their ethnic communities and
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bosses to provide were appropriated by the federal government. The New Deal began 
to play an important role for ethnics, with its federally funded relief programs, and 
ultimately a permanent Social Security system that substituted the welfare previously 
sponsored by ethnic and religious communities.48 The Depression, rather than turning 
industrial workers against the political system, and further threatening the status quo, 
drew them to it as they became beneficiaries of government programmes and even party 
voters. In 1920s Chicago, large numbers of industrial workers failed to vote; amongst 
the foreign-born, less than one third of the potential electorate turned out for the 
presidential election of 1924, in contrast to the 65% in native, middle-class wards. By 
1936, 81% of first- and second-generation ethnics supported Roosevelt: many of them 
were new recruits who had not voted in the 1920s.49 The evidence was clear: ethnic 
workers were looking increasingly to the state.
The documentary approach became an intrinsic part of the establishment -- and it 
was epitomized by the New Deal’s chief executive, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s 
Fireside Chats utilized the radio to make a direct and personal contact with the public, 
and to diminish ethnicity’s importance; thus his speech to the Daughters of the American 
Revolution which addressed them as “Fellow Immigrants.”50 The documentary 
technique was part of Roosevelt’s strategy of persuasion. In a 1932 campaign, he 
relates the following incident to explain his political decision to support old-age 
insurance:
I shall tell you what sold me on old age insurance — old age pensions. Not so 
long ago — about ten years - -1 received a great shock. I had been away from 
my home town of Hyde Park during the winter time and when I came back I 
found that a tragedy had occurred. I had had an old farm neighbor, who had 
been a splendid fellow -- Supervisor of his town, Highway Commissioner of
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his town, one of the best of our citizens. Before I had left, around Christmas 
time, I had seen the old man, who was eighty-nine, his old brother, who was 
eighty-seven, his other brother, who was eighty-five, and his “kid” sister, who 
was eighty-three.
They were living on a farm; I knew it was mortgaged to the hilt; but I 
assumed that everything was all right, for they still had a couple of cows and a 
few chickens. But when I came back in the spring I found that in the severe 
winter that followed there had been a heavy fall of snow, and one of the old 
brothers had fallen down on his way out to the bam to milk the cow, and had 
perished in the snow drift. The town authorities had come along and had 
taken the two old men and had put them in the county poorhouse, and had 
taken the old lady and sent her down, for want of a better place, to the insane 
asylum, although she was not insane but just old.
That sold me the idea of trying to keep homes intact for old people.51
Roosevelt did not simply give the reason for his political decision to support old-age 
insurance; he documented it. His documentary imagination subverted the unsettling 
effects that the genre had achieved in the early Depression years. In relation to ethnicity, 
the poignancy of establishment victims could now be converted into a ‘usable past’: 
when Chicago’s ethnically-owned banks collapsed between 1929 and 1933, their 
community leaders were held partly responsible. The contemporary irrelevance of 
ethnicity was emphasized and relegated a minimized role as a ‘way of life’ conducted 
within specific communities.52
Though the New Deal was not without its limitations, its significance is cogently 
stated by Lizbeth Cohen in her recognition that:
. . . .  the New Deal’s impact should be measured less by the lasting 
accomplishments of its reforms and more by the attitudinal changes it
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produced in a generation o f working-class Americans who now looked to 
Washington to deliver the American Dream.
My Emphasis
National Identity and Popular Culture
With the re-affirmation of establishment values, the late thirties began to present greater 
promise for Westerns to once again contain discourses of the Frontier. The basic 
assumption of the Production Code was that films could not be divorced from moral 
responsibilities; it was imperative that an affirmative view of the American society be 
presented. It is likely that this requirement could not be met in the early years of the 
Crash, when American society was threatened by fears of fragmentation and economic 
failure. The brief classic gangster cycle was an explicit manifestation of the ideological 
negotiation that ensued, revealing a failure of absolute control between forces that 
influenced the movie industry’s economic base, and what appeared at the level of movie 
content. This incomplete control was also evident in the vogue for films that 
sympathetically depicted women of easy virtue during the years 1931-1933: Susan 
Lennox: Her Fall and Rise (1931) elicited Motion Picture Herald's disdainful comment 
that “MGM seems to have continued in its ‘sin and succeed’ series with Greta Garbo. 
It. . . is proof sufficient that its present form, the Hays Code is nothing for producers to 
worry about.”53 The economic triumph of the film led to others and created a new genre 
that was as distinct and short-lived as the Gangster cycle -- Possessed, The Easiest Way, 
Illicit (1931), Blonde Venus, and Redheaded Woman (1932) constituted the films that 
championed women of dubious morality. The genre of the “Fallen Woman”, like the 
Gangster Film, signalled the difficulty in endorsing the values of traditional morality.
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However, with the erosion of ethnicity and the success of New Deal measures, a 
consolidated perspective of American national identity now existed. This re-affirmation 
of Americanism was no doubt aided by the cultivated image of a new WASP Patriarch 
who replaced Hoover and ended a period of public frustration with authority figures. In 
one of the turning points in American history Roosevelt achieved in a few minutes what 
had eluded Hoover for four years and renewed the self-confidence of the American 
people; promising jobs and assistance:
Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. There is no unsolvable 
problem if we face it wisely and courageously.
It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the government 
itself, treating the task as we would the emergency of a war, but at the same 
time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to 
stimulate and reorganize the use of our natural resources.54
Eight days after his inaugural speech, Roosevelt declared the banks safe due to his 
Emergency Banking Act -- the evidence that the American people’s faith in presidency 
was restored came the next day when bank deposits exceeded withdrawals.55 
Roosevelt’s famous Fireside Chats were also an indication of his strong actor’s instinct, 
a quality that is later relevant to images of Reagan and the next moment of political crisis 
that would sweep through America.
This sense of nationalism and patriotism was further strengthened with economic 
recovery and by America’s entry into war in 1941. It would take this revival for mass, 
and particularly, metropolitan audiences to welcome ‘A’ Westerns; meanwhile the last 
years of the 1930s were marked by a proliferation of Westerns that offered more
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explicit versions of frontier discourse — dealing with most aspects of pioneers, settlers 
and frontiersmen. The following is a comment from Variety in 1937:
The big crops are booming the market for Westerns. Bountiful yields and 
comparatively high prices spell prosperity and increased buying power for 
farmers, and they and their families and farm-hands are starting to flock to the 
theaters and the small towns, but they demand Westerns or action pictures.
Society and sex dramas, in particular, are nix with this element. The 
farmers give the musicals a slight tumble, but even the girl shows don’t begin 
to supplant their first love — the cowboy drama. As a result, local film 
exchanges are selling all the westerns they can get their hands on and report 
the demand for this type of picture is the biggest in history.56
These Westerns provided a new outlet for the emergence of frontier mythology that, like 
the urban settings of the Gangster films, was located in more recent times. The
Westerns that catered primarily to Southern audiences, and reinvented a new site for
frontier mythology, are the topic of the next chapter.
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The New West Hero
Gene Autry and the Antimodern Resolution
While my solutions were a little less complex than those offered by FDR, 
and my methods a bit more direct, I played a kind of New Deal Cowboy 
who never hesitated to tackle many of the same problems: the dust bowl, 
unemployment, or the harnessing of power. This may have contributed 
to my popularity with 1930s audiences.1
Gene Autry
Traditional film scholarship has tended to concentrate on the products and industrial 
context of the major studios, offering less detailed accounts of the histories of low- 
budget producers. This marginalization of the independent and minor studios in the 
majority of histories of the film industry corresponds to an impetus of viewing history as 
a linear process — neglecting areas that pose questions of disruption, displacement and 
overdetermination. Accounts of history that incorporate such questions have been 
termed by Jean-Louis Comolli as “materialist”.2 Comolli pits materialist historical 
accounts against linear histories, the latter further developed by Thompson and Bordwell 
into a taxonomy of linear historical patterns: evolutionary, teleological and seriality.3 
For example, according to Paul Seale the teleological movement leads historians to 
equate marginal economic power with marginal historical status, resulting to an
168
exaggeration of the limitations of studios existing outside of the majors. Seale 
observes that these limitations are implicit in the language of critics: Douglas Gomery 
notes that where 90% of the available profits were made by the majors in the studio era, 
others “scrambled” for the remainder.4 He also contends that such language “translates 
the oligopolists’ tendency toward stability into historical stasis, implicitly denying that 
the flux on the periphery might have effects on the dominant forces in the industry.”5
This chapter, amongst other concerns, is an attempt to correct the historical bias 
towards the major studios. It seeks to demonstrate that the products of the minor 
producers did have repercussions on the decision making of their usually dominant 
counterparts, and were instrumental in the restoration of the frontier myth in the popular 
imagination. Such an argument is especially pertinent to the 1930s, and with regard to a 
discussion about the production and reception of the Western genre in that period. 
Though for the most part Seale focuses on the Poverty Row Studios, he does make the 
comment that what is lacking in books taking the ‘B’ movie as their explicit subject is an 
attention to films that follow less canonic lines. Thus he praises the accomplished 
economic analysis of the ‘B’ film and low budget production in Paul Kerr’s “Out of 
What Past: Notes on the B Film Noir”, but objects to his preference for the more 
“stylistically quirky” products of Edgar G. Ulmer and Val Lewton.6 Instead, Seale 
advocates research on the movies of Joseph Kane, with his copious record of Westerns 
produced for Republic.7 Kane’s work is also noticeably absent from Todd McCarthy 
and Charles Flynn’s Kings o f the Bs: Working Within the Hollywood System. The 
Westerns produced by Joseph Kane and starring Gene Autry will be utilized to illustrate 
the argument of this chapter. It is befitting, at this juncture, to acknowledge the
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direction and expertise of Peter Stanfield, through whom I gained access to the 
Westerns and a considerable amount of the material referred to in this chapter.
The choice of Gene Autry stems from his appropriation of the Cowboy persona 
and frontier values as answers to the heightened crisis of the Depression years. In 
providing those answers Autry’s Westerns reinvent frontier mythology in a new site 
outside the boundaries of the “Old” West. It was argued in the previous chapters that, 
in Foucauldian terms, the authorities delimiting frontier discourse had created an 
obstacle for the myth to surface in Westerns that depicted the “Old” West. The 
termination of the Western as a surface in which frontier discourse could emerge 
explains why the myth was transposed onto an urban setting. The factors determining 
the discursive grid of specification, such as the role of ethnicity, also contributed to the 
Gangster film’s status as a surface of emergence. The end of chapter 5, however, 
questioned the success of this passage of discourse. While the Gangster film contained 
mythic and narrative elements of the Western, its effect on audiences seemed to be
tainted by a moral ambiguity that failed to convey a pure sense of WASP superiority.
This flaw directly violated a crucial tenet of frontier mythology and predicated the 
Gangster film’s demise as a vehicle for the discourse to emerge. The popularity of the 
Autry Westerns may be seen in the context of statism and the New Deal, when
Roosevelt restores credibility in the American nation’s WASP leadership. Their
relevance also stems from the employment of a strategy not unlike that of the Gangster 
film. In replacing the “Old” West for a “New” West setting, the Western genre acquires 
a new sense of mythological resonance that meets the requirements pertaining to cultural 
verisimilitude in the 1930s. The next section first establishes the industrial context of 
Republic Studios and the Double Bill.
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The B Studio and The Western
In 1928, Variety noted that Paramount, Universal, First National, Fox, FBO, and Pathe 
(major companies and larger independents) were the chief producers of Westerns.8 Such 
formidable competition was enough reason for the smaller independents to avoid the 
genre. In a review of 1928 entitled “Pictures’ Most Sensational Year,” however, 
Variety claimed that the Western genre was at its end:
PASSING OF THE WESTERNS 
Recalling the past year, outside of the sound phase, a subject which must be 
narrated by itself, 1928 began making picture history in mid-January when it 
signalized the passing of westerns and their familiar shootey-up thesis. If the 
theory of cycles proves true, it will be seven years before these wild riding and 
gun play stories feel the call of revival. The present tenor of the time reveals 
nothing to refute the edict that the western has passed, at least, for this year.9
While the majors continued to make Westerns on a smaller scale, the decrease in 
production gave Poverty Row producers the opportunity to meet the ongoing demand 
for the Western product. This continued demand in the face of a shrinking supply was 
apparent in February 1929 when Variety claimed: “Although the bottom has fallen out of 
Westerns it appears that there is still enough of a demand for the cowboy operas and 
suddenly almost no supply to meet the market ”10 The request for more Westerns 
specifically arose from small town audiences, and was mainly for low-budget 
programmers and serials.11 In September of the same year, Variety recorded the 
conclusions reached by a mass meeting of Texas Motion Picture Theatre Owners, that
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while the small towns of Texas “crave at least one good Western a week” only one 
major producer had Westerns to offer for the coming season.12 By October 1929 the 
majors were booking the Westerns of the independents for their own exhibition, and by 
April 1930 when Universal stopped its production of the genre, Poverty Row producers 
had mastered the problem of sound expenses.
When the National Recovery Administration prevented the major studios from 
banning the double bill in 1934, this further increased the demand for the low-budget 
Western. The origin of the double feature can be traced back to 1927, where its 
prevalence was noted in The Film Yearbook 1928.13 The greatest impact, however, 
appears to have occurred in 1935 when double billing became standard practice on a 
nation-wide basis. In this year all the majors opened B units that were deliberately 
calculated to satisfy the exhibitor demand cheaply, via low-cost films intended for the 
second half of double bills. Major studio ‘B” s had budgets that ranged from $30,000 to 
$300,000, and were made on schedules that averaged three weeks by studios including 
Warners, Fox, MGM, Universal, Columbia and Paramount.14 However, this strategy 
failed to meet the demand for the low-budget film especially during the 1934-1936 
seasons, when the exhibitor demand for ‘B’ movies to fill double bills and Saturday 
matinees escalated. This resulted in a proliferation of the products of various smaller 
companies, but by 1937 increased production of the ‘B’ films had resulted in a glut that 
together with the dominance of the major studio ‘B” s, led marginal companies to shut 
down. Another outcome in response to threatened closure was the merger of minor 
studios.15 A significant step towards this coming consolidation was an amalgamation of 
the independent front that occurred in March 1935, which led to the birth of Republic 
Pictures.
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Republic Pictures belonged to the category of secondary studios in a tier above 
Poverty Row, distinct from the quickies by their longer shooting schedules and bigger 
budgets but lacking the quality and resources of the majors. Other studios in that 
category included Monogram, Grand National, Mascot, Tiffany, Ambassador-Conn, 
Chesterfield, Invincible, Liberty, Majestic, Sono Art, Educational and World-Wide. 
Their budgets seldom went beyond $100,000, but the quality of their products nearly 
approximated the ‘B”s of the majors. Republic Pictures grew out of Monogram and 
Mascot, a union that would exploit Monogram’s national distribution organization of 
exchanges to 39 cities, and Mascot’s studio which had specialized firstly in serials and 
then features in 1933. Herbert J. Yates offered to join forces with Nat Levine, the 
founder of Mascot, in a move that guaranteed an improvement in quantity and quality: 
optimum usage of Mascot’s studio and Monogram’s controlled distribution.16 Republic 
thus began in a strong financial position that enabled the production of higher-grade ‘B’ 
movies.
According to McCarthy and Flynn, Republic epitomized the classical Hollywood 
£B’ studio, being the largest and most staple organization, releasing 66 serials within 22 
years.17 Republic’s ‘B’ Westerns, many directed by Joseph Kane, are of particular 
interest due to their variation of the Western formula, genre and frontier mythology -- in 
their utilization of a singing protagonist (Gene Autry), their modern setting (the New 
West), and the corresponding acclamation of frontier values in a space dislocated from 
the frontier in terms of distance and time. Though most ‘B’ Westerns were aimed at 
minor houses attracting Saturday matinee and juvenile audiences, especially in the small 
town and rural market, Republic’s higher-grade ‘B’ Westerns occasionally premiered at 
theatres in Hollywood Boulevard, finding an audience beyond the rural and small town
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boundary. Republic’s ‘B’ Westerns were made on modest budgets, but its profits were 
not insignificant: Autry’s first starring vehicle Tumblin’ Tumbleweeds (1935) cost 
$18,000 to make, but ultimately grossed over $1 million.18 Though due to problems of 
accessibility the Westerns made by Poverty Row studios are not included in this chapter, 
it is important to state that a large number of such films were produced by these studios 
in the 1930s, and merit consideration. The following attempts to derive an 
understanding of the ideological function of the singing Western with a resource base of 
7 Autry Westerns, chosen for their thematic concerns of industrialization and its effects. 
An appropriate point to begin with relates to the reconstruction of frontier mythology as 
a response not to Indian hostility but to advances in technology, a process relevant to 
the landscape of these films -- the New West.
The New West and the Frontier Myth
In his analysis of Witness, Wayne J. McMullen compares and contrasts films set in the 
Old West and the New West:
A common theme in both the Old West and the New West is a protagonist’s 
hero’s attempts to protect a people from the evil forces against which they are 
largely defenseless. Furthermore, both the New West and the Old West exist 
in a dominatable [sic], exploitable, land-based sphere that calls for the hero to 
direct his energies outwardly.
Unlike the Old West, however, the inhabitants of the New West attempt to 
keep the past alive in the present. The imperiled land in the New West is an 
enclave of past ways of living within a technologically advanced present-day 
society. Whereas in the Old West the land was to be conquered, the land in 
the New West now offers a refuge for a society tired of the ills wrought by
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technology. In the scenic change from Old West to the New West, the action 
shifts from conquest to preservation. Within this preserve, the New West
offers a retreat from the complexities of modem living to a simpler way of
being.19
McMullen does not offer any explicit definitions for the “Old” West mentioned in the 
above, only a vague statement that “The physical reality of the American West. . .has 
been its closing as a frontier”, with the New West occurring after the “demise of the Old 
West”. It is interesting that historical definitions of the “Old” American West and the
“Old” West of the popular imagination are not confined within similar time and spatial
boundaries. Richard White’s definition of the historical American West is the period of 
American expansion beginning with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, continuing through 
the acquisition of Texas, the Oregon Territory and the Mexican Cession in the 1840s, 
ending with the 1853 Gadsen Purchase of the lands between the Gila River and the 
present Mexican boundary.20 A definition of the Old West from the perspective of 
popular culture, derived from Cawelti in Adventure, Mystery Romance, is more graphic 
but less specific:
The symbolic landscape of the western formula is a field of action that centers 
upon the point of encounter between civilization and wilderness, East and 
West, settled society and lawless openness. The frontier settlement or group is 
a point both in space and time. Geographically, it represents a group of 
civilizers or pioneers on the edge of the wilderness, tenuously linked to the 
civilized society behind them in the East by the thinnest lines of 
communication. These links are constantly in danger of being cut by the 
savages — Indians or outlaws -- who roam the wilderness. Historically, the 
western represents a moment when the forces of civilization and wilderness 
life are in balance, the epic moment at which the old life and the new confront
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each other and individual actions may tip the balance one way or another, thus 
shaping the future history of the whole settlement.21
Will Wright’s description of the Western’s American West provides some dates for this 
historical ‘moment’:
The crucial period of settlement in which most Westerns take place lasted only 
about thirty years, from 1860 to 1890. In 1861 the Indian wars began as the 
Cheyenne found the Colorado gold miners invading their lands, and in 1862 
the Homestead Act was passed. By 1890 all the American Indians had been 
either exterminated or placed in reservations; in 1889 the last unoccupied 
region in the West, the Oklahoma territory, was opened to homesteaders with 
a massive land rush. Between these events, the major Indian wars were 
fought, and cattle empires blossomed and withered. The great Texas cattle 
drives to the Kansas cow towns, the inspiration for much of the Western myth, 
lasted only from 1866-1885. Even if we include the period of the California 
gold rush and the first wagon trains to Oregon, the entire period of western 
settlement lasted less than fifty years.22
The New West of the Western, then, is a historical period occuring after 1889 where all 
the regions in the West have been occupied (by settlers other than the Native American 
Indians), and also a state of mind, where the balance of old and new is not one between 
the wilderness and civilization, but between rural civilization and the encroachment of 
technology.
In the Autry Westerns, it is the state of mind, the “symbolic” West, that is 
instrumental. The response to technology that features strongly in his Westerns is 
coupled with the problems of the 1930s: Brian Taves observes that the key social theme 
of the CB’ Western was the loss of farms to foreclosure during economic hard times.23
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In Autry’s New West, the threat of foreclosure stems from a naivete that places the rural 
farmers at a disadvantage in their attempts at modernization (via mechanization).
Technology and the values of urban civilization, sub-categories of the Modern, 
are pitted against the values of the frontier (qualities associated with the cowboy heroes 
of the Old West). A clear and frequent example of this juxtaposition is the use of the 
automobile and tractor as replacements for the horse. The balance of Old and New in 
Autry’s Westerns is thus more complex than the urban and rural; it is the confrontation 
between the urban and frontier protagonist in a move to protect the members of rural 
civilization. Gene Autry and his group are always shown to be distinct from rural 
civilization — an obvious marker of this is in their contempt of dairy cows (in the 
Westerns discussed the remark is twice made that those who tend to such cows are 
“playing milkmaid”). They are never seen in a domestic abode but are always on the 
move, some of the time, as in The Old Bam Dance (1938), necessitated by their trading 
of horses from town to town. All the 7 Westerns discussed in the following feature this 
confrontation of urban and frontier values. Three of them -- The Old Corral (1936), 
Public Cowboy No. 1 (1937), and Colorado Sunset (1939) -- however, are also 
interesting for their usage of the gangster protagonist as an embodiment of urban values. 
Gene Autry, his sidekick Frog Millhouse (Smiley Burnette) and the cowboys that ride 
with them uphold frontier values which in the confrontation equate with the antimodern. 
This confrontation is the means via which values of frontier mythology are asserted. 
Discourses of the frontier also have a firm presence in the musical numbers, where the 
song narratives evoke nostalgia for the Old West. McMullen’s description of the New 
West as a “land-based sphere that calls for the hero to direct his energies outwardly” 
would suggest the reinstatement of outward expansion, a tenet of the Frontier Myth’s
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deep structure. An assumption of the discussion that follows is that the diachronic 
change pertaining to territorial expansion in the myth is still in force. The suppression of 
this tenet of the myth, beginning with the Gangster Film, is a necessary component of 
the process of mythic repair. A defining element of the New West is, after all, in its 
existence in a period after the phase of territorial expansion in American history.
Gangsters in the New West
In Public Cowboy No. 1 (a title that immediately brings A1 Capone to mind) Autry has to 
contend with cattle rustlers who use refrigerator trucks, planes and two-way radios to 
purloin, slaughter, and send cattle off to market in a quick operation. The cattle rustlers 
are linked to the urban and modem not only via the tools of their trade but also the 
company to which they belong: the “Chicago and Western Packing Co.” The first 
sequence of the film has these cattle rustlers carrying out their unlawful activities in Box 
Canyon, stealing a herd of cattle and murdering an innocent witness in the process. 
Gene Autry, Frog and their companions (on horseback) arrive on the scene and fail to 
catch up with the refrigerator trucks — actualizing the rustler’s claim that their “modern 
method of cattle ranching sure is making simpletons out of these ranchers.” This is 
followed by a montage of newspaper headlines that further undermine the values that 
were upheld in the Old West (relating to the superiority of the horse and cowboy) in a 
style reminiscent of the Gangster film: “Reign of Terror Sweeps Prairie County”, 
“Sheriff Doniphon no match for Modem Rustlers”. The language in later scenes also 
alludes to the crime film ~  when one of the rustlers shoots the Sheriff he describes it as 
having “plugged him”, and when he is later captured and found murdered in jail, Autry
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remarks that he was “killed by someone who was afraid he would talk.” The second set 
of headlines publicizes the killing, and the demands for the Sheriffs resignation. The 
headlines question the capabilities of Sheriff Doniphon (played by William Farnum, who 
would be recognized by audiences of the Western as a representative of the Old West) 
who admits that an “old fashioned sheriff’ and “a new fashioned rustler” can only mean 
that “enforcing the law belongs to the past.” His sentiments are echoed by Autry who 
acknowledges the need for modem equipment to get results, noting the obvious 
imbalance of “airplane and truck versus horse and buggy.” The rest of the film proceeds 
to dispel this negativism and to prove the cowboy and his horse’s ascendancy over the 
forces of modernity. This is achieved in two ways, through spectacle, and through the 
narrative of the songs.
The replacement for the Sheriff is a clear (to exaggerated proportions) 
representative of modernity and the urban -- a criminal expert from the East, 
specializing in “Scientific Criminology”, named “Quakenbusch” and with a foreboding 
reputation of being “bad news for bad men”. His appearance in the town is applauded, 
but this is immediately followed by Frog’s rendition of “The Defective Detective from 
Brooklyn”, a song that humorously subverts Quakenbusch’s authority (or what remains 
of the authority of anyone in possession of such a name). His Eastern origins are also 
ridiculed when Frog appears in a Charlie Chan disguise for part of the song. Frog’s 
performance is immediately followed by Autry’s rendition of “Old Buckaroo, Goodbye”, 
which, in contrast, is sung in a sombre mode. Autry’s song is in honour of the Sheriff, in 
a sentimental style that celebrates the Sheriffs efforts at upholding the law, but now 
being “weary and tired”, he is asked to “dream of the days on the prairie”, and to “dream 
of a new heavenly reign.” The Old West that intrudes onto the new landscape does so
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through the vehicle of dream, a motif that will recur to a great extent in most of the song 
narratives. The Old West of Autry’s Westerns is an idealized and mythical dreamscape, 
often perceived as superior to a New West that has been tainted due to the changes 
wrought by industrialisation. The juxtaposition of the two songs and their differing 
effects curbs any support for the modem that may have surfaced with the anticipation 
that the lawful agents of modernity will effectively deal with the cattle mstlers. Any 
remaining faith in the agents of modernity is extinguished in the climax of the film, in the 
scene where the camera focuses on the mopeds and motorbikes of the police stuck in the 
mud, while Autry and his cowboys capture the mstlers on horseback.
The gangster makes a more definitive presence in The Old Corral, in the person 
and name of Mike Scarlotti. The film begins when Scarlotti murders Tony Pearl, a 
nightclub owner in gang-infested Chicago. The murder is witnessed by Eleanor Spenser 
(a blues singer), who escapes to the West for safety. The plot is an exemplification of 
the New West as a “refuge for a society tired of the ills wrought by technology.” The 
bus that Eleanor travels on encounters Autry and company on a horse-drawn buggy, and 
in a scene that is repeated in the other ‘B’ Westerns, the unfamiliar sounding of the bus’s 
horn frightens the horses and they veer off into a fence. The bus is later ambushed by 
some men on horseback (the O’Keefe boys), though any sense of real danger or evil is 
dispelled by a middle-aged passenger who expresses her enjoyment at this “real Wild 
West hold-up” and her sincere request for their autographs (which is light-heartedly 
denied). The “highway robbers” are also subject to less condemnation because of their 
ability to sing well, and their earnest attempts to get on the radio. This is followed by a 
sequence where the camera is in long shot and we see the O’Keefe boys riding along the 
grassy plains, and hear them singing “Down Along the Sleepy Rio Grande”.
Meanwhile the plot sets out to establish its definition and focus of criminality — 
Martin Simms, a nightclub owner, notices Eleanor’s picture in a newspaper and tries to 
get her to perform in the “Blue Moon”. His ulterior motive is to contact Scarlotti and to 
negotiate a ransom, but to gain her trust Simms lies to Eleanor that he will protect her 
from the gangster. The sequence that occurs prior to this liason declares the 
ascendancy of a rural lifestyle in subverting the criticism of rustic indolence in 
comparison with urban industriousness: Simms’s attempts to get his automobile filled at 
a petrol station are frustrated by the attendants, who are playing a game of chess. 
Ignoring the desperate horns of the vehicle outside, they concentrate on a game in which 
the execution of a single move requires the length of a whole day. When they finally 
emerge, they register their contempt for the impatience of the “damn city boys” who in 
their opinion are always getting lost.
What follows at the Blue Moon nightclub is a self-reflexive analysis and 
commentary about the popularity of Autry’s Westerns, and the nature of his audience: 
Eleanor’s operatic rendition of “With all My Heart I Long For You” fails to procure any 
esteem from her audience, who are clearly of a rural, working-class origin. Conversely, 
they think that the quality of her singing is “pretty bad”. Autry comes to her rescue and 
assures her of her “beautiful voice”, explaining that her poor reception lies with her 
audience, who are “not educated to that type of music”. Autry and Eleanor then sing 
“In the Heart of the West” in duet, and their performance is received with a rousing 
applause. The lyrics of the song, as with “Old Buckaroo, Goodbye” in Public Cowboy 
No. 1, present an idealized image of the Old West and its inevitable link to dreaming:
You will find in the heart of the West, happiness that I’ve found the best;
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there ’neath the starlight, with love at our side, we’ll ride the trail side by side. 
Dreams come true in the heart of the West; dreams renew when the world’s at 
rest.
Something you’ve always longed for, something you’ve longed to do, 
waits for you in the heart of the West.
“Silent Trails”, the song performed by the O’Keefe boys is more like “Old Buckaroo, 
goodbye” in its inherent nostalgia for the passing of the Old West:
Silent Trails, are you lonely where you are;
Do you ever get to pining, for the pioneers returning, 
for the empire still a’burning; silent trails.
Silent trails, do the cowboys ride again. . .
are the redskins somewhere hidin’, are their spirits still a’ridin’;
Silent trails.
The nostalgia continues with Autry’s singing of “Old Pinto”. Concurrent to this 
idealization of and nostalgia for the Old West is a deprecation of urban values — Simms 
finally makes contact with Scarlotti and the latter betrays any notion of fair dealing (in a 
manner more extreme than Simms’s duplicity with Eleanor), offering only to spare 
Simms’s life in exchange for information about her whereabouts. In a scene that almost 
mirrors the ending of Public Enemy No. 1, The Old Corral reaches its climax with a shot 
that proclaims the superiority of horse and cattle over their mechanized counterparts —
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Autry and the O’Keefe boys pursue the gangsters (in their automobiles) on horseback, 
and utilize the ingenious scheme of raising a cattle stampede to disable the latter.
The shot which parallels that of the motorbikes caught in the mud is that of an 
empty automobile, unable to function because it is surrounded by cattle. It is significant 
that the O’Keefe boys are exonerated from any form of disapprobation, such that the 
image of the cowboy is not sullied ~  Autry explains to Frog that the boys are vindicated 
on three counts, firstly because they “returned the loot”, secondly because they “saved 
Eleanor from Scarlotti”, and lastly (here Autry’s commercial agenda surfaces more 
directly) because they “pulled the holdup to get publicity” for a radio job. The definition 
of evil in this moral drama is placed squarely on Scarlotti and his aides, representatives 
of modernity, urbanization and technology.
The gangster motif recurs in Colorado Sunset, where milk is substituted for beer 
in Autry’s exposing of a protection racket. This later film is also marked by an explicit 
increase in production values ~  the cast boasts the addition of Patsy Montana and the 
CBS KMBC Texas Rangers, and the opening sequence presents sophisticated camera 
techniques that make fluid transitions between close-ups of each of the cowboys as they 
sing their solo pieces on horseback, and panning backwards to a long shot when the 
group sings in unison. The rationale that is constructed for Autry’s participation in the 
dairy business is tenuous, but not entirely inconceivable -- Frog thinks that he has bought 
(with the pooled financial resources of Autry, a group of cowboys, and himself) a cattle 
ranch, but it turns out to be a herd of dairy cows. An expression of disgust is clear in 
their reaction to this turn of events, and to the notion that they might soon be “playing 
nursemaid to some cows”. The frequent distinction between cattle ranching and dairy 
farming is important, associating Autry and his group with a notion of masculinity that
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excludes the domestic, overcompensating to the extreme that even the animals they deal 
with cannot be female. The preference (almost a requisite) for ranching and not farming 
also establishes a separation from civilization with its attendant sense of rootedness, 
raising the function of cattle in Autry’s Westerns to a level that is more complex than is 
suggested by Jane Tompkins:
Economically cattle are the basis of the way of life that Westerns represent, but 
if anything they are even more invisible than horses are, in the sense of not being 
seen for themselves, or as they would see themselves. With few exceptions 
(usually scenes of branding or rescuing of calves), they are seen only from the 
viewpoint of their utility for humans; as factors in an economic scheme, as 
physical obstacles to be contended with in an heroic undertaking, or as the 
contested prize in an economic struggle.24
In addition to their crucial role in defining the cowboy’s masculinity, cattle in Autry’s 
Westerns also possess a utility that exists outside of a mere economic scheme ~  the 
capture of Scarlotti and his gang in The Old Corral, for example, placed the animals as 
active agents in the fight between good and evil. Tompkins’s pedagogical statement that 
in Westerns “cattle exist, from a human point of view, in order to die and become meat, 
and it’s hard for people to look at that fact very closely” is countered in the song “Poor 
Little Dogie”. In this song Autry looks reasonably closely (albeit in a whimsical manner 
— enabling to a large extent Tompkins’s curious request for the cattle’s perspective, and 
also alleviating the sombre nature of her pronouncements on the topic) at the fact that 
cattle exist not just in order to become meat, but a gourmet dish:
Poor little dogie, if you only knew, what modern inventions are doing to you;
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You were so happy when you roamed the range, but somehow your life has to 
change.
Once you could graze on the grain of the land, but now they’ll be feeding you 
out of a can;
You’ll get a diet of tenderized hay, you must have vitamin A.
You were contented when you bedded down. . .
Poor little dogie your life is a wreck. . .they’ve caused you remorse;
In spite of the changes they’re trying to make, you’ll wind up a porterhouse 
steak.
The above lyrics are also marked by a strong nostalgia that disparages modern methods 
(the “modern inventions”) of rearing cattle in causing the animals’ discomfort. This 
function of nostalgia in relation to cattle, and more particularly horses, is also noted by 
Tompkins: “. . .horses fulfill a longing for a different kind of existence. Antimodern, 
antiurban, and antitechnological, they stand for an existence without cars and telephones 
and electricity.”25 “Poor little Dogie” is preceded by Patsy Montana’s energetic 
rendition of “I want to be a Cowboy’s Sweetheart” (a thousand miles from the city life), 
which has lyrics reminiscent of the more sentimentally performed “In the Heart of the 
West”:
I want to be a cowboy’s sweetheart, I want to learn to rope and ride;
I want to ride over the plains and the desert, I want to ride over the great divide.
I want to hear the coyotes howling, while the sun sinks in the West,
I want to be a cowboy’s sweetheart, that’s the life that I love the best.
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As with all of the songs discussed previously, “I want to be a Cowboy’s Sweetheart” 
consolidates a position that idealizes the past of the Old West.
The purchase of the dairy cows proves, however, to be irreversible, and the 
acquisition of a dairy business leads Autry and his group into an entanglement with Dr. 
Rodney Blair’s “protective association”. Dr. Blair poses as a veterinary for the dairy 
association and surreptitiously heads a version of bootlegging, where dairy farmers are 
coerced into paying exorbitant rates for the transport of milk (via the trucking company 
“Crescent City”) into town. When the farmers attempt to bypass the company, their 
wagons are wrecked, and their containers of milk overturned. When Autry and Frog 
succeed in eluding the system, Blair swears revenge (“I’m going to control every gallon 
of milk in Barton County and name my own price for it and no smart aleck cowboys are 
going to stop me either”) and we see his outfit in operation ~  he uses Carol Haines, a 
radio presenter, to broadcast veterinary advice about cows, but a secret code hidden in 
the broadcast alerts his team of “hoodlums” to enact their wilful destruction of Autry 
and Frog’s property and milk supplies. The use of the radio is significant here; in 
Colorado Sunset and the following singing Westerns discussed, this is the only form of 
technology that is sacrosanct, but perpetrators of ‘bad radio etiquette’ who abuse its 
powers are always exposed. This also occurs to a lesser extent in The Old Corral, 
where the efforts of the O’Keefe boys to get on the radio is a crucial element in their 
absolution. The repercussions on Autry’s singing career and radio sponsorship are 
obvious inducements to such representation.
The portrayal of women in this Western places it outside of the boundary of 
what Douglas Pye states is the widespread “massively skewed” representation of women 
in the genre. Pye quotes a section from Jacqueline Levitkin’s feminist essay:
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[Women] are the symbols, illustrations of the conflict that confronts the hero, 
and thus are the character types that have been pointed out by a number of 
critics. If they come from the East, they are school marm, minister’s wife or 
pioneer woman. Identified with the West, they are the farmer’s daughter, the 
Indian or Mexican woman, and , at times, the prostitute. . .if the woman 
character representing civilization is defined positively, the woman 
representing wilderness, by contrast, is defined negatively, and vice versa.
Generally, women characters are seen to be in conflict with one another 
because they define choices of the hero. The narrative revolves around his 
choice.26
Firstly, Autry’s women do not conform to the usual stereotypes named above: they are 
often conferred with professional status, as radio presenters, running radio stations, and 
having careers as newspaper editors. The rising independence and aggression of women 
is the subject of the song “The West Ain’t what it used to be”, in reference to a female 
editor in Public Cowboy No. 1:
Oh the West ain’t what it used to be, wild and woolly and full of fleas,
Now we live a life of ease, oh the West ain’t what it used to be.
Once the West was rough and tough, before the girls used powder puffs,
Now they’re using rouge and stuff, oh the West ain’t what it used to be.
There’s a New Deal in the West, where the antelope used to play,
I met a deer/ dear this very day, oh the West ain’t what it used to be.
There ain’t much left of the West no more, the cowboys all turned troubadour,
A girl I know is an editor, oh the West ain’t what it used to be.
Now the West will never be the same, since the cowgirl editor came,
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She will make it safe and sand, oh the West ain’t what it used to be. . .
(tails off into yodeling)
The passing of the Old West in all of the other songs discussed is usually a subject that is 
treated with nostalgia and seriousness, idealizing the past and reproachful of progress 
and modernization. However, when the increasing liberation of women is what is being 
observed in the modern New West, an element of redemption breaks through the 
negativism. The facts of women “using rouge and stuff’ and being editors are not 
bemoaned but instead associated with the more neutral and even positive components of 
there being a “New Deal in the West”, and that the Cowboys have “all turned 
troubadour”. This unusually progressive aspect in a genre steeped in conservatism may 
be comprehended in the light of Autry’s female patronage. Peter Stanfield has noted the 
centrality of the female listener and film-goer in relation to Autry’s recording, radio and 
film work, quoting Pamela Grundy’s research findings on surveys of radio audiences:
Women made up a large and vocal segment of the hillbilly audience. Radio 
surveys of the 1930s showed that despite the stories of farmers hurrying from 
their fields to listen to noontime shows, the major daytime audience comprised 
women and children. Women wrote more than two-thirds of the letters 
received by stations, sponsors, and performers in the period. . .Perhaps more 
important, however, was the role of women in arranging personal appearances 
for hillbilly groups. Personal appearances provided the lion’s share of most 
musicians’ income. . .local (women’s) organisations played an essential role in 
the system; in most cases they were the ones who rented a space, provided 
publicity and handled the finances, dividing the profits with the musicians at 
the end of the performance.27
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In Colorado Sunset, the narrative also revolves not around the choices of the male hero, 
but the choices of the female protagonists. Autry is elected sheriff because the women 
actively coerce their husbands into voting for him — they rally support for Autry with 
inducements of maintaining noise control in the house, and threats of permanently 
residing mother-in-laws. David Haines’s election speech culminates in a fight where the 
women, wielding surprisingly effective weapons of umbrellas and handbags physically 
overcome Autry’s opposition.
The next four Westerns place Autry in a role where he mediates the changes 
wrought by industrialization -- it is significant that in fulfilling this role he is not at any 
one time an advocate of such changes (this point is explicitly and repeatedly made in the 
films). Instead he offers aid to those members of rural civilization who are in need of 
protection from the owners of industrial assets who actively seek to exploit their naivete 
financially. The forces of industrialization that form the subjects of these Westerns are 
irrigation, electrical power, mechanization and oil.
Industrial Sabotage in the New West
In Man o f the Frontier (1936), a drought forces the ranchers to invest in an irrigation 
project: the “Red River Land and Irrigation Co.”. However, the project is fraught with 
mishaps where explosions along the constructed dam cause the deaths of five “ditch 
riders”. Autry applies for the job and narrowly escapes two attempts on his life. Due to 
sabotage the dam builders fail to receive their payroll, and Autry is framed for the crime. 
A fist-fight develops into a gunfight at the dam, where the irate builders try to destroy 
the work for which they have not been paid, while the actual culprits (including a bank
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manager) hide-out in the control room. When the latter see Autry returning with the 
payroll and their accomplice, they open the floodgates of the dam in a third attempt on 
his life, but the female protagonist (Mary) intercedes and wins the builders over to 
Autry’s side. The ending declares plans of making Red River Valley one of the richest 
farming lands. The ranchers are saved from bankruptcy, and the dam is completed with 
Autry’s intervention.
The Man from Music Mountain (1938) begins with the completion of Boulder 
Dam, but this does not liberate the rural populace from the tyranny of their urban 
counterparts. A group of real estate swindlers incite a “back to land movement”, with 
promises that electricity from the Boulder dam project will bring a town along the Gold 
River (“dead for twenty years”) back to life. Busloads of people, heading for the town 
begin to pour in, and one of these buses startles the horses of George Harmon, who has 
bought $2,000 worth of land at Gold River and is travelling there via stagecoach. 
Before Autry can stop the horses, George is dragged to his death, leaving Buddy, his 
grandson, in Autry’s care. Autry tries to obtain a refund from Mr. Scandlon, the head 
manager, after discovering that the land development project is a hoax and that the 
proprietors of Boulder Dam have no intentions of bringing electricity to Gold River. His 
request is denied. Meanwhile Frog (“the sucker with the bankroll”) is tricked into 
investing in the project and sets up an electrical shop, surrounded by the waffle parlours, 
beauty salons, barber shops and other signs of consumption that arise.
Autry’s disapproval of Frog’s new occupation is obvious, but Frog is adamant 
that he will not remain “a cowhand all his life”. The former conceives of a strategy to 
trick Scandlon into buying back the land, but in the end gold is discovered in the nearby 
Betsy Lee mines, and Autry prevents the people from signing away their contracts.
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Electricity from the Boulder Dam project is conferred onto the town due to the presence 
of gold, and once again Autry overcomes the instruments of exploitation. Scandlon and 
his men, as with all those on the wrong side of morality in the previous Westerns, are 
dressed in business suits, distinguished from the rest who are clothed in rural, working 
class apparel: checked shirts, denim, and boots. Autry’s costume deserves a mention -- 
he stands apart from the other actors and actresses due to the elaborate detail of his 
attire — the fishbone embroidery and contrasting buttons on his shirts (particularly on his 
collar and sleeves) signal his persona as a country music performer, further establishing 
the link between that persona and his acting career. This link is made explicit in The Old 
Barn Dance (1938).
In this Western Autry is solicited for his singing talents by a woman who runs a 
radio station. He declines at first, explaining that he is a horse trader, and not a radio 
entertainer. She manages to persuade him later, but conceals the fact that he will be 
sponsored by “Mammoth Tractor co.”. Autry fails to sell any of his horses in the town, 
as most of the farmers have invested in tractors, and he expresses his displeasure to 
Sally. The daily newspaper marks a tremendous increase in the sale of tractors, on 
account of the deception that Autry is endorsing the product: “if Gene’s singing for them 
they must be alright”. The tractor company repossesses the machines of the farmers 
who are slightly late with their monthly payments, and the farmers plan their revenge on 
Autry just as he is telling Sally that he would never broadcast for Mammoth Tractors 
because he thinks it would be “wrong”. When the farmers arrive the truth is revealed 
and Sally admits that she has been lying: Autry gives the farmers his herd of horses so 
that they can continue with their harvesting. The film culminates with a fight at the radio 
station which has been taken over by Mammoth Tractor company, with Autry enraged
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at their using of his records to deceive the public into thinking that he is endorsing their 
product. The station, and all of their records are destroyed, and the film ends when 
Autry saves Sally and her brother. The latter are pursued for their possession of a 
record which contains evidence that the Tractor company were involved in provoking a 
stampede on Autry’s horses. The integrity of Autry’s sponsors is a notion that is 
developed further in Mexicali Rose (1939), where Autry sets out to expose an oil 
company who has sponsored his singing on the radio, because he believes they are 
selling “phony stocks”: “a lot of people bought stock in this outfit on my account and 
I’m going to make sure they get a fair deal”. The oil company are bringing oil to the 
derrick, without executing any actual drilling. As with The Man From Music 
Mountain, Autry manages to beguile the oil company into buying back their stocks. 
However when the official tests on the site support the probability of oil, Autry deceives 
the oil company yet again and purchases all the stock on behalf of his radio audience. In 
this Western Autry befriends a Mexican, who sacrifices his life to be remembered as a 
“Robin Hood” character. The absence of hostility towards Indians or Mexicans, 
conventionally labeled as ‘Other’ in the Western genre, is unusual, but effectively directs 
animosity towards the purveyors of modernity.
The New Deal Cowboy
Peter Stanfield notes that the popularity of Autry’s Westerns in the thirties is 
documented in the trade press of the period, beginning with In Old Sante Fe (1934) 
where Autry makes his first appearance in a featured spot. The ‘What the Picture Did 
For Me’ column in Motion Picture Herald read:
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(In Old Sante Fe) is one of the best Westerns I’ve ever run. I highly 
recommend it to any fellow exhibitor that uses Westerns. Good story, plenty 
of thrills, comedy and some good music and singing by Gene Autry and his 
band. This is the kind of Western that pleases my patrons.
Played 21-22 December 1934. Sammie Jackson, Jackson Theatre, Flomaton,
Ala. Small town and rural patronage.28
Further reviews publicized that Autry’s Westerns guaranteed healthy performances at 
the box office, and Autry’s own rationale for his success (quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter) furnishes a starting-point for understanding their popularity. The New West 
setting provided contemporary iconography that satisfied the documentary appeal of 
audiences in the 1930s, a factor in the grid of specification that was discussed in the 
previous chapter. The fears of economic dislocation that confronted the rural populace 
were however dispelled by a hero who embodied the values that were linked to the Old 
West. The celebration of the Old West is also firmly imprinted onto the New West 
landscape through the narrative of song, which through the dream motif constructed a 
space in the popular imagination where symbols of the Old West could still be relevant. 
The methods expounded in Autry’s Westerns for negotiating the economic crisis of the 
thirties were simply a celebration of the values of the Old West, through nostalgia and 
the ideological message that the dangers of modernization necessitated the agency of the 
cowboy, and the tools of his trade.
The ascendancy of this WASP hero with origins in and a masculinity defined by 
the Old West in this discourse of the frontier, was in the second half of the 1930s 
facilitated by the restored credibility in a WASP patriarchy led by Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt’s contribution to this restoration, and thus the role he plays in the success of
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Autry’s persona, is apparent in the latter’s self-administered label of “New Deal 
Cowboy”, with the attendent claim that his solutions were like the president’s ( and 
being simpler and more direct, perhaps even better). Roosevelt’s function in the grid of 
specification further clarifies why under Hoover’s reign WASP patriarch leaders were 
‘non box office elements’, and absent from the discourses of the frontier that emerged in 
the Gangster film. The discourse of frontier mythology in the Autry Westerns registers a 
diachronic change that, as with the Gangster film, shifts the focus away from the central 
quality of territorial expansion as an explanation for progress. However, a significant 
permutation to the discourse is marked by a change in the grid of specification due to 
Roosevelt’s presence, reinstating the WASP protagonist as the hero. A more internal 
reworking of the grid of specification by the industry itself was the targetting of rural 
and female audiences, a strategy that effected a synchronic change to the discourse with 
less traditional representations of women.
The popularity of the Westerns produced by a minor studio anticipated what 
Slotkin has termed the “renaissance” of the genre in 1939, where the precentage of 
feature Westerns doubled, inaugurating a thirty year period in which “the Western movie 
became pre-eminent among American mass-culture genres as a field for the making of 
public myths and for the symbolization of public ideology.”29 Slotkin attributes the 
pressure for the revival of the Western to the popularity of historical costume dramas 
(with European subjects) and the renewed seriousness that critics and scholars treated 
American history and the frontier in the late 1930s, as well as Roosevelt’s patriotic 
propaganda, and not to “a clear market signal”. However, it is arguable that the box 
office successes of the low budget Westerns, and the explicit celebration of the Old West 
contained therein, sustained discourses of the frontier in popular culture -- preserving
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the frontier in the popular imagination 
output of the major studios.
until the myth once more became the dominant
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PART THREE
The Western After Vietnam
7 Civil Rights, Feminism and Vietnam
American Credibility and the Challenge of the 
Sixties
If we lose in Vietnam, before you know it the Communists would be up on 
the beaches of Hawaii.1
Senator Strom Thurmond, 1968
The 1930s were not singular in their discrediting of the traditional American values that 
were attached to frontier mythology. A more complex and devastating threat crested in 
the sixties with an infringement of the United Nations charter which explicitly forbade 
interference in the internal affairs of member states.2 The events leading to American 
participation in Vietnam are far from obscure. Historians who have accounted for 
America’s involvement in the war include Hugh Brogan, William H. Chafe and Tom 
Englehardt, who agree that it was due to the danger that Communism posed to US liberty. 
However, though this perception of Communism as a united threat against American 
liberty later proved misconceived, it was retained and perpetuated through self-deception, 
lies, and the attendant manipulation of Congress and the American public. The failure to 
understand the actual nature of the communist movement and the persistence in that
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misconception suggest that Communism only partially explained the underlying 
motivations for American involvement in Vietnam. Another possible explanation lay in the 
fragmentation of American credibility, and the attempt to restore that credibility via an 
invocation of the myth by which it was initially established. This chapter will address the 
factors in the grid of specification that determined the configuration of frontier discourse 
in the early 1970s, with particular emphasis on the Civil Rights and Women’s Liberation 
movements, and the Vietnam War.
The progression from a territorial frontier to one of an industrial nature in the late 
19th century (first discussed in chapter two) was posited in this thesis as an explanation 
for how the economic crisis of the 1930s contributed to a subversion of frontier 
mythology. The lack of popularity of ‘A* Westerns, as vehicles in which the frontier myth 
found direct expression, was in that decade also attributed to this undermining of the 
economic frontier. The frontier discourse observed in these earlier chapters was seen to 
herald a variation of the myth at its deep structure, where the narrative of expansion is 
suppressed. The “Old West” setting in which that period of expansion dominated was 
instead replaced by more contemporary landscapes: the urban backdrop of the Gangster 
film, and the “New West” of the ‘B’ Western.
From the 1940s to the early 1960s the Western entered a period of unsurpassed 
popularity that was initiated by the success of Stagecoach in 1939. An essential feature of 
this “Golden Age” of the Western was its vision of the “Old” West as a heroic period in 
the past distinct from the rest of American society and history.3 No longer relegated to 
the ‘B’ Western’s periphery of dream or subjected to complete absence as in the Gangster
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film, the “Old” West of the frontier myth resumed unmediated expression that was an 
affirmation of its historical accuracy. The list of Westerns that Phil Hardy selects as those 
in which the idea of the frontier is “seen in its purest” is revealing. Hardy mentions The 
Covered Wagon (1923) and The Iron Horse (1924), then skips about a decade to Dodge 
City (1939), My Darling Clementine (1946), Bend o f the River (1952) and The Searchers 
(1956).4 The retrospective grouping of these pre-Depression Westerns with those 
occurring from 1939 is significant. It suggests that the frontier myth has in the interim 
undergone a process of repair.
That Westerns released from the 1940s to the late 1960s deserve critical attention 
is not an issue. Most studies of the Western to date focus on this era. Philip French, for 
example, bases his “model Western” on those made since WWII up to 1973, while Jim 
Kitses selects directors whose Westerns are associated with that period: Anthony Mann, 
Budd Boetticher, and Sam Peckinpah. In the BFI Companion to the Western, the 
Westerns that Ed Buscombe singles out as those which “merit our continued attention for 
both artistic and historical reasons” with “at least. . .some consistency in the prejudices 
revealed” mostly occur from the 1950s to the 1970s.5 The Movie Book o f The Western, a 
recently-published volume, concentrates on the period between 1939 and the present day, 
with most chapters discussing films made before and including Pat Garrett & Billy the Kid 
(1973). The last four (out of twenty-eight) contributions in the book analyse Westerns 
made in the 1990s, beginning with Dances with Wolves (1990), with the exception of one 
chapter on Heaven's Gate (1980). The aim of the following chapters of this thesis is to
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ascertain the patterns of frontier discourse that emerge in that latter “gunfighter gap”, 
approximately between the 1970s to the 1990s.
In the seventies the discourse of the frontier reverts back to a more territorial 
emphasis, with an international correlation of the necessity for boundaries that underlay 
the Indian Wars. The white-Indian conflict arose not only out of the need to displace and 
reduce the Other; in its boundaryless state the New World was overwhelming to the 
Europeans, and:
That boundless wilderness might threaten to crush the settler, or alternately as 
a landscape of strange and sensual pleasures to seduce the settler. In either 
case, where no external boundaries existed, internal boundaries threatened to 
collapse, releasing into the world of the civilized, into God’s world, either an 
unrestrained savagery or an unfettered sensuality.6
Tom Englehardt’s analysis of the imposition of external boundaries in an attempt to 
circumvent the collapse of internal demarcations is pertinent in relation to the movements 
of the sixties that endangered the traditional barriers existing between whites and blacks, 
and males and females. In 1682, Mary Rowlandson’s account of her captivity was 
published. Her account was an example of the captivity narratives drawing from Puritan 
sermons of armed retribution that later degenerated into what Englehardt calls “simple 
blood-and-thunder shockers.”7 Though superficially innocent, the ideological import of 
these narratives was considerable. They served to establish the much-needed boundaries 
of the American myth, and soon developed a clear distinction at the frontier — between the
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settled areas and wilderness; between the white women and the Indian invaders that 
sought to disrupt their civilized world.
The establishing of external boundaries within America was possible whilst the 
wilderness still existed, and more importantly, while there was still an Indian “Other” to 
displace. However, the initial efforts to marginalize America’s native inhabitants were 
adequately successful, so that by the late nineteenth century the savage “invaders” were 
subjugated and forcibly relocated to land that was deemed worthless, consequently posing 
no threat to the whites. Each white conquest moved the frontier across the continent, 
until the division between the savage and settled areas no longer existed, and when in the 
1970s there was once again the need for external boundaries, the myth necessitated a 
search outside of the America continent. Vietnam provided the opportunity for that 
external boundary to be re-established, and for the light of American civilization and 
victory once again to illumine and revivify the frontier myth.
The Civil Rights and Women’s Liberation movements threatened to upset the 
traditional hierarchy of power that granted superiority to the white male. Their cumulative 
effect led to an impending collapse of internal boundaries, relentlessly attacking the status 
quo and the very foundations of what middle-class Americans defined as constituting the 
American way.8 The American way was made up of more than middle-class beliefs in 
patriotism, religion, monogamy and hard work. These were superstructural components 
of the frontier mythology that had originally shaped what became the national American 
character. Thus in attacking the “very foundations” of the American way, it was the 
ideological base of the frontier myth that Civil Rights and Women’s Liberation were
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eroding. In a sense, these movements were authorities of delimitation that posed an 
obstacle to direct expressions of America’s frontier myth. They served to unravel the 
constructed narrative of white male victory, revealing that the savage Other violently 
killed in the name of regeneration was actually a victim of white male atrocities, and that 
the white male hero saved the woman from her captivity only to return her to another 
form of captivity where he, and not the Indian, was her oppressor.
The Other as Victim
Slotkin’s paradigm of “regeneration through violence” runs parallel to, and is consolidated 
by Englehardt’s thesis that in the construction of this American narrative, the European 
settlers were first driven to overturn the ratio of their numbers and those of the New 
World’s savage inhabitants. The inhabitants of the New World were always the victims — 
they were the victims of an invasion that first brought virulent new diseases which 
annihilated above 90 percent of their people in southern New England, and later of the 
succession of wars that robbed them of their land and their lives.9 Francis Jennings 
observes the fundamental disparity between intercultural contact between the European 
colonists and the Indians. While the former benefited from Indian guidance in 
transportation and survival techniques, the latter became addicted to European products, 
losing their neolithic skills through disuse.10 However, a narrative of Indian victimization 
by European invaders was not, for obvious reasons, deemed a suitable legacy for the 
newcomers who now inhabited the land. The European settlers were guilty of
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victimization and theft, and the task they set themselves was -- in the face of contrary 
evidence — to convert that guilt into innocence.
In The Legacy o f Conquest, Patricia Nelson Limerick analyses white Western 
expansion across the American continent anthropologically, seeing it as an example of the 
extraordinary power of cultural persistence. An aspect of that cultural persistence was the 
idea of innocence:
Even when they were trespassers, westering Americans were hardly, in their 
eyes, criminals; rather, they were pioneers. The ends abundantly justified the 
means; personal interest in the acquisition of property coincided with national 
interest in the acquisition of territory. . . .Innocence of intention placed the 
course of events in a bright and positive light. . . .n
The idea of innocence easily materialized through narratives of captivity, where the white 
woman captured by Indians symbolized the ideal innocent victim. The captivity narratives 
not only established the external boundaries that served to keep internal ones intact, they 
also allowed a reversal of roles whereby the Indian victims could be viewed as savage 
invaders, and where the white conquerors could be aligned unequivocally with the 
innocent victims of invasion. A commensurate justification for Indian violence against 
white invasion was simultaneously withheld. This was perpetuated through the constant 
of Indian inferiority.
In an earlier revisionist account of the settling of America, Jennings explains the 
mythic inception of Indian savagery. According to Jennings the invention of savagery 
was devised to fit the varied purposes of the colonists. The notion of Indian inferiority
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was a constant that implied a rejection of his humanity, denying any form of justification 
for Indian resistence to European invasion. Jennings sees the logic of savagery operating 
in the landmark decision made by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1823: “That law which 
regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations between the conqueror and 
conquered was incapable of application to a people under such circumstances”.12 Thus,
To invade and dispossess the people of an unoffending civilized country would 
violate morality and transgress the principles of international law, but savages 
were exceptional. Being uncivilized by definition, they were outside the 
sanctions of both morality and law.13
The civilized war (fought by the whites against the Indians) is differentiated from the 
savage war (fought by the Indians against the whites). The former is a rational, 
honourable and progressive activity, while the latter is attributed with qualities of 
irrationality, ferocity and unredeemed retrogression.14
Coupled with the narratives of captivity, the white acts of violence and theft were 
transformed into justified, honourable exploits of rescue and vengeance -- and their guilt 
correspondingly translated into innocence. Such narratives were operative in WWII, when 
anti-Japanese propaganda denigrated the race to the level of beasts:
In Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and deadly as they were, were still 
people. But out here [the Pacific] I soon gathered that the Japanese were 
looked upon as something subhuman or repulsive; the way some people feel 
about cockroaches or mice.15
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The analogy of the savage war was more directly invoked by government officials and in 
popular culture. Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison, who became a rear admiral for 
his service to naval history explained: “We were fighting no civilized, knightly war. . .We 
were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred 
and no quarter”. Allan Nevins, another eminent historian, claimed that “emotions 
forgotten since our most savage Indian wars were reawakened by the ferocities of 
Japanese commanders”. Hollywood perpetuated the analogy: in 1942, a stream of 
pictures was released that capitalized on the theme of Japanese brutality and treachery. 
The combined image of the enemy in A Prisoner o f Japan, Menace o f the Rising Sun, 
Remember Pearl Harbour and Danger in the Pacific was that of “fiendish, diabolical” 
“murderers”, playing a “filthy game of treachery”, killing “for no apparent reason but to 
satisfy their blood-lust”.16
It would take the emancipation of an American minority in the 1950s and its 
attendant disclosure of racial horror to cast a shadow of doubt on the legitimacy and 
origin of this idealistic American self-image. It is arguable that the cultural change would 
facilitate the writing of revisionist accounts of American history by such writers as 
Jennings, Slotkin, Richard White, and Patricia Nelson Limerick. This project is clear in 
the sub-title of Richard White’s volume, “A New History of the American West”. 
Jennings is particularly emphatic in separating himself from earlier versions of history:
European explorers and invaders discovered an inhabited land. Had it 
been pristine wilderness then, it would possibly be so still today, for neither 
the technology nor the social organization of Europe in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries had the capacity to maintain, of its own resources,
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outpost colonies thousands of miles from home. Incapable of conquering a 
true wilderness, the Europeans were highly competent in the skill of 
conquering other people, and that is what they did. They did not settle a virgin 
land. They invaded and displaced a resident population.
This is so simple a fact that it seems self-evident.17
He condemns the work of previous historians who acknowledge the fact of America being 
inhabited, but then paradoxically repeat identical phrases in purporting that the land- 
starved people of Europe had found magnificent opportunity to pioneer in and bring 
civilization to a savage wilderness. These sentiments were a reverberation of the 
indignation apparent in the rhetoric of Civil Rights leaders. Evidence of white savagery 
destabilized the construction of innocence, with this revelation gaining strength during the 
1960s and 1970s.
Civil Rights
The main agenda of the Civil Rights activists was for liberation from racial segregation and 
social, economic and political integration of minorities with the larger, dominantly White 
society. The concurrent desire for integration destabilized traditional boundaries of racial 
containment that were an essential thread in the fabric of American society, for this desire:
was not the desire to “pass” for white, but to “pass over” openly into a land 
officially declared available to all by piercing invisible yet fiercely policed 
boundaries not just around lunch counters, bus seats, and toilets, or even 
schools, housing and workplaces, but inside heads.18
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This mental barrier between white and non-white was strikingly similar to the one that the 
first settlers encountered in the New World. The barrier was one that separated 
“unrestrained savagery” and “unfettered sensuality” from the opposing values of 
civilization. To prevent an outward manifestation of these repressed but inherent desires, 
the volatile internal barrier had to be projected externally against a scapegoat who would 
symbolize these qualities, and with whom the Europeans could physically battle and 
obliterate. In that act of violence, they would obtain victory over not only the Indian 
savage, but the impulses of savagery that lay within themselves, and maintain the internal 
barrier between the values of civilization and savagery.
The cry for integration thus recalled parallel fears of the consequences that would 
ensue when the whites were forced to confront an assimilation of opposing values that 
they had projected externally out of themselves. Integration entailed more than granting 
liberation to the minorities in the economic, social and political spheres; it also 
necessitated a merger of Self and Other: the initiation of a union that would re-place the 
savage back into a position that would potentially mar the WASP American’s idealistic 
self-image.
And it did. Civil rights leaders:
transformed the war story back into a tale of atrocities and turned whites — 
from Birmingham Police Chief Bull Connor to Alabama Governor George 
Wallace, from abusive students at the University of Mississippi to Klan 
bombers -- into savages. . . .From beatings to hosings, from firebombing of 
busses to the bombing of churches, from the mutilated bodies of murdered
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civil rights workers to those of abused schoolchildren, images of horror and 
horrific disproportion were displayed.19
The Civil Rights movement fused the horrors of racial atrocities to the ideal of American 
innocence and democracy, and in doing so, appropriated the discourse of the frontier to 
their benefit. In 1662, Michael Wigglesworth wrote of the unsettled forest as a “Devils 
den”:
A waste and howling wilderness,
Where none inhabited 
But Hellish fiends, and brutish men 
That devils worshipped.20
However, in 1965 when The Autobiography o f Malcolm X  was published, the white 
colonists traded places with the non-white Other in exhibiting “Hellish” and “Brutish” 
characteristics:
‘Unless we call one white man, by name, a “devil”, we are not speaking of any 
individual white man. We are speaking of the collective white man’s 
historical record. We are speaking of the collective white man’s cruelties, and 
evils, and greeds, that have seen him act like a devil toward the non-white 
man. . . .You cannot find one black man, I do not care who he is, who has not 
been personally damaged in some way by devilish acts of the collective white 
man!’21
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The boundary separating the savage from the civilized became blurred with this reversal of 
roles when the historical acts of violence were seen for what they were, not morally 
justifiable events but examples of white “cruelties, and evils, and greeds”. The white idea 
of the interchangability of the Other was now reversed -- African-American claims 
required a reassertion of some other Other and located the historical embodiment of this 
Otherness in the white man. This projection of savagism onto the white man by the 
African-Americans shifted the balance of savageiy and civilization back onto the internal 
barrier that had confronted the first European settlers.
The 1960s were also an opportune moment for the original victims of that cruelty. 
The sovereignty of American Indians was reasserted in a series of decisions issued by the 
US Supreme Court, resulting in the recognition of the higher legal status that tribes held in 
relation to the states and the consequent limitation of state power on Indian reservations.22 
This re-establishment of Indian sovereignty occurred contemporaneously with the Civil 
Rights movement, the latter providing a corps of lawyers who would enable the Indians to 
turn the legal system that had once dispossessed them to their favor.23 The Indians were 
demanding their rights as American citizens not just on the reservations, where the land 
was considered worthless by the whites, but also on lands not covered by special treaty 
guarantees. Their demand for equality also meant “passing over” the invisible “policed 
boundaries”, with similar consequences of questioning an ideology that was historically 
grounded on the barrier between the Indian and the white man. The source of this 
external barrier — the constructed narrative of white female captivity -- that had 
sanctioned its related violent acts, rendering them innocent, now joined ranks with the
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blacks and Indians as victims of white male oppression. The notion of female captivity 
began to play a central role in further undermining the ideology of the frontier myth.
The Women’s Liberation Movement
The emergence of the Civil Rights movement provided the catalyst for women to 
formulate a feminist consciousness that opposed the denial of equality. The movement 
which had stressed the immorality of treating a person as less equal than another on the 
basis of a physical characteristic, embodied a message that linked the modes of oppression 
suffered by women and minority races. A source that offered statistical evidence of this 
inequality and gender oppression was the 1963 President’s Commission on the Status of 
Women, where John F. Kennedy appointed a group of officials to investigate the 
“prejudices and outmoded customs” blocking the realization of women’s basic rights.24 
The political purpose of that report was, ironically, to win more female votes. However, 
though recommending equal pay laws and government funding of day-care centres, the 
report opposed the Equal Rights amendment, endorsing tradition in the roles of women as 
homemakers, and men as breadwinners. Moreover, statistics were produced that 
documented gender injustice: the earnings and job status of women were lower than 
men’s, and they were inferior in both their educational level and legal status. Further 
concrete evidence on which the accusation of inequality could be based was drawn up by 
the thirty-two state commissions that followed the federal report: women were seen to be
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trapped in separate and unequal roles, the victims of propaganda by advertisers, 
psychologists and educators who perpetuated male superiority.
The Women’s Liberation movement of the 1960s was not historically the genesis 
of this drive to redefine female roles in society. By the 1920s Americans were already 
shedding the barriers that prevented women from entering the public world: large numbers 
of women joined the workforce, participated as consumers, and later, as voters.25 
However, the sex segregation that had obstructed women’s entry into the public domain 
relocated itself within the workforce. In the late 1960s there was still little opportunity for 
individual advancement or promotion, and assumptions about male and female spheres of 
responsibility were deeply ingrained.26 The women were still “trapped”, held captive in 
positions of inferiority by white male dominance, and in the 1960s, with the aid of the Civil 
Rights movement and the evidence that developed out of the Federal Report, response to 
this form of captivity rose from the level of personal indignation into a feminist ideology 
that translated into a mass movement. This mass movement towards the emancipation of 
women initiated dramatic changes in the areas of politics, education, employment, and a 
revolutionary definition of female physiology.27 More than 12 percent of lawyers and 
judges were women in 1980, for example, whereas fewer than 5 percent were in 1970. 
The increase in professional degrees among women led to a greater degree of integration 
among male-dominated professions.28
This call for integration was instituted by the National Organization for Women 
(NOW). Beginning in 1965, the organization addressed the right of women to obtain 
equal access to education, professions and political office, integrating females into the
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masculine realm, sharing equal financial and social powers with males. The demand for 
integration that had threatened white male superiority with the Civil Rights movement for 
blacks, now with the successes of the late 1960s managed to de-stabilize the structure of 
patriarchy and the notion of manliness. The conclusions of Peter G. Filene regarding male 
hostility to female equality at the turn of the twentieth century are pertinent in explaining 
the male fears that arose from the destabilization of sexual barriers:
. . .the answer derives from their fear that female passion would deplete their 
own bodily strength. . .The wife should be -- must be — the better half. If she 
abdicated her part and became an equal sexual partner, then she would drag a 
man into a sperm-depleting, manhood-killing orgy. In passion lurked the seeds 
of destruction. . .Derangement of the patriarchal order at home would be 
followed by derangement of patriarchy outside. . . “Equal suffrage is a 
repudiation of manhood”.29
When women abdicated their duty to be the “better half’ and desired instead to be only 
equally good, the boundary between male and female spheres became less distinct. 
Women had traditionally been associated with (and confined to) the “virtuous” and 
“affectionate” home, and their movement into “amoral” and “competitive” society 
threatened to unmask the ambivalences inside manliness.30 This association had depended 
upon an investment in the distinction between spheres.
The confusion that arose due to this desire for equality is clear in accounts of 
contemporary journalism. Time magazine’s 1972 special issue on the American woman 
contained the astute observation that:
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In a sense, if the feminine revolution simply wanted to exchange one 
ruling class for another, if it aimed at outright female domination (a situation 
that has occurred in science fiction and other fantasies), the goal would be 
easier to visualize. The demand for equality, not domination, is immensely 
complicated.31
Included in the issue was an attempt to dissipate the confusion: the article “Male/ Female: 
Differences between them” marked the distinction between the sexes via “Internal 
organs”, “Sex typing”, “Female passivity”, and “Sex and Success”. Nowhere was the 
distinction between male and female more crucial than in a mythology where women 
represented civilization, and where male action (and the masculine identity) was defined by 
the symbiotic relationship between that sphere and what lay outside.
To arrive at the act of violence that the Frontier hero executes, he must first 
acculturate to Indian ways — a symptom observed in Turner’s Thesis. In Slotkin’s 
account this acculturation is intrinsically associated with the archetype of the hunter, 
where there is a mysterious sense of identification between the hunter and the hunted. On 
an extended hunt for the beast, the hunter is forced to follow in the animal’s footsteps, 
eating, moving and sleeping in tandem with his prey.32 The beast, however, is more than a 
mere animal, and its symbolism gains weight in relation to the challenge of Civil Rights 
and Women’s Liberation. The hunted animal represents what exists outside of the white 
hunter’s sphere in terms of race, and sex. The racial aspect of the beast lies in its equation 
to the Indian, thus the acculturation of the hunter to the beast mirrors his acculturation to 
Indian ways; the sub-humans who possess an innate knowledge of the wilderness. The 
sexual aspect of the beast is in its equation to the hunter’s anima -- “the hidden part of his
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male consciousness where feeling subordinates intellect: passive, feminine, essential”. To 
attain regeneration, a union with the beast is required, effecting a transformation with the 
racial Other and a symbolic marriage with the hunter’s feminine self. However, this 
process fractures the idealistic image of the American hunter-hero, threatening his 
manliness and racial purity. Thus, the beast must be killed; in doing so, any claims to the 
hunter’s racial and sexual purity are exorcised. The Jungian anima converts into a 
representation of the hunter’s Fruedian id, and is recognized solely to be repressed and 
destroyed.33 Integration ~  racial or sexual -- would reverse the exorcism, leading to a 
collapse of the boundaries defining heroism and masculinity, questioning the integrity of a 
myth that depended on the stability of these distinctions.
The effect of these domestic problems was to contradict an ideology that had 
developed to justify the establishment of external boundaries (that had arisen from the 
need to prevent internal boundaries from disintegrating). The white male hero could no 
longer be white, if Civil Rights leaders claimed integration and equality for non-whites; or 
male, when women claimed entry into the masculine realm; or a hero, when definitions of 
heroism relied on the exclusion of racial and sexual Otherness, and when the object of that 
heroism — the female captive — uncovered a system of oppression, and not deliverance. 
Without recourse to a physical wilderness or a racial scapegoat to project within America, 
the frontier was once again extended outside. This outward projection furnished the 
external barriers that would suppress the ambivalences of the masculine identity, keep 
internal boundaries intact and perpetuate the nation’s founding mythology of America. 
This imposition of an international utility aimed to restore the damaged image of heroism
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and American credibility, with the opportunity for effecting restoration presenting itself in 
Vietnam. Vietnam functioned as the symbolic landscape whereby Americans could 
regenerate their past virtues, with the soldiers entering an alien landscape akin to the first 
pioneers. Like the Europeans who represented the city in its exploitative and self- 
indulgent pursuits, the subversion of Civil Rights and Feminism exposed an America that 
had fallen into the same trap of mediocrity and dissoluteness from which their frontier- 
fathers had fled. Vietnam provided the arena in which Americans could participate in a 
“ritualistic return to the hardiness, self-sacrifice, and purposefulness of the true American 
character”, and shifted the focus away from the domestic challenges facing America in the 
1960s.34
The Vietnamese Wilderness
The drive to revivify frontier mythology is explicit in Kennedy’s political rhetoric and his 
perception of the United States as standing on the edge of a new wilderness. Speaking in 
Los Angeles in July 1960, he declared:
I stand tonight facing west on what was the last frontier. From the lands that 
stretch 3000 miles behind me, the pioneers of the old gave up their safety, 
their comfort and sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the West.
. . .[But] the problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won, and 
we stand today on the edge o f a new frontier, the frontier o f the 1960’s, a
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frontier o f unknown opportunities and paths, a frontier o f unfulfilled hopes 
and threats}5
My Emphasis
Kennedy’s New Frontier thesis re-established the external boundary that had characterized 
the Indian Wars: pitting the forces of civilization against those of savagery. The difference 
this time was that the savages expressed their Otherness not in terms of race, but in their 
political beliefs. In September 1960, Kennedy insisted that the United States was facing a 
time of maximum peril in its relations with communist powers, for “freedom and 
communism (were) locked in deadly embrace”, with the issue at stake being “the 
preservation of civilization”.36 It is significant that in this Inaugural Address, not a word 
was devoted to domestic issues such as race or poverty: the crisis at home was dealt with 
relative equanimity. The strong policy of anti-communism that was Kennedy’s choice of 
emphasis minimized the domestic problems that would undermine the efforts to restore 
American idealism. When Kennedy repeatedly insisted that he would “welcome this 
challenge”, defining himself as the “commander of the Grand Alliance” in relation to the 
communist peril, he deflected attention away from the internal challenges faced by 1960s 
America. The New Republic's observation was that Kennedy’s Inaugural Address had the 
“ring of command that emboldens men to renew their faith”.37
This faith had its source in a mythology that invoked masculine heroism, the 
excitement of confrontation, and the exhilaration of victory. The frontier myth reached its 
height of popularity from the years 1948 to about 1972, when its discourse was 
manifested in the appearance of countless movie and TV Westerns. By 1956 the number
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of Western feature productions rose to 46, with the sharp decline that occurred in the 
years following until 1962 reflecting an industry-wide contraction in response to 
competition from television, where the discourse of the frontier was channeled. The level 
of audience interest sustained by the television Western was impressive, commanding a 
share of prime time unrivalled by other types of action/adventure (detective/police, 
combat, etc.) shows in the period through the sixties.38 Cawelti writes of how these TV 
Westerns launched in the 1950s were based on the classic, traditional Western formula.39 
The first TV Westerns were disparaged as the worst of television programming, due to the 
perceived mediocrity of former ‘B’ Western producers who filled the airwaves with The 
Lone Ranger (1949-1957), The Cisco Kid, Wild Bill Hickok, and The Adventures o f Rin 
Tin Tin. The new medium was however legitimized when Gunsmoke, among the longest 
of the TV Western series, was given John Wayne’s endorsement. In a sequence that 
appeared before Gunsmoke's opening credits, Wayne spoke directly into the camera and 
informed viewers that this was the first TV Western which he deemed worthy of his 
appearance. Standing behind a hitching post, he said: “I think it’s the best thing of its kind 
to come along. . .It’s honest; it’s adult; it’s realistic.”40 The 3 million American youths 
who went to Vietnam as soldiers had the average age of nineteen ~  and if they were 
nineteen at about 1962, when Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 
124 equating the importance of subversive insurgency to conventional warfare, then they 
would be among the audience cohort that grew up with and directly experienced the 
Western’s “Golden Age”, as well as the charismatic star persona of John Wayne. This 
generation of youths derived from their culture of early childhood entertainment and play a
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pure, optimistic version of frontier mythology -- the idea of fighting in Vietnam would 
later bring a sense of being “released from everyday life into a John Wayne version of 
American promise”.41 Vietnam memoirs indicate the influence of popular culture in 
nurturing a correlation of the War to an extension of the American frontier -- Ron Kovic 
relates in his personal testament, Born on the Fourth o f July, how as a child he and his 
friends saw Sands o f Iwo Jima:
. . .we sat glued to our seats, humming the hymn together and watching 
Sergeant Stryker, played by John Wayne, charge up a hill and get killed just 
before he reached the top. And then they showed the men raising the flag on 
Iwo Jima with the marines’ hymn still playing, and Castiglia and I cried in our 
seats. I loved the song so much, and every time I heard it I would think of 
John Wayne and the brave men who raised our flag on Iwo Jima that day. I 
would think of them and cry. . .John Wayne in The Sands o f Iwo Jima 
became one of my heroes.42
Though Sands o f Iwo Jima was ostensibly a WWII movie and not a Western, many films 
of that former genre expressed discourses of the frontier. Movies starring John Wayne, 
often regardless of genre, could not escape his equation with the quintessential American 
frontier hero.43 Moreover, other WWII films were produced in much the same vein. In 
addition to the anti-Japanese propaganda movies mentioned previously, Robert Ray sees 
the war as providing the American film industry with an occasion for reaffirming 
traditional forms. Ray argues for a continuity between Hollywood’s Classic movies and 
the wartime films, asserting that the narrative of Casablanca (1942) is “clearly derived 
from the western” with Rick Blaine (Humphrey Bogart) firmly connected to Warshow’s
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definition of the Western hero 44 He also categorizes the combat films of WWII as 
adherents of the same model. In a more complex fashion, Thomas Doherty sees movies of 
the same period containing the “solo hero”, a requisite “deeply ingrained in the American 
tradition” and expressed in the “lonesome cowboy, the private detective, the single- 
minded inventor” and “even the will to power of the urban gangster”. Doherty’s initial 
referents are Thunderbirds (1942) and Desparate Journey (1942). Though he does later 
observe a generic progression to an “airborne brotherhood”, Doherty notes that “the noble 
act of self-annihilation” is still retained as “the only really permissable form of self- 
assertion”.45
However, unlike the experience of WWII, the danger of universalizing the 
American experience of the Indian Wars became apparent as the war in Vietnam unfolded. 
The Vietnamese wilderness was not the wilderness West of American civilization, though 
Lyndon B. Johnson, successor to Kennedy, seemed to think it was. In Oct 25, 1966, 
American troops at Cam Ranh Bay, S. Vietnam, were urged by Johnson to “bring the 
coonskin home” from Vietnam and “nail it to the barn”.46 Johnson’s allusions linked 
Vietnam to a frontier past, likening the Vietnam War to an Indian War — giving journalist 
Hugh Sidey the reason for his involvement, Johnson said that “he had gone into Vietnam 
because, as at the Alamo, somebody had to get behind the log with those threatened 
people.”47 The Vietnam veterans who returned from the war similarly equated their 
experiences with the Indian wars. Michael Herr describes the “wild haunted going-West 
look” of the soldiers, who are told by their captains: “we’ll take you out to play Cowboys 
and Indians”.48 Richard Drinnon cites a passage from Joseph Strick’s Interview with My
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Lai Veterans, where Vernado Simpson, Jr., a black antipoverty worker in Jackson, 
Mississippi; James Bergthold, a white part-time truck driver in Niagara Falls, New York; 
and Gary Garfolo, the unemployed white son of a barber in Stockton, California, 
reminisced about their former messmates:
Simpson: They would mutilate the bodies and everything. They would 
hang’em. . .or scalp’em. They enjoyed it, they really enjoyed it. Cut their 
throats.
Bergthold: They cut ears offa guy, and stuff like this here, without knowing if 
they were VC or not. If they got an ear they got a VC.
Garfolo: Like scalps, you know, like from Indians. Some people were on an 
Indian trip over there.49
Another veteran recalled that the My Lai massacre was an “Indian idea. . .the only good 
gook is a dead gook”, and troops of the US Marine Corps referred to the Vietnamese as 
“fucking savages”.
The act of equating the frontier with Vietnam and the hope of renewed patriotism 
that lay therein inexorably deepened military engagement to such levels that a need to 
deceive the American public arose. The day before authorizing American ground troops 
to engage in offensive action, Johnson told a press conference: “I know of no far-reaching 
strategy that is being suggested or promulgated”. The public’s perception of the war was 
further controlled in a nationally televised speech at Johns Hopkins University in early 
April 1965 where Johnson pledged that America was prepared for an “unconditional 
discussion” with the enemy in order to end the fighting. An optimistic assessment of the
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chances for peace and victory was offered in place of actuality, for in the privacy of 
government councils assessments of the situation in Vietnam were consistently negative: 
the Saigon regime entered a new period of instability, and the bombing had no appreciable 
effect on the North while infiltration into the South increased. However, too much was at 
stake for withdrawal, and Johnson’s advisors insisted that the only course available was to 
pour more money, troops, and energy into the war. Administration officials led the public 
to believe that no basic decisions had been made, when in actual fact nearly 90,000 
American troops were stationed in Vietnam, American aircraft flew more than 3,600 
sorties per month, and American combat forces had begun to assume a major part of the 
responsibility for the ground war.50
Like Kennedy, Johnson’s military decisions steered towards accommodating the 
domestic situation in America, and this motive obscured the illogical commitment of 
further escalation. In an act that mirrored Hoover’s denials in the Depression years, 
Johnson denied any change in US policy three months later in July 28, intentionally 
misleading the American public so as to avoid undue excitement in domestic opinion. 
This occurred during the same week that his Medicare and civil rights bills were at a 
critical stage of deliberation, and the revelation of his true military decisions would have 
incited a national debate on war.51 Such an uproar had the potential of shattering the 
consensus and endangering the enactment of Johnson’s legislation where domestic issues 
were concerned. The public continued to be misled as long as the impression that 
America would defeat the Vietcong in South Vietnam could be sustained. It was clear 
what this victory meant — in maintaining public acquiescence Johnson hoped to restore to
America a level of civilization and humanity that would be characteristic of his “Great 
Society”. A year before in May 1964 Johnson voiced his vision of creating an America 
worthy of leadership, extending beyond material growth in possessing the “wisdom to use 
that wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our 
American civilization”, proving that “our material progress is only the foundation on 
which we will build a richer life in mind and spirit.”52 The advancement of the American 
civilization was not without its price: in the past, the Indian paid for the renewal of 
American values, in the 1960’s this role was imposed on the Vietnamese. However, this 
time, history was not about to repeat itself. Denied of victory at the external frontier, the 
focus was to shift back to the domestic sphere, resulting in an unprecedented crisis in 
national ideology and mythology. The savage was now resolutely in its original birthplace: 
wrestling for primacy within the white soul.
The Victimization of Vietnam
A component of American involvement in Vietnam was the capacity to re-position the 
Other as enemy. The traditional embodiments of Otherness -- Indians, blacks and women 
— could no longer be co-opted to fill this position convincingly, as Civil Rights and 
Women’s Liberation enhanced instead the rationale and need for integration in the interest 
of a genuine democracy. In that process, the Other surfaced as the victim of WASP male 
domination. Vietnam appeared to furnish the hostile Other that could fill the gap in the 
cycle of American renewal. However, the nature of Vietnamese warfare and the terrain of
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the battle forestalled the realization of such expectations. America’s political hopes of 
restoring credibility would be denied on two counts: not only would the Vietnamese 
emerge as victims but the victory in battle that had assisted in sanctioning acts of violence 
against the Other also failed to materialize.
The war atrocity that converted the Vietnamese Other from enemy to innocent 
victim was the My Lai massacre. Ironically, like much of Massachusetts in Mary 
Rowlandson’s captivity narrative, the Battambang Peninsula on which My Lai 4 was 
located was thought of by American soldiers as “Indian country”, and the first stories of 
My Lai to feature in the United States attempted to perpetuate that mythical construct. 
The New York Times called the operation a significant success; its front page read: 
“American troops caught a North Vietnamese force in pincer movement on the central 
coastal plain yesterday, killing 128 enemy soldiers in day-long fighting”, and the United 
Press International labeled it an “impressive victory”.53 My Lai remained a victory until 
November 13 1969, more than a year after the incident had taken place.54 The story of 
Lieutenant William Calley Jr., a Vietnam combat veteran who “deliberately murdered 109 
Vietnamese civilians during a search-and-destroy mission in March, 1968” hit the 
mainstream press, and within weeks shocking photos of the massacre would cause a 
trauma at the national level. Life published ten pages of “exclusive pictures, eyewitness 
accounts [of] the massacre at Mylai”, under the heading “a story of indisputable horror-- 
the deliberate slaughter of old men, women, children and babies”.55 The “128 enemy 
soldiers” had suddenly been transformed into innocent civilians, and helpless victims. 
Equating the American soldiers as the perpetrators of these atrocities occurred soon after
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on national television, with platoon member Paul Medio’s confessional account on CBS 
Evening News.
It was increasingly apparent that the American presence did not bring light to this 
‘cornerstone of Asia.’ The intensification of war spelt the cumulative destruction of the 
landscape and agriculture, robbing Vietnam of its most important source of income, and 
changing the country from a rice-exporting to a rice-importing nation. The inflow of 
equipment and well-paid American soldiers placed an immense weight on all the social 
services originating from a comparatively undeveloped economy, widening the scope for 
black marketing and profiteering.56 America fared no better. Stephen E. Ambrose 
calculates that during the war American commitment mounted, from $10 billion to $20 
billion to $30 billion, and 150,000 to 300,000 to 500,000 and more men a year.57 The 
economic consequences of this commitment are summed up by Robert Stevens, who 
states that the results for the nation’s economy of the Vietnam War duplicity were “the 
most virulent inflation in American history, the highest interest rates in history, and a series 
of balance of payments crises worse than any that had gone before, an unnecessary 
recession in 1970-71, two serious declines in stock prices (in 1970-73), two major 
liquidity crises at home (in 1966 and 1969-70), a collapse of the housing industry (1966)” 
and “financial market distortions that bore extremely heavily on small businesses and that 
forced state and local governments to retrench on education and other vital services.”58 
The size and extent of this investment did not signify military effectiveness: by 1973 the 
Americans had lost the war to the Viet Cong, and by 1975 they had lost the country.59 
The American defeat in Vietnam inexorably re-located the public’s focus to domestic
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issues, turning their attention to the leaders that had inspired participation in the war with 
promises of victory. However, the disillusionment that ensued after Vietnam did nothing 
to encourage the American public’s faith in their WASP male leadership. By the end of 
Johnson’s Presidency 222,351 servicemen had been either killed or wounded, and though 
Richard Nixon announced a secret plan for ending the war, American participation lasted 
longer under him than it did under Johnson, resulting in the 56,000 US servicemen killed 
and 270,000 wounded. The incident that most condemned Nixon in disclosing his betrayal 
of public trust was the Watergate affair. Daniel Ellsberg, a former employee of the 
Defense Department, leaked the Pentagon Papers, an official but secret history of the 
Vietnam entanglement to the New York Times. The Nixon administration proceeded to 
hire a number of ‘plumbers’ to stop the leaks, and with a number of hired Cuban refugees, 
they broke into the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate 
building in Washington. In the midst of their attempts to bug the phones there, they were 
detected and arrested. Nixon tried to conceal the involvement of the White House, but 
following the confession of John Dean, his counsel, to the FBI, the American people and 
politicians were forced to confront the fact of their President’s conspiring to pervert the 
course of justice. On 8 August 1974, Nixon became the first President in American 
history to resign from Office.60
If victory over the Vietnamese wilderness might have brought about a confirmation 
of frontier mythology and its attendant values in answer to the social challenges of the 
1960’s, then failure at the Vietnamese frontier could only discredit the myth, its values, 
and those who affirmed its discourse, both abroad and at home. Instead of turning
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attention away from domestic issues, as America’s politicians had hoped, Vietnam grew to 
be an uncanny reflection of America’s domestic situation, where basic institutions and the 
values of society failed to nurture the achievement of genuine equality as stipulated by the 
‘American Creed’ ~  “individual freedom, equal protection before the law, opportunity to 
advance on the basis of one’s merit, and the ability of those on the bottom of society to 
secure improvement of their lot through hard work and participation in established 
political processes.”61 It became evident that failed attempts to instill democracy in 
America translated into an inability to impose democracy abroad. Radical critiques by 
Black Power advocates in particular highlighted and condemned White America (and by 
association WASP leadership) for racial oppression and hatred, and this same thread of 
racial hatred appeared to motivate the practices of America’s troops in Vietnam, 
permeating and arguably finding its source in foreign policy. American policy imparted 
the notion that Vietnamese culture was antithetical to their own, and strove to impose the 
‘American way of life’ in Vietnam, effecting a course of action propelled by the same 
imperialistic designs that characterized the Indian Wars, and the subjugation of non- 
Whites and women. Platoon leaders embarked on a campaign of total destruction that 
implicitly condoned a poisonous doctrine of “crypto-racism”, with the incapacity to 
distinguish between the Vietnamese they had come to save, and those who were the 
enemy. One GI recalled “We’d rip out the hedges and bum the hooches and blow all the 
wells and kill every chicken, pig and cow in the whole fucking village. I mean, if we can’t 
shoot these people, what the fuck are we doing here?”. Innocent civilians were 
transformed into the enemy: the rationale of another GI was that it did not matter who he
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killed as “They are all Vietnamese”.62 However, even if the message of all Vietnamese 
being the enemy was preached to the American troops, no victory or regeneration could 
be attained in their destruction, for in death, “enemy bodies transmogrified into the 
mutilated corpses of so many innocents. In death, the terrorist became an infant; the VC 
messenger, a child; the VC whore, a girl; the VC suspect, an old man.”63 This 
transmogrification from justified bloodshed to senseless murder occurred in tandem with a 
full-fledged television age, culminating in reportage that had a devastating impact inside 
and outside of America.
Unlike the 1930’s, the Second World War and Korea, when censorship stemmed 
the tide of anti-establishment values, with Vietnam there was no censorship of news 
dispatches. With the exception of My Lai, where no nonmilitary reporters had been near 
the scene, most of the reporters were well established by the time the American troops 
arrived in force, and many were not ready to take the administration’s view of the 
conflict.64 The surfacing of My Lai took its time due to the layers of official cover-up and 
denial that had to be surpassed, but this was not so with the Tet Offensive. Taking place 
on the 30th of January in 1968, footage of the desperate battles American troops fought 
for control of their bases at Da Nang and Khe Sanh, the city of Hue and the grounds of 
the US embassy in Saigon was soon displayed on network television for more than 60 
million American viewers. Political and military propaganda of approaching victory was 
directly undercut by the reality of the American embassy in rubble, and the fact of Tet 
representing a defeat for the US.
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In Big Story, Peter Braestrup argues convincingly that though the dominant 
themes of verbal and visual commentary from Vietnam added a portrait of defeat for the 
allies, this was not the perception of historians. On the contrary, the latter concluded that 
the Tet offensive had in fact resulted in a severe military-political setback for Hanoi in the 
South. Braestrup observes that “rarely has contemporary crisis journalism turned out, in 
retrospect, to have veered so wide from reality”.65 The price of this misrepresentation 
was costly. It took only one month for the most respected figures of American journalism 
to place themselves on record in opposition to the administration. NBC anchorman Frank 
McGhee reported: “The cities are no longer secure. . .the Saigon government is weaker 
than ever. . .From all this, we must conclude that the grand objective — the building of a 
free nation— is not nearer, but further from realization”. Walter Cronkite echoed: “It 
seems now more certain than ever. . .that the bloody experience in Vietnam is to end in 
stalemate. . .[and] the rational way out. . .will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as 
honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy and did the best they 
could”.66
The absence of censorship and corresponding dominance of anti-establishment 
reportage signalled a presidential failure on the part of Lyndon Johnson. In terms of 
commentary, photographic and television coverage, the Tet attacks were equated with a 
“disaster”, directly undermining the Johnson Administration’s “progress” campaign of fall 
1967. The campaign was one of the repeated Administration efforts since 1965 to “sell” 
the war, and involved a mid-November flood of optimistic statements following the South
Vietnamese elections. At his November 17, 1967 press conference, Johnson laid out the 
“progress” line; what follows is an excerpt from the Washington Post
We are making progress. We are pleased with the results we are 
getting. We are inflicting greater losses than we are taking. . .The fact that the 
population under free control has constantly risen. . .is a very encouraging 
sign. . .overall we are making progress.67
After Tet considerable press comment highlighted Johnson’s failure to warn the public of 
the war’s bleaker sides and its probable further costs. His chronic prior refusals to 
disclose the possibility of heavy fighting that lay ahead appeared more damning in the light 
of the “progress” campaign. The campaign had carried the firm assurance that investment 
in Vietnam was beginning to show a profit, while the media representation of Tet was not 
only that of destruction and suffering, but also a stunning defeat: proof of failure of the 
Administration’s conduct of the war in Vietnam.68
Art Buchwald’s analysis in the Washington Post, Feb 6, 1968, was widely noted 
for its biting satire of the American military’s optimism in the wake of Tet. I will quote 
Buchwald’s article in its entirety, as its public invocation and subversion of the Custer 
myth reveals the intrinsic link that was created between Vietnam and America’s frontier 
past, and the equation of the Vietnamese to Indians. Custer’s Last Stand was a story that 
demonstrated the necessity of subordinating savages of all kinds. In myth his death 
became the assurance that eventual triumph over the savages would reward the brave 
cavaliers.69 Buchwald’s use of the myth overturns this notion of heroic death:
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“We have the enemy on the run” says General Custer at Big Horn 
Little Big Horn, Dakota, June 27
General George Armstrong Custer said today in an exclusive interview with 
the correspondent that the battle of Little Big Horn had just turned the comer 
and he would see the light at the end of the tunnel.
“We have the Sioux on the run,” General Custer told me. “Of course, we still 
have some clearing up to do but the Redskins are hurting badly and it will only 
be a matter of time before they give in.
“That’s good news General. Of course, there are people who are skeptical 
about the military briefings about the war and they question if we’re getting 
the entire truth as to what is really happening here.”
“I just would like to refer to you these latest body counts. The Sioux lost 
5,000 men to our 100. They can’t hope to keep up this attrition much longer. 
We know for a fact Sioux morale is low, and they are ready to throw in the 
towel.
“Well, if they’re hurting so badly, Gen. Custer, how do you explain this 
massive attack?”
“It’s a desperation move on the part of Sitting Bull and his last death rattle. I 
have here captured documents which show that this is Phase II of Sitting 
Bull’s plan to wrest the Black Hills from the Army. All he’s going for is a 
psychological victory, but the truth is that we expected this all the time and 
we’re not surprised by it.”
‘What about the fact that 19 Indians managed to penetrate your headquarters? 
Doesn’t that look bad?
“We knew all along they planned to penetrate my headquarters at the Indian 
lunar new year. The fact that we repulsed them after they held on for only 6 
hours is another example of how badly the Sioux are fighting. Besides, they 
never did get into the sleeping quarters of my tent, so I don’t really think they 
should be credited with penetrating my headquarters.”
“You seem surrounded at the moment, General.”
“Obviously the enemy plans have gone afoul,” Gen. Custer said. “The Sioux 
are hoping to win a big victory so they’ll be able to have something to talk 
about at the conference table. Look at this latest body count. We’ve just 
killed 3,000 more Indians and lost 59 of our men.”
“Then according to my figuring, General, you have only 50 men left.”
“Exactly. They can’t keep up this pressure much longer. The truth of the 
matter is that their hit-and-run guerilla tactics haven’t worked, so they’re now 
resorting to mass attacks against our positions. Thanks to our interdiction of 
their supply lines, they are not only short of bows and arrows, but gunpowder 
as well.”
An aide came in and handed General Custer a sheet of paper. “I knew it,” the 
General said. “The latest body count shows that they lost 2000 more injuns in 
the last hour. They should be suing for peace at any time.”
“How many did we lose, General?”
“Our losses were light. We only lost 45 men”
“But General, that means you have only 5 men left, including yourself.”
“Look, we have to lose some men, but we’re taking all precaution to keep our 
losses to a minimum. Besides, we can always count on the friendly Indians in 
these hills to turn against the Sioux for starting hostilities during the Indian 
lunar new year.”
The aide staggered back in, an arrow in his chest. He handed General Custer 
the slip of paper and then dropped at his feet.
“Well, they just lost 500 more. And we only lost 4. It looks as if they’ve had 
it.”
“But, General, that means you’re the only one left.”
“Boy,” said the General, “would I hate to be in the Sioux shoes right now”70
The incriminating effect that media versions of Tet had on the American public’s faith in 
their government could only be augmented after My Lai. US intervention in Vietnam 
cannot be explained by the mere drive to revivify frontier mythology, but the attempted
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revival ~  and then failure — of the mythology was a related event. This is evident, for 
example, in Buchwald’s scathing critique of the American military.
The dismal reception of gung-ho representations of the war such as John Wayne’s 
The Green Berets is hardly surprising in the aftermath of this failure. In the movie 
Wayne’s persona as cowboy-hero in Westerns such as Sands o f Iwo Jima (1949), Rio 
Grande (1950) and The Searchers (1956) is faithfully replicated. The moral universe of 
the Western is also almost completely transferred: “the Americans are good guys, the 
Vietcong are bad guys, and the peasants are the frightened townsfolk who need protection 
and the rule of law. The Special Forces compound is very like a fort in Indian territory. 
The Vietcong give war whoops.”71 Although pro-war films about Vietnam were scarce, 
anti-war films that blatantly proclaimed American defeat in Vietnam were not produced 
either. Instead, the Western and War movie genres temporarily lost their relevance and 
utility as forms of historical explanations that justified the use of violence in attaining 
victory for America. However, a series of anti-Westerns containing analogies of Vietnam 
would be made before the eclipse of the Western movie genre that coincided with the 
withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam. The subversion of frontier mythology 
occurring in American society found a route of expression in these movies which denied 
the victory of the frontier hero where it was most crucial — at the level of the American 
imagination.
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Launching Out of the Quagmire
Early Vietnam Analogies and the Sci-Fi Movie
Mythopathic moment; Fort Apache, where Henry Fonda as the new 
colonel says to John Wayne, the old hand, ‘We saw some Apache as we 
neared the Fort,’ and John Wayne says, ‘If you saw them, sir, they weren’t 
Apache.’ But this colonel is obsessed, brave like a maniac, not very bright, 
a West Point aristo wounded in his career and his pride, posted out to 
some Arizona shithole with only marginal consolation: he’s a professional 
and this is a war, the only war we’ve got. So he gives John Wayne 
information a pass and he and half his command get wiped out. More a 
war movie than a Western, Nam paradigm, Vietnam, not a movie, no jive 
cartoon either where the characters get smacked around and electrocuted 
and dropped from heights, flattened out and frizzled black and broken like 
a dish, then up again and whole and back in the game, ‘Nobody dies,’ as 
someone said in another war movie.1
Michael Herr
The West constructed through the mass media is an imagined West, appealing to national 
audiences and exerting an influence so powerful that it shapes reality and becomes an 
accepted version of history. Richard White exemplifies this influence in his account of a 
ranch foreman on the Texas Panhandle (an account written in the late 1970s by a journalist
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for the New Yorker, Jane Kramer) whose self-identity, and actions were directed more by a 
powerful cultural image of the West than the West of his surroundings.2 In the account, 
the ranch foreman views the realities of life on a cattle ranch, with its absentee ranchers 
and agribusinesses with disappointment, comparing it with a “truer” but vanished West 
that belonged to the past. His “truer” West was, however, a fictional, imagined West, one 
derived from Westerns starring movie Westerners like John Wayne and Chill Wills. This 
account attests to the power of myth to construct a new past through the processes of 
cinematic representation. The communication of myth through the vehicle of popular 
culture has the power to replace memory with its version of the past, such that the new 
version substitutes for actual past events. This construction of a new past that substitutes 
for historical accuracy is a phenomenon that relates to the cultural revisioning that was 
executed after Vietnam, supplanting the memory of failure via an exploitation of the 
strength of cinematic influence.
The “Golden Age” of the Western marked the period when the genre was most 
active in proclaiming its versions of history, with discourses of frontier mythology being 
affirmed in the public imagination. Though Robert Ray observes that more pessimistic 
Westerns were being produced, he does concede that “the old pattern of reconciliation 
was being maintained”, giving the examples of Red River (1948), The Searchers (1956) 
and The Far Country (1955).3 In the late 1960s, historical events were to exert an 
influence so strong that popular culture was forced to acknowledge their discourse, albeit 
obliquely. Robert A. Rosenstone defines this process in films as “true invention”: the 
depiction of historical events where the issues, data, ideas and arguments of the ongoing
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discourse of history are either directly or indirectly engaged with, as opposed to his 
concept of a “false invention”: that which ignores the discourse of history.4 While 
Rosenstone’s “true invention” may seem a contradiction in terms (and “false invention” 
tautological) ~  an “invention” is not usually interpreted as truth ~  every construction of 
the past in either written or visual form is always already at variance with historical 
actuality. In his pioneering Analytical Philosophy o f History, A.C. Danto puts forth the 
“narrative theory of history” which posits that we can only know partially about a historic 
event, as all history is communicated via narrative and there is a limit to what narrative can 
communicate.5 The human knowledge of actual events of history as they elapse, or what 
may also be called historic actuality, is unattainable. Danto ascribes the privileged 
knowledge of historic actuality to an “angelic chronicler”. Developing upon Danto’s 
theory, and adding to it Rosenstone’s concepts of “true invention” and “false invention”, 
we can derive three levels of historic representation in films. At one level, there is historic 
actuality, that which is impossible to attain. At the next level, there is historic accuracy, 
that which exists at close proximity to the first level. At the third level, there is historic 
manipulation, where the version of history presented is aimed not at acquiring historic 
truth, but is instead deliberately distorted to convey an ideological agenda. Rosenstone’s 
“true invention” would belong to the second level, and his “false invention” to the third. 
Neither would pertain to the first.
Building upon his work in Visions o f The Past, Rosenstone asserts in Revisioning 
History that films which seriously deal with the relationship of past and present are more 
important than traditional costume dramas and documentaries that are more purely
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concerned with depictions of the past.6 From Rosenstone’s analysis, it would seem more 
fruitful to examine a film in relation to the era of its production than the past that it 
purports to depict. This mode of analysis is particularly relevant to discussions of the 
movie Westerns made in the 1970’s, whose significance derives from the relationship that 
they manifest between the Vietnam War and the American frontier past of their context. 
In the Vietnam War era, the vessel in which Rosenstone’s “true invention” of history 
materialized was the movie Western, a genre that was also the primary vehicle for the 
mythic construction and re-telling of America’s frontier past.
As the American conflict with the Vietnamese was regularly equated to an Indian 
War at the frontier, by politicians and soldiers alike, the Western was not a surprising 
option for depictions of the Vietnam War. However, the anomaly lay in the phenomenon 
that the values and attitudes espoused by Westerns were discredited by the historical 
course of events and revelations associated with Vietnam. Imagining Vietnam as the new 
wilderness west of the frontier was no longer an acceptable version of history, nor could 
the mythic influences of the imagined West overpower the actual consequences of the war 
— reality now shaped and commanded a re-assessment of the frontier myth. The 
constructed ideal of white superiority that underlay American histories of the Indian Wars 
and the narratives of Westerns was superimposed on the Vietnam War, but without a 
manifest victory and the resultant great loss of lives on both sides, as well as immense 
damage to the Vietnamese environment, the ideal was invalidated and laid bare to charges 
of cultural imperialism. Fort Apache (1948) is Michael Herr’s retrospective “Nam 
paradigm”, but the ending of that movie does not fit the Vietnam analogy. John Wayne
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survives to perpetuate the frontier legend through a group of journalists. Wayne glorifies 
Colonel Thursday and the other men who sacrificed their lives in battling against the 
Indians, with the implication that their spirits lived on in the regiment. His claim that the 
men are “not dead”, like Herr’s other war movie where “nobody dies”, affirms the 
narrative of victory espoused in the frontier myth. In the 1970s this narrative became 
irrelevant, and this was clear in the frontier discourse that surfaced in the Vietnam 
Westerns. Thus, and ironically, the ideological message of these Vietnam Westerns would 
oppose the frontier discourse embodied by the conventional Western. The anti-Western 
that emerged was a direct reflection of the anti-frontier (or anti-Vietnamese frontier) 
sentiments that corresponded with the ending of the War: firstly, in their suppression of 
the narrative of victory, and more crucially, in re-locating the proponents of savagery 
within white boundaries.
The Quagmire Films
What I have called the “quagmire” films of the 1970s fall into two categories, the Vietnam 
Westerns (anti-Westems/ Indian Westerns with a compassionate depiction and elevated 
status of the Indian that were also allusions to Vietnam) and the first wave of Vietnam 
War films. These movies are examples of Rosenstone’s notion of “true invention”, as they 
engage with the contemporary historical discourse surrounding Vietnam. This 
engagement manifests itself through the expression of confusion, loss, and a sense that 
American military policy in relation to the War had been an act of imperialism and
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ultimately a mistake. Historically, these sentiments began to emerge under the presidency 
of Lyndon Johnson, with the widespread recognition by the end of 1967 that every aspect 
of American policy had been designed to destroy Vietnamese culture. This policy, 
according to Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, proceeded with the 
assumption that “the way to eradicate the Viet Cong is to destroy all the village structures, 
defoliate all the jungles, and then cover the entire surface of South Viet Nam with 
asphalt”.7 Increasing numbers of political leaders were in agreement that year with the 
need to extricate the American effort in Vietnam, and publicizing their views. The high- 
point of these anti-war sentiments was reached in October, with a movement that 
mobilized more than 200,000 protesters to march against the war. One month later, a 
Gallup Poll revealed that more than half of the American public disapproved of Johnson’s 
handling of the war.8 By 1970, this discourse of protest began to appear in the vessels of 
popular culture. The movies that I have selected to illustrate my argument were at the 
time of their release recognized as being not only popular and successful but also 
culturally significant. It is this cultural significance, coupled with the advantage of a 
historical perspective that justifies this present re-assessment of their utility.
A. The Vietnam Western
The Western was not the only genre to accommodate analogies of Vietnam in the 1970’s. 
Gilbert Adair recognizes an element of truth in the statement that every American feature 
made during the decade of 1965-75 directly or indirectly reflects some aspect of
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Vietnam’s political make-up and must be relevant to the debate about the war — 
strengthening Rosenstone’s conclusion with further evidence.9 However, it is interesting 
and perhaps significant that in trying to make sense of the war, the frontier paradigm 
initially used to assist a comprehension of Vietnam was inverted. It could only be an act 
of atonement for the transgression of crypto-racism that motivated a reversal of the 
traditional view equating the Vietnamese as Indian savages and the whites as proponents 
of civilized values. Whites and Indians (and by implication the Vietnamese) switched 
places — the mythic construction of white victimhood and Indian savagery was now 
reversed, and the actual victims of America’s frontier past surfaced. The anti-Westerns 
that portrayed whites as savages with references to Vietnam were Little Big Man, Soldier 
Blue (1970), and Ulzana’sR a id (1972).
In Little Big Man — a movie based on Thomas Berger’s 1964 picaresque novel — 
Dustin Hoffman plays 121 year old Jack Crabb, the only survivor of the battle of Little 
Bighorn. This was a battle infamous as one of the greatest disasters of American military 
history, occurring under General Custer’s leadership and culminating in his death. The 
movie engages with contemporary anti-war sentiments by portraying the Indians in a 
sympathetic light, differing from previous Westerns that employ a similar compassionate 
attitude to the Indian Other (such as Broken Arrow in 1950) with its allusions to Vietnam. 
The narrative mimics oral tradition with Crabb relating his life story, beginning with the 
Pawnee attack on his family leaving him and his sister as sole survivors. Jack and Caroline 
are adopted by the Cheyenne, a community vividly portrayed as having an organic culture 
in harmony with nature, exhibiting cohesive family ties and a benign code of ethics. Jack’s
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foster father, Old Lodge Skins (Chief Dan George), is the epitome of unaffected dignity 
and benevolence. Though he is the object of much humour, the nature of that humour is 
gentle rather than condescending.
The whites, on the other hand, have almost no redeeming qualities. Mrs. Pendrake 
(who assumes the role of Jack’s foster mother) is an adulteress, Merriweather a 
remorseless con-man, and General Custer the caricature of an arrogant and merciless 
psychopath. The Cheyenne tribe are the victims of a massacre led by Custer, and Old 
Lodge Skins makes the telling remark that their using rifles against his tribe’s bows and 
arrows is a victory won without pride, one that is “humiliating”. The background music to 
the Washita massacre is the regimental march “Gary Owen”, the Irish tune of Custer’s unit 
which was also used as a key dramatic motif in They Died with Their Boots On (1941). 
The music acts as a commentary on this other film’s noble depiction of Custer (Errol 
Flynn) and his soldiers. The dramatization of the Washita massacre and its attendant 
commentary — American soldiers winning a humiliating victory over their defenceless 
victims -- follows in the wake of My Lai and situates Little Big Man within the context of 
Vietnam, attesting to its engagement with the discourse surrounding the war. As the 
white hero of this narrative, Jack Crabb has in all appearances acculturated to Indian ways.
The Sand Creek Massacre is Soldier Blue's My Lai. It occurred on the 29th of 
November in 1864, when under the command of Colonel John M. Chivington one 
thousand territorial volunteers attacked the camp of five hundred sleeping Cheyennes.10 
As with the My Lai and Washita massacres, no victory resulted from the battle — a peace 
treaty with the Cheyenne leaders was in effect, and the Indians had already turned in their
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arms at Fort Lyon. In both the Vietnamese and Cheyenne accounts of violence, men, 
women and children were indiscriminately slaughtered. A similar narrative thread links 
this film to Little Big Man: Candice Bergen and Peter Strauss are victims of an Indian raid 
and saved by Cheyenne hospitality, only to witness the massacre of their hosts by the U.S. 
Army.
In Ulzana’s Raid the reference to Vietnam is more complex and oblique -- 
Douglas Pye, in his article on the movie, notes that the early sequences in the film 
(especially the baseball sequence) establish the cavalry’s incongruity and its arbitrariness of 
command. These traits are later extended to the patrol that sets out to track Ulzana, with 
their conduct revealing the pure mechanical application of regulations without any 
conviction or system of belief that will buttress and justify the historical situation of the 
army. The Vietnam allusion becomes clear in relation to the outcome of embodying such 
traits ~  the army’s role in Arizona (and in Vietnam) becomes a “morally empty assertion 
of white supremacy”.11 As with Little Big Man and Soldier Blue, the savage tendencies of 
the whites are made apparent: in reply to Lieutenant DeBuin’s comment that the 
mutilation and torture of Ulzana’s son by a man in his group were unacceptable, McIntosh 
(played by Burt Lancaster) says “What bothers you lieutenant, is you don’t like to think of 
white men behaving like Indians, kind of confuses the issue”. Pye sees this moment as 
evoking Ethan in The Searchers shooting out the eyes of the dead Comanche, and the 
parallel is interesting in a post-Vietnam context.12 Wayne’s mutilation of the Indian 
observes a set of rules that is recognized by the Indian culture, and is evidence of his 
knowledge of these rules. DeBuin’s soldiers, in contrast, execute an act of mindless,
241
chaotic savagery. Their act of violence is arbitrary. Within the movie this is an echo of 
the decisions made by DeBuin in the baseball game, and in relation to Vietnam it is a 
parallel to the military decisions made by Amerian leaders in the war.
Ke-Ni-Tay, an Indian scout, kills Ulzana, but prior to the killing we see tears in the 
latter’s eyes upon recognizing his son’s bugle in the scout’s possession. This display of 
emotion raises him from the stereotype of a heartless murderer, a redeeming characteristic 
denied Little Big Man's Custer. Any sense of betrayal is absent in this sequence where an 
Indian kills one of his own kind. Ke-Ni-Tay is to be admired for honouring his pledge to 
the American soldiers, and Ulzana undergoes a death ritual roughly akin to the death rites 
of the Japanese samurai — in both cultures honour is endowed on the warrior who 
undergoes the ritual. Moreover, we only see the results of the atrocities Ulzana commits 
(including the gruesome end of Rukeyser who is tortured, blinded, and tied to a tree) 
while the torture of the Apache is visually experienced — deliberately foregrounding the 
brutality of the white characters.
Though the whites are portrayed as savages in all three movies, and the Indians as 
the victims, it is crucial to point out that no victors emerge in these films. The whites are 
shown to commit atrocities, but this does not provide the justification for retaliation and 
even less, an Indian victory. In Little Big Man and Soldier Blue, the attack is all the more 
brutal because of the peaceable nature of the Cheyenne tribe, but this gracious 
characteristic of their society also preempts an act of vengeance against their aggressors. 
More importantly, the survivors who are capable of such acts at the end of each massacre 
are the white protagonists of the film (as no Indians possessing the vigour of youth, and
other physical requisites for revenge, survive), themselves also victims, each time only 
narrowly escaping the slaughter by both Indian and white adversaries.
The roles played out by the white protagonists in these Vietnam Westerns are 
seminal in comprehending the ideological message of the first wave of Vietnam War films. 
The spectacle of battle is stripped of honour and ridiculed in Little Big Man, abhorrent in 
Soldier Blue and without its requisite justification in Ulzana's Raid, arising from the basic 
logic in Old Lodge Skins’ remark: “Rifle against bow and arrow. I never could 
understand how the white world could be so proud of winnin’ with those kinds of odds”. 
The consequence of the massacres in these films, along with My Lai, can only be 
humiliation. In Ulzana's Raid, it is not so much a battle that takes place than the hunting 
down of a criminal, a hunt denied an explicit victory because the crime is shared by both 
the hunted and his white hunters. Thus, the spectacle of battle results in an inglorious 
victimizing rather than an noble victory. The cinematic expression of that result is the 
focus on victimhood -- a notion that will pave the way for the re-acquisition of white 
innocence, an innocence made possible because the white protagonists in these films are 
themselves victims, and not the instruments of savagery. Violence without justification 
(the prime example being My Lai) is an atrocity, but violence with justification (supported 
by the rationale of victimhood) facilitates the route to victory. The victimization of the 
whites in these Vietnam Westerns, as with the inception of the captivity narratives, 
establish the basis for violence that is affiliated to regeneration.
At this juncture it is important to distinguish between the (diachronic) changes 
made to the Western formula in reponse to the historical events preceding and surrounding
Vietnam, and the changes that were a response to the Depression. Both variations to the 
formula affect the frontier myth at its deep structure, but pertain to different components 
of that level. In the 1930s the narrative of expansion is suppressed to accommodate the 
historical invalidation of this form of progress, but in the 1970s it is the narrative of 
victory that has become irrelevant. Thus the Old West becomes an unsuitable setting for 
movies of the 1930s, but this is not the case for the 1970s: all three Westerns discussed 
are surfaces of emergence with clear depictions of that period of frontier expansion. This 
argument holds true for the Vietnam War movies which subscribe to a narrative of 
expansion in regarding Vietnam as the new wilderness.
B. The First Wave Vietnam War Movies
The Vietnam Westerns were controversial for the notion of white savagery and Indian 
victimization that they introduced, but it was the victimization of their white protagonists 
that was carried over and articulated in the Vietnam War films. Though the narrative of 
the first wave movies still results in loss, it is significant that the idea of white savagery is 
no longer emphasized ~  the focus is replaced by an accentuation on victimhood.
This focus on white victimization in the first wave Vietnam War movies also 
corresponds to and engages with its contemporary historical discourse. In 1970 President 
Nixon suggested that because of Vietnam the United States might be diminished to the 
condition of a “pitiful, helpless giant”.13 In the following years whites began to re-position 
themselves not as a dominant majority but as dominant victims, with George Wallace’s
third party presidential campaign in 1972 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke v. 
University o f California in 1978.14 In the Vietnam War movies, the ideology of 
victimhood furnished an opportunity for the expiation of guilt ~  the notable movies 
belonging to the first wave include The Deer Hunter, Coming Home (1978), and 
Apocalypse Now (1979).
The Deer Hunter is a film title that recalls Fenimore Cooper’s The Deer slayer -- an 
allusion to the novel and Indian mythology is made early on in the movie ~  Mike (Robert 
De Niro) explains to Stanley (John Cazale) the meaning of the “Sun Dogs” in the sky: an 
old Indian sign of a “blessing on the hunter sent by the Great Wolf to his children.” Mike 
has the traits of the Cooper prototype: living on the periphery of a community from which 
he is alienated, and embracing nature and a strict personal code to avoid the corruptions of 
civilization.15 In addition to this, the forested terrain on which the deer hunt takes place 
mirrors the wilderness beyond the frontier where the hero purifies and rids himself of the 
corrupt values of the metropolis. The inter-weaving narrative motifs in the film are those 
of the hunt, Mike’s “one-shot” code, and the game of Russian roulette. Mike, Nick 
(Christopher Walken) and Steve (John Savage) are drafted and embark off to Vietnam 
after Steve’s Russian-style wedding, and a deer hunt where Mike has the opportunity to 
uphold his “one-shot” code — an ability to kill his prey with one attempt (a single bullet) — 
because two tries would be a sign of weakness. In the following Vietnam sequences, the 
Viet Cong force Mike and Nick to play a game of Russian roulette, and with Nick’s 
collaboration Mike utilizes this skill of the “one shot” to annihilate his captors. The prey 
are now no longer deer, but humans. Steve is rescued but has an arm and both legs
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amputated, finding solace in a Veteran’s Administration Hospital in America. Mike 
returns to Saigon in search of Nick and finds him in a gambling den wearing a red 
headband (a sign of his professional status), voluntarily playing Russian roulette with a 
Vietnamese man. The motifs of hunting, Russian roulette and the “one-shot” combine in 
this scene when Mike rouses Nick from his drugged oblivion by reminding him of the 
hunt. Unfortunately Nick also recalls Mike’s signature skill and raises the gun to his 
temple — this time the chamber is not empty.
It is clear who the savages are in The Deer Hunter. The Vietnamese are 
dehumanized and given one-dimensional characterisations embellished by a single trait — 
their addiction to Russian roulette for the sake of entertainment and monetary gain. 
Without any evidence of their political or military agendas, or qualities that would morally 
justify the sequences of the Viet Cong tormenting their American prisoners, the 
Vietnamese in the movie are gross caricatures similar to Little Big Mari's portrayal of 
Custer. They are represented as devoid of any culture and with a completely 
incomprehensible language, contrary to the sympathetic depictions of the Indian/ 
Vietnamese Other in the Vietnam Westerns. The Deer Hunter's portrayal of Otherness is 
more reminiscent of the Indian caricatures in Westerns prior to Broken Arrow in 1950. 
The characterisations of Custer in Little Big Man and the Vietnamese in The Deer Hunter 
diverge slightly on an important premise — the Vietnamese are proponents of savagery, 
but they are evil with intent, and they are sane. Custer’s savage acts are tempered by his 
apparent insanity, such that an air of the absurd cushions his character from similar 
charges of debasement. Two notions that do get carried over from the earlier set of films
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are the sense of victimization and loss -- Steve’s physical amputation reinforces his 
psychological malaise, and Mike fails in his rescue mission (a fate Sylvester Stallone is 
spared in the Rambo series).
In the light of these observations, Adair’s comments about the final scene of The 
Deer Hunter (where Mike and his friends sing “God Bless America”) as an expression of 
Cimino’s faith in the regenerative powers of the United States are slightly premature. He 
writes that the movie’s:
. . .attempts to reaffirm the viability of a heroic posture in an unheroic age, 
revivify the frontier myth when it was being most vigorously contested and, 
above all, salve the nation’s uneasy conscience make it a prime exhibit in any 
dossier of American attitudes to the war.16
Though The Deer Hunter does endeavour to redress the American nation’s damaged 
conscience, the route undertaken by the film is not through the reaffirmation of heroism — 
as with the Vietnam Westerns, no victors or heroes emerge from this film. Mike absents 
himself from the hero’s welcome home party that his friends prepare for him, and more 
importantly, the “one-shot” motif that had established his heroic posture in the film’s 
beginning (distinguishing and raising him above the other hunters) is undermined: he is 
unable to kill the deer that he sights in the mountains, firing into the sky instead. The deer 
is elevated above its status as prey and victim, assuming a majestic air as it calmly moves 
away. The following extract from Cooper’s The Deerslayer, describing Hurry Harry’s 
failed attempt to shoot a buck, provides a commentary on Mike’s action:
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The report of the rifle had the usual sharp, short sound of the rifle, but when a 
few moments of silence had succeeded the sudden crack, during which the 
noise was floating in air across the water, it reached the rocks of the opposite 
mountain, where the vibrations accumulated, and were rolled from cavity to 
cavity for miles along the hills, seeming to awaken the sleeping thunders of the 
woods. The buck merely shook his head at the report of the rifle and the 
whistling of the bullet. . .17
Deerslayer chastens his companion: “the creatur’s death could have done neither of us any 
good and might have done us harm. The echoes are more awful in my ears than your 
mistake, Hurry, for they sound like the voice of natur’ calling out ag’in a wasteful and 
onthinking action.” The reproach of the “wasteful and onthinking” action when situated 
within the Vietnam War context equates with Mike’s deliberate choice of missing the deer: 
Hurry Harry needs Deerslayer to explain what Mike has personally witnessed through his 
Vietnam experience. The requisite of violence enforced by the American Frontier Hero as 
a route to regeneration was exposed as an indictment of false innocence and claim to 
superiority.
The deer hunt is significant in terms of the Indian and frontier myths, in the second 
as a route to purification, and in both to regeneration. In the creation myth of the 
Delaware Indians (and the Mohawks), the hero journeys out of the underworld onto the 
surface, where he spies a deer, hunts, kills, and eats it, returning with the meat to his 
people in the underworld. They partake of the meat and emerge onto the surface to 
“enjoy the light of heaven” and populate the world.18 The killing of the deer/ beast is the 
act of violence that the frontier hero must accomplish to complete the cycle of
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regeneration, and Mike’s inability to do so after Vietnam indicates the inadequacy of the 
myth in its application to the war, and his being contaminated by the experience. The war 
denies Mike the recourse to purification that results from an externalization and 
extermination of the beast within himself. This instance of contamination functions as a 
block to subsequent applications of the same rite until the Vietnam beast is exorcised. It is 
also not coincidental that the hint of recognition in Nick’s utterance of the “one shot” 
code immediately precedes his suicide -- almost as if the mere memory of heroism in the 
American wilderness cannot compensate for the actual experience of the War. The 
gathering of Mike and his friends at Nick’s wake thus mocks the naive patriotism in their 
hesitant rendition of “God Bless America”.
Mike, Nick and Steve are victims, but they are furnished with more than just the 
rank of victimhood, they are also all ascribed with innocence. The focus of their Vietnam 
experience is their capture by the Viet Cong, and prior to that they do not display any 
active aggression against the Vietnamese. We only see Mike and Nick exercising violence 
against the enemy to break free from their captivity, reacting to their circumstances. 
They are more often aiming pistols at their own skulls than at other objects. This attribute 
of innocence is similar to the historical justification implicit in frontier discourse — though 
the European settlers were themselves guilty of victimization and theft, they converted 
that guilt into innocence by aligning their personal interest in the acquisition of property 
with the national interest in the acquisition of territory. In this latter scenario, however, 
when the national interest of participation in Vietnam is questioned, it is the innocence of 
intention at the personal level that is preparing a way out of the guilt at the national level.
The idea of innocence initially materialized through narratives of captivity, and in 
The Deer Hunter it is clear that such narratives are being employed. With the frontier 
myths the captivity narratives facilitated a reversal of roles whereby the Indian victims 
could be viewed as savage invaders, and where the white conquerors could be equated 
with the innocent victims of invasion. In the movie, none of the white protagonists exhibit 
the behaviour of savage invaders. The traits of savagery and exploitation belong almost 
completely to the Vietnamese, with the Americans occupying the positions of innocent 
victims. The question of whether American involvement in Vietnam was beneficial to the 
Vietnamese is never raised. What is being deliberated is whether involvement in the War 
was beneficial to America, and an answer is communicated via the unreserved sense of 
loss the film conveys, particularly at its end.
Coming Home builds upon this sense of loss, concentrating on the physical and 
emotional price American men paid for their involvement in Vietnam19. Most of the 
scenes take place at a Vietnam War Veteran’s hospital, where Sally Hyde (Jane Fonda) 
volunteers for unpaid nursing when her Marine captain husband Bob (Bruce Dern) goes to 
fight in the war. The action centres around Luke Martin (John Voight), whose role is just 
about parallel with Steve in The Deer Hunter. The psychological damage of both men 
after Vietnam is represented by physical crippling: both are paraplegics in wheelchairs. 
The film focuses on Luke’s rehabilitation (aided by Sally), and culminates in Bob’s 
attempts at symbolically cleansing himself from the contamination that inflicted him in 
Vietnam. This is the section where he strips and plunges naked into the ocean — a 
sequence intercut with Luke articulating his anti-war beliefs to an audience of high school
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students. The victimization of Luke and Bob (both physically as well as psychologically 
wounded) portrays at the level of the individual what the film’s beginning scenes present: 
actual hospitalized Vietnam veterans, all in wheelchairs around a pool table, voicing their 
attitudes about the war and how they were incapacitated by the war experience. The 
Vietnamese are denied any token presence, and as a result, though the film does engage in 
the historical discourse of victimization and loss, its representation of the war is 
incomplete. Such a representation is particularly relevant when America was still coming 
to terms with its experience of the war. Michael Selig’s comments about Hollywood’s 
war films, of which Coming Home is included, make this clear:
What passes for an indictment of war in general, or any specific war, is an 
imprecise representation of a particular environment, the battlefield (where 
“life is cheap”), or the war’s aftermath, with men who are physically and 
psychologically crippled. In these films, a nearsighted humanism laments the 
loss of American (male) lives and, sometimes, their innocence. The visual 
and narrative distinctions between ally and enemy are generally no different 
than in the conventional war film. No matter who the “enemy” is in the 
film’s particular war, s/he remains an Other, strange or exotic, generally 
exhibiting behaviour and belief repugnant to the film’s representation of 
American sensibilities.20
Selig’s generalizations do not, however, apply to Vietnam War movies starting from and 
following Platoon, where the representation of the Vietnamese environment becomes 
increasingly precise. The position of the enemy is made even more vague in Coming 
Home, for at the climactic turning point, Luke tells Bob: “The enemy is the fucking war”.
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The film does partially qualify its own medium of representation, when Sally asks Bob 
what the war is like, he replies: “TV shows what it’s like, sure as hell doesn’t show what it 
is”.
Apocalypse Now, a movie labelled in 1981 as “the most successful interpretation of 
Conrad to date”, applies the metaphoric framework of the quest narrative utilized in the 
author’s Heart o f Darkness}1 The quest culminates in the person of Kurtz, an ivory 
trader in Africa in the novel, whom Coppola translates into a Colonel in the American war 
effort in Vietnam. The film’s version of Kurtz mirrors the novel; Kurtz (Marlon Brando) 
is an exemplary representative of the establishment who has become “unsound” -- like 
Nick in The Deer Hunter, he has been contaminated by his experience of the war. Other 
significant derivations from the novel are the sense of waste and incongruity (the latter 
also an echo of Ulzana’s Raid). Conrad’s Marlow encounters rotting machinery and the 
French frigate firing aimlessly into the jungle, while his movie counterpart Willard (Martin 
Sheen) witnesses the wreckage of helicopters and the huge-B52 tail littering the 
Vietnamese landscape.
The character of Colonel Kilgore evokes John Wayne, from his cavalry hat, his gait 
and mannerisms, to his radio call sign “Big Duke”. His role in the movie (much like 
Wayne does unconsciously in The Green Berets) is to reveal that the old frontiersman 
tradition does not fit the present context of Vietnam.22 Kilgore exists as an ironic 
comment on the frontier myth, exposing it as myth in the sense of falsehood, functioning 
to invalidate it in the same way as the Vietnam Westerns. His apparent invulnerability to 
bullets and explosives disassociate him from the actual Vietnamese context, locating him
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on a surreal plane where heroes are indestructible (a plane occupied also by the likes of 
JohnRambo). The film’s use of surrealism extends beyond Kilgore’s characterisation. 
The cameo appearance of Coppola as a movie director on the battlefield telling Willard to 
“look as if you are fighting” makes a self-reflexive statement on the manipulation involved 
in the mass media’s construction of war images, and a sense of incongruity and the absurd 
also emanates from the U.S.O. Playboy bunny, beach party, and the helicopter cavalry 
charge and surfing sequences. The assault on the Viet Cong village is an important case in 
point. The traditional associations of a cavalry charge evoked by the bugle call at the 
opening of the scene, the sound-track with Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries” arousing the 
martial spirit, and the proficient editing first establishing the attacking helicopters in 
perspective, then cutting to inside the machines and finally to an exhibition of massive 
firepower, all serve to immerse the audience in the exhilaration of the raid. However, the 
usual heroic connotations attached to such voyeuristic displays are undercut by the 
juxtaposition of a village school with children dressed in symbolic white, and the lack of 
any justifying enemy presence. Moreover, Kilgore’s rationale for bombing the village — to 
watch Lance, one of his “boys”, surf at the height of the battle — can only lead to a 
questioning of his sanity.
The general movement of the film results in a censure of American participation in 
Vietnam. It exposes the repercussions that stem from applying an expansionist frontier 
ideology indiscriminately, and the derangement that concludes the attempt. As with The 
Deer Hunter and Coming Home, the question of whether American involvement in 
Vietnam was beneficial to the Vietnamese is never raised: what is being deliberated yet
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again are the consequences of involvement in the War with respect to America, and the 
answer is consolidated with the object of Willard’s quest -- Kurtz. The appearance of 
Brando as Kurtz, completely shaven and bloated, renders a visual correlative on the 
degeneration of the character, particularly when placed in contrast to the flattering picture 
of him that Willard sees earlier. Kilgore’s dementia, the degeneration of Kurtz, and the 
mental instability of Willard suggest the impossibility of retaining one’s sanity in or after 
Vietnam, and that the likeliest route for even the most exemplary of soldiers is to be a 
victim of contamination. It is thus appropriate that Willard finds Kurtz reading T.S. 
Eliot’s ‘The Hollow Men’, a poem that ends: “Mistah Kurtz ~  he dead”, an imputation of 
his empty spiritual state.
The surreal experience of Vietnam as depicted in these films is significant. With 
the first set of quagmire movies, the Vietnam war could only appear by analogy. In this 
latter set surrealism acts as a buffer from direct engagement with the actuality of the War. 
Michael Cimino’s defence in reply to war correspondent Peter Arnett’s charge in the Los 
Angeles Times that the Russian roulette sequences in The Deer Hunter were “simply a 
bloody lie” is telling. When accused of “artistic irresponsibility” in distorting historical 
truth, he argued that the movie was “surrealistic, not realistic”, for they were “not doing 
newsreels, We’re moviemakers”.23 However, the accusation of artistic irresponsibility 
may be erroneous. Denise J. Youngblood in “Repentance: Stalinist Terror and the 
Realism of Surrealism”, claims that the surrealist mode utilized in the film to depict the 
Stalinist Terror of the thirties is a “true representation of the epoch it depicts because of 
its surrealism, not despite it.” She argues against the Sovet critics’ explicit rejections of
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the film as historical due to its self-conscious surrealism, which they find fundamentally 
antihistorical. Youngblood writes:
No period in Soviet history (and perhaps in all of history) was more 
surrealistic than the Great Terror, a time when black was white and day was 
night. The transcripts of the show trials demonstrate this — and so does 
Repentance, as vividly and profoundly as any other source. Abuladze utilizes 
the tools of a master filmmaker, but he thinks like a historian in this picture.
Through the construction of a “metanarrative,” he has brought the mentalite 
of the 1930s to life. As one sympathetic and perceptive Russian critic put it,
“The historical parallels are not obvious but grasped inwardly.”24
Similarly, in Youngblood’s terms, it is arguable that no period in American history (but 
not in all of history) was more “surrealistic” than the Vietnam War era, and the incomplete 
transmission of realism in the first wave Vietnam War films testifies to an inability to 
normalize that historical event. As with the Soviet experience, the Vietnam War was so 
horrific for those involved that any attempt to represent it in a purely realistic way could in 
fact do violence to its meaning by normalizing that which was not normal.25 Referring 
back to the three levels of historical representation in films, the surrealistic modes of 
representing Vietnam in the movies discussed would occupy the second level: that of 
historical accuracy, and “true invention”. The “historical parallels” of Vietnam do exist in 
these first wave films as true inventions, but when American filmmakers were later able to 
utilize a realistic mode to represent the war, these second wave films ironically exemplify 
Rosenstone’s concept of “false invention” — ignoring the historical discourse, past and 
contemporaneous, about Vietnam.
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In denying an endeavour to rewrite history or recreate reality, Cimino’s argument 
is appropriate for a period up to the late 1970s, when the American nation had not yet 
become reconciled with the memory of Vietnam. The fact that an attempt at reconciliation 
was in process would surface over a decade later, with the second wave Vietnam War 
movies that claimed realism. Before this second wave could reach the screens, 
communism would have to be successfully re-fought in another spatial arena to enable a 
restoration of confidence in the frontier myth. This was achieved through the other major 
tenet of Kennedy’s New Frontier: space.
The Next Frontier
Kennedy’s space programme and the Vietnam War were ostensibly two parts of one 
ideological project — a project based on regenerating America’s frontier heritage, and a 
counter-response to fears of a communist takeover. Space achievements particularly in 
the years following 1957 did not only establish Soviet technological primacy, the rockets 
were also vehicles for Soviet propaganda designed to promote communism (and the 
USSR under Krushchev) as the vanguard of universal progress.26 In his investigation of 
space-weapon politics and technology, The Final Frontier, Dale Carter marks the 
propaganda that accompanied each Soviet launch: in 1957, Tass stressed “how the freed 
and conscious labour of the people of the new socialist society” was turning “even the 
most daring of mankind’s dreams into reality”; in 1961, Gagarin dedicated his flight “to 
the people of a communist society, the society which our Soviet people are already
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entering, and which, I am convinced, all the people on earth will enter,”; in 1962 the flight 
of Nikolaev (a cosmonaut of Chuvash origins) and less than a year later of Valentina 
Tereskova served to demonstrate the racial and sexual equality that existed under 
socialism.27
Soviet space triumphs, in the absence of comparable American achievements, 
suggested that the Russians had overtaken the Americans as the world’s most advanced 
nation. This led to a corresponding validation of their political stance — originating from 
the Soviet abolishment of private enterprise and its replacement with a planned economy 
after the Bolshevik Revolution. Accepting the Russian blueprint for progress could only 
disqualify notions of American supremacy and development, and this was painfully evident 
in the political discourse of the time. In late 1957 the Soviet UN delegation classified the 
United States as an underdeveloped nation by offering aid to the Americans under the 
Russian technical assistance programme, and four years later in a well-publicized 
telephone call, Khrushchev’s claims of superiority (“Let the capitalist countries catch up 
with our country!”) were left undisputed.28
The need to restore faith in the American way — a motive apparent in the decision 
to interfere in Vietnam ~  was thus the basis for Kennedy’s support for the Apollo project, 
and this was one frontier war that the Americans would win. The use of frontier discourse 
in relation to the space programmes was rampant, so much so that even the Russians 
appropriated similar terminology — from the start astronauts of both nations were firmly 
situated in the American pioneering tradition. Lyndon Johnson likened their astronauts to 
the American forefathers who “tamed a broad continent and built the mightiest nation in
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the history of the world”, and “blazed new trails across the untraveled wilderness of 
space”, whilst Gagarin had become the “Columbus of the cosmos” and his successors 
were “blazing a trail for all mankind”. 29 The borrowing of frontier discourse by the 
Russians was, however, almost tantamount to usurpation, for it inevitably posed a threat 
to notions of American exceptionalism. This threat was soon dissipated when America 
managed to forge ahead in the space race.
The American moon shot captured the frontier of scientific and technological 
achievement from the Russians, and with it a reaffirmation of frontier mythology. This 
latter connection to the frontier myth is explicit in Dale Carter’s observation that both 
American society and American history were invested in the space programme, such that 
the astronauts who “pioneered on that final, inexhaustible frontier took with them more 
than just the hopes of NASA and the Democratic Party: they embodied a nation, a social 
system, a whole way of life.” And like the first pioneers, their mission would “make 
manifest America’s destiny; their achievements would universalize the American 
century”.30 This extension of the frontier to space occurred in 1961. In 1976, it was 
utilized in Star Wars as the apparatus that launched Hollywood out of the quagmire.
The “cultural instrumentality” of science fiction movies is a consideration 
emphasised by Annete Kuhn in her introduction to Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and 
Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema, and utilized as a structuring component in that 
volume of essays. She identifies five cultural instrumentalities as a basis for organization, 
and the three most pertinent for a discussion of the Lucas trilogy are that of the science 
fiction genre as a reflection of social trends and attitudes of the time, as a mediation of
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ideologies, and for the fantasies they evoke in their spectators. The final tenet is 
particularly illuminating when combined with the cultural function of fantasy films, of 
which science fiction films constitute a part — James Donald in Fantasy and the Cinema 
states that the dominant view of fantasy film is that they are vehicles of “either a coercive 
or a potentially liberating wish-fulfilment”.31 The acknowledgment that cultural 
instrumentality is of great importance rescues the Lucas trilogy from such criticism as 
voiced by Robin Wood in his explication of the films. His critique is also generally 
problematic for reasons expressed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, in equating value 
with the ability to disturb:
What I find worrying about the Spielberg-Lucas syndrome is the enormous 
importance our society has conferred upon the films, an importance not at all 
incompatible with their not being taken seriously ( “But of course, it’s pure 
fantasy”): indeed, the apparent contradiction is crucial to the phenomenon. The 
old serials were not taken seriously on any level (except perhaps by real children, 
and then only young ones); their role in popular culture was minor and marginal; 
they posed no threat to the co-existence of challenging, disturbing or genuinely 
distinguished Hollywood movies, which they often accompanied in their lowly 
capacity.32
It is Wood’s contention that unlike the “old serials” (Buck Rogers, Superman, Batman, 
etc.) the Star Wars films contained a propensity for delivering reassurance that made them 
responsible for the poor box-office performances of Heaven ’s Gate, Blade Runner and 
The King o f Comedy, films lacking the same mode of dispensing reassurance and
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belonging to Wood’s category of “challenging, disturbing or genuinely distinguished 
Hollywood movies”.
I would not argue with Wood’s criticism that Star Wars is simplistic ~  nor would I 
totally reject his analysis that the success of the films becomes comprehensible only when a 
widespread desire for regression to infantilism; an urge to evade responsibility; is 
assumed.33 For Wood the crisis in ideological confidence in the 1970s (fuelled by Vietnam 
and Watergate) which he finds enacted in Hollywood’s “incoherent texts” (such as Taxi 
Driver) has not been resolved; “no resolution of the fundamental conflicts is possible”, and 
the Star Wars films are evidence that the conflicts have instead been forgotten.34 In this 
chapter, however, we see that the Star Wars films are part of a larger ideological project 
that sought to repair what Englehardt has termed “victory culture”, and what I identify as 
the victory narrative that is a component of frontier mythology at its deep level. Space 
was the one arena that restored the possibility of victory at the frontier to the American 
popular consciousness, with Star Wars reflecting the positive attitudes towards the space 
race of a not too distant era — situating the films at the margins of Rosenstone’s category 
of “true invention”. The films also communicated ideologies, and evoked fantasies that 
were potentially liberating wish-fulfilment for their American spectators — to all other 
members of the audience (Vietnamese and non-WASP) the effect would more likely be 
one of coercion.
In Part IV of The End o f Victory Culture: Cold War America and the 
Disillusioning o f  a Generation; to which this present chapter is heavily indebted; 
Englehardt provides an enlightening perspective on the “cultural instrumentality” of the
Star Wars films. He writes about how Lucas successfully challenged (not, as Wood 
suggests, simply forgot) the legacy of the 1970s by “decontaminating war of its recent 
history through a series of inspired cinematic decisions that rescued crucial material from 
the wreckage of Vietnam” -- the crucial material referred to here being tied to Lucas’s use 
of special effects and of the machines that had not been discredited in the war.35 The 
success of the films is surprising considering the very blatant projections of WASP 
superiority, particularly in an era that was grappling with accusations of crypto-racism and 
imperialism. Wood’s explanation, that Vietnam and the events of the 1970’s were simply 
forgotten, neglects the propensity of films like Lucas’s Star Wars to (using Englehardt’s 
description) “decontaminate” the past. There are three possible reasons why the notion of 
WASP superiority, shunned in the quagmire films in great part due to the memory of 
Vietnam, is celebrated in the trilogy. Firstly, the historicity of the films in question differ. 
The anti/ Vietnam Westerns dealt with two strains of American history, with America’s 
frontier past, and with the Vietnam War era. The Vietnam War films, logically, dealt more 
directly with the latter era. These films would have to acknowledge, to some extent, the 
legacy of those periods, as was discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. The Star 
Wars movies, on the other hand, are situated not only in our future (even at this present 
moment we do not possess the technology to build a colossal device like the Death Star, 
much less in the 1970’s), but in another galaxy, and even then “a long time ago” in another 
galaxy ~  safeguarding the ideology embodied in these films from specific historical 
parallels or specific historical reponsibility. The narrative of expansion becomes 
ahistorical. The movie does begin on a footing reminiscent of post-Vietnam narratives:
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Luke begins in the film as a victim (his sole relatives, an uncle and an aunt, are killed by 
the imperial storm troopers), and this victimhood would justify revenge. This equation of 
victimization and a justifiable act of violence was a quality of the captivity narratives, and 
appropriated by the Star Wars films, as well as the quagmire movies. However, as the 
former movies exist at a further remove from history than the latter, they are 
unencumbered by Vietnam’s heritage of loss, making victory conceivable. In fact, their 
lack of historicity even allows for visual references (in the conclusion to the first film of 
the trilogy) that echo Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph o f the Will. A film that can 
decontaminate not only the memory of Vietnam but also the memory of the holocaust 
accomplishes no mean feat. The lack of historicity is linked to another significant factor 
that enables a guilt-free victory. The enemies of Luke and his heroic counterparts are not 
Jews, neither are they the Viet Cong, or innocent Vietnamese civilians, or the Indians of 
America’s frontier past. The severed arm that falls onto the floor of the bar belongs to a 
space creature (who babbles incomprehensibly like the Vietnamese in The Deer Hunter), 
and Ben Kenobi is free to proceed after removing this obstruction to his mission. The 
sub-text of this scene justifies an extermination of Otherness. If the owner of the 
appendage had been more directly linked to a Jew, a Vietnamese or an Indian, or any 
historically non-WASP minority, making that sub-text a surface-text, the reception of such 
a spectacle would be quite different. As Richard Maltby concludes in “A Better Sense of 
History: John Ford and the Indians”: “In space, at least for the time being, no one can hear 
you scream about misrepresentation”.36
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The ideology of WASP superiority is sanitized by another feature characteristic of 
science fiction movies — the special effects. This third element provides a distraction from 
the central ethos of the movie, a faculty of sci-fi films noted in John Brosnan’s remark that 
“with most sf (science fiction) films, the special effects are always watchable no matter 
how boring or silly the films may be.”37 Brosnan is referring to Logan’s Run (1976), and 
claiming that the special effects are the sole source of entertainment in the film, for other 
than that aspect it moves with the “grace and style of an arthritic elephant.”38 The 
function of the special effects in Star Wars is twofold: firstly, as noted by Englehardt and 
mentioned above, the technology utilized in Vietnam -- the smart bomb, the electronic 
sensor and the video camera -- appears in the film combined with high-tech weaponry that 
erased the offensive associations of cruelty that issued from the recent war. The spectacle 
of war is sanitized. It is “exotic, bloodless and sleekly unrecognizable.”39 The second and 
more general aspect of these effects is explored by Steve Neale in his critique of John 
Carpenter’s version of The Thing (1982). In the essay, Neale writes about the status and 
role of special effects in science fiction films, making reference to Christian Metz’s notion 
of £trucage’.40 According to Metz, in relation to the special effects of a science fiction 
film, ‘the spectator ascribes to the diegesis the totality o f the visual elements furnished 
him'41. Neale’s choice of The Thing and not E.T. or Star Wars as the subject of his 
inquiry becomes apparent in his conclusion; “the more interesting films will be those which 
work not, like E .T  (1982), simply to affirm belief (and the cinema’s capacity to feed it), 
but those which, like Invasion o f the Body Snatchers (in particular the 1956 version), 
work instead to link habitual perceptions, assumptions and judgements to issues and forms
263
of social conformity -- and in the process offer a challenge to both.”42 It is clear which 
category the Lucas trilogy falls into. Thus while movies like The Thing and Invasion o f 
the Body Snatchers will be involved in complex processes of persuasion that establish their 
regimes of credence and authenticate the events they portray simultaneously 
acknowledging the spectator’s awareness of the cinematic fabrication (hence the 
significance of that line “You’ve got to be fucking kidding”), the role of the special effects 
in movies like Star Wars and E.T  exists solely at the first level of persuasion without 
subjecting the spectator to judgements of improbability.43 The totality with which the 
visual elements are ascribed to the diegesis are in these films complete — the spectator is 
encouraged to immerse himself fully into the cinematic world that is before him, and 
discouraged from the questioning that challenges notions of social conformity and habitual 
perceptions that arise from a direct engagement to the external world. It is of great 
consequence that this cinematic world is generically verisimilitudinous to the world of the 
Western -- the Star Wars protagonists are rebels fleeing metropolitan corruption (“the evil 
empire”) and basically enunciate a frontier past. However because this past is 
dehistoricized, the frontier myth can also be decontaminated, and re-applied.
The impact of Star Wars — breaking numerous international box-office records — 
effected a reversal of influence, bringing Rosenstone’s concepts of “true” and “false” 
invention into another dimension. Drawing from the discourse surrounding America’s 
dominance in the space race, the movies restored the notion of a justifiable American 
victory in the arena of battle, and this second “falsely invented” ideology, would form the 
basis of not only a series of films that applied the ideology to Vietnam, but also be adopted
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in the contemporary political discourse that referred back to the Vietnam War. In a more 
complex fashion, these developments mirror the account of the ranch foreman described in 
the beginning of this chapter. The films that joined the Star Wars enterprise were the 
Rambo series.
Rambo. Reagan and the Vietnamese Frontier
Victory in the context of Vietnam became a possibility when a simulated battle in space 
with a major impact on the nation’s popular consciousness headed the route out of the 
quagmire. The fact that this re-visioning of the war was still in its embryonic stages 
becomes apparent when one considers the nature of the Rambo films. The influence of 
Star Wars on this re-visioning of Vietnam in the films was noted not only by Englehardt, 
but also, and more significantly, by David Morrell, author of the novel First Blood (1972), 
and the initiator of Rambo II  (1985). In a recent interview, Morrell expressed the opinion 
that the movie was a constant reminder of ‘Star Wars in Vietnam’. According to the 
author, Rambo is an adventure film in the tradition of comic book and fantasy.44
Much has already been written about how the Rambo (I: 1982, II: 1985, III: 1988) 
films present a glorified perspective of the Vietnam experience, contrary to the Vietnam 
War movies that preceded it. There are, however, two aspects of the series that merit 
special attention in relation to this cultural revisioning of Vietnam: the notion of betrayal, 
and more briefly, the physique of John Rambo. It is interesting that the idea of betrayal by 
the American government is closely knitted to the narrative of victory in the films — it is
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reiterated more than once that Rambo rescues the POWs in spite of the machinations of 
his government. The telling line in Rambo: First Blood Part II  occurs when Rambo is 
pulled out of the stockade rock pile and asks Colonel Trautman: “Do we get to win this 
time?”. The answer to that question has already been answered in the advertisement for 
the movie: “They sent him on a mission and they set him up to fail”.45 It is obvious that 
the U.S. government of the Vietnam era is scapegoated in an attempt to exonerate the 
soldier from culpability. The displacement of blame onto government bureaucracy aligns 
it with the evil empire that sought to exterminate Luke Skywalker and the other members 
of the rebellion. This appropriation of a Star Wars theme is, however, in direct conflict 
with the actual level of Government support for American soldiers fighting in Vietnam. 
Sumiko Higashi in “Night o f the Living Dead. A Horror Film about the Horrors of the 
Vietnam War Era” dispels the myth that Americans fought the war with one hand tied 
behind their backs, or that politicians constrained military action. She writes:
. . . .American forces in Vietnam enjoyed the advantage of the most 
sophisticated technology ever used in modem warfare. At Khe Sanh, for 
instance, General William Westmoreland installed an electronic laboratory 
that transmitted data from seismic sensors to computers in Thailand. During 
that siege, the American military employed B-52 bombers, an airborne control 
plane, C-47 transports, rocket-armed helicopter gunships, starlight scopes 
enabling night vision, people sniffers detecting troop movements, gravel 
mines, fragmentation shells containing steel darts, napalm, white phosphorous, 
chemical defoliants and solvents, and marine artillery. Short of using 
nuclear weapons, a tactic that had in fact been debated, U.S. troops in 
Vietnam were hardly deprived of manpower.46
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This notion of betrayal is not one that is novel in coming to terms with the memory of 
military defeat. After W.W.I, the Germans embraced the myth of the “stab in the back”, 
with the defeat of its army explained as a conspiracy concocted by German generals who 
signed the surrender. The explanation was maintained in spite of numerous facts which 
exposed its deceit.47 After W.W.II, the Japanese shifted blame for the war onto wartime 
leaders who were no longer alive, with the Japanese soldiers regarded as victims of a 
military government that betrayed the soldiers and the public.48 It is of some importance, 
though, that in the cultural process of revisioning Vietnam in the Rambo series one 
cinematically fabricated motif emerges in the political discourse following the release of 
the movies, and another occurs in the Vietnam War films that are later produced. The first 
motif is that of betrayal, and is voiced by Reagan. In addition to an oft-quoted comment 
that revealed his adulation of the Rambo films: “Boy, I saw Rambo last night; now I know 
what to do next time”, Reagan further exposed the impact of these films in an earlier 
statement that: “We are just beginning to realize how we were led astray when it came to 
Vietnam”.49 Reagan did not isolate this tactic of displacing blame to the American 
experience of Vietnam. At the military cemetery in Bitburg, he told the Germans (with 
some truth on his side) that their buried German soldiers were victims of the Nazis “just as 
surely as the victims of the concentration camps”.50
The motif that appears in Vietnam War films following Rambo is the notion that 
Vietnam was not an instance of an American defeat, cinematically correcting the national 
humiliation that resulted after the war. The Guardian's view of the movie follows:
267
SYLVESTER STALLONE’S Rambo II has become more than just a movie. It 
opened in American cinemas at the right time to profit from the Beirut 
hijacking. When the White House was impotent with rage, patriotic 
Americans could watch the muscle of Rambo destroy the Vietnamese and 
Russian enemies as he rescued GIs from Communist prisons; he won in 
cinema the war the United States lost on the ground.51
The way to a victorious war established in Star Wars and adopted by Rambo sets a 
precedent that is applied in Oliver Stone’s Vietnam War films (all the movies being box 
office successes -- with the exception of Heaven and Earth). However, one crucial 
distinguishing factor separates the post -Rambo Vietnam War movies from their 
predecessors. Though restoring the narrative of victory to the frontier myth, the Rambo 
and prQ-Rambo films mentioned utilized a genre of fantasy and surrealism — the 
hypermasculinity of Stallone is a topic much discussed in relation to the films, a sign of 
over-determination and “a regressive retreat into fantasy.”52 Stallone’s physique has also 
been perceived as a response of muscular over-compensation to the lack of muscular 
American government policy, and as a result his character is extra-ordinary, and thus 
surreal. In contrast, Stone’s first film would claim realism. This would be the final stage 
of rewriting the Vietnam War, and thus of repairing the frontier myth — for the outcome 
of realism is a naturalization of ideology. This naturalization would stem from a cinematic 
“false invention” that was in contradiction with the contemporary historical discourse; the 
Vietnam War was successfully re-written as an American victory. This representation of 
Vietnam through a realistic mode, that which is traditionally accepted as historical 
accuracy, exists at the third level of historical manipulation, and therein lies the irony.
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9  Recycling Mythologies
Cinematic Regressions and the Post-Revisionist 
Western
“We have not sought to goose-step the American soul”1
Lowell Mellett
In the previous chapter, the genesis of a process of ideological negotiation to repair the 
mythology of the frontier was discussed in relation to Vietnam Westerns, Science Fiction 
movies and the Rambo series of films. It was argued that in the arena of fantasy, it was 
possible to extol the ingredients of the dominant American conservative ideology: Star 
Wars championed the values of individualism, elite leadership and white, male superiority, 
whilst the Rambo films reinstated those ideals in relation to Vietnam. The ideological 
utility of the fantasy film is thus one of its strengths: Norma Pecora’s article in Steve 
Craig’s Men, Masculinity and the Media explores the socialising effect of comic book 
heroes, a process not unrelated to the appeal of Rambo. Her conclusion follows:
Young boys are still offered cultural representations that reinforce maleness as 
machismo. The superheroes are loners, fighting evil in their own way, a way
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that invokes violence. Technology is used for power and control. Women are 
elderly and weak or voluptuous and unimportant. And, it would appear, little 
has changed.2
The violence that is invoked is “an institutionalized. . .acceptable means of solving 
conflicts,” with “racism, sexism and heterosexism” being “socially regulated acts of 
violence.”3 Pecora’s analysis of Superman comics in the 1980s has close links with 
Rambo (she perceives that the movie offers ideals and inspiration through the recognition 
of a fantasy): “The Superman of the eighties supported a fantasy world with Superman 
acting as a vigilante, solving problems with violence, while maintaining the status quo.”4 
Native Americans and black characters are in the comics subjected to racist ideology, 
while women are portrayed as victims. The popularity of the Superman comics in spite of 
their political incorrectness is determined largely by the audience that the comics cater to - 
- boys between the ages of 10 and 15.5 The acceptance of similar ideals in Rambo and 
Star Wars results not only from an identification of their status as fantasy, but also a 
corresponding desire in American movie audiences for an escape to an era before the 
cultural dislocation of the 1970s. The outward signs of cinematic regression were an 
answer to the desire for ideological regression existing in the popular imagination.
As operations at the level of fantasy, these cinematic regressions have greater 
liberation from the social responsibility that attends films claiming realism. However, films 
that operate on the level of fantasy have less capacity for a naturalisation of the ideology 
that is asserted. They are, in Noel Carroll’s words, an “assault on the reality principle” : 
the cartoon-like quality of the Rambo films is not helped by ludicrous scenes where the
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protagonist carries a raw haunch of meat into a cave.6 John Rambo is barely human; he 
has godlike powers and a physique to match. Nonetheless when we view the cinematic 
regressions as part of a process of ideological negotiation, then they can be seen to enable 
a reiteration of the ideology embraced for films that function at the level of realism. To 
infer, as Robin Wood does, that the crisis of the 1970s was simply forgotten, would be 
neglecting the complex cinematic developments that aimed to seal the breaches in 
American credibility. The final part of this stratagem would utilise the power of the realist 
narrative.
Ryan and Kellner observe that narrative realism is the governing form of 
Hollywood film used to reinforce the codes of patriarchal and capitalist life, by replicating 
the figures that constitute the substance of values, practices and institutions shaping a 
society of domination. The observation that they make is flawed in two aspects. Firstly, 
the statement is overly didactic, claiming that Hollywood is in league with institutions that 
seek to manufacture a society of victims. Secondly their understanding of realism, as 
explained in the earlier chapters of this thesis, lacks complexity. However, the realization 
they arrive at in acknowledging the necessity of narrative realism (and here it is cultural 
verisimilitude that they are discussing) is important.
As critics on the Left, Ryan and Kellner’s intention is to disable the outcome of 
what they notice as a process of replication, whereby “those grounding figures of society 
(the narrative of individual success, the metaphor of freedom, the synecdocic privileging of 
efficiency over democracy, the litotic liberal ideal of pluralist neutrality etc.) are 
transcoded into specifically cinematic forms ~  the male quest narrative, the camera
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positions of individuated identification, the domestic mise-en-scene” and so on.7 The 
method via which they hope to accomplish their project is significant. They note that the 
undermining of narrative realism, of the basic film illusion, “misses the mark” -- it is more 
important to accept the viewing assumptions of narrative realism. The rupturing of 
narrative realism (through modernist formal revisions) is an obstruction in gaining access 
to popular audiences, and thus also a barrier to reshaping the dominant figures of 
patriarchal capitalist social life.8 If we discard what Ryan and Kellner think they are 
discussing — a narrative realism that equates with actuality ~  as well as their crude binary 
oppositions and assumptions about the audience, then what we are left with is the 
necessity of an element of realist representation for the effective communication of 
ideology. That this element of realist representation is “ruptured” by “modernist formal 
revisions” is not of as much consequence as when the cultural verisimilitude in the films 
cannot be expressed with a firm claim of historical accuracy.
The Hollywood films discussed in the previous chapter do not violate the 
convention of narrative realism; they contain varying levels of generic and cultural 
verisimilitude. However, they do exist at one remove away from movies that claim 
realism as the portrayal of historical accuracy: the first wave Vietnam War films employing 
surrealism (though as discussed in the last chapter, these films were historically accurate in 
depicting the sense of confusion and loss surrounding Vietnam) and the Rambo and Star 
Wars movies employing fantasy. This final stage in the procedure of mythological repair, 
where the ideology appears to be communicated via a direct reflection of actuality, was
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facilitated by the contemporary political environment. The resultant verisimilitude shared 
by popular culture and political culture no doubt manifested a symbiotic relationship.
The revival of conservative social movements, initiated by the “New Right” 
strengthened under the leadership of Ronald Reagan. The aim of these movements was to 
restore the traditional values that had been undermined by policies recently introduced in 
the national agenda, including feminism, the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision sanctioning 
abortion, and bussing. Members of the “New Right” also devoted countless hours and 
money to those who opposed the Equal Rights Amendment. The collective effort was to 
reinstate the traditional boundary that existed between American and Other; the ultimate 
aim was to expel the savage from within. A letter from a New Right group on the issue of 
busing is a clear expression of these sentiments:
I  am rushing you this urgent letter because the children in your 
neighbourhood are in danger. How would you feel if tomorrow your child. . 
was taught by a practising homosexual?. . .was bused twenty to thirty miles 
away to school every morning?. . .was forced to attend classes in a school 
where all religion is banned? If you think this will never happen. . .you are in 
for a shock!9
The argument posed by members of such groups suggested that a conspiracy existed 
among the liberal elite to sanction a “new morality” of license and excess. The return to a 
traditional sense of morality corresponded with the renewal of militarism. Reagan 
proclaimed that the “Vietnam syndrome” was over, aggressively defending and acting 
upon America’s right to combat communist insurgency wherever it surfaced.10 This
273
declaration of moral superiority, with a commitment that justified intervention in any part 
of the world, was a direct echo of the impetus for American participation in Vietnam. 
The arms race became a symbol of the most elemental and ancient of frontiers: “good 
versus evil, right against wrong.”11 During Reagan’s first administration, a 41 percent 
increase in defence spending was encouraged, with a pledge to build 17,000 new nuclear 
weapons. The belief that regeneration through violence was a better possibility with more 
sophisticated technological implements of war still seemed to be held, though this was 
clearly invalidated by the experience of Vietnam, where the rudimentary weapons of the 
Viet Cong overcame the American forces.
With the re-establishment of the boundary between American and Other, the 
maligned figure of the frontier hero (portrayed as psychotic and blamed for the failure of 
Vietnam) could now be repaired. The vet could not remain as the savage in the Vietnam 
War scenario. It was crucial that he assumed the role of the heroic white protagonist in 
that constructed narrative of victory. Without this requisite, the victory narrative in the 
deep structure of the myth was not complete, and could not emerge in discourses of the 
Vietnam War. The 1982 construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was significant 
in prompting the reintegrative phase in which veterans were reconciled with society: this 
significance is marked in media-generated representations of the vet prior to and following 
the construction of the memorial. During the 1974 TV season, the vet was seen as a hired 
killer on Columbo, as a drug dealing sadistic murder on Mannix, as a shakedown artist in 
Cannon, and as a “returned hero” who blew up himself, his father, and a narcotics lab on 
Hawaii Five-O. In the late 1970’s, the vet was depicted as a milder form of a criminal, he
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was turned into an always irreverent, slightly crazed eccentric, subject to the occasional 
flashback.12 The films made in that period offered comparable representations: in Tracks 
(1975) Dennis Hopper plays a returned vet who after displaying a mass of idiosyncrasies 
and emotional tics, finally loses his grip on sanity and surrenders to his hallucinations, and 
in Black Sunday (1976) an ex-Vietnam POW (Bruce Dem) is so intensely bitter after the 
war that he joins the Palestine Liberation Organisation in their attempt to bomb the 
Superbowl. Others such as The Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now and Who 11 Stop the Rain 
(1978) complement these images with narrative strategies of rupture and dislocation.13 
This portrayal of the vet was an echo of the treatment that Vietnam War veterans received 
at their homecoming. They were regarded as social pariahs, treated with a lack of respect 
or honour, with the antiwar climate relegating his duty for his country in Vietnam to a 
criminal activity. Vets referred to themselves as “the unwilling working for the unqualified 
to do the unnecessary for the ungrateful.”14
The historical marginalization of the vet was useful for the purpose of 
scapegoating, in the same way that the gangster figure was scapegoated for the failure of 
the economy in the 1930’s. Vindication was crucial after the failure of the economic 
frontier in the early years of the Depression. That need for exoneration was paralleled 
fifty years later for the failure at the Vietnamese frontier. The WASP hero of frontier 
mythology and the Western is also scapegoated for his temporary acculturation of 
savagery — he is seldom able to return permanently within the arena of civilization. The 
Gangster, Vietnam vet and frontier hero have this quality in common. The distinction 
between the Gangster and the frontier hero has been made evident in previous chapters.
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The quality of frontier heroism evades the vet because his descent into savagery is not 
directly followed by an expulsion of that savagery within himself. This explains the 
depiction of the vet in the 1970s — the savage “Other” was not exterminated at Vietnam, 
but acculturation, the precondition to that act of violence, had already taken place. 
However, unlike the gangster who failed because he was ‘not quite American’, the vet had 
not only sacrificed himself for America in the Vietnam War, he also symbolised the WASP 
frontier hero, Jefferson’s yeoman, who sought to extend the light of civilisation at the 
Vietnamese frontier. The route to salvaging the war at that frontier carried the pre­
condition that the Vietnam vet must first be honoured, and this was achieved via the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
The glorification of war through memorials, monuments and military cemeteries 
honouring the dead was a procedure that the German nation was familiar with, as a means 
to reshaping their experience of the two World Wars. George L. Mosse classifies this 
procedure as the Myth o f the War Experience, a vision of war that was developed, above 
all, in defeated nations:
The Myth of the War Experience was designed to mask war and to legitimise 
the war experience; it was meant to displace the reality o f war. The memory 
of the war was refashioned into a sacred experience which provided the nation 
with a new depth of religious feeling, putting at its disposal ever-present saints 
and martyrs, places of worship, and a heritage to emulate. . . .Through the 
myth which came to surround it the war experience was sanctified. Yet at the 
same time, the war was confronted and absorbed in a radically different way, 
by being trivialised through its association with objects of daily life, popular 
theatre, or battlefield tourism. Here the war experience could be distorted and
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manipulated at will. Veterans deplored such trivialisation; it was those who 
stayed at home or were too young to have fought who were apt to indulge in it 
during and after the war.15
My Emphasis
Mosse develops the thesis that having masked the horrors, consecrated the memory and 
justified the purpose of World War I, the Myth of the War Experience profoundly 
influenced Germany in the interwar years and ultimately fuelled the aggressive nationalism 
that led to World War II.16 The American experience of defeat finds striking parallels — in 
addition to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the dead were honoured in Gardens o f Stone 
(1987) which featured Francis Coppola’s choreographed burial rituals, with the strongest 
impact of the movie arising when the camera pans over the headstones in the gardens of 
stone and focuses on the guard of honour folding a ceremonial flag with military precision, 
handing it over to a grieving widow or parent.17
The important difference between the experiences of both nations was that while 
Germany’s Myth of the War Experience was built up mainly through the accounts of war 
volunteers, popular culture was the main vehicle of America’s Myth of the Frontier.18 
Thus instead of trivialising the war, movies were the site of contestation whereby frontier 
mythology could be re-validated. Popular culture, though not trivialising the war, was a 
means of sanctifying the memory of defeat at Vietnam and displacing its reality. With the 
developments in the political environment, and the cinematic strategies discussed in the 
previous chapter, this recuperation could now be attained. Just as it was the German 
Right who were able to annex the Myth of the War Experience and to exploit the suffering
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of the millions involved for their own political ends, the Myth of the Frontier would also 
be central to America’s political Right.19 The moment where Slotkin’s cycle of 
regeneration through violence was elevated to its former credibility began with Oliver 
Stone’s Platoon.
Platoon was a watershed film in that it did not carry with it any disclaimer, overt 
or otherwise, of being anything other than the real experience of the Vietnam War -- the 
26 January issue of Time magazine proclaimed that the movie dramatised “Vietnam as it 
really was.”20 The movie relates the war experience of a nineteen-year-old volunteer Chris 
Taylor (the average age of the Vietnam soldier was nineteen unlike the older De Niro and 
his counterparts in The Deer Hunter) who joins Bravo Company of the 25th Infantry 
Regiment near the Cambodian border. The platoon enters a Vietnamese village where 
Sergeant Barnes commits an atrocity, when in process of interrogating the head of the 
village, he murders the Vietnamese man’s wife. Barnes is confronted by Sergeant Elias, 
and the latter is later shot by Barnes and left behind when the platoon is ambushed and 
lifted out by helicopter. Chris witnesses Elias being pursued and killed by the Viet Cong. 
Amidst the chaos of a second attack on the 25th infantry near the Cambodian border, 
Chris shoots Barnes in cold blood, and after the American position is re-established, Chris 
is lifted out by helicopter.
The seven pages Time devoted to its acclamation of the movie included an 
endorsement from the distinguished political commentator David Halberstam who stated 
tha t11 Platoon is the first real Viet Nam film” in The New York Times (8 March 1987):
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By nature the movie industry has been a notorious cheat when it comes to 
confronting serious subjects, and on Vietnam in particular there was a rare 
schizophrenic attitude on the part of the industry’s leaders. . . .Of the serious 
post-war films that have preceded Platoon, none to me ever passed the test of 
being a true Vietnam War movie. . . .By contrast, Platoon is about Vietnam.
It exists only, as they say, in-country. It has no other objective, no other 
agenda. To me it is both a great American movie and a great War movie.
Its combat scenes are as good as any I have ever seen. . . .It is painfully 
realistic. . . .Real it is. This is the ultimate work o f witness, something 
which has the authenticity o f documentary and yet the vibrancy and 
originality of art.21
My Emphasis
Two comments which are particularly significant in the passage above are that Platoon is 
given the official seal of authenticity above the “serious post-war films” preceding it, and
that this authenticity is given equal status with documentary -- “the ultimate work of
witness”. The latter claim, and what Halberstam means by his use of the word “real”, are 
worth unpacking. The clue lies in the last sentence: “the ultimate work of witness” is 
“something which has the authentictity of documentary” and yet “the vibrancy and 
originality of art”. Halberstam is equating “art” here to works existing outside of the 
documentary form, and in this passage, in relation to fiction films: “great Amerian 
movie(s)” and “great War movie(s)”. In the course of this thesis fiction films have been 
noted for their mythic investment. It is my contention that Platoon is given Halberstam’s 
stamp of approval because it is better able to combine its claim to truth (cultural 
verisimilitude) with a mythic verisimilitude than the movies that have preceded it. The film 
passes the test as being “a true Vietnam War Movie” because it fits the version of frontier
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mythology that is an intrinsic component of the historical tradition of the American War 
movie.
The claim to actuality, and the corresponding implications of its status as 
documentary are thus disconcerting when seen in perspective with the mythological strain 
that is apparent and endorsed in the film. More disturbing perhaps, is that where a film 
like The Green Berets carried similar connotations of American supremacy and was 
dismissed as fiction, Platoon's re-enactment of a successful frontier cycle is marketed as a 
document of the war and manages to attract a mass audience upon its release. The movie 
superseded the economic performance of Full Metal Jacket and Hamburger Hill (released 
in the same year) by reaching the $100 million mark at the box office alone.22
Oliver Stone’s Vietnamese Frontier
Harold Schecter and Jonna G. Semeiks contend that Slotkin’s formula of “regeneration 
through violence” “precisely matches the action of Platoon”, but merely read the film as a 
duplication of the formula rather than a film that adapts the formula to accommodate the 
Vietnam experience.23 Theirs is a straightforward application of Slotkin’s formula that 
neglects the differences which make Platoon a specific variant of the original paradigm. 
The two features of Slotkin’s paradigm that emerge as significant in this film are the heroic 
quest and the violent act that takes place in the wilderness.
In accordance with the motif of the individual taking on the frontier quest, Chris, 
the central protagonist of Platoon, is differentiated from the rest of Bravo company as a
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literate, middle-class recruit in contrast to the underclass “grunts” and social misfits who 
constitute the rest of his military unit.24 He begins by having separated himself from the 
comforts of his upper-middle class life, from then on his pilgrimage through the cycle of 
regeneration is structurally similar to Slotkin’s model. Chris enters Vietnam a 
representative of civilised values. His first encounter with the jungles of Vietnam 
symbolically finds him, in Turner’s words, “European in dress, industries, tools, modes of 
travel, and thought”, and proceeds in stripping off his “garments of civilisation”. This 
encounter is graphically presented in the movie: in a rapid unbroken sequence, Chris is 
inflicted by cuts on his hands, vomits at the sight of a jungle-rotted corpse, and has his 
neck infested with biting jungle ants when he rests against a tree. This is historically 
accurate as the Viet Cong’s style of close-quarter fighting had to a large extent made 
American War technology irrelevant.25 The film’s claim to authenticity is also 
underscored by the autobiographical nature of Chris Taylor’s characterisation. Oliver 
Stone, the director of the movie, comments that in his own service in the war, he saw 
himself “as a product -- an East Coast socio-economic product” and he “wanted to break 
out of the mould”. The solution he decided upon was “total anonymity”; he joined the 
Army because he “had to atone.”26 The movie provides an unmediated echo of these 
sentiments:
I guess I’ve always been sheltered and special. I just want to be anonymous. .
.maybe from down here I can start up again and be something I can be proud
of, without having to fake it, be a fake human being.27
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“Down here” in the symbolic wilderness, Chris engages in an act of violence with the 
“Indian Other/ beast” . The mythic qualities of this latter entity are displaced onto 
American counterparts to facilitate a politically correct fulfilment of the violent act. The 
wilderness beast is the site of the “anima-id” paradox.28 As anima, the beast embodies the 
feminine, passive but essential part of the male consciousness, the “lost half’ of the hero 
with which he needs union to achieve personal salvation. Simultaneously, as id, the beast 
is to be repressed and destroyed. In the frontier myth, the wilderness beast takes the form 
of the Indian Other from whom there is much to learn, but one who also carries the threat 
of annihilation and thus must be slain. In Platoon, Chris’s relationship with Elias and 
Barnes functions as the locus of this paradox.
Elias occupies the feminine role associated with the anima. Leader of the 
underworld where erotic connotations abound in the closeness and shared activity of men, 
Elias is portrayed as nurturing, emotional and valuing life; he offers to help Taylor with his 
overloaded backpack, and halts a potential (My Lai) massacre led by Barnes. Elias is also 
the frontier hunter-hero who has been acculturated into the ways of the Indian.29 The 
identification between the hunter and the hunted (where “the hunter is forced to follow in 
the animal’s footsteps, to eat when he eats, sleep when he sleeps, and move when he 
moves”30) is mirrored in Elias’s movements. Prasch contends that “No one else among 
the American troops comes closer to the Viet Cong ideal of invisibility and silence in 
motion.”31 A third tenet of Elias’s characterisation is his adherence to Cooper’s synthesis 
of the ‘Saint of the woods’, the tragic hero who has acculturated so folly to Indian ways
that he cannot return to the metropolis and is scapegoated for the extension of 
civilisation.32
There is evidence that Elias’s heroic qualities are transferred to Chris in two 
aspects. Firstly, his imitation of the sergeant’s actions: immediately after Elias prevents 
the killing of the child (an action that might have led to a massacre), Chris intervenes to 
avert the rape of a Vietnamese girl.33 Secondly, the two are linked by their mutual 
identification with Christ ~  albeit contemptuously, Elias is called “Jesus fucking Christ and 
“water walker”, a connotation sealed by his dying cruciform pose. When Chris is first 
brought into Elias’s underworld, he is introduced as someone “resurrected”, and the first 
six letters of his name (Chris Taylor) literally spell the spiritual parallel.34
The battle that Chris engages with Barnes completes the “anima-id” paradox. In 
accordance with the metaphor of the hunt where:
. . .the exorcism of the Indian is likened to the hunting down and slaying of 
rabid beasts embodying all qualities of evil. In the captivity narratives, bestial 
Indians are seen as the outward type of the beast that is in every man. . .the 
captive’s salvation. . .depends on his ability to see that the “hellish principles” 
are within himself. He must hunt out the inner beast and slay it before he can 
be redeemed.35
If Elias is identified with Christ, Barnes is associated with the devil and linked with death. 
Without showing any moral restraint he barbarically kills a Vietnamese woman before 
burning the village, murders Elias in cold-blood (attempting to do the same with Chris), 
and bears the testimony of mastery over death. Chris is told that “Barnes been shot seven
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times and he ain’t dead”. Elias’s route to death begins with a trinity of bullets in the chest. 
When Chris avenges Elias’s death with the killing of Barnes, three things happen. Firstly, 
Chris successfully discovers the “hellish principles” (symbolised by Barnes) and releases 
the dark and violent energies within himself. Secondly, he appropriates qualities 
associated with the anima from Elias and engages in an act of violence that brings the 
anima-id paradox to fulfilment. Thirdly, the film echoes history in scapegoating Barnes as 
the “crazed” veteran who is representative of those soldiers responsible for the American 
atrocities committed in the Vietnam War. With the death of Barnes, Chris, (and the 
American public) is thereby absolved of complicity with these war crimes. It is of crucial 
importance that Platoon does not end with the scapegoating of Barnes, nor is Barnes the 
central protagonist of this Vietnam narrative.
Having purged the inner beast from himself, Chris returns to America a mediator 
of new knowledge. The attainment of regeneration is signalled through a legitimisation of 
Chris’s experience, as affirmed by the privileging of his voice in a voice-over (separating 
the hero from other characters whose voices are heard only when they speak), and visually 
when he transcends from the depths of hell in a helicopter. One of the roles assigned to 
the frontier hero is that of a prophet who teaches his people from a position of authority 
and this is the role adopted by Chris. Richard Combs writes that:
As Chris, in Silhouette, is swallowed in incandescent light, his voice-over also 
becomes preachy: ‘Those of us who did make it have an obligation to build 
again, to teach others what we know. . .to find goodness and meaning to this 
life’.36
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Through the interlocking of these transparent signs, Platoon renders a sense of closure 
previously unattainable with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. As perceived by Sturken: 
“In rejecting the architectural lineage of monuments and contesting the aesthetic codes of 
previous war memorials, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial also refuses the closure and 
implied tradition of these structures. . .”37. This is reiterated by Mosse, who in concluding 
Fallen Soldiers uses the Vietnam Veterans memorial as evidence of the demise of his 
Myth of the War Experience:
Here there is no patriotic inscription, just the over-long list of the names of the 
dead engraved in the low-lying black wall, names to touch and to honour in 
private not public grief. . .Near it, at the request of some more conservative 
veterans, the American government erected a conventional war memorial 
showing members of each of the military services in uniform, grouped 
together, symbolising national duty. . .While the wall of mourning is crowded 
at all times, many fewer people visit the statue nearby. That old symbols have 
lost their power is not merely a sign of changing tastes, but an expression of 
attitudes toward war. The Vietnam War Memorial can stand not only as a 
monument to the fallen of the war, but also, snatching victory from defeat, as 
a monument to death, however provisional, of the Myth of the War 
Experience.38
As film memorial, however, Platoon manages to produce a warrior hero who has 
undergone a journey of maturation and education. At the beginning of the film, Chris 
admits his ignorance of the basic needs of survival in Vietnam: “I don’t even know what 
I’m doing. A gook could be standing three feet in front of me and I wouldn’t even know 
it.” In the coda of the movie, Chris asserts that “We did not fight the enemy, we fought
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ourselves and the enemy was in us”. The narrative envelope is enhanced by the visual 
cycle of the hero being flown in and out of Vietnam both times to the tune of Barber’s 
Adagio fo r  Strings.39 The movie thus carries on where the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial 
left off* ~  Chris returns to civilisation as a resurrected frontier hero, showing that the war 
served as a field of education and character building, and that participation in war is a 
route to heroic status. In glamorising war, the movie has even been likened to a recruiting 
advertisement where the carnage of war is made so exciting that it is possible to enjoy it.40
The process of naturalising the ideology of the frontier myth is advanced in the 
same fashion in Stone’s Born on the Fourth o f July (1990) and Heaven and Earth (1993). 
As cinematic adaptations of autobiographies these latter films, like Platoon, bear claims of 
authenticity with affirmations of the frontier paradigm (this is achieved in spite of Ron 
Kovic’s written account in the second film). Though Kovic’s autobiography explicitly sets 
up the American myth of Frontier heroism as the main driving force compelling him to 
fight in the Vietnam War, and exposes the myth as an ideological cloak which proved 
inadequate in the actual war experience, Stone’s Kovic journeys through the frontier cycle 
and measures up to the heroic ideal. In both the written account and the movie Kovic 
separates himself from the metropolis, and enters the wilderness of Vietnam where he is 
denied a regenerative violent act: though he instructs his squad to hold their fire his 
command is unheeded and this results in the massacre of innocent Vietnamese civilians. In 
the second violent act Kovic is blinded by the sun and shoots at the silhouette of a soldier 
emerging over the crest of a dune above him in self defence. It is significant that he is 
technically innocent on both accounts. Lacking the requisite victory, Kovic’s return to the
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metropolis necessitates the undertaking of another journey, with the Mexican wilderness 
furnishing the site for acculturation and a third violent act.
In Mexico Kovic grows his hair and takes on “the guise of the Indian, the natural 
man who in popular culture. . . .had been presented as the savage or noble Other 
confronting the white American on the frontier.”41 It is here that Kovic meets Charlie, 
played by Willem Dafoe. This is an interesting inter-textual link as Dafoe fulfils the same 
role in both the communes of the underworld drug den in Platoon and in this Long Island 
village in Bom  on the Fourth o f  July. The anima-id paradox is once again present, in the 
verbal exchange between the two ex-patriot veterans:
Charlie: Fuck ‘em. Fuck the Mexicans. Fuck the gooks. Fuck em’ all. . .
You ever have to kill gook babies? I’ll bet you was never ordered to kill little
gook babies.
Kovic: Leave me the fuck alone. Maybe I killed more babies than you did.
The conversation takes place as the two circle closer to one another in their wheelchairs 
and drag one another down, fighting to exhaustion. It is then that Charlie asks the 
question: “How are we gonna get out of here?”, and Kovic comes to the realisation that 
there is a way out for him, a way back to the metropolis from the wilderness. This third 
“Violent Act” does not constitute an actual killing, but language that is replete with 
notions of killing mixed with sexual obscenities. It proves to be regenerative once again 
through the ploy of scapegoating. Just as Elias is gunned down in Platoon so that his 
heroic mantle may fall on Chris’s shoulders, Charlie delivers to Kovic the crucial advice of
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“doing it in the lips” (and is left behind in Mexico), alluding to the dream that Kovic’s 
mother has of him speaking to a large crowd of people.
In the written account, Kovic’s failure is determined by his accidental shooting of 
Lance Corporal Wilson, a fellow marine whose safety he had guaranteed prior to the 
battle. He does not have the opportunity to eradicate his guilt. In the cinematic 
adaptation, Kovic redeems his killing of Wilson by telling the latter’s family the truth 
about their son’s death. Stone’s camera work and editing of the scene is particularly 
evocative of the idea that Kovic is resurrected by his confession:
Kovic’s departure from Wilson’s home is captured in a crane shot which 
slowly rises above Wilson’s front yard littered with generations of cast-off 
junk and up through brown autumn leaves clinging to a tree in the foreground.
A sound overlap of the song “When Johnny comes marching Home,” begins 
and continues as a large American flag is superimposed over the tree. This 
tree is more like the sun-dappled, green-leaved tree of Kovic’s youth than the 
ravaged battlefield tree in Vietnam: this tree is mature, and although dormant, 
not dead. Rising from above his guilt, Kovic has begun the process of 
regaining his manhood, his patriotism, and his life by coming home and 
admitting the truth of what he did in Vietnam, to take responsibility for it, and 
to communicate to fellow Americans who must share that responsibility.
My Emphasis
The cycle of “Regeneration Through Violence” ultimately reaches full cycle when the 
cinematic adaptation concludes with Kovic at the 1976 Democratic National Convention 
in New York City, awakening fellow citizens to the “folly and waste of imposing the
288
American frontier myth upon an alien culture.”42 This cycle is mapped out in the 
following diagram.
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Interesting conclusions can be drawn in comparing the mise-en-scene of this final 
scene to John Voight’s character Luke in the parallel final sequence of Coming Home. 
In Born on the Fourth o f July, Tom Cruise is made up in the image of Kovic, a 
transformation so complete that it was “unnerving”: when the real Kovic saw him he 
claimed that with his “long hair and moustache” Cruise looked “just like” him, “it was like 
looking at a photograph” of himself.43 For Kovic’s speech at the Democratic National 
Convention, however, Cruise is restored to his former good looks while John Voight 
retains his long hair and moustache. Moreover, while Cruise is impeccably attired in 
military uniform and engaging in the reputable task of enlightening “fellow Americans” at 
a national convention, Voight is informally dressed in faded T-shirt and denim jeans, 
addressing a group of school boys in a hall, in front of a stage. This marks a transition 
from victimised vet in a wheelchair to vet, still in wheelchair, but endowed with 
conventional qualities of heroism. Cruise is elevated on a stage, above his audience of 
peers, the focus of their attention and respect.
Heaven and Earth has been lauded as a film that represents Stone’s coming to 
terms with two Others ~  the feminine and the Vietnamese experience of war. In contrast 
with Platoon and Born on the Fourth o f July with their central white male protagonists 
and neglect of the Vietnamese perspective, this third film has a Vietnamese woman at its 
centre. The landscape of Vietnam is accorded a proper physical, historical and 
philosophical identity ~  the camera pans across verdant green fields of padi documenting 
the Vietnamese way of life. The political agenda of the Viet Cong is also relayed, as well 
as the historical facts of the Japanese and French invasions. The philosophical nature of
the relationship between the Vietnamese people and the crop they grow and eat is 
conveyed in the scene where the heroine’s mother (played by Joan Chen) teaches her the 
sacred communion that is the process of eating rice. The film charts Le Ly’s experience of 
war. After a hapless existence in Vietnam, where she is tortured by both political sides 
(the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese government), she is forced into prostitution and 
in her most desperate moments rummages through the garbage at a military camp, where 
she sees, to her horror, the remains of Vietnamese prostitutes killed by American soldiers. 
Le Ly is rescued from her “bad karma” by U.S. Marine Steve Butler (Tommy Lee Jones) 
to California, where aisles of food lining supermarkets and massive well-stocked 
refrigerators signify a land of plenty. Haunted by the guilt of his participation in Vietnam, 
Steve despairs of his sanity, kidnaps their children and commits suicide. Thirteen years 
later, Le Ly is a successful businesswoman renting houses and owning restaurants.
The underlying ethos of Heaven and Earth is strikingly similar to the captivity 
narratives of the frontier myth. Le Ly fulfils many of the criteria defining the captive:
In it a single individual, usually a woman, stands passively under the strokes 
of evil, awaiting rescue by the grace of God. The sufferer represents the 
whole, chastened body of Puritan society; and the temporary bondage of 
captive to Indian is a dual paradigm -  of the bondage of the soul to the flesh 
and to the temptations arising from original sin, and of the self-exile of the 
English Israel from England. . .The captive’s ultimate redemption by the grace 
of Christ and the efforts of the puritan magistrates is likened to the 
regeneration of the soul in conversion. The ordeal is at once threatful of pain 
and evil and promising of ultimate salvation.44
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She attributes each experience of torture she suffers to “bad karma” — punishment for the 
sins of her past lives and not to her oppressor’s abuse of authority, with an adulterous 
affair in Saigon representing “the bondage of the soul to the flesh and to the temptations 
arising from original sin”. Steve facilitates her “ultimate redemption”. Though she is not 
a “self-exile” of an “English Israel from England”, this difficulty is resolved by the 
American conception of South Vietnam as a captive of North Vietnamese forces, and 
Stone’s whitening of his female protagonist.45 Le Ly is victimised not only by the Viet 
Cong, but also tortured by the South Vietnamese soldiers. Though this last instance is 
witnessed by an American soldier it is clear that he is innocent of the atrocities committed 
on the woman.
A sequence that could pose a problem to this argument is the segment where Le 
Ly’s father is badly beaten by the American soldiers, but this is dissipated by Stone’s 
specific use of a cinematic device. He shoots the sequence in six frames a second and in 
black and white 35mm to emphasise that it was a “fractured memory”. The vague nature 
of this episode is contrasted with the sequence where Le Ly’s mother is almost executed 
by the Viet Cong, where the sequence is shot with twenty-four frames a second.46 At the 
end of the film, Le Ly is “whitened” by her acculturation to the American way, and this is 
signalled by several incidents. In opposition to a previous section where the behaviour of 
her parents establishes the patriarchal nature of power relations between the Vietnamese 
sexes Le Ly loses the submissive and long suffering traits of an “oriental wife” and finds 
herself behaving “like an American”: scowling and speaking back to her husband. When 
she returns to Vietnam, her mother finds her so changed that she is called ghost — a direct
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Chinese translation of someone with a foreign appearance, in this context Caucasian. 
The acculturation of Le Ly is not contrary to Stone’s intentions, for his aim was to present 
“a woman’s life in a series of stages and transformations; her identity is remade by one 
person after another until she discovers her true self.”47 The discovery is that her salvation 
can only be attained in America, an assertion that is also made in Hayslip’s autobiography.
Hayslip Americanises her native experience of war by making it an uncanny 
reflection of the American fight for independence: it was “like the American 
Revolution.”48 In a subsequent chapter entitled “The Pursuit of Happiness”, in the second 
part “Finding the American Dream” (both terms are employed literally) of Child o f War, 
Woman o f Peace, Hayslip has no qualms in declaring that this independence, the route to 
self-discovery, is achieved in America:
I now owned three houses in and around a major American city and a 
third of a growing business — no mean feat for a meo con kitten so scrawny 
at birth that the peasant midwife wanted to choke me and throw me away!. .
.And (though I still collected rejection slips) my book was ripening on its vine 
along with my bank account.
Was there anything more a woman like me could want? 49
Hayslip’s autobiography offers the possibility of redemptive war via the implementation of 
a captivity narrative, as a chronicle of the successful attainment of “The American 
Dream”, in which the basis of success finds its improbable source in the American invasion 
of Vietnam. In the movie, it is also in America that the pivotal act of violence takes place.
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Tommy Lee Jones’s character is akin to Willem Dafoe’s in the first two films of 
the trilogy. He becomes another ‘Saint of the woods’, as the tragic hero who is 
scapegoated for the extension of civilisation — upon his return to the States, he discloses 
to Le Ly that he cannot assimilate back into a life of inactivity as the marine corps had 
made him a “killer”, and he did not know how to do anything else. His descent into 
savagery is marked by the barbaric kidnapping of their children. The mantle of civilisation 
is passed onto the whitened Le Ly, who emerges as victor in the violent act (the 
kidnapping and encounter with the savage) and the cycle of “Regeneration Through 
Violence” is completed. This route through the frontier cycle is traced in the following 
diagram:
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In all three films the Vietnam War is imagined as a site that produces a frontier 
hero, with a corresponding acquisition of regeneration through violence. They are 
surfaces of emergence in which the translation from frontier myth to discourse is intact. 
The communication of frontier ideology, and manipulation of history to depict not defeat, 
loss and suffering but victory and regeneration in Vietnam are located within realist 
narratives that claim authenticity. These second wave Vietnam War films occupy the third 
level of historic manipulation, while parading as historic accuracy. The ideology of 
American supremacy — damaged in the 1960’s and shattered after Vietnam — undergoes a 
complex process of repair and negotiation within popular culture to the point of attaining 
naturalisation.
Seen in this context, Auster and Quart’s unease as to the only “rhetorical 
obeisance” that the Reagan administration makes to the Vietnam dead is, in fact, a logical 
progression of events:
(The Reagan administration) continues to often demonstrate an utter 
obliviousness to the (Vietnam) war’s murderous lessons. Its covert, overt, and 
illegal support of the contras in Nicaragua repeats many of the same 
strategies and arguments that led us into the Vietnam quagmire. Beyond 
Nicaragua, the administration offers inflated and ever-escalating military 
budgets, hard-line posturing on arms control and the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI), and in general a penchant for cold-war oratory and 
confrontational politics that has softened under the spotlight of Gorbachev’s 
glasnost.50
My Emphasis
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The implications of a successful masking of the horrors of war, a legitimisation of that 
experience, and a displacement of its reality with a new constructed past that re-instates 
the original martial ideology, are sobering. The domestication of war in times of peace — 
its acceptance as a natural route to social heroism — entails an attitude of brutalisation and 
indifference to individual human life that could perpetuate itself in greater manifestations 
of mass violence.51 A frontier myth that is exposed and shattered does not have the 
ideological power to propel men into action against a political enemy, but when repaired, 
its ideological utility can once again be exploited. This process was achieved with the 
tools of popular culture, in a decade when the audience for the movies was unlikely to 
have been directly involved in the war, or witnessed first-hand its devastating effects of 
suffering and loss.
The Post-Revisionist Western
The revival of the Western in the late 1980s points to this repair of the frontier myth. 
Including the two Young Guns (1988, 1990), Lonesome Dove and Dances with Wolves 
(1990), movies that Slotkin sees as the genesis of a fourth sustained revival of the Western 
genre, the flood of Westerns consists of Silverado (1985), City Slickers (1991), 
Unforgiven, The Last o f the Mohicans (1992), Geronimo: An American Legend, 
Tombstone (1993), Bad Girls, Maverick, Wyatt Earp, The Cowboy Way (1994), The 
Quick and the Dead (1995), and the Western movie animations of An American Tail: 
Fievel Goes West (1991), Pocahontas and Toy Story (1995). It is striking that, with some
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exceptions (notably Unforgiven, but Clint Eastwood has seldom been unexceptional), 
many of these recent Westerns tend to be “post-revisionist” — relapsing backward to a 
stage prior to the generic progression of revisionist Westerns that began with Broken 
Arrow. It would not be possible to analyse all the films mentioned here in any great depth, 
but a select key group would suffice in explaining the nature of the post-revisionist 
Western.
The Last o f  the Mohicans returns the Western to its point of mythic origin — that 
of the captivity narrative. The film’s retelling of frontier mythology has clearly been 
facilitated by the process of mythic repair. The frontier myth emerges in its purest form, 
re-situating the film in a period where that direct representation can once again convey the 
quality of mythic verisimilitude. The Last o f the Mohicans contains frontier discourse that 
explicitly communicates the fundamentals of the myth. While revisionist Westerns seek to 
elevate the Indian with a sympathetic representation, the post-revisionist Western firmly 
reinstates the boundary between American and Other, often through a process of 
dehumanisation. Early on in The Last o f the Mohicans for example, there is the 
stereotypical barbaric ambush led by the Hurons on the retreating British forces, replete 
with scalping and the slashing of throats on a tumultuous killing field. In addition to this, 
a racist interpretation of acceptable sexuality is perpetuated in the transference of the 
romantic alliance from the Mohican Uncas and Cora in Cooper’s 1826 original rendition 
onto Hawkeye and Cora, with Uncas and Alice (a secondary alliance consisting not of 
actualised passion but of smouldering glances) killed off in a move to avoid any blurring of 
the boundary between the American and the Other.
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The Last o f the Mohicans is followed by no less than two versions of the 
showdown at the O.K. Corral: Wyatt Earp and Tombstone. Edward Gallafent writes that 
the titles of these two recent Westerns would evoke associations that are likely to relate 
modern audiences to a significant body of Western fact, fiction, and film-making. The 
films depict incidents and characters that are intrinsic parts of the landscape of the 
Western, exemplified particularly in My Darling Clementine (1946) and Gunfight at the 
OK Corral (1957).52 While The Last o f the Mohicans brings the Western back to its 
mythic origins, these Westerns recall the genre’s “Golden era”, when the Western was a 
thriving and dominant vehicle of frontier discourse. The following critiques Wyatt Earp 
together with Silverado and Dances with Wolves, because in each of these Westerns Kevin 
Costner is cast as the quintessential post-revisionist Westerner.
In Wyatt Earp, Kevin Costner is literally John Rambo in cowboy boots, and the 
frontier hero is reinstated as an invincible super-human -- in the showdown near the OK 
Corral with the Clantons, Earp walks into point-blank gunfire and is unscathed. Costner is 
in the centre of the frame, his coat tails lifted in the wind like the cape of superman, while 
the bodies of his compatriots and the enemy are scattered around him. His second 
supernatural encounter occurs when he is in pursuit of the same gang of rustlers, this time 
for the revenge of his brother Morgan. Earp and Doc Holliday are ambushed as they 
traverse some cliffs, and Earp runs out of ammunition. He turns around, walks to his 
horse and reaches for his shotgun, turning back to face a member of the Clanton gang who 
has, all this time, been firing at him with a gun in each hand. The look of incredulity on 
this man’s face as he falls to the ground, barely five metres away, is no doubt a sentiment
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shared by the spectator. In general, the movie echoes celebratory treatments of the legend 
of Wyatt Earp such as in My Darling Clementine and Gunfight at the OK Corral A 
revisionist depiction of the legend would question it, as in Hour o f the Gun and Doc.
The movie’s expression of legend and truth is telling. This surfaces in relation to 
the story of Tommy O’Rourke, whom Earp is reputed to have saved from a lynch mob. 
Earlier on in the movie, Josie Marcus questions Earp about the incident, and it is clear that 
this story endears him to her and is a factor that grounds their romantic alliance. Earp’s 
reply is that he cannot remember the man. At the end of the movie, after 17 years have 
passed, Earp and Josie (now his wife) are on their way to Alaska when a young man 
recognises him and thanks him for saving his uncle Tommy O’Rourke. As the nephew of 
O’Rourke relates the story to jog Earp’s memory, the audience is provided with a 
flashback of the incident. No cinematic devices are present that suggest the story is 
vague, though it is second-hand and passed down from the young man’s father. The 
young man leaves after expressing his respect for Earp. Earp turns around and says: 
“Some people say it didn’t happen that way”, but Josie gets the last word — an echo of the 
editor in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance — “Never mind Wyatt, it happened that 
way”. They gaze off into the horizon and then autobiographical details of the various 
characters in the movie come onto the screen, the ages they lived up to, as well as the 
claim that Wyatt died without having been so much as grazed by a bullet.
The Costner persona does not vary much in Dances with Wolves. The superman 
image is established in the opening sequences, when Dunbar, played by Costner, attempts 
suicide. In between two armies fighting in the civil war, Costner rides his horse (with the
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letters “U.S.” symbolically printed on its side) across the field ~  the camera focuses on his 
hands on the reigns and pans outwards as he lifts his arms in cruciform pose. Barely 20 
metres away, a line of soldiers is firing at him, and a total of 27 shots fail even to graze the 
rider. The voice-over tells us: “In trying to produce my own death I was elevated to the 
status of a living hero.” Michael Walker has written about how this sequence could even 
be a specific reference to Sgt. Elias in Platoon, at his moment of death.53 While Elias dies 
in Vietnam, however, Costner is resurrected after his cruxifiction. The translation from 
vet to frontier hero is here accomplished with ease. The movie also pays homage to 
captivity narratives found in Little Big Man and Soldier Blue. Dunbar is posted to an 
abandoned soldier’s fort, and cultivates friendships with the neighbouring Sioux people. 
He falls in love with Stands with a Fist, a white woman whose family was massacred by 
the Pawnee and adopted by the Holy Man of the Lakota tribe, Kicking Bird (Graham 
Greene). Unlike the Vietnam Westerns, Dunbar later fully acculturated as Dances with 
Wolves -- he eats raw buffalo, wears Indian dress, dances round a fire he builds himself to 
a background soundtrack of Indian war whoops — is not a victim. He leaves the tribe 
attended by a sober and tearful farewell (so that the potential My Lai is circumvented), 
with his wife by Indian marriage (who is conveniently white to avoid similar racial 
complications as in Last o f the Mohicans). There is a suggestive line in the movie said by 
Kicking Bird’s wife about the union of Dunbar and Stands With a Fist: “Noone is angry”, 
“it makes sense” because “they are both white”.
In Silverado Costner is Jake, the younger brother of Emmet. The strand of 
humour attached to his character Dances with Wolves is also present in this earlier film.
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Costner belongs to the group of “good” cowboys — those who care about dogs and little 
old ladies (Paden, played by Kevin Kline), who act responsibly towards younger and 
weaker members of their family (Emmet and Malachi) -- with only the rather precious flaw 
of kissing girls he shouldn’t be kissing. The “bad” cowboys use the number 13 and are 
mean to little old ladies (Cob), they let their cattle loose on land that is not theirs, victimise 
old men of a minority race, and kidnap little boys (McKendrick’s gang) and gamble 
(Slick). The movie reads like a morality play with equivalent dialogue. Rosanna 
Arquette’s character warns Paden (Kevin Kline) that her beauty will not last but that the 
beauty of the earth will, and Estelle doesn’t like the fact that “good people are being hurt” 
because of her. Kevin Kline exhibits the qualities of the post-revisionist hero when he 
shoots a thief — the latter is advancing on him, fires four shots (one going through the seat 
of Kline’s long johns but not touching him). Kline is all this while stationary, and loading 
the gun he has just bought from a store. When he is ready he looks up, fires one shot and 
kills the horse-rider.
All three movies are explicit versions of frontier mythology, and also engage in 
idealized, uncomplicated discourses of the myth. The supremacy of the white protagonist 
bows only to verisimilitude of a generic and mythic nature. Cultural verisimilitude is 
deemed unecessary when credibility in the frontier discourse is unproblemmatic. In Wyatt 
Earp the glorification of the legend is accompanied with a dismissal of the Native 
American. Aside from derogatory comments, one made by Sheriff Johnny Behan that 
Indians who are afraid of their souls being captured by the camera, and another by 
O’Rourke’s nephew that whilst Earp was saving his uncle his brothers were away
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“collecting renegade Indians”, the sole native American in the movie makes his presence 
as “Indian Charlie”, a member of the Clanton gang. “Indian Charlie” appears in three 
scenes. The camera provides a fleeting glimpse of him when members of the Clanton gang 
are tried in court, and if that went by unnoticed, the camera is given an excuse to draw 
more attention to him when he tries to steady himself after Doc Holliday slaps the horse he 
is riding, and finally his longest acting segment has him being pursued through the woods 
before being gunned down by Earp. In Dances with Wolves the Lakota are “polite 
guests”, “eager to laugh, devoted to family”, with a “familiar humour” and Dunbar has 
never met a people “so dedicated to each other”. The depiction of the Pawnee, however, 
is where the movie falls short of being pro-Native American. Apart from carrying the 
responsibility of the flashback massacre on a white family including women and children, 
they scalp and kill an innocent mule skinner (with unforgivably inequitable odds of four to 
one), attack the harmonious Lakota tribe without good reason (“Pawnee do not come for 
horses, they come for blood). The U.S. Army is portrayed as insane, illiterate and corrupt. 
Costner does, however, emerge as the noble white frontier hero one step above the Lakota 
in sacrificing himself for their safety. In Silverado no native Americans feature at all, 
though the role of Malachi Johnson does provide a slight balance to the other three WASP 
heroes.
The re-release of the Star Wars trilogy in the wake of Independence Day deserves 
some comment. Independence Day is unreservedly a vessel of WASP ideology, where the 
savage Other, as with Star Wars, is alien. The climax of the film occurs when the two 
male protagonists manage to fly an alien craft into the mothership (acquisition of the skills
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of the Other) and implant a computer virus, enabling the American President to fire the 
disabling shot that saves the world from the alien invasion. The world is saved by the 
representative of WASP patriarchy, and the fourth of July becomes Independence Day for 
the entire world. A telling comment is made by one of the non-American troops 
expressing the gratitude that the rest of the world should be feeling: “I’m glad the 
Americans are doing something”. The conservative backlash of the 1980s relating to the 
discrediting of American values in the sixties and seventies echoes the attempt to restore 
status quo in the thirties. A comparison of the instrumentality that genres in popular 
culture had in reflecting and negotiating the changes in the socio-political environment of 
these two periods will form the argument of the conclusion.
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Epilogue
Generic Interludes and the Reconstruction of Myth
. . .repression operated as a sentence to disappear, but also as an injunction to 
silence, an affirmation of non-existence, and, by implication, an admission that 
there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, nothing to know. Such
was the hypocrisy of our bourgeois society with its halting logic.1
Michel Foucault
The Western’s “golden era” separates the two periods regularly identified as lapses in the
history of the genre. Gerald D. Nash writes that the reception of the West as myth
between 1945 and 1960 was exceptionally positive -- by 1950 Americans read at least 18 
million Westerns annually, tens of millions went to see the frontier myth communicated in 
movie Westerns, while audiences of television Westerns such as “Bonanza” and 
“Gunsmoke” formed even greater numbers.2 The occurrence of such a phenomenon was 
far from the anticipations of trade papers that predicted the demise of the Western in the 
late 1920s.
Similar forecasts of the genre’s eclipse were made in the late 1960s. Richard 
Maltby suggests that in this latter instance the Western is formulated as a critical object: a 
cultural text of masculine seriousness by white male critics. That decade of uncertainty
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spawned key works that elevated the Western to a state of classicism -- in 1969 Jim Kitses 
wrote Horizons West, in 1971 John G. Cawelti Six Gun Mystique, in 1973 Philip French 
Westerns, in 1974 Jack Nachbar edited the volume Focus on the Western and in 1975 Will 
Wright published Six Guns and Society. The exception appears to be There Must be a 
Lone Ranger (1974), written by a woman, Jenni Calder. However, the distinction ends 
there. Calder’s approach to the movie genre is not at variance with the project of her 
white male counterparts; in fact, There Must be a Lone Ranger, as its title suggests, 
positions itself as a nostalgic construction of the genre. This is exemplified early in her 
introduction, where she announces her intention “to describe and explain the essential 
ingredients of the Western in terms of the contribution to the myth and their appeal”, with 
the attendant claim that “the Western defies the limitations of history”. Calder’s selection 
of Westerns consists of those screened in the 25 years preceding her work, a corpus (‘A’ 
Westerns made between 1945 and the early 1970s) on which importance is also bestowed 
in the other key works mentioned. The justification she gives for this is significant 
because of its emphasis on nostalgia: “it is these films that are most likely to have been 
seen and remembered by those who take pleasure in Westerns.”3 Her conclusion re-enacts 
the dehistoricizing process that began in her introductory claim:
It is not necessary to belong to the West to enjoy this submission of the 
Western heritage. It is not even necessary to be American; millions of non- 
Americans respond to the re-enactment of the individual facing a gigantic 
challenge. The sheer scope of challenge in the Western is probably unique.
That and the solitariness of the hero make the confrontation both elemental 
and magnificant. They are two o f the essential qualities o f classic myth and
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in one form or another audiences have been responding to them for 
centuries.4
My Emphasis
This granting of classic status and the attribution of timelessness in the form of this 
nostalgic construction (“the Western”) is based on a historically limited body of film texts. 
In a comparable manner, the frontier myth, though originating from a specific historical 
period, defies history in its acquisition of a persistant usage that defines a society’s way of 
interpreting its present and recent past.
In the two periods of heightened political and social crisis identified in this thesis, 
the frontier myth became an anachronism: it reverted back to a series of actual events in 
the historical past that had no relevance in the present. Moreover, its version of those 
events were now suspect. A myth can only be persuasive if it can be understood as 
history, but the frontier myth’s interpretation of actual events in the past was in the two 
periods of crisis regarded as historically inaccurate. As a result, explicit discourses of the 
myth that impose its version of contemporary events were rejected. In the 1930s this 
rejection pertained especially to the narrative of expansion, and in the 1970s the narrative 
of victory. In the 1970s there is a moment when the mythology is reinterpreted, and the 
Vietnam Western maintains that its revisionist account of history is accurate, but in the 
telling of that accurate historical account, the mythology is discredited.
The gaps in the Western’s popularity were interludes when these components in 
the deep structure of the myth (the narratives of expansion and victory) were repressed. 
They represented an act of atonement for the sins of materialism and imperialism
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respectively, “an admission that there was nothing to say about such things”. However, 
the migration of frontier discourse to other genres -- sustaining the myth in the 1930s, and 
repairing it in the 1970s and 1980s — created a space of ideological negotiation that 
allowed for a reassertion of the myth’s utility. The following diagram charts this process:
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MYTHIC REPAIR IN THE 
1930s AND 1970s
STRUCTURE 
OF MYTH 1930s 1970s 1976 1980s
URFACE
ng^ H DIACHRONIC 
I CHANGE
w w v k w v iDEEP
A: Suppression of narrative of expansion 
(Gangster film and‘B’ Western)
B: Suppression of narrative of victory
(Vietnam Western and 1st wave Vietnam War films)
*: Release of Star Wars
C: Frontier Myth emerges intact
(2nd wave Vietnam War films and the Post-revisionist Western)
The argument of this thesis has been to illustrate the cultural instrumentality of movie 
genres as receptacles for myth: the generic space of the Western remains relevant when 
diachronic challenges can be accommodated by a binary resolution that offers an overlap 
between cultural and a mythic verisimilitude. This process of ideological negotiation is 
more complex in reponse to the 1970s, when the myth is dismantled to its basic 
constituents such that the original process of myth-making is replicated. The captivity 
narrative is severed from the triumphalist scenario of the Indian-war story, a disassembling 
of the historical integration that Slotkin locates as the moment that was the genesis of the 
Myth of the Frontier “in which the triumph of civilization over savagery is symbolized by 
the hunter/warrior’s rescue of the White woman held captive by savages.”5 The 
reinstatement of innocence was successfully united with the restoration of a credible, 
victorious hero-protagonist in the post-Vietnam war era. The post-revisionist Western 
communicates explicit frontier discourses of an imperialist victory, negating and separating 
itself from the disabling charges of racism and sexism. This celebration of the frontier 
resists accusations of hypocrisy. It attests to the provenance of myth in tandem with the 
instruments of popular culture -- transcending history and substituting a new and guiltless 
past in the shared memory of the American imagination.
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Appendix
The following statistics are selected from tables compiled by Ed Buscombe in the BFI 
Companion to the Western (London: Andre Deutsch/BFI Publishing, 1988), pp. 426- 
428.
Table 1: Production of Westerns 1930-1940
1930 79
1931 85
1932 108
1933 65
1934 76
1935 145
1936 135
1937 135
1938 112
1939 123
1940 143
Table 2: Production of Westerns / Total Features by Studio 1928-1940
COL FOX
1930 5/29 4/48
1931 11/31 5/48
1932 16/29 4/40
1933 10/32 5/50
1934 4/43 2/52
1935 13/49 3/52
1936 15/52 4/57
1937 15/52 6/61
1938 19/54 3/56
1939 14/52 5/59
1940 17/51 8/49
MGM PAR RKO
5/47 5/63 3/32
2/46 6/61 4/33
1/39 2/55 8/46
0/42 6/59 4/48
1/43 4/53 1/46
1/47 8/58 3/40
3/45 12/72 5/39
2/51 12/64 5/53
1/46 10/50 10/43
3/49 12/50 8/49
4/49 1/37 7/53
UA U WB
0/15 14/40 6/76
0/13 2/23 0/54
0/14 9/30 3/55
1/16 9/37 3/55
0/20 6/44 0/58
1/19 9/37 2/49
2/17 9/28 4/56
0/25 9/37 8/68
1/16 11/46 3/52
1/19 7/49 2/53
2/20 10/55 2/43
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Table 3: Major Hollywood Studios’ Production o f ‘A’ and {B ’ Westerns 1930-1940
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
COL
All films 29 31 29 32 43 49 52 52 54 52 51
All Westerns 5 11 16 10 4 13 15 15 19 14 17
‘A’ Westerns 1
FOX
All films 48 48 40 50 52 52 57 61 56 59 49
All Westerns 4 5 4 5 2 3 4 6 3 5 8
£A’ Westerns 2 1 - - - 1 1 - - 3 3
MGM
All films 47 46 39 42 43 47 45 51 46 49 49
All Westerns 5 2 1 - 1 1 3 2 1 3 4
‘A’ Westerns 2 1 - - - 1 3 1 1 2 2
PAR
All films 63 61 55 59 53 58 72 64 50 57 50
All Westerns 5 6 2 6 4 8 12 12 10 8 10
‘A’ Westerns 2 2 - - - 1 2 2 1 1 2
RKO
All film 32 33 46 48 46 40 39 53 43 49 53
All Westerns 3 4 8 4 1 3 5 5 10 8 7
‘A’ Westerns - 1 1 - - 1 - - - - -
UA
All films 15 13 4 15 20 19 17 24 16 19 20
All Westerns - - - 1 - 1 2 - 1 1 2
‘A’ Westerns - - - 1 - - - - - - 2
U
All films 40 23 30 37 44 37 28 37 46 49 55
All Westerns 14 2 9 9 6 9 9 9 11 7 10
‘A’ Westerns 1 - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 1
WB
All films 76 54 55 55 58 49 56 68 52 53 43
All Westerns 6 - 3 3 - 2 4 8 3 2 2
CA’ Westerns 2 2 2 2
Totals
All films 350 309 308 339 359 351 366 411 363 387 370
All Westerns 42 30 43 38 18 40 54 57 58 48 60
‘A’ Westerns 9 5 2 1 - 4 7 3 4 9 13
313
Notes
Preface
1. John Harkness, The Academy Awards Handbook (NY: Pinnacle Books, 1994). At 
this point I am leaving out The Deer Hunter as it falls into the category of war films.
2. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 627.
3. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 628.
4. Richard White, “Frederick Jackson Turner and Buffalo Bill” in James R. Grossman, 
ed., The Frontier in American Culture (Berkely: University of California Press, 
1994), p. 9.
5. White, “Frederick Jackson Turner and Buffalo Bill”, p. 54.
6. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 254.
7. Paul Smith, Clint Eastwood: A Cultural Production (London: UCL Press Limited, 
1993), p. 264.
8. Patricia Nelson Limerick, “The Adventures of the Frontier in the Twentieth 
Century” in James R. Grossman, ed., The Frontier in American Culture, p. 74.
Chapter One: The Western and Hollywood’s Classic Era
1. Robert Warshow, “Movie Chronicle: The Westerner”, in Focus on The Western, ed. 
JackNachbar (N.J.: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1974), p. 52.
2. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 234.
3. Richard Maltby, Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1995), p. 107.
4. Steve Neale, “Questions of Genre”, Screen 31:1 (Spring 1990), p. 46.
5. Neale, “Questions of Genre”, p. 56.
6. Dwight Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” in Rosenberg and White, eds.
314
Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America (New York: Free Press, 1957), quoted 
inMaltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 28.
7. Richard Dyer, “Entertainment and Utopia”, Movie no. 24 (Spring 1977), pp. 10-1.
8. Dyer, “Entertainment and Utopia”, p. 12.
9. John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 5.
10. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, p. 5.
11 .Richard Dyer, The Dumb Blonde Stereotype: Documentation fo r  EAS Class-room 
Materials (London: Educational Advisory Service, BFI, 1979).
12.Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, pp. 6-8.
13.Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the Studio System 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 4.
14.Robert B. Ray, A Certain Tendency o f the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 29.
15.Balio, 1976; Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 4.
16.David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema: Film Style and Mode o f Production to 1960 (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 
91.
17.Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, p. 96.
18.Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 6; Schatz derives his statistics from Christopher H. 
Sterling and Timothy R. Haight’s The Mass Media: Aspen Institute Guide to 
Communication Industry Trends (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978).
19.Charles Eckbert, “Shirley Temple and the House of Rockerfeller,” Jump Cut2 (July- 
August 1974), p. 1; Ray, p. 30.
20.Lewis Jacobs, The Rise o f the American Film (New York: Teachers College Press, 
1939), p. 421; Robert Sklar, Movie-Made America: A Social History o f the 
American Movies (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 162-167; Tino Balio, 
Grand Design: Hollywood as Modern Business Enterprise, 1930-1939 (California: 
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 22-25.
21.Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 30.
22. Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 31. Donald MacRae suggests that this ideological 
tension is characteristically American, inevitable for a nation founded on a claim to
315
perfection, yet still strongly aspiring to progress (Richard Maltby, Harmless 
' Entertainment: Hollywood and the Ideology o f the Consensus [London: The 
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1983], p. 160.)
23.Balio, p. 281.
24.Neale, “Questions of Genre”, p. 64.
25.Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 110.
26.Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 109.
27. Andre Bazin insisted on the category of “Sur-Western” which stressed the 
romanisation of frontier themes. (Cahiers du Cinema, Christmas 1995; George N. 
Fenin and William K. Everson, The Western: From Silents to the Seventies 
[Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977], p. 19)
28.Philip French, Westerns: Aspects o f a Movie Genre (London: Seeker & Warburg, 
BFI, 1973), p. 18.
29.Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, 
(Cleveland, Ohio: Press of Case Western University, 1973), p. 5.
30.Laura Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 16.
31 .Kristin Thompson, Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 11.
32.Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, p. 18.
33.Carol Clover, Men, Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film 
(London: BFI, 1992), p. 11.
34. James B. Twitchell, Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy o f Modern Horror (NY and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 84; Clover, p. 11.
35.Robin Wood, “Return of the Repressed,” Film Comment 14 (1978), p. 26; Clover,
p. 12.
36. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 233.
37.Andrew Britton, “Blissing Out: The Politics of Reaganite Entertainment,” Movie 
31/32 (1986), pp. 2-3; Clover, p. 9.
38.Tzvetan Todorov, ‘An Introduction to Verisimilitude’ in Introduction to Poetics 
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1981), pp 118-119; Neale, “Questions of Genre”, p.
47.
39.Richard Maltby, Harmless Entertainment, p. 25.
316
40.Ray, p. 26.
41. Alan Williams, ‘Is a Radical Genre Criticism Possible?’, Quarterly Review o f Film 
Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1984) in Neale, “Questions of Genre”, p. 59.
42.Tag Gallagher, ‘Shoot-Out at the Genre Corral: Problems in the ‘Evolution’ of the 
Western’; Barry Keith Grant, ed., Film Genre Reader (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1986), p. 212.
43.Alan Williams, ‘Is a Radical Genre Criticism Possible?’, p. 123.
44.Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, Romance, p. 252.
45.Schatz, Hollywood Genres, pp. 36-38.
46.Todorov, The Fantastic, p. 8.
47.Ray, p. 30.
48.Robert Sklar, Movie-Made America: A Social History o f American Movies, (New 
York, Random House, 1975), pp. 195-96; Ray, p. 31.
49.Balio, pp. 37-72.
50.Maltby, “The Production Code and the Hays Office”, p. 71.
51 .Charles Eckert “The Anatomy of a Proletarian Film: Warner’s Marked 
Woman,"Film Quarterly 21 (Winter 1973-1974), pp. 10-24.
52.Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner, Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology o f 
Contemporary Hollywood Film (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1988), p. 1.
53.Ryan and Kellner, p. 1.
54.Ryan and Kellner, p. 1.
55.Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 24.
56.Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker, New York: Norton, 1978) p. 172; Ray, p. 13
57.David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985), p. 31.
58.Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, p. 34.
59.Ryan and Kellner, p. 76.
60. John G. Cawelti, “Chinatown and Recent Generic Transformations” in Film Genre 
Reader, p. 192.
61.Cawelti, “Chinatown and Recent Generic Transformations”, p. 194.
317
62.Christine Buci-Glucksmann, “Hegemony and Consent: A Political Strategy” in 
Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and 
Readers Publishing Cooperative Society Ltd., 1982)
63.Maltby, Harmless Entertainment, p. 25.
64.Will Wright, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study o f the Western (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), p. 16, 25.
65. Christopher Frayling, Spaghetti Westerns: Cowboys and Europeans from Karl May 
to Sergio Leone (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 46.
66.Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 68; 
Wright, p. 132.
67.Wright, p. 132.
68.Wright, p. 135.
69.Wright, p. 140.
70.Wright, p. 171.
71.C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962); Will Wright, p. 182.
72.Wright, pp. 182-184.
73 .Wright, p. 183.
74.Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America (London: The 
Penguin Group, 1990), p. 387.
75.Frayling, Spaghetti Westerns, p. 57.
Chapter Two: The Western and Frontier Mythology
1. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 6.
2. Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 3.
3. Nash Smith, Virgin Land, pp. 3, 250.
4. Jim Kitses, Horizons West: Anthony Mann, Budd Boetticher, Sam Peckinpah: 
Studies o f Authorship within the Western (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd. in 
association with BFI, 1969), p. 12.
318
5. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 234.
6. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 5.
7. Theodor H. Gaster, “Myth and Story” in Alan Dundes, ed., Sacred Narrative:
Readings in the Theory o f Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.
133.
8. H. Sharer, “Die Bedeutung des Menschenopfers im dajakischen Totenkult,” 
Mitteilungsblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft fu r  Volkerkunde (Hamburg, 1940) 25; 
Th. P. Van Baaren, “The Flexibility of Myth” in Sacred Narrative, p. 219.
9. Eric Dardel, “The Mythic” in Sacred Narrative, p. 233.
10.Richard Slotkin, The Fatal Environment: The Myth o f the Frontier in the Age o f  
Industrialization, 1800-1890 (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 
1986), pp. 37-38.
11 .W. A. Williams, The Roots o f the Modern American Empire: A Study o f the Growth 
and Shaping o f Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (London: Anthony 
Blond Ltd., 1970), p. 277.
12. J. A. Kasson, “The Monroe Declaration,” North American Review (Sept. 1881), 247- 
249; W.A. Williams, p. 277-278.
13 .Richard White, “I t ’s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own ”: A New History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), p. 94.
14.White, pp. 328-329.
15. Slotkin, The Fatal Environment, pp. 38-39.
16.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 3.
17.Lewis Evans, Geographical, Historical, Political, Philosophical Essays. The First, 
Containing an Analysis o f a General Map o f the Middle British Colonies in 
America, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1775), p. 31; Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 124.
18.Philip Freneau and High Henry Brackenridge, “The Rising Glory of America,” The 
Poems o f Philip Freneau, ed. Fred L. Pattee, I, 76n., 77n.-78n.; Nash Smith, Virgin 
Land, p. 125.
19.“The Internal State of America; Being a True description of the Interest Policy of 
That Vast Continent,” in The Writings o f Benjamin Franklin, ed. Albert H. Smyth, 
X, 117-118, 121; Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 125.
20.Letters From an American Farmer (London, 1782), p. 48 in Nash Smith, Virgin
319
Land, p. 126.
21.Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer and Skethches o f 
Eighteenth-Century America: More Letters from an American Farmer (N.Y.: The 
New American Library, 1963), p. 48.
22.Crevecoeur, p. 66.
23.Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 127.
24.Crevecoeur, p. 37.
25.Crevecoeur, p. 195.
26. Slotkin, The Fatal Environment, p. 70
27. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787 (N. Carolina: 
University ofN. Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 214-215.
2%.Boston Independent Chronicle, Dec. 8, 22, 1785, Oct. 18, 1787; Gordon S. Wood, 
p. 219.
29.“On Hard Times,” American Museum, I (1787), 462; Cumings, Sermon Preached 
May 28, 1783, 17-18; Boston Independent Chronicle, Mar. 23, 1787; Gordon S. 
Wood, p. 399.
30. Andrew’s journey begins when he meets a substantial citizen who is also a 
prosperous farmer on the dock. He is guided through the process of finding work, 
finding land to rent as a tenant, and accommodating his tame Indian neighbours to 
become a man of property.
31.Crevecoeur, pp. 203-209, 215, 223.
32.Crevecoeur, p. 84.
33.Crevecoeur, p. 98.
34. Slotkin, The Fatal Environment, p. 73.
3 5. William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National 
Character (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1963), p. 33.
36.Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee, Slotkin, The Fatal Environment, p. 73.
37.31 Cong., 2 Sess. Congressional Globe, Appendix, p. 137 (January 29, 1851); Nash 
Smith, Virgin Land, p . 171.
38.Slotkin, Fatal Environment, pp. 16, 17, 39.
39.Henry Nash Smith, “Rain Follows the Plow: The Notion of Increased Rainfall for 
the Great Plains, 1844-1880,” Huntington Library Quarterly, X, 169-193 (February,
320
1947); — , Virgin Land, p. 174.
40.Helene S. Zahler, Eastern Working Men and National Land Policy, 1829-1862,
(New York, 1941); Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 169.
41. Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation o f America: Culture and Society in 
theGuilded Age (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 21.
42.Nash Smith, Virgin land, p. 170.
43 .New York Semi-Weekly Tribune (May 9, 1862), quoted by Roy M. Robbins, “Horace 
Greely: Land Reform and Unemployment,” Agricultural History, VII, 41 (January, 
1933); Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 189.
44New York Semi-Weekly Tribune (May 8, 1862), quoted by Joseph G. Rayback,
“Land for the Landless. The Contemporary View,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, 
Western Reserve University (1936), p. 89; Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 189.
AS New York Semi-Weekly Tribune (May 7, 1862), quoted by Joseph G. Rayback,
“Land for the Landless. The Contemporary View,” p. 89; Nash Smith, Virgin Land, 
pp. 189-190.
46.Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 190. Nash Smith refers to Fred A. Shannon’s “The 
Homestead Act and the Labor surplus,” in American Historical Review, XLI, 638 
(July, 1936) for these statistics.
47.Trachtenberg, p. 22.
48.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 17.
49.For William Gilpin’s biography refer to Karnes, Thomas L., William Gilpin:
Western Nationalist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970) and chapter 3 of Nash 
Smith’s Virgin Land, Slotkin, Fatal Environment, p. 220.
50. William Gilpin, The Mission o f the North American People, Geographical, Pastoral 
and Gold Regions o f North America (1873), pp. vi, 234; Slotkin, Fatal Environment,
p. 220.
51 .William Gilpin, Mission o f the North American People. . .(Philadelphia, 1874), p.
130 quoting a letter of 1846); Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 37.
52.Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 38.
53. W. A. Williams, The Roots o f the Modern American Empire: A Study o f the Growth 
and Shaping o f Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random 
House, 1969), chs. 1-3; Hofstader, The American Political Tradition and the Men
321
Who Made It, New York: Vintage Books, 1974, ch. 3; Edward Pessen, Jacksonian 
America: Society, Personality, and Politics, Revised edition. Homewood, 111.: The 
Dorsey Press, 1978, ch. 6; Lawrence I. Friedman, Inventors o f the Promised Land, 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975, Pts. II-IV; Slotkin, Fatal Environment, p. 112.
54. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (NY: 
Modern Library Edition, 1937), p. 13; W.A. Williams, pp. 60-61.
55.Adam Smith, pp. 14-15, 355.
56.Adam Smith, pp. 17, 353, 645.
57. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 12.
5 8. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 13.
59.Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 
The Turner Thesis: Concerning the Role o f the Frontier in American History, ed. 
George Rogers Taylor, Rev. ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), p. 2.
60. Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, chs. 4-5; — , Fatal Environment, pp. 63-
64, 86-87; — , Gunfighter Nation, p. 15.
61.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 15.
62. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 8.
63.Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) esp. chs. 2-4.
64.Benedict Anderson, pp. 34-35, 44.
65.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 8. See Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, Romance, 
chapter 1.
66.Trachtenberg, p. 150.
67.Trachtenberg, esp. Preface and chs. 5-6; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 10.
68.Roger Schank, Dynamic Memory: a Theory o f Reminding and Learning in 
Computers and People (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
pp. 2-3,26, 40-41.
Chapter Three: The Western Formula and Film Narrative
1. John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 16.
322
2. F. de Saussure, Coursde linguistique generate, Paris 1971 in Synchronic or 
Diachronic?: A Debate on Method in Old Testament Exegesis, ed. Johnannes C. De 
Moor (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 146.
3. Jane Tompkins, West o f Everything: The Inner Life o f Westerns (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 10.
4. John G. Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green 
University Popular Press, 1970), p. 27.
5. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, pp. 29-30.
6. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 7.
7. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery and Romance, pp. 10-3.
8. Robert Warshow, The Immediate Experience (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor 
Books, 1964), p. 130.
9. Harry Berger, Jr., “Native Consciousness and Culture Change: An Essay in 
Historical Structuralism,” Bulletin o f Midwest Modern Language Association, 6, no. 
1 (Spring 1973), p. 35; Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery and Romance, p. 16.
10.Tompkins, West o f Everything, p. 25.
11 .Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic o f Reception, Brighton: The Harvester 
Press, 1982, p. 79; Neale, “Questions of Genre”, pp. 56-57.
12.Warshow, The Immediate Experience, p. 147.
13. John Hellmann, American Myth and the Legacy o f Vietnam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p. 111.
14. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 231.
15. George N. Fenin and William K. Everson, The Western: From Si tents to Seventies 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1962), p. 47.
16.Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, p. 117.
17.Fenin and Everson, pp. 47-49.
18.Fenin and Everson, pp. 47, 50.
19.Fenin and Everson, p. 52.
20.Philip French, Westerns: Aspects o f a Movie Genre (London: Seeker and Warburg, 
1973), p. 48.
21.Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, Minorities in the New World (NY: Columbia
323
University Press, 1958), p. 243 in Virginia Wright Wexman, Creating the Couple: 
Love, Marriage and Hollywood Performance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), p. 72.
22.Ellis Cashmere, Dictionary o f Race and Race Relations (London: Routledge, 1984) 
16, quoted in Wexman, p. 71.
23.Wexman, p. 72.
24.Fenin and Everson, p. 38.
25.Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique, p. 37.
26.Michael Walker “The Westerns of Delmer Daves” in Douglas Pye and Ian Cameron, 
eds, The Movie Book o f The Western (London: Studio Vista, 1996), p. 124.
27.Douglas Pye, “Double Vision: Miscegenation and Point of View in The Searchers” 
in The Movie Book o f The Western, p. 229.
28.Budd Boetticher, quoted in Jon Tuska, The American West in Film: Critical 
Approaches to the Western (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 224.
29.Tuska, pp. 224-225.
30.Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, p. 156.
31 .Frederick Jackson Turner.
32.Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique, p. 39.
3 3.Patricia Hills, “Picturing Progress in the Era of Westward Expansion” in William H. 
Truettner, ed., The West as America: Reinterpreting Images o f the Frontier, 1820- 
1920 (Washington: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), pp. 102-112.
34.Tompkins, West o f Everything, p. 69.
35.Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique, p. 39.
36.Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, p. 175.
37.Roland Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives”, Image- 
Music-Text, trans. Stephen Heath, (London: Fontana, 1977); Frank Piecarczyk, 
unpublished doctoral thesis, p. 1.
3 8. Will Wright, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study o f the Western (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), p. 48-9.
39.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 10.
40. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 259.
324
Chapter Four: The Depression Era
1. Anthony Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40 (Basingstoke and 
London: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 2.
2. Badger, p. 14.
3. Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant o f 
Conquest (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 6.
4. Bruce Barton, ‘How it came to be Written’, The Man Nobody Knows: A Discovery 
o f the Real Jesus (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1924), p. 179, quoted in Richard 
Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the Rushes: the propriety of the 
Christ story”, Screen 31:2 (Summer 1990), p. 199.
5. T. J. Jackson Lears, “From Salvation to Self-Realization” pp. 13-14, quoted in 
Maltby, “The King o f Kings,” p. 199.
6. Tino Balio, Grand Design: Hollywood as a Modern Business Enterprise, 1930-1939 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), p. 13.
7. Ronald Brownstein, The Power and the Glitter (New York: 1992), p. 20, in 
Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, p. 4.
8. Colin Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis: Cinema and American Society, 1929-1939 
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 5.
9. Balio, p. 13.
10.Refer Appendix.
11. According to Paul Seale, though the exact origin of the double feature is obscure, it 
can be tracked to around 1927, appearing in the Film Yearbook 1928. The double 
bill is discussed further in chapter six.
12.Brian Taves, “The B Film: Hollywood’s Other Half’ in Balio, pp. 316-7.
13.Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 710.
14. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, pp. 255-256.
15.Ed Buscombe, The BFI Companion to the Western (London: Andre Deutsch/BFI 
Publishing, 1988), p. 39.
16.Balio, p. 12.
17.Balio, p. 29; For a more detailed breakdown of budget figures for each sub-category
325
of the ‘B ’ film refer to Taves’s chapter, especially pp. 317-329.
18.Buscombe, The BFI Companion to the Western, p. 41.
19. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 255-256.
20.Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 30.
21 .Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West: Historical Interpretations 1890-1990 
(Albuquerque: The University of Mexico Press, 1991), p. 11.
22.Herbert Croly, The Promise o f American Life (New York, 1909), pp. 7, 16, 18; 
Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, pp. 11-12.
23.Gerald D. Nash , Creating the West, p. 13.
24.Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America (London: The 
Penguin Group, 1990), p. 457.
25.See p. 21.
26.Frederic Logan Paxson “The Pacific Railroads and the Disappearance of the Frontier 
in America” (1907), quoted in Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, p. 13.
27.Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, p. 21.
28.Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, pp. 23-27.
29.Charles Beard, quoted in Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, p. 23
30. Charles Beard, “The Myth of Rugged American Individualism”, Harper’s 164 
(December 1931), 13-14; quoted in Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, p. 34.
31. John C. Almack, “The Shibboleth of the Frontier,” Historical Outlook 16 (May 
1925), 197, 198, 202; Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, pp. 27-28.
32.Michel Foucault, in Paul Rabinov, ed., The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to 
Foucault’s Thought, with Major New Unpublished Material (London: Penguin 
Books, 1984), p. 301.
33.Foucault, in Rabinov, ed., The Foucault Reader, p. 302.
34.Buscombe, The BFI Companion to the Western, p. 43.
3 5. Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story (London: Pyramid Books, 1989), p. 36.
36. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, p. 253.
37.Finler, p. 276.
38.Finler, p. 36. The Western was originally budgeted at US$25,000 but was 
successful enough at the box office to launch Jesse Lasky and Cecil B. Demille’s 
first picture.
326
39. James Monaco, James Pallot and Baseline, The Second Virgin Film Guide (Great 
Britain: Virgin Books, 1993) 73.
40.Variety, Oct 22, 1930, p. 17.
41.Finler, p. 175.
Al.Variety, Oct 22, 1930, p. 27.
43. Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (London: Tavistock 
Publications Ltd., 1980), pp. 97-8.
44.Ray Allen Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 440-3, 446-51, 462-3; Slotkin, Gunfighter 
Nation, p. 257.
45. Alvin Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (New York, 1941), pp. 43, 360; 
Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West, p. 43.
46.Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 123.
47. Variety, February 18, 1931, p. 5.
48.Graham Barnfield, “Addressing Estrangement: Federal Arts Patronage and National 
Identity Under the New Deal”, Cultural Studies Occasional Papers, Communication, 
Media and Communities Research Centre, Sheffield Hallam University, p. 2.
49.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, p. 512.
50.Barnfield, “Addressing Estrangement”, p. 9.
51 .Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, p. 511.
52. Senator Albert Johnson, quoted in Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States 
o f America, p. 512.
53.Hollinger, David A. (1975) “Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence 
of American Liberal Intelligentsia”, American Quarterly, May : 133-134; Barnfield, 
“Addressing Estrangement,” p. 3.
54 .Laws o f the State o f Illinois Enacted by the Fifty-fifth General Assembly at the 
Regular Biennial Session (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1927), pp. 557-90 in Lizbeth 
Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 69-70.
55.Lizbeth Cohen, Making a New Deal, p. 95.
56.Barnfield, “Addressing Estrangement,” p. 9.
57.Richard Maltby, “The Production Code and the Hays Office” in Tino Balio, Grand
327
Design: Hollywood as a Modem Business Enterprise, 1930-1939, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 45.
5 8.Neal Gabler, An Empire o f Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood’ (New 
York, 1989) 119, in Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, p. 220.
59. Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, pp. 220-221.
60.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, p. 518.
61.The Editors, “Beer, Graft or Politics”, The New Republic, April 12, 1933: 229-230 in 
Barnfield,, “Addressing Estrangement,” p. 7.
62.Barnfield, “Addressing Estrangement,” p. 8.
63.Reverend Moredecai F. Ham, quoted in Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United 
States o f America, p. 520.
64.Rolf Lunden, Business and Religion in the American 1920s (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 58, 65 in Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of 
All the Rushes,” p. 196.
65.Endnotes 65 to 67 are from Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the 
Rushes,” pp. 196-8.
66.Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Modern American 
Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and world, 1929), p. 406.
67. Rolf Lunden, Business and Religion in the American 1920s, p. 74.
68.Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the Rushes,” p. 190.
69.W.E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils o f Prosperity (Chicago, 1958) 188, in Shindler, 
Hollywood in Crisis, p. 9.
70.Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the Rushes”, p. 212.
71. William Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 14.
72. Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America, p. 62, 68-71.
73.Paula Rabinowitz, They Must be Represented: The Politics o f Documentary 
(London: Verso, 1994), p. 75-104.
74.Richard Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?: A1 Capone and The Spectacle of Criminality, 
1948-1931”, in John Benson, Ken Berryman and Wayne Levy, eds, Screening the 
Past: VI Australian History and Film Conference Papers, (Melbourne: La Trobe 
University Press, 1995), p. 115.
328
75 “The Gangster Film”, Special Film Study Extract Supplement, BFI Education, Jan. 
1978 (reprinted Nov. 1988), p. 24.
76. Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America, p. 57.
Chapter Five: Negotiating the Thirties
1. William Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America (N. Y.: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 92.
2. Robert B. Ray, A Certain Tendency o f the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 71.
3. Ray, p. 74.
4. Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America (London: The 
Penguin Group, 1990), pp. 438, 461, 518.
5. Richard Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?: A1 Capone and The Spectacle of Criminality, 
1948-1931”, in John Benson, Ken Berryman and Wayne Levy, eds, Screening the 
Past: VI Australian History and Film Conference Papers, (Melbourne: La Trobe 
University Press, 1995), p. 116.
6. Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?” p. 115; Michael Woodwiss, Crime, Crusades and 
Corruption, 1900-1987 (London: Pinter, 1988), p. 14.
7. Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?” pp. 116, 119.
8. Stephen Louis Karpf, The Gangster Film: Emergence, Variation and Decay o f a 
Genre 1930-1940 (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 43.
9. Jack Shadoian, Dreams and Dead Ends: The American Gangster/ Crime Film 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 23.
10.The ease with which Cagney plays both roles exemplifies this observation.
11.Robert Warshow, “The Gangster as Tragic Hero” in The Immediate Experience 
(New York: Anchor, 1964), pp. 87-88.
12. James Robert Parish and Michael R. Pitts, The Great Gangster Pictures (Metuchen, 
N.J: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 1976), pp. 80-81.
13.Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?”, p. 117.
14.Eugene Rosow, Born to Lose: The Gangster Film in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p. 6.
329
15.Colin McArthur, Underworld USA (New York: Viking, 1972), p. 59.
16.Nash Smith, Virgin Land, p. 259.
17.Rosow, Born to Lose, p. 154.
18.Colin McArthur, p. 35.
19.Robert Warshow, “Movie Chronicle: The Westerner”, in Focus on The Western, ed. 
JackNachbar (N.J.: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1974), p. 133.
20. Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 94.
21. Judith Hess Wright, “Genre Films and the Status Quo,” in The Genre Reader, p. 49. 
22.Shadoian, pp. 10-11.
23.Murray Kempton: Part o f Our Time (New York, 1967), p. 5, quoted in Shindler, 
Hollywood in Crisis, p. 15.
24. A description of Hoover in the autumn of 1932, in Brogan, The Penguin History o f 
the United States, p. 532
25.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States, pp. 532-533.
26. Variety, 23 February 1932, quoted in Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, p. 22.
21 .Variety, 6 September 1932; 25 October 1932, quoted in Shindler, Hollywood in 
Crisis, p. 23
28.Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 
The Turner Thesis: Concerning the Role o f the Frontier in American History, ed. 
George Rogers Taylor, Rev. ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), p. 2.
29. Stephen Louis Karpf, The Gangster Film: Emergence, Variation and Decay o f a 
Genre 1930-1940 (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 199.
30.Robert Sklar, City Boys: Cagney, Bogart, Garfield (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p. 15.
31 .Alice Barker at one point orders her sons to kill a middle-aged man whose blue eyes 
remind them of their father.
32.Herbert Hoover, quoted in Jack Salzman and Barry Wallenstein, eds, Years o f  
Protest (NY: Western Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 10, 14 in Rosow, Born to Lose, p. 
155. Endnotes 33 through to 36 are from Rosow, pp. 156-8.
33.Robert and Helen S. Lynd, Middletown in Transition (NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1937)
34.Letter from F. Clinton Spooner, Brooklyn, NY, Screenland, April 1930, p. 8.
330
35.Letter from Floyd Casebolt, Waxachia, Texas, Movie Classic, Mar. 19, 1933, p. 6.
36. Will Hays, Annual Report (NY: 1934) p. 2.
37.Maltby, “Tragic Heroes?”, pp. 115.
3 8.Gerald Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst: Documents in the Cultural History o f 
Film in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 345.
39.Henry James Forman, Our Movie Made Children (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1933), in Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst, pp. 354-357.
40.Forman, Our Movie Made Children, in Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst, pp. 358
41.Raymond Moley, Are We Movie Made? in Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst, p. 
361.
42.Richard Maltby, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the Rushes: the propriety of 
the Christ story,” Screen, 31:2 (Summer 1990) pp. 196, 204.
43.Raymond Moley, The Hays Office in Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst, pp. 319-
320.
44.Richard Maltby, “The Production Code and the Hays Office” in Tino Balio, Grand 
Design: Hollywood as a Modern Business Enterprise, 1930-1939 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 49.
45.Raymond Moley, The Hays Office in Gerald Mast, ed., The Movies in Our Midst, p. 
331.
46.Maltby, “The Production Code and the Hays Office”, p.49.
47.Olga J. Martin, Hollywood’s Movie Commandments, in Gerald Mast, ed., The 
Movies in Our Midst, p. 334.
48.Lizbeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 268.
49.Kristi Anderson, The Creation o f a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 83-120, in Lizbeth Cohen, Making a New 
Deal, pp. 255-256.
50.Graham Barnfield, “Addressing Estrangement,” p. 34.
51.FDR, quoted in William Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America, p. 98.
52.Lizbeth Cohen, Making a New Deal, pp. 230-233.
53 Motion Picture Herald, 21 March 1931, quoted in Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, p. 
99.
331
54.Franklin Roosevelt, quoted in Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f  
America, p. 536.
55.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United states o f America, p. 539.
56. Variety 1 September 1937, quoted in Shindler, Hollywood in Crisis, p. 84.
Chapter Six: The New West Hero
1. Gene Autry with M. Herskowitz, Back in the Saddle again (NY: Doubleday & Co, 
1978), p. 53, quoted in Peter Stanfield, Dixie Cowboys: Hollywood and the 1930s 
Western, (Forthcoming).
2. For Comolli’s notions of linear history see “Technique and Ideology: Camera, 
Perspective, Depth of Field,” trans. Diana Matias, Film Reader " (January 1997), 
pp. 128-140, and “Machines of the Visible,” The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. Teresa 
de Lauretis and Stephen Heath (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp. 121-142.
3. Paul Seale, “‘A Host of Others’: Toward a Nonlinear History of Poverty Row and 
the Coming of Sound” Wide Angle, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1991. 75
4. Douglas Gomery, The Hollywood Studio System, pp. 8-9 in Seale, p. 77.
5. Seale, p. 77.
6. Paul Kerr, “Out of What Past: Notes on the B Film Noir,” in The Hollywood Film 
Industry, ed. Paul Kerr (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986)
7. Seale, p. 98.
8. Seale, p. 93.
9. “Pictures’ Most Sensational Year” Variety, (2 January 1929), p. 5.
10.“Inside Stuff — Pictures,” Variety (20 February 1929), pp. 11, 28 in Seale “‘A Host 
of Others’”, p. 93.
1 l.In 1928, Pathe recognized the popularity of its western stars in the small towns, and 
when it had abandoned the genre, it continued to use these actors in serials catered 
for such audiences. “Pathe’s Former Western Names Now in Serials” Variety (24th 
October 1928), p. 5.
12 “Westerns, Not Talkers, Wanted by Small Town Exhibs of Texas” Variety (11 
September 1929), p. 5.
13.Seale, p. 75.
332
14.Brian Taves, “The B Film: Hollywood’s Other Half’ in Tino Balio, Grand Design: 
Hollywood as a Modern Business Enterprise, 1930-1939 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 316, 318-319.
15.D.W.C., “On the Leasing Lot,” New York Times, 10 November 1935; “Quickies Not 
So Hot,” Hollywood Reporter, 1 November 1935, p. 1 in Taves, “The B Film”, p.
321.
16.Taves, p. 322.
17. Todd McCarthy and Charles Flynn, eds, Kings o f the Bs: Working Within the 
Hollywood System, (NY: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975), pp. 18, 23, 25.
18.Taves, p. 322.
19. Wayne J. McMullen, “Reconstruction of the Frontier Myth in Witness”, Southern 
Communication Journal: Rhetoric, Culture and Community, No. 1, Vol 62 (Fall 
1996), p. 32.
20.Richard White, ‘Tt's Your Misfortune and None o f My Own ”: A New History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), p. 4.
21 .John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 193.
22. Will Wright, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study o f the Western (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), p. 5.
23.Taves, p. 335.
24. Jane Tompkins, West o f Everything: The Inner Life o f Westerns (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 113-114.
25.Tompkins, West o f Everything, p. 93.
26. Jacqueline Levitkin, Film Reader 5, 1982, p. 97 in Ian Cameron and Douglas Pye, 
eds. The Movie Book o f the Western, p. 13.
27.Pamela Grundy, “‘We Always Tried to be Good People’: Respectability, Crazy 
Water Crystals,and Hillbilly Music on the Air, 1933-1935” Journal o f American 
History. March 1995. V.81, #4. P. 1613 in Stanfield, Dixie Cowboys (Forthcoming).
28Motion Picture Herald, 5 January 1935, p. 60 in Stanfield, Dixie Cowboys 
(Forthcoming).
29.Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 278.
333
Chapter Seven: Civil Rights. Feminism and Vietnam
1. Quoted in Gilbert Adair, Hollywood’s Vietnam: From The Green Berets to Full 
Metal Jacket (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1989), p. 46.
2. Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: The Penguin Group, 1990), p. 673.
3. John G. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 245.
4. Phil Hardy, The Western (London: Arum Press, 1983), p. 18.
5. Ed Buscombe, The BFI Companion to the Western (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 
1988), pp. 13,247-312.
6. Tom Englehardt, The End o f Victory Culture: Cold War America and the 
Disillusioning o f  a Generation (New York: BasicBooks, 1995) p. 19.
7. Englehardt, p. 23.
8. William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 337.
9. Englehardt, p. 19.
10.Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant o f 
Conquest (US: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 41.
11 .Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy o f Conquest: The Unbroken Past o f the 
American West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), p. 36.
12 Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. William McIntosh, 21 U.S. Reports 240, 260-261 
(1823) quoted in Jennings, p. 60.
13.Jennings, pp. 59-60.
14.Jennings, p. 146.
15.Ernie Pyle, quoted in Clayton R. Kipps and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to 
War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies 
(Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1990), p. 248.
16.Allan Nevins, Samuel Eliot Morison and OWI, quoted in Kipps and Black, pp. 253- 
254.
17.Jennings, p. 15.
18.Englehardt, p. 108.
334
19.Englehardt, p. 109.
20.“God’s Controversy with New England,” Proceedings o f the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, XII (1871-1873), 83, 84 in Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The 
American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1950), p. 4.
21 .Alex Haley, The Autobiography o f Malcolm X  (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 
371.
22.Richard White, “I t ’s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own A New History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 580.
23 .White, “I t ’s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own, ” p. 582.
24.Peter G. Filene, Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America. 2nd ed. (Baltimore 
and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 193.
25. John D’Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History o f Sexuality in 
America (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 233-4.
26.Chafe, p. 329.
27.Filene, p. 201-202.
28.U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Perspectives on Working Women: A Databook 
(Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 10-1, in Filene, p. 201.
29.Filene, p. 93.
30.Filene, p. 93
3\.Time, March 20 1972, p. 24.
3 2.Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology o f the American 
Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), p. 156.
33.Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, p. 179.
34. John Hellmann, American Myth and the Legacy o f Vietnam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p. 44.
35 .New York Times, July 17, 1960; Richard M. Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics 
o f Indian-Hating and Empire Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1980), p. 429.
36.John F. Kennedy, quoted in Chafe, p. 187.
37.Quoted in Chafe, p. 188.
3 8.Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century
335
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 348.
39.Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery, Romance, p. 252.
40 John Wayne, quoted in Christopher Anderson, Hollywood TV: The Studio System in 
the Fifties (USA: The Univeristy of Texas Press, 1994), p. 205.
41.Englehardt, p. 171.
42.Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth o f July 1976 (London: Corgi Books, 1990), pp. 42-
3.
43.This is later discussed in relation to The Green Berets, a Vietnam War Film.
44.Ray, A Certain Tendency o f  the Hollywood Cinema, p. 90.
45.Thomas Doherty, Projections o f War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World 
War II  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 105-113.
46. Johnson, quoted in Gordon Hardy, ed. Words o f War: An Anthology o f Vietnam War 
Literature (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Co., 1988), p. 174.
47.Hugh Sidey, “The Presidency,” Life, Oct. 10, 1969, p. 4; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 
p. 496.
48.Michael Herr, Dispatches (London: Picador, 1979), pp. 55, 65.
49.Quoted in Drinnon, pp. 456-7.
50.Chafe, p. 283-4.
51.Chafe, p. 289.
52. Johnson, quoted in Chafe, p. 233.
53.Englehardt, p. 216-7.
5 4.March 16, 1968.
55.Englehardt, p. 219
56.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, p. 676.
57.Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Policy Since 1938, 7th rev. ed. 
(New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1993), p. 216.
5 8.Robert Stevens, Vain Hopes, Grim Realities: The Economic Consequences o f the 
Vietnam War, p. 13; Anthony Woodwiss, Postmodernity USA: The Crisis o f Social 
Modernism in Postwar America (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1993), p. 91.
59.Rick Berg, “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age of Technology,” in Linda 
Dittmar and Gene Michaud, ed.s, From Hani to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in 
American Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 41.
336
60.Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, pp. 677, 684-686.
61.Chafe, p. 343.
62.Quoted in Chafe, p. 294.
63 .Englehardt, p. 220.
64.Englehardt, p. 217; Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America, p. 
677.
65.Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and 
Interpreted the Crisis o f  Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977), p. 508.
66.Quoted in Chafe, p. 347.
67.“LBJ: ‘Time has Come for. . . New, Fresh Look at Dissent,5” the Washington Post, 
Nov. 18, 1967, p. A8 in Braestrup, Big story, p. 49.
68.Braestrup, Big Story, p. 467.
69. White, “It's Your Misfortune and None o f My Own”, p. 622.
70. Art Buchwald, quoted in Gordon Hardy, ed. Words o f War, p. 117.
71.Leo Cawley, “The War about the War: Vietnam Films and American Myth” in 
Dittmar and Michaud, p. 75.
Chapter Eight: Launching Out of the Quagmire
1. Michael Herr, Dispatches (London: Picador, 1979), p. 44.
2. Richard White, “It's  Your Misfortune and None o f My Own ”: A New History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 614.
3. Robert B. Ray, A Certain Tendency o f the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 170-174.
4. Robert A. Rosenstone, Visions o f The Past: The Challenge o f Film to Our Idea o f  
History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 72.
5. A.C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy o f History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965)
6. In this volume Rosenstone refers to Pierre Sorlin5s The Film in History, which offers 
explanations as to why historical films reflect their own periods (of production) 
rather than representing the past. (The Film in History: Restaging the Past [Totowa,
337
NJ: Barnes & Noble Imports, 1980]; Rosenstone, Visions o f The Past, p. 7); Robert 
A. Rosenstone, Revisioning History; Film and the Construction o f a New Past 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)
7. John McNaughton, quoted in William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America 
Since World War II, 3rd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 297.
8. Chafe, p. 297.
9. Gilbert Adair, Hollywood's Vietnam: From “The Green Berets” to “Apopcalypse 
Now” (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1989), p. 11.
10. Clyde A. Milner II, ed., Major Problems in the History o f the American West 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), p. 359.
11 .Douglas Pye, “Ulzana’s Raid” in Ian Cameron and Douglas Pye, eds, The Movie 
Book o f the Western (London: Studio Vista, 1996), p. 265.
12.Pye, “Ulzana’s Raid”, p. 266.
13.Richard Nixon, quoted Tom Englehardt, The End o f Victory Culture: Cold War 
America and the Disillusioning o f a Generation (New York: BasicBooks, 1995), p. 
274.
14.Englehardt, p. 274.
15.Janice Hocker Rushing and Thomas S. Frentz, Projecting the Shadow: The Cyborg 
Hero in American Film (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 102.
16.Adair, Hollywood's Vietnam, p. 133.
17. James Fenimore Cooper, The Deerslayer: or The First Warpath (New York: The 
New American Library, Inc., 1963), p. 48.
18.Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology o f the American 
Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), p. 305.
19.Michael Selig, “Boys will be Men: Oedipal Drama in Coming Home” in Linda 
Dittmar and Gene Michaud, eds From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in 
American Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 191.
20. Selig, p. 189.
21 .Jacobs, D. “Coppola films Conrad in Vietnam” in The English Novel and the Movies 
Klein, M. and Parker, G., eds. (NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. Inc., 1981), p. 
217.
22.Adair, Hollywood's Vietnam, p. 154.
338
23 .Michael Cimino, in Anthony Holden, Behind the Oscar: The Secret History o f the 
Academy Awards (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 77.
24.Denise J. Youngblood “Repentance: Stalinist Terror and the Realism of Surrealism” 
in Rosenstone, Revisioning History, p. 141.
25.Rosenstone, RevisioningHistory, p. 11.
26.Dale Carter, The Final Frontier (London: Verso, 1988), p. 155.
27.Nikita S. Khrushchev, Kruschev Remembers, Volume II: The Last Testament, trans. 
and ed. Strobe Talbott (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp. 70-71, 74-79, 86-90 in 
Carter, p. 156.
28.Carter, p. 157.
29.Carter, p. 157-159.
30. John Logsden, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National 
Interest (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970), p 128, New York Times, 14 October 
1961, p. 6, in Carter, p. 159.
31 .James Donald, Fantasy and the Cinema (London: BFI, 1989), 4.
32.Robin Wood, Hollywoodfrom Vietnam to Reagan (NY: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 165.
33.Robin Wood aligns the trilogy to the “utterly uncreative hack work” exemplified by 
films like Roy Rogers or Hopalong Cassidy, p. 163.
34.Robin Wood, p. 162.
35.Englehardt, p. 266.
36.Richard Maltby, “A Better Sense of History: John Ford and the Indians” in Cameron 
and Pye, eds, The Movie Book o f the Western, p. 49; Richard Maltby, Hollywood 
Cinema: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), p. 132.
37. John Brosnan, Future Tense: The Cinema o f Science Fiction (London: Macdonald 
and Jane’s, 1978), p. 243.
38.Brosnan, p. 243.
39.Englehardt, p. 266.
40.Christian Metz, ‘Trucage and the Film’, trans. Franfoise Meltzer, Critical Inquiry, 
vol. 3, no. 4, 1977 in Steve Neale, “‘You’ve Got to be Fucking Kidding!: 
Knowledge, Belief and Judgement in Science Fiction” in Annete Kuhn, ed. Alien 
Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema (London: Verso,
339
1990).
41.Metz, p. 667.
42.Neale, ‘“You’ve Got to be Fucking Kidding!”, p. 168.
43 .Neale, “‘You’ve Got to be Fucking Kidding!” pp. 163-165, 160.
44.David Morell, quoted in William Alland, Knave, 1986, 18 (6), pp. 60-4; Alf Louvre 
and Jeffrey Walsh, eds. Tell Me Lies About Vietnam: Cultural Battles fo r  the 
Meaning o f War (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), p. 57.
45.Dittmar and Michaud, eds, From Hanoi to Hollywood, p. 107.
46.Peter Carroll, “Khe Sanh, Tet, and The War at Home” (Paper delivered at State 
University of New York College at Brockport, September 1988); Sumiko Higashi, 
uNight o f  the Living Dead: A Horror Film about the Horrors o f the Vietnam Era, in 
Dittmar and Michaud, eds, From Hanoi to Hollywood, p. 179.
47. Alex de Jonge, The Weimar Chronicle (London: Paddington Press, 1978), p. 32; 
William Shirer, The Rise and Fall o f the Third Reich, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 
1960, 55-56; Galyn Studlar and David Desser, “Never Having To Say You’re Sorry: 
Rambo ’s Rewriting of the Vietnam War” in Dittmar and Michaud, eds, From Hanoi 
to Hollywood, p. 103.
48.Galyn Studlar and David Desser, “Never Having To Say You’re Sorry: Rambo’s 
Rewriting of the Vietnam War” in Dittmar and Michaud, eds, From Hanoi to 
Hollywood, p. 104.
49.President Ronald Reagan, quoted in The New York Times, 1 July, 1985; Michael 
Klein, “Historical Memory, Film, and the Vietnam Era; President Ronald Reagan, 
quoted in Studlar and Desser, “Never Having To Say You’re Sorry”, pp. 23, 107.
50.President Ronald Reagan, quoted in Studlar and Desser, “Never Having To Say 
You’re Sorry”, p. 104.
51. Quoted in Yvonne Tasker, Spectacular Bodies: Gender, Genre and the Action 
Cinema (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 93.
52.Tasker, p. 95.
Chapter Nine: Recycling Mythologies
1. Lowell Mellett, head of the Office of War Information’s Bureau of Motion Pictures,
340
quoted in Thomas Doherty, Projections o f War: Hollywood, American Culture, and 
World War II  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 34.
2. Norma Pecora, “Superman/Superboys/Supermen: the Comic Book Hero as 
Socializing Agent” in Steve Craig, ed. Men, Masculinity and the Media (California: 
Sage Publications, 1992), p. 63.
3. Kaufman quoted in Pecora, p. 63.
4. Pecora, pp. 62, 68.
5. Pecora, p. 61.
6. Noel Carroll, “Back to Basics” in American Media, ed. Philip Cook, Douglas 
Gomery, and Lawrence Lichty, 111-125 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson street Press,
1989) quoted in Elizabeth G. Traube, Dreaming Identities: Class, Gender, and 
Generation in 1980s Hollywood Movies (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 
p. 40.
7. Ryan and Kellner, p. 267.
8. Ryan and Kellner, p. 268.
9. Quoted in William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, 
3rd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 462.
10.Chafe, p. 476.
11.President Ronald Reagan, quoted in Chafe, p. 477.
12.R. Brewin, “TV’s Newest Villain: The Vietnam Veteran,” TV Guide, 19 July 1975, 
p. 4 in Rick Berg, “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age of Technology,” in 
Linda Dittmar and Gene Michaud, eds, From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam 
War in American Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), pp. 45-6.
13. Judy Lee Kinney, “Gardens o f Stone, Platoon, and Hamburger Hill. Ritual and 
Remembrance,” in M. Anderegg, ed., Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and TV 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), p. 155.
14. Albert Auster and Leonard Quart, How the War was Remembered: Hollywood and 
Vietnam (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), p. 78.
15. George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory o f the World Wars 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 7.
16.Mosse, pp. 159-181.
17. Auster and Quart, p. 141.
341
18.Mosse, p. 9.
19.Mosse, p. 161.
20. Thomas Prasch, “Platoon and the Mythology of Realism,” Search and Clear: 
Critical Responses to Selected Literature and Film o f the Vietnam War (Bowling 
Green, OH: Bowling Green University Press, 1988), p. 195.
21.David Halberstam, quoted in William J. Palmer, “Symbolic Nihilism in Platoon”, 
America Rediscovered: Critical Essays on Literature and Film o f the Vietnam War 
(London: Garland Publishing, 1990), p. 263.
22.Harold Schechter and Jonna G. Semeiks, “Leatherstocking in ‘Nam: Rambo, 
Platoon, and the American Frontier Myth,” Journal o f Popular Culture 24.4 (Spring
1991), p. 17.
23.Schechter and Semeiks, p. 20.
24. Schechter and Semeiks, p. 20.
25.Leo Cawley, “The War about the War: Vietnam Films and American Myth” in
f
Dittmar and Michaud, p. 74.
26.Oliver Stone, quoted in Richard Combs, “Beating God to the draw: Salvador and 
Platoon.” Sight and Sound 56.2 (Spring 1987), p. 138.
27.Combs, p. 138.
28.Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology o f the American 
Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), p. 156.
29. According to Stone, Elias was based on an actual person who “was (like) an 
Apache” (Louise Tanner, “Oliver Stone,” Films in Review (1987), p. 153)
30. Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, p. 156.
31.Prasch, p. 204.
32.Richard Maltby, “John Ford and the Indians; or, Tom Doniphon’s History Lesson,” 
Representing Others: White Views o f Indigenous Peoples, ed. Mick Gidley (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1992), p. 130.
33.These actions are inherently feminine, an equation found, amongst much other 
critical material, in John Wheeler ‘s comment: “I consider my commitment [to the 
military and his country] as a statement that things are worth dying for. It is a 
masculine statement. I think it is the masculine statement. This is why the war has 
tended to be viewed as a masculine enterprise. . . .Woman expresses the idea that
342
things are worth living for.” (John Wheeler, Touched With Fire: The Future o f the 
Vietnam Generation [NY: Avon, 1984], pp. 140-41 in Susan Jeffords, The 
Remasculinhization o f America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana Universwity Press, 1989), p. 88.)
34.Prasch, p. 206.
35.Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, p. 154.
36.Combs, p. 136.
37.Marita Sturken, “The Wall, the Screen, and the Image: The Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial,” Representations 35 (1991), p. 122.
38.Mosse, p. 224-255.
39.Prasch, p. 200.
40.Prasch, p. 209; Peter Rist, “Standard Hollywood Fare: The World War II Combat 
Film Revisited”, Cineaction! (Spring 1988), p. 26.
41 .John Hellmann, American Myth and the Legacy o f Vietnam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p. 76.
42.Don. Kunz, “Oliver Stone’s Film Adaptation of Born on the Fourth o f July. 
Redefining Masculine Heroism,” in War, Literature and The Arts 2.2 (Fall 1990) p.
23.
43.Kovic, quoted in Robert Seidenberg, “To Hell and Back,” American Film xv.4 
(1990), pp. 30-1.
44. Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, pp. 94-5.
45.This is invoked in President Johnson’s Johns Hopkins address of 1965. (Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, “American Policy in Vietnam,” Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. 
Falls, eds., The Viet-Nam Reader, p. 344; Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 
p. 562)
46.Oliver Stone, quoted in Gavin Smith, “Oliver Stone interviewed by Gavin Smith,” 
Film Comment 30.1 (1994): 38.
47.Smith, “Oliver Stone,” p. 26.
48.Le Ly Hayslip, Heaven and Earth Part One: When Heaven and Earth Changed 
Places 1989 (London: Pan Books, 1994), p. xvi.
49.Le Ly Hayslip, Child o f War, Woman o f Peace: Heaven and Earth Part Two 1993 
(London: Pan Books, 1994), p. 216.
343
50. Auster and Quart, p. xiii.
51.Mosse, p. 11.
52.Edward Gallafent, “Four Tombstones: 1946-1994” in Ian Cameron and Douglas 
Pye, eds, The Movie Book o f the Western (London: Studio Vista, 1996), p. 302.
53.Michael Walker, “Dances with Wolves” in Cameron and Pye, eds, The Movie Book 
o f the Western, p. 286.
Epilogue
1. Michel Foucault, “We ‘Other Victorians’”, The History o f Sexuality Vol. 1, in Paul 
Rabinov, ed, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought, with 
major new unpublished material (London: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 293.
2. Gerald D. Nash, Creating the West: Historical Interpretations 1890-1990 
(Albuquerque: The University of Mexico Press, 1991), p. 233.
3. Jenni Calder, There Must Be A Lone Ranger (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1974), 
p. xiii.
4. Calder, p. 216.
5. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), p. 15.
344
Bibliography
Adair, Gilbert, Hollywood’s Vietnam: From The Green Berets to Full Metal Jacket 
(London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1989)
Ambrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism: American Policy Since 1938, 7th rev. ed.
(New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1993)
Anderegg, M., ed., Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and TV (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1991)
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983)
Anderson, Christopher, Hollywood TV: The Studio System in the Fifties (USA: The 
Univeristy of Texas Press, 1994)
Auster, Albert, and Quart, Leonard, How the War was Remembered: Hollywood and 
Vietnam (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988)
Badger, Anthony J., The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan Press, 1989)
Balio, Tino, Grand Design: Hollywood as Modern Business Enterprise, 1930-1939 
(California: University of California Press, 1995)
Barnfield, Graham, “Addressing Estrangement: Federal Arts Patronage and National 
Identity Under the New Deal”, Cultural Studies Occasional Papers, Communication, 
Media and Communities Research Centre, Sheffield Hallam University 
Barnouw, Erik, Documentary: A History o f the Non-Fiction Film, 2nd rev. ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
Barthes, Roland, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives”, Image-Music- 
Text, trans. Stephen Heath, (London: Fontana, 1977)
Bordwell, David, Narration in the Fiction Film (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985)
Bordwell, David, Staiger, Janet, and Thompson, Kristin, The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema: Film Style and Mode o f Production to 1960 (London: Routledge and
345
KeganPaul, 1985)
Braestrup, Peter, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and 
Interpreted the Crisis o f Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977)
Brogan, Hugh, The Penguin History o f the United States o f America (London: The 
Penguin Group, 1990)
Brosnan, John, Future Tense: The Cinema o f Science Fiction (London: Macdonald and 
Jane’s, 1978)
Buscombe, Ed, The BFI Companion to the Western (London: Andre Deutsch/BFI 
Publishing, 1988), p. 39.
Calder, Jenni, There Must Be A Lone Ranger (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1974) 
Carter, Dale, The Final Frontier {London-. Verso, 1988)
Cawelti, John G., Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976)
Cawelti, John G., The Six-Gun Mystique (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green 
University Popular Press, 1970)
Chafe, William H., The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, 3rd ed.
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)
Clover, Carol, Men, Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film 
(London: BFI, 1992)
Cohen, Lizbeth, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
Combs, Richard, “Beating God to the draw: Salvador and Platoon.” Sight and Sound 
56.2 (Spring 1987), pp. 136-8.
Cooper, James Fenimore, The Deerslayer: or The First Warpath (New York: The 
New American Library, Inc., 1963)
Craig, Steve, ed. Men, Masculinity and the Media (California: Sage Publications,
1992)
Crevecoeur, Hector St. John de, Letters from an American Farmer and Skethches o f  
Eighteenth-Century America: More Letters from an American Farmer (N. Y.: The 
New American Library, 1963)
Cameron, Ian, and Pye, Douglas, eds, The Movie Book o f The Western (London: Studio
346
Vista, 1996)
Danto, A.C., Analytical Philosophy o f History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965)
Doherty, Thomas, Projections o f War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War 
II  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
Donald, James, Fantasy and the Cinema (London: BFI, 1989)
Drinnon, Richard M., Facing West: The Metaphysics o f Indian-Hating and Empire 
Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980)
Dundes, Alan, ed., Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory o f Myth (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984)
Dyer, Richard, The Dumb Blonde Stereotype: Documentation fo r  EAS Class-room 
Materials (London: Educational Advisory Service, BFI, 1979)
Dyer, Richard, “Entertainment and Utopia”, Movie no. 24 (Spring 1977), pp. 2-13. 
Eckert, Charles, “The Anatomy of a Proletarian Film: Warner’s Marked Woman,”Film 
Quarterly 21 (Winter 1973-1974), pp. 10-24.
D’Emilio, John and B. Freedman, Estelle, Intimate Matters: A History o f Sexuality in 
America (New York: Harper and Row, 1988)
Englehardt, Tom, The End o f Victory Culture: Cold War America and the 
Disillusioning o f a Generation (New York: BasicBooks, 1995)
Fenin, George N., and Everson, William K., The Western: From Silents to the Seventies 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977)
Filene, Peter G., Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America. 2nd ed. (Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974)
Finler, Joel W., The Hollywood Story (London: Pyramid Books, 1989)
Foucault, Michel, “We ‘Other Victorians’”, The History o f Sexuality Vol. 1, in Paul 
Rabinov, ed, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought, with 
major new unpublished material (London: Penguin Books, 1984)
Frayling, Christopher, Spaghetti Westerns: Cowboys and Europeans from Karl May to 
Sergio Leone (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981)
French, Philip, Westerns: Aspects o f a Movie Genre (London: Seeker & Warburg, BFI, 
1973)
“The Gangster Film”, Special Film Study Extract Supplement, BFI Education, Jan.
347
1978 (reprinted Nov. 1988)
Gidley, Mick, ed., Representing Others: White Views o f Indigenous Peoples (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1992)
Grant, Barry Keith, ed., Film Genre Reader (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986) 
Grossman, James R., ed., The Frontier in American Culture (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 1994)
Hardy, Gordon, ed. Words o f War: An Anthology o f Vietnam War Literature (Boston, 
MA: Boston Publishing Co., 1988)
Hardy, Phil, The Western (London: Arum Press, 1983)
Harkness, John, The Academy Awards Handbook (NY: Pinnacle Books, 1994)
Haley, Alex, The Autobiography o f Malcolm X  (London: Penguin Books, 1968) 
Hayslip, Le Ly, Heaven and Earth Part One: When Heaven and Earth Changed Places 
1989 (London: Pan Books, 1994)
Hayslip, Le Ly, Child o f War, Woman o f Peace: Heaven and Earth Part Two 1993 
(London: Pan Books, 1994)
Hellmann, John, American Myth and the Legacy o f Vietnam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986)
Herr, Michael, Dispatches (London: Picador, 1979)
Holden, Anthony, Behind the Oscar: The Secret History o f the Academy Awards (NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 1993)
Jeffords, Susan, The Remasculinhization o f America: Gender and the Vietnam War 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Universwity Press, 1989)
Jennings, Francis, The Invasion o f America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant o f  
Conquest (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975)
Karpf, Stephen Louis, The Gangster Film: Emergence, Variation and Decay o f  a 
Genre 1930-1940 (New York: Arno Press, 1973)
Kerr, Paul, ed., The Hollywood Film Industry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1986)
Kipps, Clayton R. and Black, Gregory D., Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, 
Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War IIMovies (Berkeley, LA: University of 
California Press, 1990)
Kitses, Jim, Horizons West: Anthony Mann, Budd Boetticher, Sam Peckinpah: Studies
348
o f Authorship within the Western (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd. in association 
with BFI, 1969)
Klein, M. and Parker, G., eds., The English Novel and the Movies (NY: Frederick 
Ungar Publishing Co. Inc., 1981)
Kovic, Ron, Born on the Fourth o f July 1976 (London: Corgi Books, 1990)
Kunz, Don, “Oliver Stone’s Film Adaptation of Born on the Fourth o f July.
Redefining Masculine Heroism,” in War, Literature and The Arts 2.2 (Fall 1990) 
Limerick, Patricia Nelson, The Legacy o f Conquest: The Unbroken Past o f the 
American West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987)
Louvre Alf, and Walsh, Jeffrey, eds., Tell Me Lies About Vietnam: Cultural Battles 
for the Meaning o f War (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988)
Maltby, Richard, Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1995)
Maltby, Richard, “The King o f Kings and the Czar of All the Rushes: the propriety of 
the Christ story”, Screen 31:2 (Summer 1990), pp. 188-213.
Maltby, Richard, “Tragic Heroes?: A1 Capone and The Spectacle of Criminality, 
1948-1931”, in John Benson, Ken Berryman and Wayne Levy, eds, Screening the 
Past: VI Australian History and Film Conference Papers (Melbourne: La Trobe 
University Press, 1995), pp. 112-9.
Mast, Gerald, ed., The Movies in Our Midst: Documents in the Cultural History o f  
Film in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982)
McCarthy Todd, and Flynn, Charles, eds, Kings o f the Bs: Working Within the 
Hollywood System (NY: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975)
McMullen, Wayne J., “Reconstruction of the Frontier Myth in Witness”, Southern 
Communication Journal: Rhetoric, Culture and Community, No. 1, Vol 62 (Fall 
1996), pp. 31-41.
Milner II, Clyde A., ed., Major Problems in the History o f the American West 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989)
Monaco, James, Pallot, James and Baseline, The Second Virgin Film Guide (Great 
Britain: Virgin Books, 1993)
Mosse, George L., Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory o f the World Wars 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
349
Mulvey, Laura, Visual and Other Pleasures (London: Macmillan, 1989)
Nachbar, Jack, ed., Focus on The Western (N.J.: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1974)
Nash, Gerald D. Creating the West: Historical Interpretations 1890-1990 
(Albuquerque: The University of Mexico Press, 1991)
Neale, Steve, Genre (London: British Film Institute, 1980)
Neale, Steve, “Questions of Genre”, Screen 31:1 (Spring 1990), pp. 45-67.
Neale, Steve, “You’ve Got to be Fucking Kidding!: Knowledge, Belief and Judgement 
in Science Fiction” in Kuhn, Annette ed. Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and 
Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 160-8.
Palmer, William J., “Symbolic Nihilism in Platoon", America Rediscovered: Critical 
Essays on Literature and Film o f the Vietnam War (London: Garland Publishing,
1990)
Parish, James Robert and Pitts, Michael R., The Great Gangster Pictures (Metuchen, 
N.J: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 1976)
Prasch, Thomas, “Platoon and the Mythology of Realism,” Search and Clear: Critical 
Responses to Selected Literature and Film o f the Vietnam War (Bowling Green, OH: 
Bowling Green University Press, 1988)
Rabinov, Paul, ed., The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought, with 
Major New Unpublished Material (London: Penguin Books, 1984)
Rabinowitz, Paula, They Must be Represented: The Politics o f Documentary (London: 
Verso, 1994)
Ray, Robert B A Certain Tendency o f the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985)
Rist, Peter, “Standard Hollywood Fare: The World War II Combat Film Revisited”, 
Cineaction! (Spring 1988)
Roddick, Nick, A New Deal in Entertainment: Warner Brothers in the 1930s (London: 
British Film Institute, 1983)
Rosenstone, Robert A., Visions o f The Past: The Challenge o f Film to Our Idea o f  
History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995)
Rosow, Eugene, Born to Lose: The Gangster Film in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978)
Rushing, Janice Hocker and Frentz, Thomas S., Projecting the Shadow: The Cyborg
350
Hero in American Film (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press)
Ryan, Michael and Kellner, Douglas, Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology o f 
Contemporary Hollywood Film (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1988)
Saussure, F. de, Coursde lingguistique generate, Paris 1971 in Moor, Johannes C.
De, ed., Synchronic or Diachronic?: A Dehate on Method in Old Testament 
Exegesis (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995),
Schank, Roger, Dynamic Memory: a Theory o f Reminding and Learning in 
Computers and People (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
Schechter, Harold and Semeiks, Jonna G., “Leatherstocking in ‘Nam: Rambo,
Platoon, and the American Frontier Myth,” Journal o f Popular Culture 24.4 (Spring
1991)
Seale, Paul, “‘A Host of Others’: Toward a Nonlinear History of Poverty Row and the 
Coming of Sound” Wide Angle (Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1991), pp. 73-103. 
Seidenberg, Robert, “To Hell and Back,” American Film xv.4 (1990), pp. 28-31, 56. 
Shadoian, Jack, Dreams and Dead Ends: The American Gangster/Crime Film 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977)
Schatz, Thomas, Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the Studio System 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981)
Sheridan, Alan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (London: Tavistock Publications 
Ltd., 1980)
Shindler, Colin, Hollywood in Crisis: Cinema and American Society, 1929-1939 
(London: Routledge, 1996)
Sassoon, Anne Showstack, ed., Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and Readers 
Publishing Cooperative Society Ltd., 1982)
Sklar, Robert, Movie-Made America: A Social History o f the American Movies (New 
York: Random House, 1975)
Sklar, Robert, City Boys: Cagney, Bogart, Garfield (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992)
Slotkin, Richard, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
America (New York: Atheneum, 1992)
Slotkin, Richard, The Fatal Environment: The Myth o f the Frontier in the Age
351
Industrialization, 1800-1890 (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 
1986)
Smith, Henry Nash, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950)
Smith, Paul, Clint Eastwood: A Cultural Production (London: UCL Press Limited,
1993)
Stanfield, Peter, Dixie Cowboys: Hollywood and the 1930s Western (Forthcoming). 
Stott, William, Documentary Expression and Thirties America, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973)
Sturken, Marita, “The Wall, the Screen, and the Image: The Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial,” Representations 35 (1991)
Tanner, Louise, “Oliver Stone,” Films in Review (1987)
Tasker, Yvonne, Spectacular Bodies: Gender, Genre and the Action Cinema (London: 
Routledge, 1993)
Thompson, Kristin, Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)
Time (March 20 1972)
Todorov, Tzvetan, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre 
(Cleveland, Ohio: Press of Case Western University, 1973)
Tompkins, Jane, West o f  Everything: The Inner Life o f Westerns (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992)
Trachtenberg, Alan, The Incorporation o f America: Culture and Society in theGuilded 
Age (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1982)
Traube, Elizabeth G., Dreaming Identities: Class, Gender, and Generation in 1980s 
Hollywood Movies (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992)
Truettner, William H., ed., The West as America: Reinterpreting Images o f the 
Frontier, 1820-1920 (Washington: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991),
Turner, Frederick Jackson, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in 
Taylor, George Rogers, Rev. ed., The Turner Thesis: Concerning the Role o f the 
Frontier in American History (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965)
Tuska, Jon, The American West in Film: Critical Approaches to the Western 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985)
352
Variety (24th October 1928)
Variety, (2 January 1929)
Variety (11 September 1929)
Variety (22 October 1930)
Variety ( February 18, 1931)
Warshow, Robert, The Immediate Experience (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor 
Books, 1964)
Wexman, Virginia Wright, Creating the Couple: Love, Marriage and Hollywood 
Performance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993)
White, Richard, “I t ’s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own A New History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993)
Williams, W. A., The Roots o f the Modern American Empire: A Study o f the Growth 
and Shaping o f Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (London: Anthony 
Blond Ltd., 1970)
Winston, Brian, Claiming the Real: The Grierson Documentary and Its Legitimations 
(London: BFI, 1995)
Wood, Robin, Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan (NY: Columbia University Press, 
1986)
Woodwiss, Anthony, Postmodernity USA: The Crisis o f Social Modernism in Postwar 
America (London-. Sage Publications Ltd., 1993)
Woodwiss, Michael, Crime, Crusades and Corruption, 1900-1987 (London: Pinter, 
1988)
Wright, Will, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study o f the Western (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976)
353
Select Filmography
Apocalypse Now Omni/ Zoetrope d. Francis Ford Coppola (1979)
The Big Trail Fox d. Raoul Walsh (1930)
Black Sunday Paramount d. John Frankenheimer (1976)
Blazing Saddles Warner/ Crossbow d. Mel Brooks (1974)
Born on the Fourth O f July Universal/ Ixtlan d. Oliver Stone (1989)
Broken Arrow 20th Century Fox d. Delmer Daves (1923)
Casablanca Warner d. Michael Curtiz (1942)
Cheyenne Autumn Warner/Ford Smith d. John Ford (1964)
Cimarron RKO d. Wesley Ruggles (1931)
Cimarron MGM d. Anthony Mann (1960)
Colorado Sunset Republic d. Joseph Kane (1939)
Coming Home United Artists/Jerome Heilman d. Hal Ashby (1978)
The Covered Wagon Paramount/Famous Players-Lasky d. James Cruze (1923)
The Cowboy and the School Marm
Dances With Wolves Guild/Tig Productions d. Kevin Costner (1990)
The Deer Hunter Universal/EMI d. Michael Cimino (1978)
Doorway to Hell Warner d. Archie Mayo (1930)
E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial Universal d. Steven Spielberg (1982)
First Blood Carolco d. Ted KotchefF (1982)
The Great Train Robbery Edison d. Edwin S. Porter (1903)
The Green Berets Warner/ Batjac d. John Wayne and Ray Kellogg (1968)
Heaven and Earth Warner/ Regency Enterprise/ Le Studio Canal +/ Alcor Films 
d. Oliver Stone (1993)
Independence Day 20th Century Fox/Centropolis d. Roland Emmerich (1996)
The Iron Horse Fox d. John Ford (1924)
InO ldSanteFe  Mascot d. David Howard (1934)
Invasion o f the Body Snatchers Aliied Artists/ Walter Wanger d. Don Siegel (1956)
354
I t ’s Always Fair Weather MGM d. Gene Kelly and Stanley Donen (1955)
The King o f Kings Pathe d. Cecil B. de Mille (1927)
The Last o f the Mohicans Warner/ Morgan Creek d. Michael Mann (1992)
Little Big Man Stockbridge/ Hiller/ Cinema Center d. Arthur Penn (1970)
Little Caeser Warner d. Mervyn Le Roy (1931)
The Man from Music Mountain Republic d. Joseph Kane (1938)
Man o f the Frontier Republic d. Joseph Kane (1936)
Mexicali Rose Republic d. George Sherman (1939)
The Old Barn Dance Republic d. Joseph Kane (1938)
The Old Corral Republic d. Joseph Kane (1936)
Platoon Hemdale d. Oliver Stone (1986)
Public Cowboy No. 1 Republic d. Joseph Kane (1937)
The Public Enemy Warner d. William Wellman (1931)
Rambo: First Blood Part II  Carolco/ Anabasis Investments NV d. George Pan 
Cosmatos
Rambo III Carolco d. Peter MacDonald (1988)
The Sacrifice
Sands o f Iwo Jima Republic d. Allan Dwan (1949)
Scarf ace Howard Hughes d. Howard Hawks (1932)
Silverado Columbia-Delphi IV d. Lawrence Kasdan (1985)
Soldier Blue Avco d. Ralph Nelson (1970)
Stagecoach United Artists/Walter Wanger d. John Ford (1939)
Star Wars 20th Century Fox/Lucasfilm d. George Lucas (1977)
Straight Shooting Universal Butterfly d. John Ford (1917)
The Squaw Man MGM d. Cecil B. de Mille (1931)
The Thing Universal/Lawrence Turman d. John Carpenter (1982)
Tracks Rainbow Pictures d. Henry Jaglom (1976)
Tumblin'Tumbleweeds Republic d. Joseph Kane (1935)
Ulzana’s Raid Universal d. Robert Aldrich (1972)
Washington Masquerade MGM d. Charles Brabin (1932)
Washington Merry Go-Round Columbia d. James Cruze (1932)
Wyatt Earp Warner/ Tig Productions/ Kasdan/ Paragon d. Lawrence Kasdan (1994)
355
SHEFFIELD HALLAM UNIVERSITY 
LEARNING C t H J R t  
PSALTER LANE CkUPUS  
1 SH EFFIELD , S11 GUZ
